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Abstract 
During the American Civil War Wilmington, North Carolina and the 
Bermudian ports of St. Georges and Hamilton served as vital links in a 
complex trading network that developed to facilitate the exchange of southern 
agricultural products for war materials and civilian merchandise through a 
Union blockade of the Confederacy. Although that material contributed 
significantly to the Confederate war effort, Anglo-Confederate blockade 
running has received limited scholarly attention. Much of the associated 
literature is based on memoirs rather than scholarship and does not accurately, 
reflect that necessarily clandestine trade. The primary goal of this thesis is to 
produce a more comprehensive and detailed picture of blockade running, the 
cargoes carried through the Union blockade and the powerful steam vessels 
that made Anglo-Confederate commerce possible. Unlike previous treatments, 
this thesis combines the results of both archival and archaeological research. 
The results illustrate the evolution of strategies involved in both establishing 
and maintaining the blockade and those developed for running the blockade. 
Assessment of the vessel remains and historical data associated with the 
construction and procurement of steamers identifies the vessel types and 
confirms that blockade runners adapted extant technology. Contrary to the 
popularly held impression, no technological innovations were specifically 
developed to address the demands of the trade. The spatial distribution of 
wrecks and the minimal amount of cultural material surviving in association 
with them, provides strong evidence that cargoes were more valuable than the 
vessels. That premise influenced the strategy adopted by blockade runners. 
While Confederate salvors left little evidence of cargo, historical research 
revealed a wealth of new insight into the specific nature of that material. This 
new evidence provides a more accurate and detailed picture of Anglo- 
Confederate blockade running and the strategies, ships and cargoes that made 
blockade running between Wilmington and Bermuda a success. 
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Introduction 'I" 
During the American Civil War Wilmington, North Carolina and the 
Bermudian ports of St. Georges and Hamilton served as vital links in a 
complex trading network that developed to facilitate the exchange of southern 
agricultural products for war materials and civilian merchandise through a 
Union blockade of the Confederacy (Figure 1). In spite of the constantly 
increasing vigilance of Union naval vessels, a fleet of swift and powerful 
steamers provided the technology to maintain Anglo-Confederate commerce. 
Using those steamships Confederate government agencies, states, and British 
and Confederate merchants shipped cotton and other southern agricultural 
products abroad. Proceeds from those sales and bonds backed by agricultural 
products such as cotton financed weapons, war materials and a variety of 
manufactured products supplied by British mercantile firms and speculators. 
Although never developed to its full potential, blockade running ensured an 
uninterrupted supply of war materials and other manufactured goods that 
sustained southern efforts to secede from the union of states formed in 1789. 
As a consequence of Union efforts to isolate the Confederacy from 
foreign markets and Anglo-Confederate 'efforts to maintain that foreign 
commerce, the coastal waters of southeastern North Carolina and Bermuda 
contain the remains of thirty of the steamships that carried on that important 
trade. Although not all of those shipwrecks have been identified, eighteen 
have been located and, to one degree or another, examined. Those sites 
represent the most comprehensive source of archaeological data concerning 
American Civil War blockade runners. More than thirty years of research 
carried out on, or associated with, those eighteen wrecks has generated a variety 
of archaeological and historical data concerning the design, construction, 
operation and cargoes of Anglo-Confederate blockade runners engaged in 
trading between Bermuda and Wilmington. 
This thesis represents an attempt to combine the results of that research 
in a document that more accurately and comprehensively illustrates the nature 
and scope of Anglo-Confederate blockade running. Because the focus of almost 
all of the research associated with Civil War blockade runners has been on the 
activities that linked North Carolina and Bermuda, it seemed appropriate to 
explore and develop that connection as a model that could facilitate 
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Figure 1. Map of the Atlantic Seaboard, Gulf of Mexico and West 
Indies. 
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understanding the trade in more general terms. Using the trading network 
that developed between Wilmington and Bermuda as a focus for 
understanding the trade appeared all the more logical because of the 
availability of both shipwreck data and historical records that no longer exist for 
Nassau and are unavailable for Havana. Three specific areas of interest 
appeared especially productive. 
The first was an examination of the mechanics of successfully trading 
through the Union blockade. Specific issues addressed by the research included 
documenting the evolution of strategies involved in both establishing and 
maintaining the blockade and those that were developed for running the 
blockade. Although the blockade has been well documented at Wilmington, 
the subject was reconsidered to establish a background for blockade running 
and because the strategies adopted by blockade runners reflected those 
developed by the United States Navy. 
A second consideration was the identification and assessment of steam 
vessels that made trading through the blockade possible. The Civil War 
shipwrecks of Bermuda and Wilmington represent perhaps the most extensive 
collection of wrecked blockade runners available for examination. The value 
of that collection of shipwrecks is also enhanced by the volume of data 
concerning British built blockade runners that 'survives in archives in England 
and Scotland. Much of that material has never been systematically examined 
or treated by historians. Although most of the literature associated with Anglo- 
Confederate blockade running suggests that many of the technological 
innovations on steam powered blockade runners were specifically developed to 
address the demands of the trade, a more detailed examination of the issue 
confirmed that blockade runners adapted extant technology. With the 
exception of camouflage paint schemes, no technological innovations were 
specifically developed to address the demands of the trade. 
A final consideration was the specific nature of material shipped 
through the blockade. Because blockade running was of necessity a clandestine 
enterprise, the nature of cargoes was frequently and deliberately obscured. 
Salvage of the blockade runner Modern Greece suggested that the most 
comprehensive source of cargo specific data would be the shipwrecks. While 
that did not prove to be the case, exploration of the wrecks and investigation of 
previously untapped archival sources provided new and valuable insight into 
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the cargoes of Anglo-Confederate steamers. While salvage left little evidence 
of cargo in the archaeological record, historical research revealed a wealth of 
new insight into the specific nature of that material. 
In order to develop the thesis additional historical research was carried 
out in Bermuda, Great Britain and the United States. Although utilized and in 
part published almost half a century ago by Frank E. Vandiver, the Bourne 
letter books and Bermuda Customs records from St. Georges and Hamilton 
were reexamined. They were found to contain a wealth of information that 
has not been fully developed. Data contained in those sources was 
complimented by additional records in British repositories. Chief among those 
was the Public Records Office. There records include communications from-the 
Governor of Bermuda and those associated with the Royal Navy at Dockyard. 
British newspaper sources, including the Confederate propaganda organ Index 
that are preserved at the British Library Newspaper Repository in Collingdale 
were examined for insight into blockade running activities and ship 
procurement and construction. In addition, records associated with the firms 
that built blockade runners and the plans and details of the ships themselves 
preserved in British university and museum collections were examined. 
In the United States, additional information can be found in the 
communications captured aboard vessels attempting to run the blockade. 
Those relevant archival collections were found in regional repositories of the 
National Archives at Waltham, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Washington, D. C. and Atlanta, Georgia. 
Surprisingly those data, identified by Madeline R. Robinton in An Introduction 
to the Papers of the New York Prize Court had also not been fully examined. 
Records associated with activities at the -Port of Wilmington and the blockade 
running records of the State of North Carolina survive in collections of the 
North Carolina Division of Archives and History. There collections such as 
the papers of North Carolina's Civil War Governor Zebulon B. Vance were 
examined. Additional records associated with Confederate Government 
blockade running were examined in repositories in both Richmond, Virginia 
and Washington, D. C. Finally, a surprising amount of untapped information 
was found in manuscript sources preserved in the archives associated with 
several southern universities. Those records were associated with individuals, 
businesses, officials and officers involved in one way or another with the trade. 
5 
Additional insight into the clandestine business of blockade running 
required synthesizing data generated by archaeological research. 
Accomplishing that objective included reexamination of data generated during 
the last three decades of Civil War shipwreck investigation. That investigation 
concentrated on identification and examination of the records, reports, and 
publications produced in conjunction with salvage and field research projects. 
As salvage activities produced almost all of the available blockade runner 
related cultural material, examination of surviving collections was also 
undertaken. 
Field investigations were carried out in both Bermuda and North 
Carolina waters. In Bermuda that research focused on the remains of the 
steamers Mary Celestia and Nola. As both vessels were extensively salvaged 
after sinking, the focus of on-site research was to document the surviving 
vessel structure and machinery. In North Carolina the wrecks of the steamers 
Modern Greece and Kate lost in 1862, the Hebe, Phantom, Arabian, Elizabeth, 
Douro, Venus and Beaureguard lost in 1863 and the Bendigo, Ranger, Wild 
Dayrcll, Dee, Fanny & Jenny, Lynx, Ella, Stormy Petrel and Agnes E. Fry lost in 
1864 were examined to identify associated cargo and document the surviving 
vessel structure and machinery. The focus of site specific research was to 
accurately locate and identify each of the vessels and carry out a reconnaissance 
survey of each site. Reconnaissance activity was designed to generate sufficient 
data to support the development of a description of the exposed wreck remains 
and assess the nature and scope of associated cargo. 
In the final analysis, it appears that the continuation of international 
commerce enabled the Confederacy to survive and resist long after the 
rebellion should have collapsed. The success of the blockade runners that 
maintained that commerce was based on international politics, the evolution 
of successful strategy, the availability of steam powered blockade runners, and 
the nature of the cargoes they carried. This examination of both historical and 
archaeological resources provides new insights into that clandestine trade and 
the strategies, ships and cargoes that made blockade running a success. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the results of this research challenge many of the existing 
perceptions of Anglo-Confederate commerce. 
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Historiography 
In spite of the critical role that Anglo-Confederate blockade running 
played in sustaining southern efforts to secede from the Union by force of arms, 
the subject has received relatively limited attention by American Civil War 
historians. A cursory examination of American Civil War historiography 
confirms that most scholars have focused their research on politics, domestic 
social and economic issues, military activities, and personalities of the period. 
Campaigns of the Union and Confederate armies have received the most 
intense scrutiny. Those historians interested in the impact of naval activities 
have concentrated on establishing and maintaining the naval blockade and the 
various aspects of naval and riverine warfare. Blockade running received only 
marginal attention and its impact on the war was generally considered 
inconsequential. 
Initial consideration of the subject of blockade running was provided by 
veterans of the service who afforded the public exciting and frequently 
romanticized accounts of their experiences and exploits. Immediately after the 
war Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, a British naval officer who captained 
blockade runners while on furlough, published his account of the adventure in 
Never Caught in 1867. Ten years later in 1877, John Wilkinson, another highly 
successful blockade runner, published his experiences in The Narrative of a 
Blockade Runner and in 1882, the first of John Newland Maffitt's articles on 
"Blockade Running" appeared in United Service magazine. 
Two years after Maffitt's articles began to appear, James D. Bulloch's The 
Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe provided a detailed account 
of how he and other Confederate agents managed to secure ordnance, war 
materials, and ships for the Confederacy in spite of Union efforts to curtail 
southern procurement abroad. Although Bulloch's account concentrated on 
politics, efforts to obtain war material, and the construction and equipping of 
commerce raiders, his observations also shed some light on blockade running. 
William Watson's The Adventures of a Blockade Runner; or Trade in Time of 
War appeared in 1892 and Captain M. P. Usina's Blockade Running in 
Confederate Times was published in 1895. Both proved to be romanticized but 
interesting reflections on the clandestine trade. The experiences of Thomas E. 
Taylor appeared in one of the most popular accounts of the trade; Running the 
Blockade published in 1897. Although of considerable interest, these highly 
popular accounts were little more than entertainment. Later in 1902 James 
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Sprunt brought out Tales of the Cape Fear Blockade: Being a Turn of the 
Century Account of Blockade Running and in 1919 he produced Derelicts: An 
Account of Ships Lost, at Sea in General Commercial Traffic and a Brief History 
of Blockade Runners Stranded Along the North Carolina Coast 1861-1865. 
When organized Civil War veterans began to celebrate their experiences 
late in the nineteenth century, Americans discovered a new and more 
sophisticated interest in the War Between the States. That interest stimulated 
historical research and produced the first detailed examination of naval and 
maritime activities. Between 1894 and 1927 the United States Naval War 
Records Office compiled and published a series of 31 volumes titled Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. 
This publication made primary source data available to both the public and 
professional historians and still serves as a principal source of data concerning 
Civil War naval activity. Historians such as James Russel Soley produced the 
first detailed account of the blockade in The Blockade and the Cruisers 
published as one of three volumes in a series on The Navy and the Civil War 
brought out by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1883. While Soley's examination of 
the subject concentrated on the Union blockade, a chapter on blockade running 
combined the romance of the trade within an historical context. In 1887, 
Thomas J. Scharf produced his two volume History of the Confederate Navy 
published by Rogers and Sherwood in 'New York. Scharf included a single 
chapter on the blockade and blockade running that represents a serious but 
general and only superficially detailed assessment of the subject. Surprisingly, 
the works of Soley and Scharf remained the most comprehensive treatment of 
the subject until the Civil War Centennial Celebration focused new attention 
on Civil War America. 
In 1925, Francis B. C. Bradlee published Blockade Running During the 
Civil War, and the Effect of Land and Water Transportation on the 
Confederacy. Bradlee, like Soley and Scharf, relied heavily upon the 
nineteenth century reminiscences of those who participated in the trade. 
Unfortunately, his efforts to examine the companies that supported the trade 
suffered from equally inadequate sources. Frank L. Owsley's ý King Cotton 
Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America published 
in 1935 was the first historical treatment of the subject that accurately identified 
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the importance of blockade running. Owsley's chapter on "The Ineffectiveness 
of the Blockade" was the first to seriously explore the success of blockade 
runners and their impact on Confederate maritime commerce. 
Madeline R. Robinton published her dissertation on, records associated 
with the adjudication of captured blockade runners as An Introduction to the 
Papers of the New- York Prize Court in 1945. Although the work produced an 
excellent and extremely valuable catalog of adjudication records, Robinton did 
not attempt to weave the data into an enhanced historical context. Three years 
later, Marcus W. Price began a series of articles on blockade running for the 
American Neptune with a detailed accounting of "Ships that Tested the 
Blockade of Carolina Ports, 1861-1865. " Price's American Neptune article and 
subsequent publications identified the ships that ran the blockades of Georgia, 
East Florida, and Gulf of Mexico ports and the masters and pilots that served 
the trade. While many historians questioned Price's statistics, the work clearly 
supported Owsley's earlier -premise that the blockade was "a leaky and 
ramshackle affair. " In 1947, Frank E. Vandiver edited and published letter 
books and customs records associated with blockade running activities in 
Bermuda in his Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda, 1861-1865. 
Like Robinton's treatment of the New York Court records, Vandiver's work 
provided an excellent introduction to the sources but failed to effectively utilize 
the data to enhance the historical record. He did however conclude like both 
Owsley and Price that the success of the trade ".... enabled the Confederate 
armies and people to carry on appreciably longer than would otherwise be 
possible" had the Union blockade been effective. 
Popular interest in the blockade and blockade running was rekindled 
immediately prior to the Civil War Centennial. Hamilton Cochrane's 1958 
volume on Blockade Runners of the Confederacy combined the personal 
accounts of Thomas Taylor, Augustus Hobart-Hampden, John Wilkinson and 
other veterans of the service in a popular historical background. The Blockade 
Runners: True Tales of Running the Yankee Blockade off the Confederate 
Coast written by Dave Horner in 1968, also relied heavily on those early sources 
in a popular treatment of the subject that included a description of early 
exploration of sunken blockade runners off the Cape Fear coast of North 
Carolina. Virgil C. Jones produced three volumes on the Civil War at Sea 
during 1960 and 1962 and articles in Civil War Times Illustrated in 1960 
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"Slipping through the Blockade" and 1971 "Mr. Lincoln's Blockade". None 
reflected a comprehensive assessment of the subject and most relied heavily on 
well utilized secondary sources. 
The Journal of the Confederate Historical Society, the Journal of 
Southern History and American Neptune all published articles on blockade 
running in response to interest generated during the Centennial period. In 
The Journal of the Confederate Historical Society Wendell Pierce published 
"The Blockade Runner Acadia" in the Winter 1973 issue, W. A. C. Simpson 
published "Britain and the Blockade" in the Spring 1968 volume, and in the 
Summer 1965 issue Jerry Williams published the "Wirral-Built Blockade 
Runners of the American Civil War". The Journal of Southern History 
published William Diamond's "Imports of the Confederate Government from 
Europe and Mexico" in November 1940, Kathryn Hanna's "Incidents of the 
Confederate Blockade" in May 1945, Edith Gentry's "A Confederate Success in 
Europe: The Erlanger Loan" in May 1970 and "The Activities and Attitudes of a 
Confederate Business Man: Gazaway B. Lamar" by Edwin Coddington in 
February 1943. American Neptune published "Investment by Sea: The Civil 
War Blockade by Robert Johnson in January 1972, a series of articles by Marcus 
W. Price that began with "Ships That Tested the Blockade of Carolina Ports, 
1861-1865" published in April 1948 and continued with "Blockade Running as a 
Business in South Carolina during the War Between the States, 1861-1865" in 
January 1949, "Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Gulf Ports, 1861-1865" in 
January and July 1952, "Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Georgian and East 
Florida Ports, 1861-1865" in April 1955, "Four from Bristol" in October 1957, and 
"Masters and Pilots Who Tested the Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861-1865" 
published in April 1961. 
Steamboat Bill of Facts published A. C. Wardle's "British Built Blockade 
Runners" in December 1954 and a series on specific ships authored by Eric Heyl 
"The Blockade Runner SCOTIA" and "The Lady Was a Tramp" in the Fall 1963. 
While Price concentrated on identifying the ships, captains, and pilots 
involved in blockade running, Wardle concentrated on the careers of a few 
individual ships both during and after the war. 
Without question the most comprehensive and scholarly treatment of 
the subject to date is Stephen R. Wise's Lifeline of the Confederacy published in 
1988. Wise's examination of blockade running is a broad brush treatment of 
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the trade that concentrates primarily on economics and administration. While 
the study is unquestionably the most thorough examination of blockade 
running it sacrifices detail to achieve a manageable overall perspective. 
In 1991, Kevin Foster examined vessels engaged in blockade running in a 
masters thesis titled: "The Search for Speed Under Steam: The Design of 
Blockade Running Steamships, 1861-1865. " Foster's thesis focused on the 
technology associated with the design and construction of steam powered 
blockade runners in Great Britain. His research was based on historical records 
associated with contemporary engineering publications, descriptions of the 
vessels and their operations recorded in the memoirs of individuals that 
commanded or served on specific ships. Foster's thesis was designed to 
provide a technological and design history of the steam vessels engaged . in 
blockade running and identify the demands of the trade that influenced the 
development of new technology. Although a valuable survey, Foster's work 
does not give adequate attention to the more general considerations and 
preoccupations that influenced technological development in Great Britain 
prior to and during the period of the American Civil War. 
With the exception of Foster's thesis and Wise's Lifeline of the 
Confederacy, the majority of those treatments of the subject of American Civil 
War blockade running have been either popular accounts or dated general 
historical treatise that are somewhat limited in detail. Collectively this 
material provides a perspective that is not fully developed. Research and 
writing to date leaves numerous historical sources untapped and ignores many 
fertile areas of research. Examination of that material can contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of blockade running. 
The extant perception of blockade running is based almost entirely on 
the historical record. However, during the last three decades examination of 
the physical remains of sunken blockade runners has generated additional 
insight in the trade. In many cases the shipwreck investigations represented 
little more than efforts to salvage material associated with the vessels. With 
few exceptions, those projects produced almost no record of the on-site 
activities or documentation of artifacts recovered from the wreck sites. 
Although little archaeology was involved in those early investigations, salvage 
projects produced a variety of artifacts and some information on the vessels 
themselves. Subsequent investigations reflected nascent archeological 
considerations but were generally limited to reconnaissance level structural 
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documentation and testing. Although no comprehensive examination of the 
wreck of a blockade runner has been carried out to date, more recent 
investigations have generated important insight into the trade and the vessels 
that made it successful. 
The first efforts to locate, -identify and recover material from those 
wrecks were carried out during the Civil War Centennial celebration. The 
impetus of those early investigations was a result of the highly publicized 
salvage of material from the blockade runner Modern Greece. In spite of the 
interest generated by salvage activity, little was published beyond a plethora of 
newspaper and magazine articles. Perhaps the first author to include 
information on salvage activity was David Horner. In his The Blockade 
Runners: True Tales of Running the -Yankee Blockade off the Confederate 
Coast published in 1968, Horner documented some of that early salvage and 
exploration activity. The Blockade Runners combined both an historical 
treatment of blockade running anecdotes based on the writings of such authors 
as John Wilkinson, Thomas Taylor and James Sprunt and personal 
communications with early explorers and salvors working in North Carolina 
such as Hall Waters and Punkie Kure. In the late 1960s, Edward L. Spence 
recovered material from blockade runners sunk off Charleston and two decades 
later personally published limited accounts of his salvage of the steamers 
Georgiana and Mary Bowers in Shipwrecks of South Carolina and Georgia. 
Archaeological interest in Civil War shipwrecks associated with blockade 
running began to result in more professional publications during the following 
decade. Although very site specific they documented rising historical and 
archaeological recognition of the significance of investigating shipwrecks 
associated with blockade running. In 1973, the author and Leslie S. Bright 
published "Progress in underwater archaeology in North. Carolina 1962-1972" 
in the International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater 
Exploration. That article documented some of the salvage activity associated 
with Civil War shipwrecks in North Carolina. Frank Hole published a report 
on his investigation of the remains of the blockade runner Acadia, lost off the 
Texas coast near Galveston in a report titled "The Acadia: A Civil War 
Blockade Runner. " That 1974 volume documented Hole's historical and 
archaeological investigation of the wreck of the Acadia. By 1977, personnel of 
the Underwater Archaeology Unit of the North Carolina Division of Archives 
and History had cataloged and documented material recovered from the 
12 
blockade runner Modern Greece. That same year the collection was published 
by the North Carolina Division of Archives and History in The Modern Greece 
and Her Cargo. A similar treatment of the vessel history and catalog of the 
material recovered from the Confederate blockade runner and warship 
Nashville was compiled and published by Franklin N. Chance, Paul C. Chance 
and David L. Topper in 1985. Their volume titled Tangled Machinery and 
Charred Relics: The Historical and Archaeological Investigation of the C. S. S. 
Nashville documented the history, wreck remains and cultural material 
recovered by investigation of the remains of that unique blockade runner. 
In 1988, the author published "The Civil War at Sea: Dawn of an Age of 
Iron and Engineering" in Ships and Shipzvrecks of the Americas, edited. by 
George F. Bass and "Bermuda in the American Civil War: A Reconnaissance 
Investigation of Archival and Submerged Cultural Resources" in the 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology. Both publications focused at 
least superficially on some of the results of more than a decade of research on 
blockade runners previously treated in a variety of unpublished research and 
submerged cultural resource -management reports. The following year, the 
author also produced a popular article on the subject for Archaeology titled 
"Runners of the Union Blockade. " In spite of the research that has been carried 
out, archaeologists, like the historians who have focused on blockade running, 
have produced only a few publications with limited focus. 
Chapter I The Blockade and Occupation of North Carolina Sounds 
When the USS Daylight appeared off Cape Fear on the North Carolina 
coast on 13 July 1861, hostilities associated with the Civil War in America were 
already in their third month. 13 Under the command of Commander Samuel 
Lockwood the small wooden screw steamer had been dispatched to formally 
establish a Union blockade of the Port of Wilmington located some twenty 
miles inland on the Cape Fear River. 14 Closing Wilmington to maritime 
commerce was one objective in a complex plan adopted by newly elected 
President Abraham Lincoln to isolate the Confederate States of America from 
all sources of foreign assistance and commerce. The "Anaconda Plan" had been 
conceived by the aging General Winfield Scott and Secretary of State William 
Seward as a method of strangling the life out of the southern rebellion without 
a protracted and costly armed conflict. President Lincoln proclaimed his 
intentions to close ports in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas on 19 April 1861 and extended the blockade to 
include Virginia and North Carolina on 27 April. Lincoln: 
.... deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within 
the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States 
and of the Law of Nations in such case provided. For this purpose 
a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit 
of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to 
violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to 
leave any of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the 
commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on 
her register the fact and the date of such warning, and if the same 
vessel shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she 
will be captured, and sent to the nearest convenient port for such 
proceedings against her, and her cargo as a prize, as may be 
deemed advisable. 
13S. Lockwood to S. H. Stringham, 16 July 1861, Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 31 Volumes. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894- 
1927) Series I, Volume 6, pp. 11-12. Hereafter cited as ORN. 
14 Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865, Naval History Division, Navy Department, 
Washington D. C., 1971, pp. 1-19. 
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Once in effect, the Union blockade would permit the United States Navy to 
search and seize vessels attempting to engage in communication and 
commerce with the Confederacy. '5 
The blockade President Lincoln proposed to establish was not adopted 
without reservations. In 1856, forty-six nations signed the Declaration of Paris. 
That document established a series of codicils governing international relations 
that included several significant maritime considerations. According to the 
Declaration of Paris privateering was abolished. Also, with the exception of 
cases involving contraband of war, a neutral flag provided protection for 
enemy goods and neutral goods were determined not liable to capture under an 
enemy flag. Finally and perhaps most significantly, the forty-six nations 
signing the document agreed that "to be binding" a blockade had to be effective 
and "maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the coast of the 
enemy. "16 While the United States had not signed the treaty in 1856, the 
political and military necessities of 1861 dictated a change of position and 
Secretary of State William H. Seward informed diplomats abroad that the 
United States would, as a consequence, adhere to the document. '? 
President Lincoln's declaration of a blockade of those states attempting to 
secede from the Union created several additional problems for the United 
States. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, one of the blockade's most 
serious critics, cautioned Lincoln that the declaration of a blockade was 
nothing less than a mistake. Welles later wrote that: "We had placed ourselves 
in a wrong position at the beginning, made the Rebels belligerents, given them 
nationality, an error, an anomaly. It was one of Mr. Seward's mistakes. "18 In 
addressing Congress on 4 July 1861, Secretary Welles reported that: 
In carrying into effect these principals, and in suppressing the 
attempts to evade and resist them, and in order to maintain the 
Constitution and execute the laws, it became necessary to interdict 
15 Abraham Lincoln to William Seward, 19 and 27 April 1861, ORN, I, 5, pp. 620-621. 
16 Francis Deak and Philip C. Jessup, eds, A Collection of Neutrality Lazvs, Regulations and 
Treaties of Various Countries, 2 Vols. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1939, Vol. II, pp. 1473-1474. 
17 Thomas J. Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy Fron: Its Organization To The 
Surrender Of Its Last Vessel, New York, Rogers and Sherwood, 1887, reprinted., New York: The 
Fairfax Press, 1977, p. 431. 
18 Howard K. Beale, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles, 3 Vols, New York: W. W. Norton and Company 
Inc., 1960, Entry 15 October 1862, Vol. 1, p. 174. 
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commerce at those ports where duties could not be collected, the 
laws maintained and executed, and where the officers of the 
Government were not tolerated or permitted to exercise their 
functions. In performing this domestic municipal duty, the 
property and interests of foreigners became to some extent 
involved in our home questions, and with a view to extending to 
them every comity that the circumstances would justify, the rules 
of the blockade were adopted, and, as far as practicable [sic], made 
applicable to the cases that occurred under this embargo or non- 
intercourse of the insurgent States. The commanders of the 
squadron were directed to permit the vessels of foreigners to 
depart within fifteen days, as in cases of actual effective blockade, 
and the vessels were not to be seized unless they attempted, after 
having been once warned off, to enter an interdicted port in 
disregard of such warnings. 19 
At the recommendation of the Treasury Department, Lincoln 
additionally complicated matters by signing the Ports Act passed by Congress in 
July 1861. The Ports Act authorized the President to close ports to maritime 
commerce and collect customs duties aboard ships stationed off a port. The 
inconsistencies of the United States policy particularly disturbed the British. In 
accordance with international law a state cannot blockade its own ports, only 
those of its enemy. On the one hand, as the London Times pointed out: 
We are at this moment neutrals, but history informs us that the 
normal state of this country in time of war is that of a belligerent, 
and, as the first maritime Power in the world, a blockade is by far 
the most formidable, weapon we possess. Surely we ought not to 
be overready to blunt its edge or injure its temper? 20 
British foreign secretary, Lord John Russell observed: 
It is impossible for Her Majesty's government to admit that the 
President or Congress of the United States can at one and the same 
time exercise the belligerent right of blockade, and the municipal 
right of closing the ports of the South. 
19 "Report of the Secretary of the Navy", 4 July 1861, Congress of the United States, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., pp. 89-90. 
20 London Times, 10 February 1862. 
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In the present case, Her Majesty's government do not intend to 
dispute the right of blockade on the part of the United States with 
regards to ports in possession of the Confederate States, but an 
assumed right to close any ports in the hands of insurgents would 
imply a right to stop vessels on the high seas without instituting 
an effective blockade. This would be a manifest evasion of the 
necessity of blockade in order to close an enemy's port.... Maritime 
nations would not submit to this excess under the pretense of the 
rights of sovereignty. 21 
Unofficially, Lord Russell confided to Lord Lyons: 
If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the southern ports it will 
be well, but if this cannot be done by agreement there will be 
surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles, creeks and bays out of which 
small vessels may come, and run for Jamaica or the Bahamas 
where the cargoes might be transhipped. But it is not for Downing 
Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street. 22 
Lord Palmerston appeared to have been in agreement and in a letter to Russell 
he indicated that the most appropriate policy should be to "keep quite clear of 
the conflict between North and South" and in spite of the blockade "the 
probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America.... "23 
In the face of mounting European pressure and recommendations from 
Seward, Lincoln elected to put a blockade into effect rather than risk the 
consequences of attempting to "close" those ports under Confederate control. 24 
That entailed securing more than 3500 miles of coastline from the Chesapeake 
Capes to the border with Mexico. Only in the United States Navy was the real 
impact of Lincoln's proclamation immediately recognized. To develop an 
effective blockade Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox assembled a 
"Blockade Strategy Board" composed of Captain Samuel F. Du Pont and 
21 Lord John Russell to Lord Richard Lyons, 19 July 1861, quoted in Genry Glass, "Maritime 
International Law", United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 11, No. 3,1885, p. 460. 
22 Ephriam D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, Vol. 1, Peter Smith, 
Gloucester, 1957, p. 252. 
23 Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
24 Stuart Anderson, "1861: Blockade vs. Closing The Confederate Ports", Military Affairs, Vol. 
41, December 1977, p. 190. 
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Commander C. H. Davis of the United States Navy, Major John G. Bernard of 
the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and Professor Alexander D. Bache of the 
United States Coast Survey. 
Each of the other members of the board was selected to bring specific 
knowledge and experience to the decision-making process. Major John G. 
Bernard of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers represented that branch of the U. 
S. Army responsible for development and maintenance of harbor facilities, 
fortifications and navigable channels in the United States. Bernard would be 
able to shed important light on the fortifications protecting southern harbors, 
port facilities, navigation channels and the mechanics of their obstruction and 
clearing. Professor Alexander D. Bache of the United States Coast Survey 
brought to the board the extensive experience his agency had accumulated in 
several decades of charting the southeast Atlantic and Gulf coastal waters. 
Bache conducted and superintended the hydrographic survey work and the 
production of most of the charts employed for navigation in United States 
waters. He and Du Pont had previously served on a board formed in 1851 to 
investigate the Lighthouse Establishment. Bernard and Bache were clearly 
instrumental sources of critical geographical and technical information. Their 
input was also important in identifying priorities of the blockade and 
developing realistic objectives for the U. S. Navy. Commander C. H. Davis 
was the final member of the board. He was an experienced officer and a long 
time friend and loyal supporter of Captain Du Pont. In addition to serving as a 
member of the board Davis served as its secretary. 25 
The Blockade Strategy Board first assembled in Washington, D. C. on 27 
June 1861.26 Following consideration of such questions as "What is an effective 
blockade", the relevant statutes of the "Law of Nations" and the "Naval, 
Nautical and Commercial" considerations of a blockade, the board addressed 
the matter of establishing coaling stations on the southeastern Atlantic 
seaboard that could support the steamers required to guard the Confederate 
coast. 27 After preparing a report on the matter for Secretary Welles on 4 July 
1861, the board members turned their attention to the requirements of an 
25 Davis, Charles H., Life of Charles Henry Davis, Rear Admiral, 1807-1877, Boston, 1899. 
26 Du Pont to Wife Sophie, 28 June 1861, in Hayes, John D., Samuel Francis Du Pont A Selection 
from his Civil War Letters. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, Vol. 1,1969, p. 85-86. 
Hereafter cited Du Pont, Civil War Letters. 
27 Ibid., and "Papers of the Blockade Stratagy Board, " Record Group 45, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C. 
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effective blockade. In a second report dated 16 July 1861, the board 
recommended that the Atlantic blockade be divided into two distinct areas. 
That recommendation was based on the geographic and environmental 
features that distinguished the area between Cape Henry, Virginia and Cape 
Romain, South Carolina from the area between Cape Romain and St. 
Augustine, Florida. 28 The area between Cape Henry and Cape Romain was 
characterized by "narrow belts of sand which separate large inland waters from 
the ocean, and are divided at irregular intervals by'openings or inlets through 
which the ocean tides ebb and flow and access is obtained to the enclosed 
sounds. "29 The area between Cape Romain and St. Augustine was 
characterized by what the board called "ordinary ports and bays" 3° 
Because of the distinctive difference in the geography and physical 
features of the two areas, the board felt that two decidedly different approaches 
to management of the blockade were required. Their first consideration was 
the area between Cape Henry and Cape Romain. That included the entire coast 
of North Carolina and portions of' southern Virginia and northeastern South 
Carolina. The board was quick to point out that the Elizabeth and James Rivers 
and consequently the Virginia ports of Richmond and Norfolk could not be 
effectively blockaded until the entrances to North Carolina's Albemarle, 
Pamlico and Core sounds were closed. Both the James and Elizabeth Rivers 
were connected to the sounds of North Carolina by the Dismal Swamp and 
Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal. 
The Dismal Swamp Canal was a narrow and relatively shallow waterway 
that connected the Southern Branch of the Elizabeth River with the upper 
reaches of the Pasquotank River above Elizabeth City, North Carolina. That 
canal had been laboriously dug by hand early in the nineteenth century and 
offered navigation to small shallow draft vessels and flats. 31 The Albemarle 
and Chesapeake Canal had been completed in 1859 and connected the Southern 
Branch of the Elizabeth River with the North Landing River and Currituck 
Sound. 32 Unlike the Dismal Swamp Canal, the Albemarle and Chesapeake 
28 Blockade Board to Gideon Welles, 5 July 1861, ORN, 1,12, p. 198. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31Alexander C. Brown, Juniper Waterway: A History of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal. 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1981, p. 18-26. 
32 Ibid., pp. 58-62. 
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Canal had been dug using steam machinery and had sufficient depth and 
breadth to accommodate both sailing vessels and steamers. Commercial 
connections between the port of Norfolk and northeastern North Carolina 
were also enhanced by the Elizabeth City and Norfolk Railroad. The northern 
terminus of the Elizabeth City and Norfolk was Portsmouth, Virginia and the 
southern terminus was Edenton, North Carolina near the western end of the 
Albemarle Sound. 33 The Elizabeth City and Norfolk Railroad served what 
would become one of the most important sources of agricultural products for 
Confederate armies in the field. 
The board clearly recognized that as long as the sounds of North 
Carolina and the shallow inlets that afforded access to the Atlantic were open to 
navigation no blockade of the Confederacy could be effective. To interrupt that 
trade the board proposed "putting down material obstructions" that would 
close shallow channels within the sounds. The most effective method of 
closing channels to navigation appeared to be sinking old vessels laden with 
ballast. Because of the nominal tidal bore within the sounds, the board felt that 
such obstructions would survive long enough to accomplish the desired 
objectives and would only be dislodged by extremely powerful storms. While 
the board suggested that the hulks be periodically examined to ensure that they 
were not removed, they concluded that the Confederates had virtually no 
means of clearing the wrecks. 34 
The board carefully studied each of the North Carolina inlets from Cape 
Henry to Tubbs Inlet. Oregon Inlet, located 45 miles south of Cape Henry 
provided the only access to the sounds north of Cape Hatteras. Because of the 
"dangerous shifting bar" the board recommended that Oregon Inlet be 
obstructed by sinking as many hulks as were necessary to eliminate navigation. 
Hatteras Inlet, 11 miles southwest of Cape Hatteras, and Ocracoke Inlet, 14 miles 
southwest of Hatteras were more stable with deeper channels. The board 
recommended that channels inside the sounds be obstructed leaving the inlets 
and anchorages inside the Outer Banks open to serve as harbors of refuge. Du 
Pont, Davis, Bernard and Bache also recommended that a decision be made 
concerning the most appropriate method of eliminating commerce on the 
sounds. If plans called for the capture and occupation of towns on the 
33 Black, Robert C., III. The Railroads of the Confederacy. University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, 1952. 
34 Blockade Board to Gideon Welles, 16 July 1861, ORN, 1,12, p. 199. 
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Pasquotank, Chowan, Roanoke, Pamlico and Neuse rivers, Hatteras and 
Ocracoke inlets would be critical to the invasion. 35 Although that 
recommendation was well taken by Lincoln, the boards strong suggestion to 
obstruct navigation with lines of hulks instead of occupying towns in the area 
was dismissed. They warned that during summer the "whole region of 
marshes and cedar swamps is fatally unhealthy.... to our Northern 
constitutions. " The board also expressed their concern about Cape Hatteras. 
They agreed that: 
The vicinity of Cape Hatteras is one of the worst regions on our 
coast for tempestuous weather, the cape itself being the point of 
separation between the storms peculiar to the two divisions of the 
country-the West India hurricanes at the south, the course of 
which, after striking the ocean borders of Florida, Georgia, and 
South Carolina, turns to the eastward before arriving at Cape 
Hatteras, and the common northeast storms of our Northern 
States, which begin at the southwest extremity of their track and 
make their progress to the northward and eastward. 36. 
Those elements would make station-keeping on the North Carolina coast a 
dangerous business. 
Between Cape Lookout and Cape Fear, Du Pont, Davis, Bernard and 
Bache also recommended obstructing Bogue Inlet and New Inlet with hulks. 
Between Cape Fear and the South Carolina border they listed Lockwoods Folly 
and Tubbs Inlet for similar obstruction. Other inlets like Old Topsail, 
Masonboro and Little River Inlet on the South Carolina boundary were 
apparently considered too shallow and dangerous for navigation. No specific 
recommendations were tendered for their obstruction. 
In addition to recommending closing the sounds to navigation and 
obstructing most of the navigable inlets, Du Pont, Davis, Bernard and Bache 
pointed out that North Carolina had two important ports. According to their 
conclusions, both would require a blockading squadron unless expeditions 
were dispatched to capture the fortifications that protected the navigation 
channels. Those two ports were Beaufort, immediately west of Cape Lookout, 
and Wilmington, twenty miles up the Cape Fear River from Smith Island. The 
harbor at Beaufort was protected by Fort Macon, a small but well built 
35 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
36 Ibid. 
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fortification constructed prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Like most of the 
seacoast fortifications authorized by Congress following the War of 1812, Fort 
Macon had been built of brick and mortar and designed to resist naval 
bombardment. Construction had taken place between 1826 and 1834 when the 
fortification was first garrisoned. Because Fort Macon had not been adequately 
maintained during the two decades prior to secession, it had fallen into a state 
of disrepair. Confederate efforts to refurbish and rearm Fort Macon could not 
overcome the fact that any advantage masonry fortifications once offered had 
been undermined by subsequent developments in naval ordnance. The board 
had been quick to recognize that fact and previously pointed out the advantages 
of capturing Fort Macon and utilizing the protected harbor as a station-for 
refuge, coaling and resupply. Another distinct advantage was that the 
inhabitants of the small fishing village of Beaufort were thought to be loyal. 37 
The Cape Fear River entrance to Wilmington would be a different 
matter entirely. Access from the Cape Fear River to the Atlantic was formed by 
two inlets geographically separated by Smith Island and Cape Fear Shoals. The 
main entrance to the Cape Fear was over the Western Bar between Smith 
Island and Oak Island. That was the traditional entrance to the Cape Fear and it 
had been fortified decades before the war. Fort Caswell on the eastern end of 
Oak Island was a masonry fortification similar in design to Fort Macon and 
constructed as a consequence of the same Congressional authorization. At 
Smithville inside the Western Bar, Fort Johnston also contributed to the 
defense of the port of Wilmington. Fort Johnston had been built during the 
Colonial Period and reinforced during the War of 1812. Although it afforded 
little protection, it served as headquarters of the Lower Cape Fear Defense 
System that ultimately included earthwork fortifications at Bald Head on 
Smith Island and batteries Campbell and Shaw on islands inside the river. 
North of Smith Island, New Inlet provided a secondary entrance to the 
river through shifting bars. In their report, the board related that "the alarm of 
the people of Wilmington has led them to close New Inlet". 38 Although that 
received consideration, the Confederate Army had actually begun fortifying the 
north shore of the inlet. Fort Fisher on the north side of the inlet, would 
become the largest and most heavily armed earthwork fortification ever erected 
37 Ibid., p. 201. 38 Ibid. 
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in the United States. On Zeke's Island on the south side of the inlet a powerful 
battery was also constructed. While the board suggested that closing New Inlet 
with obstructions would be easy, they conceded that unless Fort Caswell could 
be occupied or destroyed, obstructing the Western Bar would be difficult. 39 
While the board shifted their attention to the southern coast below Cape 
Romain, the United States Navy began the task of putting Lincoln's blockade 
into effect. Du Pont did not like the decision to divide blockade responsibilities 
among three squadrons, each under the command of a flag officer. He also 
expressed his concern about the British suggestion that it would be virtually 
impossible to effectively blockade the Confederacy. For Du Pont it was obvious 
that the U. S. Navy did not have to blockade every mile of the southern 
coastline. All that would be required was to blockade the ports of entry that 
were capable of accommodating foreign trade. Du Pont wrote that: "It is the 
intention of the government, I presume, to connect the shore between 
blockaded ports by light-draft cruisers to prevent the ingress of arms and 
contraband" and reasoned that maintaining an effective blockade would be 
"easily done, in my judgment, if the Navy Department and the flag officers 
understand their business. "40 I 
Unfortunately for the United States, establishing an effective blockade 
required considerably more than the understanding of U. S. Navy flag officers. 
At the time Lincoln announced his intention to blockade, the entire southern 
coastline from Cape Henry, Virginia to the Rio Grande, the United States Navy 
was totally unprepared to accomplish the task. Most of the fleet were on 
foreign stations and those in home waters were almost entirely in the Gulf of 
Mexico. A complete list of ships in the United States Navy on 4 March 1861 
was prepared for Congress by the Secretary of the Navy. That list identified a 
total of ninety-three vessels41 including twenty-one vessels that were employed 
as receiving ships or stationary storeships, some that remained unfinished, 
others that were on the stocks for repairs and a few that had been determined 
impractical to repair. The sixty-nine remaining vessels that Secretary Welles 
identified in his estimate of the current "available force" included one ship of 
39 Ibid. 
40 Du Pont to Henry W. Davis, 1 June 1861, Du Pont, Civil War Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 76-77. 
41 "Report of the Secretary of the Navy", Navy Department 4 July 1861. United States 
Government Documents, Washington, D. C., 1862, pp. 85-86. Hereafter cited "Report of Secretary 
of Navy". 
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the line, eight frigates, twenty sloops of war, three brigs, three storeships, six 
steam frigates, five first-class steam sloops, four first-class side-wheel steamers, 
eight second-class steam sloops, five third-class screw steamers, four second- 
class side-wheel steamers and two steam tenders. 42 
However, only forty-two vessels; two frigates, eleven sloops of war, 
three storeships, one screw frigate, five first-class steam sloops, three first-class 
side-wheel steamers, eight second-class steam sloops, five third-class screw 
steamers, three second-class side-wheel steamers and one steam tender, were in 
commission and available for immediate service. That list also included the 
Stevens Battery, an ill-conceived armored vessel which had been under 
development for almost three decades. 43 Many of those vessels listed were on 
foreign stations. 44 In fact only three warships were on the Atlantic seaboard 
and four were on the Gulf Coast at the time Lincoln declared the blockade. 
Those vessels consisted of the screw sloop Pawnee at Washington, D. C., the 
steamers Crusader and Mohawk at New York and the frigate Sabine, sloop St. 
Louis and steamers Brooklyn and Wyandotta at Pensacola. 45 " 
When Flag Officer Garrett J. Pendergast, commander of the Home 
Squadron, issued a warning to Virginians and North Carolinians that he had a 
"sufficient naval force there for the purpose of carrying out the proclamation" 
he in fact had under his command the Potomac Flotilla, a force hardly 
sufficient to blockade Virginia's Chesapeake Bay shoreline and Hampton 
Roads. 46 Most of his vessels were large traditional warships without the speed 
to successfully chase blockade runners and with drafts too deep to operate in 
the vicinity of shallow southern inlets. Command of the squadron blockading 
the Atlantic was transferred to Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham on 1 May 1861.47 
Under Stringham's command were fourteen ships and the vessels of 
Commander James H. Ward's Potomac River Flotilla. Stringham's squadron 
consisted of the Minnesota, Cumberland, Perry, Harriet Lane, Dawn, 
42 "Report of Secretary of Navy", 1862, pp. 85-86. 
43 U. S. Congress, House, Number of Vessels in the Navy, House Executing Document 159,40th 
Congress, Second Session. 1868 and "Statement of the Number and names of vessels belonging to or 
connected with the Navy on the first of April 1861" Copy of Statement No. 1 called for by the 
House Resolution 6 January 1861. Mobilization and Demobilization, Subject File OL, RG 45, NA. 
44 Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers, pp. 13-14. 
45 David D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, Castle, Secaucus, New Jersey, 1984, p. 36. 
46 Garrett J. Pendergast to All Whom It May Concern, 30 April 1861, ORN, 1,4, p. 356. 
47 Gideon Welles to Silas Stringham, 1 May 1861, ORN, 1,5, p. 621. 
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Monticello, Union, Reliance, Resolute, Daylight, Mount Vernon, Penguin, 
Albatross and Wabash. Those vessels included three large steam frigates, four 
traditional and virtually obsolete frigates, and seven recently purchased or 
chartered merchant steamers. 48 Stringham, unlike Flag Officer Pendergast, did 
not feel that he had sufficient vessels to establish the blockade and submitted a 
barrage of requests for twelve to fifteen additional vessels. 49 
In spite of the overall lack of sufficient warships and crews, by 29 June 
1861, the number of ships under his command had increased to twenty-two. 
Those vessels were served by 3,300 officers and men and carried a total of 296 
pieces of ordnance. 50 Many of the new vessels that were assigned to 
Stringham's command had been secured through an unprecedented effort to 
refit vessels in ordinary and an aggressive procurement program initiated by 
Secretary Welles. Although efforts to launch and commission eight warships 
authorized by Congress prior to the attack on Fort Sumter were redoubled, it 
was apparent that the new sloops of war would not begin to fill the Navy's 
requirements. In addition, all of the new vessels were large traditionally 
designed deep draft steam auxiliaries of which the USS Kearsarge was a good 
example. After the outbreak of hostilities, construction of eight additional 
warships was authorized. Those vessels were also traditional sloops of war of 
even larger dimensions. Although powerful, they were not well suited for 
duty on the blockade as they could not operate in shallow water and did not 
have the speed necessary to run down fast steamers. 51 
The warships did however reflect the naval philosophy Secretary Welles 
adopted at the on-set of the war. Although acutely aware of the criticism to 
which he would be subjected if he advocated the construction of "large and 
expensive vessels", Welles was convinced that powerful warships were the 
most effective agents of peace. He was afraid that-he would be "denounced for 
being unprepared" if the Navy was not ready to suppress the rebellion and to 
defend the United States in the event of a war with England or France. "A few 
48 Welles to D. Stringham, 17 May 1861, ORN, I, 5, p. 635. 
49 Stringham to Paulding, 24 May 1861, ORN, 1,5, p. 666. 
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strong; powerful vessels will conduce to economy because they will deter 
commercial nations from troubling us, and if not troubled, we need no large 
and expensive navy. "52 
Welles quickly shifted his initial position concerning large and powerful 
warships as the necessities of the blockade and engagements on the shallow 
rivers and sounds of North Carolina and the Confederacy created the demand 
for fast and shallow draft vessels. Without waiting for congressional 
authorization, the Navy Department also contracted with private yards for the 
construction of twenty-three wooden gunboats. Those vessels were smaller 
shallow draft steamers of five hundred tons which carried auxiliary sails. Each 
of the vessels was fitted with a single cylinder steam engine and screw 
propeller. The "ninety-day gunboats" as they were called because of the speed 
with which they were constructed and fitted out for service, carried from four 
to seven guns. Their shallow draft and speed made them effective for both 
blockading and fighting. 53 
For service inshore and in the shallow estuaries and rivers of the 
Confederacy the U. S. Navy also contracted for the construction of a unique 
class of double-ended steamers. Although several hundred tons heavier that 
the "ninety-day gunboats" the "double-enders" were designed for shallow 
water operations. Their double ended design with a rudder at each end enabled 
them to navigate satisfactorily in either, direction and eliminated the necessity 
for turning around in the restricted channels of southern rivers. Because of the 
success of the Octorara class, as the first twelve "double-enders" were identified, 
the Navy ultimately procured an additional 27 "double-enders" of larger 
capacity. TM 
Construction of new vessels contributed significantly to the dramatic 
increase in the United States Navy's capacity that was necessary to establish and 
maintain a blockade. However, vessels could not be built fast enough to 
accommodate the demands placed on the Navy. To relieve the pressure 
Welles initiated a crash program to charter and purchase any vessel that could 
52 Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Houton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1911, 
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be adapted to serve the Navy's purpose. 55 Initially, charters provided a limited 
number of vessels for the Navy. In April 1861, Welles obtained the use of two 
steamers from Philadelphia and five from New York through charters. Those 
vessels included the powerful steamers R. R. Cuyler, Huntsville and Keystone 
State that were later purchased by the Navy. The monthly rate for the R. R. 
Cuyler was $12,500 and the rate for the Huntsville was $10,000. In May five 
additional vessels were leased including the steamer Daylight that was 
dispatched to blockade Wilmington. Leasing proved to be an expensive long- 
term proposition. In 1861, the bill for sixteen vessels leased for varying periods 
between April and November came to a total of $391,305.05.56 
Welles realized leasing was neither a practical nor an economical 
approach to strengthening the Navy. Although leasing permitted vessels to be 
obtained on very short notice, Welles also moved quickly to establish a means 
of purchasing vessels. At first he focused on light draft steamers that could 
operate close to the shallow bars that characterized southern inlets and had 
sufficient speed to run down and capture "neutral unarmed blockade- 
runners. "57 Welles took care to point out to his detractors that small light draft 
steamers were not only the most economical and effective for establishing a 
blockade but, they could maintain station during adverse winter weather. 58 
The procurement program initiated by Welles to obtain commercial 
vessels was not without problems. The operation was extensively criticized for 
purchasing unsuitable vessels of poor condition that required expensive and 
frequent repairs and put officers and crews at risk. Welles was also criticized for 
paying high prices for many of the vessels his agents obtained. In spite of the 
criticism, the operations increased the available naval strength by seventy-nine 
steamers and fifty-eight sail by the end of December 1861.59 
Chartering and purchase of vessels to support operations against the 
Confederacy was initially undertaken by the Navy. Commodore S. L. Breese, 
Rear Admiral Hiram Paulding, Rear Admiral Silas H. Stringham, Admiral 
Samuel F. Du Pont, Commodore C. K. Stribling, Commodore J. B. 
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Mongtomery, Captain H. S. Stellwagen, Captain W. L. Hudson, Commodore J. 
B. Hulland and Commodore J. G. Pendergast all negotiated vessel lease or 
purchase agreements on behalf of the United States Navy. 60 
During 1861, when expansion of the fleet was most critical, naval officers 
operated extensively out of Philadelphia and Baltimore. In Philadelphia 
Admiral Du Pont, Commodore Stribling and Commodore Pendergast 
purchased a total of sixteen vessels at a cost of $593,675. Du Pont and 
Pendergast negotiated the purchase of an additional three steamers for $172,300 
in nearby Wilmington, Delaware in 1861. Commodore Stribling continued to 
operate out of Philadelphia throughout the war and purchased an additional 
thirty-one vessels costing $511,103. On 13 August 1861, Captain Steliwagen 
purchased fourteen schooners in Baltimore. The Baltimore schooners cost 
$14,300 and were to be loaded with stone and be employed as obstructions at 
Hatteras Inlet on the North Carolina coast. 61 
The overwhelming majority of vessels secured for naval use were 
obtained at New York. Although Commodore S. L. Breese negotiated the 
purchase of four vessels in New York in 1861 and Admiral David Dixon Porter 
and Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren each subsequently purchased vessels the 
majority were obtained by Rear Admiral F. H. Gregory and Rear Admiral 
Hiram Paulding. Between May 1861, when Rear Admiral Paulding purchased 
the sidewheel steamer Thomas Freeborn and 30 December 1864 when Rear 
Admiral Gregory obtained the screw steamer Spirca the two officers secured a 
total of sixty-one ships at a cost of $4,532,422.62 
Only ten of the vessels purchased in New York by naval officers were 
obtained in 1861. During 1861, the Navy relied almost entirely upon a civilian 
agent appointed by Welles who negotiated vessel purchases for the Navy. 
Welles felt that a merchant experienced in the shipping business could better 
serve the Navy than officers without extensive business experience. He and 
others also felt that it was important to avoid establishing a procurement 
system that stimulated undesirable competition among the Navy's agents. 
Welles selected a civilian agent with "a great business capacity and of the most 
scrupulous and unquestioned integrity" willing to relinquish "all private 
engagements, and withdrawing from all business connections of every 
60 Statistical Data of U. S. Ships, United States Vessels, ORN, II, 1, pp. 27-272. 
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description. "63 Welles selected his brother-in-law George D. Morgan to serve as 
the agent for the Department of the Navy. In spite of charges of nepotism and 
suggestions of corruption, Welles defended his decision before Congress and 
reported that "the very best vessels in the commercial marine have been 
secured for naval service at moderate rates, and to great advantage to the 
government. "64 
Initially Morgan and a board of inspection officers comprised of a naval 
contractor, ordnance officer and an engineer concentrated on securing steamers 
of moderate size and draft to facilitate enforcement of the blockade. Powerful, 
seaworthy and fast steamers such as the 1,128 ton Quaker City, the 1,152 ton 
James Adger and the 1,070 ton Mcrcedita were typical of the type determined to 
be immediately useful for service. As the number of steamers purchased began 
to relieve some of the pressure, Morgan and the board expanded their 
purchasing operations to include sail, steam tugs and ferries. Although sailing 
vessels were not at all suited to establishing the blockade, Welles proposed to 
employ them to act as colliers and to transport supplies for the steamers 
engaged in blockading the Confederacy. 65 
The survey and purchase of vessels for the Navy did not entirely solve 
the problem faced by Welles. Many of the surveys carried out by boards 
consisting of a naval constructor, an ordnance officer and an engineer 
identified deficiencies in the vessels offered for sale to the Navy. 66 Some 
purchases received board approval contingent upon the owner's willingness to 
rectify problems and make specified repairs. Surveys confirmed that most of 
the commercial vessels procured by Morgan, Forbes, Chappell 'and the Navy's 
procurement officers required some combination of service, repair and 
adaptation for military service. On 12 April 1861, Fox telegraphed Captain W. 
L. Hudson to confirm that owners should be responsible for caulking and other 
maintenance of repairs necessary to make their ships seaworthy. Fox 
acknowledged that "all the strengthening for guns & accommodation for stores 
should be done by the U. S. "67 To carry ordnance most merchant vessels 
required some strengthening of the deck and the construction of magazines 
63 "Report of Secretary of the Navy", 4 July 1861, p. 14. 
64 Ibid., p. 15 
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and shot lockers. The limited quarters of merchant ships were rarely sufficient 
for the full complement of officers and crew that would be assigned to a naval 
vessel. 68 In spite of the efforts of Morgan and the officers inspecting merchant 
vessels, many were sent to the fleet without being ready for the taxing service 
they were expected to render. Many vessels like the USS Daylight, the first 
vessel on the Wilmington station, were constantly in need of repair. 
The massive effort Welles initiated to secure additional vessels for the 
Navy proved to be a success. By the end of 1861, the number of vessels 
available for naval service had increased to 264. However, the lack of sufficient 
vessels was not the only problem confronted by the United States Navy in 1861. 
By July, two hundred and fifty-nine officers resigned their commissions or 
were dismissed from naval service. 69 Initially, the lack of sufficient officers 
forced the Navy to send ships to sea without a full crew. The problem was in 
part resolved by volunteers, many with previous naval experience, who 
patriotically tendered their services. Most were offered the rank of acting 
lieutenants, masters and masters' mates and served in capacities that included 
those of junior officers aboard warships and as captains of gunboats and 
support vessels. 
The necessity for additional surgeons and paymasters, well beyond the 
number authorized by Congress, was likewise temporarily resolved by Welles 
by appointing acting officers. 7°° To prepare them for naval service, schools of 
gunnery and naval training were established at the Navy Yards. There each 
acting officer was schooled by naval instructors. 7' Passage of legislation 
authorizing the increase in enlisted men and the establishment of naval 
rendezvous at each of the principal northern seaports permitted the Navy to 
recruit enough seamen to man the newly commissioned vessels. 72 The 
number of seamen increased dramatically from 7,600 in March 1861, to 22,000 
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in December. 73 By December 1863 that number had increased to 38,000 and by 
the end of the war 51,000 enlisted men were serving in the Union Navy. 74 The 
ranks of naval officers increased from 1,300 in 1861 to 6,700 in 1865.75 
The personnel problems that Welles faced were also complicated by a 
stagnant system of advancement spawned by years of neglect and marginal 
congressional support. Only the brief and limited revitalization of the Navy 
that occurred in conjunction with the Mexican War interrupted the cycle of 
neglect that followed the War of 1812. The muster roles of the Navy were filled 
with aging officers who had long since abandoned hope of promotion but held 
tenaciously on to their station. Young officers seeing no hope of advancement 
had taken leave or resigned to accept more promising positions in the 
merchant marine. 76 Welles recommended an extensive reorganization of the 
service to resolve the problem. 
On 21 December 1861, additional legislation was enacted to facilitate 
streamlining the system of advancement and retirement. Officers listed on the 
Naval Register for fifty-five years or more, or who had reached the age of sixty- 
two were to be retired from active service. That legislation cleared the ranks of 
many aging and inept officers and permitted the advancement of more 
competent and aggressive personnel. 77 The act to "establish and equalize the 
grade of line officers" also directed the Secretary of the Navy to appoint an 
advisory board of senior officers to review and examine the list of active line 
officers at or above the grade of master and inform the Secretary of those 
"worthy of promotion. " Although the new system and the legislation that 
created it was not without problems, it did stimulate a much needed expansion 
of the officer corps and created a progressive system of advancement. 73 
In addition to difficulties associated with vessels and personnel the Navy 
Department faced a number of other problems associated with establishing and 
maintaining a blockade of the Confederate coastline. The vessels deployed to 
intercept southern commerce required a complex and extensive base of 
73 David D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, p. 37. 
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logistical support. ; As the number of vessels increased and as more steamships 
were assigned to stations on the blockade, demands for supplies, munitions 
and repairs became more extensive. One of the issues addressed by the 
Blockade Strategy Board was identification of harbors that could be captured, 
defended and developed to serve as distribution centers and harbors of refuge 
and repair. 79 
Initially, the focus of that attention was on Hatteras Inlet on the North 
Carolina Outer Banks west of Cape Hatteras. Hatteras Inlet had previously been 
identified by the Strategy Board as an option for developing a harbor of refuge 
and coaling station. Hatteras Inlet became an unignorable priority by the first 
summer of the rebellion because of the success of privateers that began to base 
their operations there in 1861. Because the Confederacy had virtually no navy, 
President Jefferson Davis decided to issue letters of marque and reprisal to the 
owners of vessels willing to fit them out as privateers. On 17 April 1861, Davis 
issued a proclamation "inviting all those that desire, by service in private 
armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this government in resisting sb wanton 
and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or letters of 
marque and reprisal to be issued under the seal of these Confederate States. "$° 
During the spring and summer of 1861, the steam vessels of the North 
Carolina "Mosquito Fleet" initiated privateering operations based out of 
Hatteras Inlet. The tugs Raleigh and Beaufort and the sidewheel steamer 
Winslozv made up the squadron. Under the command of Captain Thomas M. 
Crossan they began to conduct daily sorties to harass Union commerce passing 
Cape Hatteras. 81 They captured the brig Lydia Frances of Bridgeport, 
Connecticut, the bark Linzvood of New York and the schooner Willct S. 
Robbins. In June the Winslozv captured the schooner Transit chartered by the 
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United States to transport munitions and provisions to Key West and the 
hermaphrodite brig Hannah Balch, a Union prize captured off Charleston. In 
July the crew of the Winslow captured the schooner Herbert Manton. 82 
Depredations of the "Mosquito Fleet" were curtailed somewhat when 
the vessels were transferred to the Confederate Navy, but the lucrative nature 
of their activity attracted privately commissioned vessels operating with letters 
of Marque and Reprisal from Jefferson Davis. One of the first was the pilot 
schooner York from Norfolk, Virginia. In spite of capturing two prizes, the 
York proved to be unsuccessful and had to be run aground to avoid being 
captured by the USS Union. 83 The Mariner, a small screw steamer from 
Wilmington, North Carolina captured the Union schooner Nathaniel Chase in 
July and the privateer steamer Gordon, out of Charleston, arrived at Hatteras 
with the brig William McGilvery. 84 
One of the first vessels to operate under a Letter of Marque and Reprisal 
was the brig Jefferson Davis. That vessel, previously the slaver Echo, had been 
armed with a pivot gun and four small carronades and fitted out in Charleston, 
South Carolina. 85 In July 1861, the Jefferson Davis began to harass Union 
shipping in the Atlantic off Cape Hatteras. In a report to Secretary Gideon 
Welles, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers of the United States Naval Academy 
related that the brig Mary E. Thompson, the brig John Welsh, the ship Mary 
Goodell, and the schooners J. C. Warner and Enchantress had been captured, 
looted and released. 86 
By August 1861, Hatteras Inlet had become a well established and highly 
successful base of operations against Union shipping. The success of those 
lightly armed and shallow draft privateers focused considerable attention on 
the North Carolina Outer Banks. On 9 August George W. Blunt conveyed a 
report from Captain Campbell of the brig Lydia Martin to Gideon Welles. 
Campbell provided Blunt with a description of the privateers and the defenses 
at Hatteras and Ocracoke Inlet. 87 A9 August 1861 letter from representatives of 
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the marine insurance companies of Philadelphia to the Secretary of Navy, 
confirmed that off Cape Hatteras "the loss of property is and has been very 
heavy" and that "any project by which this nest of pirates could be broken up 
would be hailed with gratitude by all interested in commerce" 88 
The following day Lieutenant Thomas 0. Selfridge described the 
situation to Secretary Welles: 
It seems that the coast of Carolina is infested with a nest of 
privateers that have thus far escaped capture, and, in the 
ingenious method of their cruising, are probably likely to avoid 
the clutches of our cruisers. Hatteras Inlet, a little south of Cape 
Hatteras light, seems their principal rendezvous. Here they have 
a fortification that protects them from assault. A lookout at the 
light-house proclaims the coast clear, and a merchantman in sight; 
they dash out and are back again in a day with their prize. So long 
as these remain it will be impossible to entirely prevent their 
depredations, for they do not venture out when men-of-war are in 
sight; and, in the bad weather of the coming season, cruisers can 
not always keep their stations off these inlets without great risk of 
going ashore. 89 
In a letter to Gideon Welles, Flag-Officer S. H. Stringham admitted that: "there 
seem to be nests of pirates who.... require vigilant attention and some stringent 
action. "90 On 12 August a committee of the New York Board of Underwriters 
sent Welles a description of the Confederate defenses on the Outer Banks and 
included a plea for the "Government to prevent, as far as possible, any further 
captures by the pirates who sally out from those inlets". 91 
That pressure prompted Secretary Welles to order Flag-Officer S. H. 
Stringham to close all the North Carolina Outer Banks inlets except Hatteras. 
Hatteras would be developed as the harbor of refuge and supply identified by 
the Strategy Board. Welles authorized Stringham to prepare a Navy expedition 
to capture forts Hatteras and Clark at Hatteras Inlet. Likewise, General 
Winfield Scott authorized General Benjamin F. Butler to provide sufficient 
Army support for an amphibious expedition to occupy the forts. 92 On 26 
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August 1861, the expedition sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia. 
Stringham's command consisted of the screw frigates Minnesota and Wabash, 
the sloop-of-war Cumberland, the screw sloop Pazvnee, the paddle frigate 
Susquehanna, the steam gunboat Monticello and the revenue cutter Harriet 
Lane. The Army transports Adelaide and George Peabody carried the 
complement of 886 officers and soldiers of the Ninth and Twentieth New York 
Volunteer Infantry, the Second United States Artillery and the Union Coast 
Guard 93 
The attack began on the morning of 28 August when the Minnesota, 
Wabash, Cumberland and Susquehanna steamed in and commenced shelling 
Confederate defenses at Fort Clark. An hour and a half after the naval 
bombardment began General Butler carried out an amphibious landing on the 
beach approximately two miles north of Fort Clark. 94 The Confederate 
defenders returned the fleet's fire but the range was too great for the caliber of 
the guns. Once their ammunition was exhausted the officers agreed that their 
most effective option was to spike the guns and retire to Fort Hatteras. 95 
Shortly after 2: 00 p. m. Union pickets entered the abandoned fortification and 
raised the Union flag. Two hours later the Monticello steamed into Hatteras 
Inlet to take possession of Fort Hatteras but, Confederate artillery opened an 
accurate fire on the vessel. The fleet immediately moved inshore and returned 
fire until sunset. 96 
On the following morning Stringham's vessels resumed their attack at 8 
a. m. Although the Confederate batteries returned the Union fire, the range of 
their guns was not sufficient to have any effect. The Confederate strategy was 
to conserve their ammunition and await reinforcements but after enduring 
more than two hours of intensive shelling the decision was made to 
surrender. 97 At 11: 10 the Union fleet observed a white flag on the parapet and 
ceased fire. General Butler took the tug Fanny into the Inlet and took 
possession of Fort Hatteras. 98 When Commander Henry S. Stellwagen's efforts 
to block Ocracoke Inlet by sinking a small fleet of schooners failed due to bad 
93 S. H. Stringham to J. E. Wool, 20 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 108. 
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weather and'a lack of local pilots, Stringham and Butler decided to garrison the 
forts and left Colonel Rush C. Hawkins in command of the forts and 
Commander Stephen C. Rowan in command of a small naval force to provide 
protection. 99 The capture and occupation of Confederate forts at Hatteras Inlet 
eliminated privateering off Cape Hatteras and provided the United States with 
an important base of operations for an invasion of coastal North Carolina. 
As soon as Fort Hatteras was secure both General Butler and Flag-Officer 
Stringham departed for Washington, D. C. to revel in and take credit for their 
success. Aboard the USS Susquehanna off Hatteras, Captain J. P. Bankhead 
wrote G. V. Fox making reference to a joke circulating through the fleet 
concerning their "foot race North" and relayed the apparently general 
sentiment that the success at Hatteras Inlet should have been followed by an 
immediate attack on Confederate defenses at Beaufort, North Carolina. 
Bankhead, perhaps optimistically, felt that had "they both remained, we might 
have had the whole coast in our possession. "' 00 Another less sensitive critic 
wrote: "the enemy never had more faithful allies than they had in the brutal 
folly, supreme ignorance and want of ordinary military and naval perception of 
Como. Stringham and Gen. Butler.... "101 Criticism of the handling of the 
Hatteras Expedition subsequently forced Stringham to tender his resignation on 
16 September 1861.102 That cleared the way for Welles to create the North and 
South Atlantic Blockade Squadron recommended by the Strategy Board. 103 
Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough replaced Stringham until Flag-Officer S.. F. 
DuPont was appointed to command the South Atlantic Blockade Squadron. 
Goldsborough remained in command of the North Atlantic Blockade 
Squadron. '°4 
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One of Goldsborough's first priorities was to expand the Union presence 
in North Carolina. During the first week of December 1861, Goldsborough 
informed Fox that he would "give to blow of which you speak. "los 
Goldsborough's proposal was to enter the North Carolina sounds at Hatteras 
with a combined Army and Navy amphibious force. Once his fleet was 
assembled, Goldsborough would capture Roanoke Island by assault. The island 
would serve as a base of operations to destroy the canals that connected the 
North Carolina sounds with Norfolk, Virginia and capture New Bern at the 
confluence of the Neuse and Trent rivers. With New Bern under Union 
control, the army could cut communication between the port of Beaufort and 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad at Goldsboro. With Beaufort isolated it 
would be possible to launch a combined Army and Navy assault on Fort Macon 
or starve out the defenders. 106 
On 7 January 1862, Major-General McClellan provided Brigadier-General 
Burnside with instructions to join the expedition assembling at Fort Monroe 
and cooperate with Goldsborough in an invasion of North Carolina. '07 A fleet 
of more than 100 vessels had assembled off Fort Monroe by the first week of 
January. By 15 January, Goldsborough's seventeen vessels lay at anchor inside 
the bar although navigation of the inlet had been extremely difficult and 
dangerous. 108 In spite of Burnside's "absolute readiness" the army transports 
were not assembled inside Hatteras Inlet until the end of January. In addition 
to being poorly organized the army expedition was caught in a gale off Hatteras 
and three vessels, the City of New York, Pocahontas and Zouave, were lost. '09 
Burnside was finally ready to launch an attack on 5 February and 
Goldsborough's fleet steamed north up the sound in three columns. Two days 
later at 10: 30 a. m. the Union gunboats engaged eight Confederate vessels, under 
the command of Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch. The Confederate flotilla was drawn 
up adjacent to a barricade of pilings and sunken vessels that stretched across the 
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109 L. M. Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, 23 January 1862, ORN, 1,6, pp. 538-539 and Ambrose E. 
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Second Series No. 6, Providence: N. Bangs Williams & Company, 1882, pp. 6-7. 
37 
sound from Pork Point on Roanoke Island to Red-Stone Point on the western 
shore. Although Lynch's command fought aggressively, the weight and range 
of Goldsborough's ordnance drove the Confederates north of the obstructions 
and damaged two of the vessels. Late in the afternoon, Lynch's flotilla closed 
with the Union fleet but withdrew when their ammunition ran low and 
headed to Elizabeth City in an effort to resupply. 11° 
At the same time that part of Goldsborough's fleet was engaging the 
Confederate gunboats, other Union vessels shelled Fort Bartow, the 
Confederate fortification at Pork Point on Roanoke Island. By late afternoon, 
the Confederate battery fell silent and General Burnside launched a landing at 
Ashby's Harbor on the west side of the island. Using shallow draft steamers to 
tow a collection of small boats and bridge pontoons filled with troops, Burnside 
landed his army. By midnight approximately 10,000 men were ashore and 
making preparations for an early morning attack on Confederate positions. 11' 
The following morning Burnside's army launched their attack, 
advancing up the middle of the island while Goldsborough's flotilla shelled 
Fort Bartow so heavily that the Confederates were forced to abandon the 
position. With assistance from Midshipman Porter and several naval boat 
howitzers, Burnside's force was able to overwhelm Confederate resistance and 
advance to the northern end of the island. Generals Burnside and Foster 
arrived aboard the USS Philadelphia at 7: 15 p. m. and announced that the island 
was in Union hands and that 300 prisoners and 40 pieces of artillery had been 
captured. 112 On 9 February, Goldsborough dispatched Commander Rowan to 
Elizabeth City with thirteen gunboats to destroy Lynch's flotilla and curb 
navigation on the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal. 113 
The capture of Roanoke Island and destruction of the Confederate flotilla 
left the North Carolina sounds in control of the United States. Without 
effective Confederate resistance the Navy and Army carried out a series of 
combined operations that resulted in the capture of New Bern on the Neuse 
River, Washington on the Pamlico River and Plymouth on the Roanoke 
River. With the exception of a Confederate attack on Plymouth and the fleet in 
the Albemarle Sound that was supported by the ironclad CSS Albemarle and 
110 Report of Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch, 18 February 1862, ORN, I, 6, pp. 594-596. 
111 Report of L. M. Goldsborough, 18 February 1862, ORN, I, 6, pp. 550-553. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., p. 590. 
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unsuccessful attempts to recapture Washington and New Bern, Union control 
was uncontested. In addition to depriving the Confederacy of one of its richest 
sources of agricultural products the invasion strangled most of northeastern 
North Carolina's water borne commerce. 
Union control of the North Carolina sounds virtually eliminated both 
privateering at Hatteras and blockade running along the coast north of Cape 
Lookout. It also opened the way for capturing Fort Macon and the important 
Confederate harbor at Beaufort. Although eclipsed by the activities of Hatteras 
privateers, Beaufort had become an increasing source of irritation during the 
first year of the rebellion. In spite of Union vessels tasked with closing the port, 
blockade runners operated out of Beaufort with virtual impunity. 
The John Frazer and Company ships Alliance and Gondar sailed into 
Beaufort in August 1861. The Gondar arrived with a cargo of railroad iron and 
salt and the Alliance carried "grindstones, quicksilver, castor oil, spool cotton, 
mackerel, tin plate, block tin, bar iron, sheet iron, iron wire, pig iron and two 
trunks of percussion caps. "114 While the blockade proved to be effective 
enough to keep the Frazer ships in port, on 28 February 1862 a steamer ran 
through the blockade and into Beaufort. That vessel was the Nashville, 
previously a Confederate commerce raider and source of considerable 
embarrassment for the United States Navy. 115 When the CSS Nashville 
arrived in Southhampton, she became the first Confederate warship to fly the 
Confederate flag in a British port. ll6 Union embarrassment was amplified 
when, on 17 March, the Nashville steamed back out of Beaufort without 
incident. "" Secretary of the Navy G. V. Fox admitted that the Nashville's 
successful running of the blockade at Beaufort was "a terrible blow to our naval 
prestige" and called the episode "a Bull Run to the Navy. "lls 
114 J. F. Armstrong to L. M. Goldsborough, 17 March 1862, ORN, I, 7, p. 131 and W. A. Parker to L. 
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Escape of the steamer Nashville focused Union attention on the 
immediate capture of the harbor at Beaufort. The harbor was well protected by 
Fort Macon, a masonry fortification on Bogue Banks that was completed in 
1833.119 Fort Macon was never garrisoned and only four pieces of artillery had 
been mounted when, Confederates occupied the fort after North Carolina left 
the Union in April 1861.120 In September 1861, H. K. Burgwyn informed 
Secretary S. R. Mallory that: 
Fort Macon has not one practical gunner; has only forty reliable 
fuses, no rifled cannon, no ordnance officer, and only raw troops 
without proper supplies. 121 
Brigadier-General D. H. Hill wrote Secretary Mallory to confirm the untenable 
condition of Fort Macon in October pointing out that: 
Fort Macon cannot be held without 4 more efficient guns of long 
range. There are but 4 guns now of long range, and these are illy 
supplied with ammunition and are mounted on very inferior 
carriages. 122 
In spite of reports that Confederates were reinforcing Fort Macon, 
Goldsborough and Burnside realized that the casemated fortification was 
undermanned and poorly armed. Burnside used his base at New Bern to cut 
Beaufort, Morehead City and Fort Macon off from reinforcement. Morehead 
City, Carolina City and Beaufort were all occupied without resistance in March 
by General Parke. 123 That left Fort Macon completely isolated and cut off from 
reinforcement and supply. When Confederate Colonel Moses J. White refused 
General Parke's offer to "save the unnecessary effusion of blood" by 
surrendering, the Union general moved to isolate the fortification. 124 
119 Daniel H. Hill, Bethel to Sharpsburg, 2 Vols., Edwards & Broughton Company, Raleigh, 
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On 29 March, a landing was effected on Bogue Banks. By April, Brigadier 
General John Parke reported that "every available hour of night and day was 
spent in transporting men, siege train, and supplies" to support the attack. 125 
Three weeks later, on 25 April, Parke began to shell Fort Macon from the 
batteries erected on Bogue Bank. Although seas were too rough for 
Commander S. J. Lockwood's gunboats to effectively engage the Confederates, 
Parke's artillery was able to disable almost half of Fort Macon's artillery after 
ten hours of intense shelling. At 4: 30 p. m. a white flag appeared above the 
ramparts and the following morning Colonel White and the garrison 
surrendered. 126 
When the vessels of the North Atlantic Blockade Squadron entered 
Beaufort after the fall of Fort Macon, it was immediately apparent to 
Commander Samuel Lockwood that the harbor would be an ideal base for 
repair and resupply. On 30 April, he wrote Goldsborough from Beaufort to 
confirm that: 
This would be a good place of deposit for coal, provisions, small 
stores, and lubricating oil, which is in constant demand by the 
engineer's department for the vessels stationed here and 
blockading off [Cape] Fear River, North Carolina. 127 
Goldsborough moved quickly to take advantage of the newly acquired facilities 
and, on 2 May, he informed Commander Lockwood that: 
I have this day ordered a thousand tons of coal to be sent from 
Philadelphia to Beaufort for the use of our vessels there and off 
Wilmington, and also a full supply of provisions, stores, and 
clothing to be sent from Baltimore to Beaufort for the same 
purpose. Tell the commanding officers of the Chippezva and State 
of Georgia that here-after they will find supplies at Beaufort, and 
direct them to inform the commanding officers they may meet off 
Wilmington that they, too, hereafter, are to go to Beaufort for 
supplies. In short, no vessel stationed at Beaufort or off 
125 J. G. Parke to Lewis Richmond, 9 May 1862, ORA, I, 9, p. 377. 
126 J. G. Parke to Lewis Richmond, 9 May 1862, ORA, 1,9, p. 284. 
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Wilmington is to come here unless her condition is such as to 
render the move absolutely necessary, or unless she be ordered by 
the Navy Department or myself to do so. 128 
Although Beaufort and Morehead City had only limited facilities for storing 
supplies and ordnance, the Navy used vessels to serve as storehouses until 
improvements could be made in docking and warehouse facilities. '29 
The capture of Fort Macon was the last objective associated with Union 
plans to occupy and control coastal North Carolina from Cape Lookout to the 
Virginia border. Control of the North Carolina sounds completely eliminated 
the necessity for maintaining a blockade in the dangerous waters north of Cape 
Lookout. That significantly increased the number of vessels that could be 
assigned to blockade Wilmington and the shallow inlets in southeastern North 
Carolina. Even before the fall of Fort Macon, Goldsborough sent a 
communication to Commander G. A. Prentiss requesting that: 
Should Beaufort with Fort Macon fall into our possession, or 
should there be at any time more of our vessels off there than may 
be absolutely necessary to maintain the blockade and prevent the 
escape of the Nashville, I wish every steamer not needed, or that 
possibly can be spared, to go off Wilmington, N. C., and assist in 
blockading that port. 130 
When Goldsborough communicated his congratulations to Commander 
Lockwood for the successful capture of Fort Macon, he also ordered that the 
Chippewa and State of Georgia be dispatched to Wilmington "without delay" to 
strengthen the blockade. 131 Due to the lack of vessels that could be assigned to 
blockade Wilmington, that important port city had been able to carry on 
commercial activities almost without inconvenience. In fact, the 
establishment of a naval blockade at Charleston, South Carolina stimulated 
trade at Wilmington. 
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In June William Guyer of Norwalk, Connecticut reported in a letter to 
the United States Treasury Department: 
When I left Wilmington, N C., three vessels had just arrived, one 
with a cargo of railroad iron from Cardiff, Wales; one with a cargo 
of molasses, from Cardenas; and one with a cargo of lime from 
Maine. The latter vessel was bound for Charleston, but finding 
that harbor blockaded, put into the port of Wilmington. When I 
left, no blockade was established off the Cape Fear River, and I 
have not seen any account of any since my arrival North. Unless 
Wilmington is blockaded, the blockade of Charleston Harbor is a 
practical nullity. 132 
Secretary Welles was well aware of the situation but instructions to Flag-Officer 
Stringham to station a vessel at Wilmington "provided it can be done without 
weakening other more important points" confirmed the more pressing 
priorities associated with the privateers at Hatteras Inlet and occupation of the 
North Carolina sounds. 133 It was not until October 1861, that three vessels were 
assigned to blockade the Cape Fear. 134 Until the fall of Fort Macon, 
Wilmington was blockaded by a combination of sail and steam vessels. While 
sailing ships could maintain their stations without the necessity for coaling and 
mechanical repairs, they were poorly suited to the task of running down fast 
sailors and virtually incapable of arresting steamers. Steamers, on the other 
hand, were more adapt at intercepting illegal traffic but required extensive time 
away from station to resupply and effect repairs at yards no closer than the 
Chesapeake Bay. Goldsborough informed Welles that: 
Fast steamers, of light draft, properly armed, are the only vessels 
fit for blockading our Southern coast. Sailing vessels, at best, are 
but of poor account-next to good for nothing on such a service. 
Steamers, as you are fully aware, must replenish their fuel 
frequently, and hence the necessity for a sufficient number to 
secure reliefs and keep up, as it were, a constant circulation. The 
accidents to which they are exposed and the time involved in 
their repair must also be considered. '35 
132 William A. Guyer to Treasury Department, 25 June 1862, ORN, 1,5, p. 746. 
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With those issues resolved and a new base of operations at Beaufort, Flag- 
Officer Goldsborough could make Wilmington the focus of sufficient attention 
to make the blockade effective. 
Chapter II The Blockade of Wilmington and the Southeastern Coast 
Until the steamer USS Daylight arrived off the Cape Fear on 14 July 
1861, Wilmington, North Carolina's commerce suffered no restraint 
whatsoever. When the Daylight took up station the situation changed only 
marginally. Commander Lockwood quickly discovered that maintaining an 
effective blockade of the Cape Fear was not going to be accomplished without 
considerable resources. Two inlets at the entrance to the Cape Fear River 
provided vessels attempting to run the blockade with an important option for 
entering or departing Wilmington. To further complicate the situation Old 
Inlet to the south and New Inlet a few miles to the northeast were separated by 
Smith Island and Frying Pan Shoals which extended seaward more than twenty 
miles. When Daylight was in position to restrict navigation at one inlet the 
other was open. Commander Lockwood noted that vessels were able to 
observe his position off one inlet and escape through the other with impunity. ' 
Lockwood's difficulties were compounded by breaking an eccentric strap. That 
forced him to abandon the Cape Fear blockade and return to Hampton Roads to 
make arrangements for repairs. 2 
Stringham ordered the Penguin to replace Daylight off Wilmington but 
that vessel proved to be almost as ineffective. 3 In August, Commander J. W. 
Livingston had reported that the vessel was unfit for outside cruising. 4 In spite 
of the vessel's condition, Commander Livingston tried to be more effective by 
remaining out of sight offshore during the day and cruising in the vicinity of 
the Cape Fear inlets at night so that his position would not be obvious to 
vessels running the blockade. 5 Livingston's strategy paid off on 11 August. 
The crew of the Penguin discovered the schooner Louisa of Wilmington 
crossing the south side of Frying Pan Shoals and gave chase. The Louisa 
1 Lockwood to Stringham, 16 July 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 691 and Abstract Log of the U. S. S. 
Daylight, 17 July 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 691. 
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refused to surrender and almost made Old Inlet before running aground and 
breaking up on a shoal. 6 The following day Livingston was forced to give up 
his station and return to Hampton Roads for coal and supplies.? 
The assignment of three vessels, in September 1861, permitted both 
entrances to the Cape Fear to be guarded simultaneously. 8 Unfortunately, two 
of the three vessels assigned to the Cape Fear, the USS Jamestown and the USS 
Gemsbok were sail powered. Only the USS Young Rover was equipped with 
auxiliary steam power. 9 Commander Green wrote Goldsborough on 23 October 
to suggest that "two good steamers would, I think, secure pretty effectual the 
blockade of this place, by changing to the east or west side of the reef during 
heavy weather. They would still be in sight of both entrances and be secure, 
and able at once in a few hours to resume their position, which cannot be done 
by a sailing vessel.... "10 A fourth vessel, the bark Amanda, dispatched to 
Wilmington at the end of October provided another sail. " The arrival of the 
USS Monticello in November provided another steamer on the Wilmington 
station but the USS Young Rover was forced to return to Hampton Roads as 
the ship was unseaworthy, low on supplies and the crew was in need of winter 
uniforms. 12 In December the bark Fernandina and the steamers USS Mount 
Vernon and USS Monticello were also assigned to Wilmington. 13 On 
Christmas Day the Fernandina captured the Wilmington schooner William H. 
Northrup, 25 miles southeast of Cape Fear but the steamer Gordon passed 
through the blockade undetected. 14 Goldsborough informed Welles on 3 
October 1861, that he felt there should be four active steamers "off or about" 
Wilmington to make the blockade effective. '5 
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By the first of February 1862, Commander Glisson of the USS Mount 
Vernon reported that his was the only vessel on station off Wilmington in 
spite of the fact that the steamers North Carolina and Gordon were known to 
be ready to run out of Wilmington at the first opportunity. The USS Gemsbok 
had gone to Hampton Roads for repairs and the USS Monticello, and the 
recently assigned Chippewa, were both already there for repairs, coal and 
supplies. 16 Despite pressure for the USS Monticello and USS Chippewa to join 
the Roanoke Island expedition, Goldsborough was under pressure to reinforce 
Wilmington as both England and France were lodging "grave complaints 
against the effectiveness of our blockade". As he did not want vessels' at 
Wilmington to escape and contribute to the international problems already 
apparent, Goldsborough ordered the USS Chippewa to return to Cape Fear as 
soon as possible. '? 
During February the North Carolina, renamed the Annie Childs, escaped 
without detection. In March she arrived in Liverpool with Confederate officers 
assigned to the commerce raider Oreto (Florida) and a cargo of 634 bales of 
cotton, 788 barrels of rosin, 215 3/4 and 10 1/2 boxes of manufactured tobacco, a 
box of peanuts and another of unidentified material. The cargo was consigned 
to Fraser, Trenholm & Company and that firm had a cargo of arms and 
munitions for the return voyage. 18 To make matters at Wilmington more 
embarrassing, the Nashville, renamed the Thomas L. Wragg, ran through the 
blockade on 24 April with a cargo of arms and powder, quickly loaded with 
cotton and returned to sea on 30 April. 19 At about the same time the steamer 
Gordon also escaped through the blockade. 20 Welles was furious and ordered a 
court of inquiry. 21 
Although the Nashville's evasion of the blockade at Wilmington fueled 
criticism of the Navy, the presence of the CSS Virginia at Hampton Roads and 
the necessity for protecting newly occupied positions, on the North Carolina 
sounds prevented reassigning vessels to blockade the Cape Fear. In May only 
six vessels had been assigned to the Wilmington Station. They were, however, 
16 0. S. Glisson to L. M. Goldsborough, 3 February 1862, ORN, 1,6, p. 545. 
17 L. M. Goldsborough to A. Bryson, 19 February 1862, ORN, I, 6, p. 645. 
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all steamers; USS Mount Vernon, USS State of Georgia, USS Monticello, USS 
Penobscot, USS Chippewa and USS Victoria and their presence began to 
produce results. 22 At daylight on 22 May, the USS Mount Vernon, USS State of 
Georgia and USS Victoria found the steamer Constitution, previously the G. 
Washington of Albany, New York off Lockwoods Folly Inlet. Inspection of the 
vessel's papers confirmed enough inconsistencies to justify sending the vessel 
north for adjudication. 23 On the morning of 28 May, the USS State of Georgia 
and USS Victoria discovered another steamer heading east along the coast of 
Oak Island toward Fort Caswell. After several shots from the Union steamers 
the crew of the steamer abandoned the vessel. A boarding party found that the 
vessel was the Nassau, the "notorious" Gordon, owned by John Frazer and 
Company and carrying a cargo of Enfield rifles, ammunition, clothing and 
medicine. 24 The following month the USS Cambridge, only recently assigned 
to the Wilmington Squadron, chased the steamer Modern Greece ashore 
immediately north of Fort Fisher. 25 
Ten steamers had been assigned to the Wilmington Station by 24 July 
1862, and the increasing number of captures and the destruction of blockade 
runners reflected their presence. Unfortunately, maintaining station proved to 
be difficult and it was rare that all ten vessels were off the Cape Fear. Coal was 
one of the most persistent reasons for vessels being absent. Different rates of 
use, periods of steaming and different bunker capacities made it difficult to 
coordinate coaling and reduce the number of times that more than one vessel 
was absent. After the capture of Fort Macon, coal could be obtained at Beaufort 
but that still required leaving the Cape Fear for several days. Admiral Lee 
ordered that: 
There must be a better system about coaling to avoid weakening 
the blockade. Only one vessel should be absent at a time. There 
must be no such custom as taking turns to go for coal. 26 
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Coal was only part of the problem. Vessels of the Wilmington Squadron were 
also periodically absent to obtain supplies. During the summer of 1862, the 
William Badger was assigned to Beaufort to serve as a store ship. That vessel 
provided most of the non-perishable supplies and the steamer Massachusetts 
was assigned to provide fresh meat and produce to both the North and South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 27 Not until August 1863, was the New Bern 
assigned to supply only the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 28 
Perhaps the most vexing problem was repairs. Many of the vessels 
assigned to the Wilmington Squadron had serious structural and/or 
mechanical problems. Carrying heavy ordnance created a dangerous situation 
on more than one vessel. Commander J. W. Livingston of the USS Penguin 
complained to Flag-Officer S. H. Stringham that: 
.... 
her boiler requires bracing fore and aft; it has already started 2 
inches. Rock shaft wants lengthening to give it another bearing to 
support it. The cut-off eccentrics want keying on the shaft, in place 
of set screws which now hold them. 
Livingston also reported: 
She bears her armament very well forward in smooth weather, 
but in a seaway the length and weight of metal outside when the 
guns are run out cause them to leap, guns and carriages, seaward 
in a fearful manner, independent of train tackle, so as to be almost 
uncontrollable and useless. Her hull seems in good condition up 
to her gun deck.... but all above, including her upper-deck joiner- 
work, only intended to protect cargo from rain, is light, leaky, and 
insecure, and will inevitably be [swept] away in gales at sea. Her 
numerous hatches render her fires liable to be extinguished. Her 
stern frame and deadwood is very light and insufficient to protect 
her from the seas in her squatting, which is great and throw her 
propeller out of water. Her light sails and spars are too light for 
service in moderate weather; her storm sails are well, but are not 
secured in a proper manner; her stays are too light and the bolts 
are secured into light carlines, which must give way when the 
strain is brought on them; the stays have already fallen about our 
heads. 29 
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In February 1863, Captain B. F. Sands informed Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee 
that: 
Of the paper steamers composing our force off Wilmington the 
Penobscot has been obliged to go north for repairs. The Cambridge 
ought to go, and is ordered north for repairs. The Maratanza, in 
heavy weather, is in danger of swamping with her heavy after 
pivot gun; and others are always complaining of deficiencies or 
inefficiency. This vessel even (probably the only or the most 
efficient one of them all) had her old boilers patched and stayed in 
New York in November last, to last for six weeks. By care and 
painstaking, especially due to Chief Engineer P. G. Peltz.... we have 
not been obliged to go north for repairs, and hope to hold out 
until she can be spared to take in her new boilers, which await her 
at Boston, and for a general refitting in dock, etc. This is the 
condition of the blockade here. 30 
i 
Making repairs to worn out or broken machinery were not always possible in 
Beaufort. Some could be made in Hampton Roads but, frequently more 
complex work required weeks in Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia or New 
York where yard and machine shop facilities were available. 
Rear-Admiral Goldsborough complained to Welles on 9 August 1862, 
that: 
The Chippewa has been a most prolific source of complaint ever 
since she first joined this squadron; and, beyond all doubt, justice 
was not done to her machinery originally. In my judgment, , what is now required will not be properly done, except at one of our 
navy yards. Hence, one of the reasons which induce me to send 
her to Washington. 31 
In some instances the machinery of vessels on the blockade was not 
properly maintained and serviced, if not abused. After arriving at the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard, the boilers and machinery of the steamers USS State 
of Georgia and USS Mercedita were inspected and found to have been abused. 
The inspector of the USS State of Georgia found that the "oil holes and 
30 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1863, ORN, 1,8, pp. 518-519. 
31 L. M. Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, 9 April 1862, ORN, I, 7, p. 637. 
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channels in the brasses clogged up with hard dirt--the condenser nearly filled 
with tallow--and a thickness of five inches of tallow and dirt was found in the 
air pump. "32 
By August the steamer Kate replaced the captured Gordon/Nassau as the 
major source of embarrassment for the United State Navy at Wilmington. 
Under the command of Thomas Lockwood the Kate began to run into and out 
of Wilmington with disturbing regularity. On 21 September S. P. Lee chastised 
Commander Gustavus H. Scott, the Senior Officer off Wilmington, for 
permitting the Kate to evade three vessels stationed off New Inlet. Lee pointed 
out that "the Department will be extremely mortified to hear that the Kate has 
run the blockade of Wilmington, out by New Inlet, with a load of cotton, an 
article now so valuable that a single cargo will purchase a large quantity of 
arms. " Lee continued that; "I am informed that these steamers lie at anchor 
day and night, 5 miles off from the inlet and 2 miles from each other. I hope 
this is not so; if true, it will easily account for the escape of the Kate. The 
steamers should, between evening and morning twilight, shift their day berths 
and maintain positions just as near the bar as is safe and practicable. " Lee 
pointed out that; "with a close cordon by night off the inlet by all the steamers, 
or with even one at anchor on picket duty, as near as possible to the bar, 
keeping the brightest sort of a lookout during the night, and the others 
anchored at their several night stations, convenient for watching and 
supporting the picket steamer, it is scarcely possible that the Kate could have 
escaped. "33 
The embarrassing success of the Kate motivated Lieutenant Bunce of the 
Gunboat USS Penobscot to propose a nocturnal raid to burn the steamer. Scott 
wanted to see the "miserable craft destroyed" and although he felt the chances 
of success were "too great to make the attempt with any certainty of success" he 
authorized the plan. 34 On 8 October, Lieutenant Bunce and aý crew of 
volunteers attempted to take two boats from the Cambridge and another from 
the Mystic through New Inlet and attack the Kate. The expedition was 
abandoned because of heavy surf in the inlet. A second expedition was made 
32 Browning, "North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, " p. 371. 
33 S. P. Lee to Gustavus H. Scott, 21 September 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 331. 
34G. H. Scott to W. A. Parker, 6 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 153. 
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on 12 October but, it was also abandoned due to rough seas. 35 While the 
expedition was not successful Lee applauded the effort and considered it 
indicative of the "active and enterprising spirt" of the blockaders. 36 
Although not necessarily a result of the more aggressive strategy ordered 
by Lee and his threat of censure for failure to maintain a strict blockade, the 
British screw steamer Sunbeam was captured by the USS State of Georgia just 
after daylight on 28 September. The Sunibeani's captain had been confused by 
the lights used by the blockade vessels to signal the Union Mail steamer 
Massachusetts. Before the British vessel could make the safety of Fort Fisher, 
the guns of the USS State of Georgia brought the vessel to a halt. Commander 
J. F. Armstrong confirmed that the Sunbeam was the same vessel identified in 
the 8 August 1862 report of the U. S. consul at Liverpool that had been 
circulated to the fleet. 37 
That consular report was the product of a complex system of intelligence 
gathering that had been developed to identify vessels fitting out in foreign 
ports to run the blockade. The backbone of the system was the United States 
diplomatic and consular service. The collection of useful information about 
the activities of Confederate agents abroad by agents of the Department of State 
convinced Secretary Seward of the intelligence gathering potential of his 
organization. Special instructions were issued to U. S. diplomats charging 
them with the responsibility for collecting naval as well as political 
intelligence. By August 1862, Secretary Seward had obtained authorization 
from Congress for President Lincoln to create new consulates for the purpose of 
collecting naval intelligence. 38 Agents in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Paris, 
Nassau, Bermuda and Havana provided highly accurate insight into 
Confederate efforts to obtain political support, vessels and war materials. New 
consuls were appointed for Bristol, England; Cardiff, Wales; St. Johns, 
Newfoundland; and Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia to help track the 
activities of Confederate vessels and blockade runners. Information from this 
system also included detailed descriptions of vessels, inventories of contraband 
35 F. M. Bunce to G. H. Scott, 16 October 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 155. 
36 S. P. Lee to G. H. Scott, 27 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 155. 
37 Report of James F. Armstrong, 28 September 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 331. 
38 United States Congress, Senate, Serial 1121, Senate Executive Document 12,37th Congress, 2nd 
Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1862, pp. 1-5. 
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cargoes, sailing schedules and anticipated ports of call. United States consuls 
identified the owners, officers and crew members of many insurgent vessels 
and ships dispatched to run the blockade. 39 
Communications from foreign consuls were forwarded to the United 
States by steamship lines maintaining regular mail services. 40 At ports such as 
New York, Boston; Philadelphia and Baltimore, dispatch agents received the 
mail and forwarded them to Washington. Information of interest to the Navy 
was forwarded to the Navy Department. There letter press copies were made 
and the information was immediately dispatched to the blockade squadron 
commanders. Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough set up a printing-press on 
his flagship and printed extracts of the information he received from the 
consular dispatches. Those extracts were sent to the commander of each of the 
vessels in Goldsborough's squadron. Each extract identified and described 
vessels engaged in blockade running, schedules, officers and crew members and 
lists of their cargoes and in some cases markings used to identify the shipper or 
owner. 41 Rear Admiral S. P. Lee continued the practice of printing extracts and 
distributing them to the commanding officers of the North Atlantic Squadron. 
Lee regularly reiterated that ranking officers at Beaufort and Wilmington 
should "impress upon commanding officers the necessity of making 
themselves familiar with the contents of these papers. "42 
Intelligence from abroad helped identify vessels intending to run the 
blockade but, capturing them still remained difficult. Rear-Admiral Lee's 
orders to maintain "a close cordon by night" resulted in a7 October collision 
between the steamers USS State of Georgia and USS Mystic. As a consequence, 
the USS State of Georgia had to leave her station for repairs. After being 
informed of the collision, Lee ordered that "vessels should have their regular 
39 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Serial 1136, House Executive Document 104, 
37th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1862, pp. 1-211 and Barnes 
and Morgan, United States Congress, House of Representatives, Serial 1136, House Executive 
Document 104,37th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1862, pp. 113- 
117. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Serial 1200, House Miscellaneous 
Document 77,38th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1862, pp. 1-11. 
40 Domestic Letters of the Department of State, NA, Washington, 1959, Microfilm No. 40, Roll 
51, pp. 469-473,13 March 1861, Secretary Seward to Dispatch Agent Charles A. Stetson. 
41 Navy Department, Record Group 45, entry 152, Department of Consular Letters and Letters to 
Squadron Commmanders by the Secretary of the Navy, Volume 1,9 November 1861, Secretary 
Welles to L. M. Goldsborough, NA, 1959, Microfilm No. 40, Roll 51, pp. 469-473,13 March 1861, 
Secretary Seward to Dispatch Agent Charles A. Stetson. 
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lights burning and covered with tarpaulin hoods, readily removed; also a 
lookout standing by each ready to uncover promptly in case of necessity, so that 
the course of each vessel may be quickly indicated. " Lee also cautioned that 
"vessels returning at night, especially when looking for each other, and when 
the situation may have occasioned the other vessels previously lying-at anchor 
to be underway, should move carefully; the officers should watch vigilantly. "43 
When Lee ordered Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. Trathen to take the 
USS Mount Vernon to Wilmington to help maintain a "strict and rigid" 
blockade of the Cape Fear, he provided the most recent extracts from the 
diplomatic service and squadron, blockading instructions and copies of the 
general orders and circulars. Lee also provided copies of the "U. S. Navy laws 
passed at the last session of Congress" one of which was to be preserved in the 
cabin library and the other was to be hung up in a public place for "general 
reference. " A copy of "Upton's Maritime Warfare and Prize" was also provided 
for the USS Mount Vernon. 44 Lee hoped to avoid both misunderstandings 
about the conduct of the blockade and legal complications associated with 
captured prize vessels. 
Maintaining a close blockade became increasingly difficult as 
Confederates strengthened fortifications protecting entrances to the Cape Fear. 
On the morning of 11 October 1862, Commander Scott reported that "at 9: 30 this 
morning the enemy opened upon us with two Armstrong guns from a battery 
which they had constructed during the night on the beach. " Confederate 
gunners found their mark with a second shot which exploded in the USS 
Maratanza's port quarter. Although the USS Maratanza got underway 
immediately another shell passed over the ship at a range of 4 1/2 miles. Scott 
informed Lee that it was no longer safe to maintain stations within 2 1/2 miles 
of Oak Island. 45 This made it more difficult to intercept vessels in the 
immediate vicinity of the inlet and U. S. vessels could only guard the bar under 
cover of darkness. 
The eight steamers at Wilmington were not sufficient to curb the 
steamship traffic, but their presence had a dramatic impact on sailing vessels 
attempting to run the blockade. Vessels that previously ran the blockade 
43 Ibid., p. 122. 
44 S. P. Lee to J. Trathen, 9 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 125. 
45 G. H. Scott to S. P. Lee, 11 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 127 and W. H. Macomb to S. P. Lee, 1 
November 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 125. 
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without much difficulty or risk began to shift their activities to unblockaded 
inlets west of Old Inlet and north of New Inlet. Traffic at Shallotte Inlet 
increased to the point that the USS Penobscot was assigned to interrupt that 
activity in October 1862. On 2 November, that vessel discovered the English 
schooner Pathfinder near shore approximately two miles west of Little River 
Inlet. The crew of the schooner abandoned the vessel after the USS Penobscot 
opened fire and the Pathfinder drifted ashore. A prize crew from the Penobscot 
was unable to get the Pathfinder off and the vessel and her cargo were burned. 46 
The following morning the USS Daylight discovered the British bark 
Sophie of Liverpool lying at anchor immediately south of Masonboro Inlet. 
The crew of the Sophie made sail as soon as they were discovered and headed 
the bark toward the beach. Prize crews from the USS Daylight and USS Mount 
Vernon attempted to get the bark off, but rough seas drove the vessel hard 
aground. Although a crew from the USS Mount Vernon was able to set the 
Sophie on fire all but one of the boats sent to the wreck were driven ashore. 
When darkness made it impossible for the guns of the USS Daylight and USS 
Mount Vernon to protect the boat crews, they were captured by Confederate 
cavalry and infantry. During the night a company of artillery from Fort Fisher 
set up several rifled field pieces and the following morning drove the Union 
vessels away. 47 
On 6 November, the USS Mount Vernon returned to Masonboro Inlet 
and discovered another bark and a schooner close along the shoreline. After it 
was apparent that the USS Mount Vernon intended to approach, both ships 
were run ashore near the remains of the Sophie. Both crews escaped ashore 
and the vessels were pounded to pieces in the surf. 48 Yet another schooner was 
discovered off Masonboro Inlet by the USS Cambridge on the morning of 17 
November. That vessel was also driven ashore and burned by a party from the 
USS Cambridge. After their boat swamped, the boarding party was captured on 
the beach by Confederate infantry. 49 The English captain of the schooner and 
three Negro crew members were sent by Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting to 
46 J. M. B. Clitzto to S. P. Lee, 3 November 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 190. 
47 A. J. Trathen to W. A. Parker, 5 November 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 194; A. E. Barnett to J. D. Warren, 
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Charleston so that they could all make their way back to Nassau. 50 That same 
day the USS Daylight drove a small brig into the surf at New Inlet before being 
driven away by the guns of Fort Fisher. 51 
At Shallotte Inlet, the crew of the USS Monticello discovered two 
schooners the following day. The first proved to be the Aricl of Halifax. That 
vessel was run ashore by her crew and was burned by boarding parties from the 
USS Monticello. Before the Ariel could be destroyed the USS Monticello 
noticed a second schooner along shore to the west of Shallotte Inlet. That 
vessel was the Ann Maria of Nassau. After being run ashore, she was towed off 
by the USS Monticello but, sank as a consequence of damage from grounding. 
Both of the vessels were loaded with bags of salt and contained a few kegs of 
lard and barrels of sugar and flour. 52 
While only one steamer had been captured and two destroyed, the 
blockade was clearly making trade in traditional sailing vessels more difficult. 
Out of the fifty-five vessels assigned to the North Atlantic Blockade Squadron 
by December 1862, six were assigned to the Wilmington Station. 53 On 5 
December Rear-Admiral Lee informed Gideon Welles that since the first of 
September a total of twenty vessels had been captured or destroyed in 
attempting to enter Wilmington or one of the shallow inlets north and west of 
the Cape Fear. In addition to the steamer Sunbeam, two barks, two brigs and 
fifteen schooners had been intercepted. 54 The total value of those sailing 
vessels and their cargoes was inconsequential compared to the goods shipped 
through the blockade during the same period on steamers. Perhaps the best 
news that Lee conveyed to Welles in December was notice of the loss of the 
Confederate steamer Kate. While Lee could take no credit for the Kate's 
destruction, news that the steamer had run on obstructions in the Cape Fear 
and sank was welcome. 55 
News of the destruction of the Kate was also overshadowed by 
November reports from the United States consuls in Liverpool and Glasgow. 
Intelligence from both of those centers of British shipping and shipbuilding 
50 Report of W. H. C. Whiting, 19 Novemebr 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 216. 
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confirmed that British and Confederate agents were focusing their efforts to 
run the blockade almost entirely on fast steamers. On 14 November, the consul 
in Liverpool reported that: 
The Confederates and their friends in this country are making 
rather formidable preparations for operations at sea and to get 
supplies into Southern ports. Besides the boats they have in ports 
in different parts of the West Indies, on the way across and in the 
ports in Europe ready and preparing to leave, they have quite a 
number building. They have recently been buying all the fast 
vessels-steamers-they can find for sale, and are now in treaty for 
three of the very fastest and best boats that have been built in 
England. They are new, all alike, 480 tons each, and built to run 
between Dover and Calais. They are side-wheel, built in the best 
possible manner, covered with steel plates instead of iron, and are 
very fast and of light draft of water, and are wanted to run in with 
cargoes from Bermuda and Nassau. 56 
Similarly, the consul in Glasgow reported that: 
Glasgow is now the great resort of Southern emissaries for the 
purchase and outfitting, and also for the building, of iron 
steamers, either to run the blockade as merchant vessels or to 
ravage the seas as ships of war. 57 
In addition to procuring a fleet of fast steamers to conduct business 
through the blockade, Confederates began to extensively reinforce fortifications 
protecting the entrances to the Cape Fear. Fort Caswell on Oak Island and Fort 
Johnson at Smithville had been occupied by North Carolina troops in April of 
1861.58 Under the direction of Major W. H. C. Whiting those fortifications were 
quickly made operational and rearmed. 59 After the fall of fortifications at 
Hatteras Inlet and the invasion of the North Carolina sounds, Brigadier 
General J. R. Anderson was assigned to develop the defenses of the lower Cape 
56 Extracts from Consular Reports Received from Navy Department, 8 December 1862, by S. P. Lee, 
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Fear. 60 Under Anderson the District of Cape Fear was formed. His command 
consisted of 209 officers and approximately 4,000 enlisted men. The defenses of 
the Cape Fear consisted of Fort Caswell, with a garrison of 384 men, Fort 
Johnson, with a garrison of 443 men and several small batteries constructed on 
Confederate Point that were manned by 86 men. 61 
Confederate Point was the weakest of the Cape Fear defenses and after 
Colonel William Lamb was assigned to command the garrison in July 1862 
work on improving the defenses continued without interruption. 62 By 
December 1864, Fort Fisher had become the "Malakoff of the South" with a 
land face extending 682 yards across the Confederate Point peninsula and a sea 
face 1,898 yards long extending south to the Mound Battery. Fort Fisher was 
ultimately equipped with more than forty heavy pieces of ordnance that 
included a 130-pdr Armstrong and a 170-pdr Blakely rifle. 63 In February 1863, 
Commander A. L. Case reported the Confederates were "working like beavers 
in adding to the defenses of New Inlet. " Case also informed S. P. Lee that the 
Federal Point light had been torn down and the brick used in the construction 
of shot furnaces in the new batteries. He also confirmed that the rebels under 
Colonel Lamb's command were using steam machinery to lift sand used in the 
construction of the earthworks. 64 Another large earthwork, Fort Anderson, 
was constructed on the west bank of the Cape Fear River five miles above Fort 
Johnson. 
The Blockade Strategy Board recommended the capture of Wilmington 
in 1861. However, not all their recommendations were acted upon by the 
United States Navy. Other strategic priorities undermined several proposals to 
capture the Cape Fear fortifications and close the Port of Wilmington. After the 
capture of Hatteras Inlet and Roanoke Island, the Navy focused on capturing 
the principal coastal towns accessible to the sounds instead of Wilmington. In 
December 1863, Admiral Lee complained to Welles that: 
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The capture of Hatteras Inlet and their vessels put a stop to the 
rebel depredations from that quarter on our commerce. The easy 
capture of Fort Macon gave us the possession of Beaufort Harbor; 
thus we had all the seacoast of North Carolina, except 
Wilmington, the capture of which was as easy then as difficult 
now, and the army then had there many vessels and boats suitable 
for the transportation required. But the complete acquisition of 
the seacoast was abandoned in favor of the sound towns. 65 
In May 1862, the Navy Department suggested that Goldsborough attempt 
to capture Fort Caswell but, before he could initiate an attack countermanding 
orders arrived instructing the Admiral to abandon any assault on the Cape Fear 
fortifications. 66 When McClellan's campaign to capture Richmond by 
advancing up the peninsula between the York and James rivers failed, the 
Navy shifted the focus of its attention to Charleston for the "fall of Charleston 
is the fall of Satan's kingdom. "67 When S. P. Lee took command of the North 
Atlantic Blockade Squadron he resumed planning for an attack on the Cape 
Fear fortifications. The success of Lee's plan was contingent upon the use of 
ironclads to reduce Fort Caswell and once in command of the river, to attack 
Fort Fisher from the rear. Although Fox felt that the rate of fire of the 
monitors was too slow to effectively reduce Fort Caswell, the Navy proceeded 
with plans to close Wilmington. Planning for the attack continued until the 
end of December when the USS Monitor was lost in a gale off Cape Hatteras. 68 
Loss of the Monitor, according to Gustavus Fox, was credited with "breaking up 
the whole affair. "69 
Welles felt it best to "push on to Charleston and strengthen Du Pont" for 
an attack on those fortifications. He and Fox continued to promise Lee light 
draft monitors that could be employed in an attack on Wilmington but none 
were delivered. 70 Ultimately, the proposed attacks on Fort Fisher and Fort 
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Caswell were abandoned in favor of a plan to land troops on Smith Island. 71 
When sufficient army support for the operation could not be obtained, that 
proposal was also abandoned. 72 In May, Lee confided to Welles that he did not 
feel that "a purely naval attack can succeed in getting possession of either or 
both entrances to Wilmington. " For Lee the "difficulties of attack and the 
shoalness of the water on the bars and in the entrances to the Cape Fear River 
make the difficulty greater at Wilmington than at Charleston. " He was also 
acutely aware of the "strength and extent of defenses" the Confederates had 
developed by the spring of 1863.73 
The strength of Confederate fortifications and the difficulties associated 
with navigating the inlets under fire prevented a Union attack to close the 
Cape Fear, but the strength of the Cape Fear Blockade Squadron was 
periodically increased. By mid-January 1863, the number of steamers 
blockading off the Cape Fear had increased to fifteen. 74 One of those vessels was 
the Columbia, the first captured blockade runner assigned to help maintain the 
Wilmington blockade. 75 The Columbia had been captured off the coast of 
Florida by the USS Santiago dc Cuba, condemned as a prize and purchased 
from the Key West Prize Court by the U. S. Navy. 76 After being converted for 
use as a gunboat the USS Columbia was assigned to the Cape Fear Blockade 
Squadron. The screw steamer was also the first blockade ship to be lost off the 
Cape Fear. 
Late in the afternoon of 14 January 1863, the USS Columbia was headed 
in towards Masonboro Inlet. As the vessel approached the shore in the 
gathering darkness, it grounded in breaking water. Unable to back the vessel 
off, the crew attempted to lighten ship by throwing coal and ballast overboard. 
Their attempt failed. On the morning of 16 January a southeasterly gale drove 
the vessel closer in to shore. As a last resort the guns were spiked and thrown 
overboard and the foremast was cut away. By the morning of the 16th, 
Confederates had set up a battery on the beach and drove off the USS 
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Cambridge and USS Penobscot attempting to assist the crew of the USS 
Columbia. The following day Confederates set fire to the wreck and the vessel 
was completely destroyed. 77 
Loss of the USS Columbia at Masonboro Inlet was a consequence of 
Union efforts to curb blockade running through a. series of small inlets along 
the North Carolina coast north and west of the entrances to the Cape Fear. The 
increase in United States vessel strength off New and Old Inlet shifted some 
activity to those unguarded but navigable inlets. Numerous schooners had 
been discovered in the vicinity of Masonboro and Shallotte Inlets and steamers 
had begun to put both passengers and cargoes ashore at those more remote 
locations. On 29 December 1862, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant E. Hooker of the 
USS Victoria reported discovering a steamer off Little River South Carolina. 78 
Hooker described the vessel as "very rakish" with "dark-colored paint" and 
indicated that he was "confident that the steamer communicated with the 
land. '179 
Three months later, on 21 March 1863, the crew of the USS Victoria and 
the blockade schooner William Bacon found another steamer off Little River. 
The vessel proved to be a "large side-wheel steamer, without masts, except a 
lower foremast, painted lead color.... " The USS Victoria gave chase and after 
firing a half-dozen shots the steamer hove to and hoisted English colors. The 
vessel proved to be the Nicolai I from Nassau with a cargo of dry goods, arms 
and ammunition. After being driven away from Charleston, the captain of the 
Nicolai I decided to attempt to enter Little River or Wilmington. 80 
Extending the blockade to those shallow inlets in the vicinity of the Cape 
Fear had an impact on the blockade running activity. Small schooners and 
brigs that had carried on an extensive trade with the Bahamas and West Indies 
through those inlets were captured or destroyed in increasing numbers making 
the trade extremely dangerous. Capture of the Nicolai I demonstrated that 
steamers attempting to trade through those inlets were also clearly at risk in 
spite of their speed. As the blockade tightened, blockade runners shifted the 
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focus of their activities to the two main inlets of the Cape Fear and almost 
entirely abandoned the use of sailing vessels. In March 1863, Commander A. L. 
Case pointed out that: 
None but quick vessels in good order can be of any service off 
New Inlet. The class of vessels now violating the blockade is far 
different from those attempting it a year ago, and the batteries are 
so numerous that we can do but little, if anything, after they are 
once by us. 81 
To intercept that new class of swift steamers, a different strategy was required. 
The Wilmington Squadron was divided into two separate stations; one to 
blockade the traditional approach at Smithville and a second to guard New 
Inlet. At night, the preferred time for blockade runners to make their critical 
run across the bar, picket boats were stationed in the channel to watch for 
steamers. Their objective was to give warning to the gunboats that a vessel was 
attempting to escape or to enter the Cape Fear. 82 
That duty was frequently dangerous. The bar was 'a dynamic 
environment under the guns of Confederate fortifications. Early on the 
morning of 14 February, Acting Master William Earle was in command of the 
second cutter of the USS Dacotah anchored in the channel southwest of Fort 
Caswell. 83 About 4 a. m., Earle noticed a "long, low steamer, with two masts and 
two smokestacks" approaching from the west. Earle was afraid of being run 
down as the steamer was traveling so fast that the hull was visible for only two 
minutes. 84 "With much chagrin" Captain Sands reported that he could not see 
how to prevent the success of blockade runners without "more vessels to string 
along the beach in sight of each other, and a line, or even one steamer, outside, 
to intercept before they make the land.... "85 
On 26 March, Captain Case suggested that: 
Vessels farther from the inlet than we usually are will have the 
best chance. Where we lay, and where some vessels always 
should be, it is a dash with them, if seen, and they are soon under 
81 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 12 March 1863, ORN, 1,8, p. 50. 
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the batteries; if not seen, the result is of course the same. When 
going out, of a dark night, it is pretty much the same thing; the 
ground is clear for their light draft, and they have pilots who 
know every inch of it. Such vessels as this are visible long before 
we can see them, and they come, after seeing us, with a full head 
of steam and are by us and away in a jiffy86 
Sands had suggested that an outer line of vessels be formed beyond the stations 
of the force already deployed off New Inlet to intercept vessels approaching the 
Cape Fear. 87 Commander Case agreed that their "chief hope, of success in 
preventing the inward violation of the blockade will be in finding the vessels 
farther away" and also recommended an "offshore as well as an inshore 
lookout vessel. "88 On 26 February, Captain Sands reported another violation of 
the blockade and again suggested an "outer line of cruising vessels" to capture 
vessels driven off or identified in escaping by picket boats on the bar. 89 Sands 
also recommended the use of a "low-pressure tug for each side of the reef, with 
a rifle howitzer to sweep the coast at night above New Inlet and below Western 
Inlet. "90 Commander Case reiterated the usefulness of the tugs especially if 
they were "fast, with engine and boiler in first-rate order. " Case was not sure 
the inshore blockade could be "effective without.... tugs or some small and very 
fast steamers, such as can move about at night without being seen and signaled, 
as all the large vessels are now. "91 The new strategy proved to be highly 
effective and significantly increased the risk to blockade runners. 
The tug Violet was assigned to the Wilmington Squadron on 27 March 
1863 and four days later S. P. Lee informed Captain A. L. Case that the 
department was "preparing three light, swift steamers for duty off Wilmington, 
which, doubtless, when completed and sent, will materially strengthen that 
blockade. "92 With shallow draft vessels and tugs a slightly different blockade 
strategy could be adopted off Wilmington. During the night the Violet was 
assigned a station close to the bar. Three other vessels were assigned positions 
86 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 26 March 1863, ORN, 1,8, pp. 630-631. 
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that formed a crescent further off shore. The northern and southern vessels 
were to move in near the shore under cover of darkness and cruise slowly up 
and down the coastline as close as conditions permitted. 93 To help the vessels 
navigate safely close to shore, a light was placed on the USS Iroquis' day station 
buoy. 94 With an outer line of vessels cruising from the outer shoal off New 
Inlet and Rich Inlet, Commander Armstrong of the USS State of Georgia felt 
that they "might get them in a net and hope to put a stop to this nefarious 
neutral traffic ...... 95 Rear-Admiral Lee suggested that Captain 
Case assign the 
USS Nippon to cruise on an arc about 30 miles out from [Rich Inlet] to pick up 
some of the blockade breakers. 96 
In spite of efforts to tighten the Cape Fear blockade, illegal steamer traffic 
at Wilmington increased. It was not until 11 June 1863 that the Wilmington 
Squadron was able to capture one of the steamers operating with regularity 
through the blockade. That vessel was the Calypso. After sighting the steamer 
from her day anchorage 6 miles off the Western Bar, the USS Florida was able 
to chase down the Calypso by "crowding canvas.... and by burning slush in the 
furnaces. "97 
Capture of the Calypso was eclipsed by the appearance of one of the 
ironclads built at Wilmington. On the morning of 30 June, the armored vessel 
was identified lying off Smithville in the company of a powerful paddle-wheel 
steamer. Clearly the vessel had "steam up, and [was] apparently ready to come 
out the first favorable opportunity. "98 Captain Charles Boggs of the USS 
Sacramento wrote S. P. Lee to request assistance and warn that: 
The vessels off the Western bar are all cripples in their engines, 
and should the raid come from that quarter before reinforcements 
arrive, they will be fortunate if they escape capture, as to prevent 
such vessels from coming out is impossible on either side with 
such vessels as compose the blockading squadron. 99 
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The appearance of a Confederate ironclad at Smithville caused a furor within 
the Wilmington Squadron. Acting Paymaster William F. Keeler of the USS 
Florida described the situation in a letter to his wife Anna. On 13 July 1863, 
Keeler wrote: 
A terrible disease is prevailing in the fleet here--commanding 
officers seem to be the most severely attacked with it though no 
one as yet has been lost. It is termed "ram fever" & is supposed to 
be brought on by the occasional sights at a rebel ironclad passing 
up & down the river between Fort Caswell & Wilmington. 100 
Although the CSS North Carolina would never conduct an offensive 
operation, the presence of the ironclad off Battery Island psychologically 
strengthened Confederate defenses. 
Perhaps as a consequence of the arrival of the CSS North Carolina and 
the increased level of alert associated with the consternation it caused, the 
Wilmington Squadron captured or destroyed nine steamers between 12 July 
and 21 October 1863. The first of those vessels was the twin screw steamer Kate, 
the second vessel to bear that name. The Kate was headed into Old Inlet and 
Wilmington after being chased away from Charleston. After being discovered 
by the USS Penobscot, the blockade runner was run aground. A crew from the 
USS Penobscot destroyed the vessel's machinery and set the ship afire in spite 
of fire from a Confederate battery. 101 Shortly after dawn on 1 August 1863, 
Captain James Trathen of the USS Mount Vernon discovered that Confederates 
had refloated the Kate and were towing the steamer toward New Inlet. In spite 
of accurate fire from Armstrong and Whitworth guns, the USS Mount Vernon 
was able to drive the salvage crew away from the Kate and tow the vessel out of 
range. The USS Iroquois towed the wrecked steamer to Beaufort. 102 
The strategy of keeping vessels in close to the bar during dark nights paid 
off when the paddle steamer Merrimac was sighted running out of New Inlet 
about 2 a. m. on 24 July 1863. Although the Merrimac and another steamer 
escaped during the night, the USS Iroquois steamed north up the coast and at 
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daylight rediscovered the Merrimac. With the assistance of another steamer 
the blockade runner was captured after a chase of more than three hours. 103 
Because of the speed and condition of the Merrimac, Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee 
requested that the vessel be obtained by the Navy, fitted out for service on the 
blockade and sent back to the Wilmington Squadron. l°4 
In early August, Acting Rear-Admiral Lee reported the escape of a screw 
steamer from New Inlet and took the opportunity to point out to Welles that 
the USS Mount Vernon was unable to catch the blockade breaker "for want of 
speed. " That vessel had been on the blockade for ten months and was in bad 
need of an overhaul. Only the USS Minnesota was on station at the time as the 
USS Iroquois was in Beaufort with the Kate and coaling and the USS James 
Adger was occupied in positioning the Frying Pan Lightship. Lee also pointed 
out that the three vessels on the south side of Cape Fear were also in a state of 
disrepair. Both the USS Chocura and USS Victoria were too slow to chase 
effectively because of badly needed repairs and the USS Sacramento's valves 
were cut so badly that "she must probably be very soon sent north for new 
ones ...... los Lee reiterated the complications created 
by geography and the threat 
of Confederate ironclads and suggested that from fifteen to eighteen steamers 
were required to effectively blockade "the most difficult port to close on the 
coast of the United States.... " Two ironclads were necessary at Wilmington, one 
to guard each entrance to the Cape Fear. In the event that ironclads were not 
available, Lee wanted warships carrying "effective broadside batteries" and two 
similar vessels to keep their stations when supplies and repairs were 
necessary. "' 
The dramatic sinking of the USS Hatteras by the commerce raider CSS 
Alabama off Galveston had almost as profound an effect on the vessels on the 
Wilmington Station as did the appearance of Confederate ironclads in the 
lower Cape Fear River. On 11 January 1863, the CSS Alabama, under the 
command of Captain Raphael Semmes, drew the steamer USS Hatteras away 
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from a fleet dispatched to recapture Galveston. In a brief battle the CSS 
Alabama sank the USS Hatteras and escaped. 107 As early as February 1863, 
Captain B. F. Sands warned S. P. Lee that: 
I can not send one vessel alone to chase, if she is not able to cope 
with any rebel afloat, but must send an additional one to look out 
for her, for any bold buccaneer may draw her away from the 
squadron and destroy her, as was done with the Hatteras.... Many 
of our vessels are not a bit better than was the Hatteras, and could 
not be expected to make a better fight with such a foe, and would 
only be doomed to go down as she did, with her flag flying. '°8 
That anxiety persisted and in some cases undermined the willingness of 
captains to put their vessels at risk in chasing unidentified steamers. On 20 
August 1863, the USS Florida, USS Montgomery and USS Victoria chased two 
unidentified steamers off the Western Bar. Both vessels displayed lights, 
refused to answer the designated Coston signal and did not attempt to escape as 
most blockade runners. Lieutenant MacDiarmid of the USS Victoria thought 
one of the vessels was "a bark-rigged armed steamer, and endeavored to entice 
him from the squadron, as her movements were certainly very strange, going 
ahead slowly when he did, stopping when he did, showing a light and 
gradually working to the southward and westward.... '°9 MacDiarmid "deemed 
it prudent" to return to the fleet rather than pursue the strange steamer. "" 
In spite of the condition of the vessels blockading the Cape Fear, the 
appearance of ironclads and the threat of the CSS Alabama and other 
Confederate war steamers, an unprecedented number of blockade running 
steamers were captured or destroyed during the fall of 1863. The first of those 
was the screw steamer Hcbc. That vessel was run ashore north of Fort Fisher. 
A boarding party from the USS Nipl: on attempted to destroy the vessel and 
was captured after their boats capsized and they made their way to shore. 
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Union vessels and Confederate artillery fought over the wreck until two 
valuable Whitworth field pieces were captured by a landing party from the USS 
Minnesota. ' 
After the Hebe skirmish several blockade runners were driven ashore 
under the guns of Fort Fisher. 112 There grounded vessels were relatively safe 
from the Union fleet and Confederates could refloat them unless 
environmental conditions prevented that operation. The steamer Arabian 
proved to be one of two blockade runners discovered ashore by the USS 
Niphon on the morning of 8 September. 113 That vessel was apparently chased 
ashore by the USS Nansemond and was completely destroyed by the sea before 
a salvage operation could be organized. 114 On 22 September, the steamer Juno 
was captured by the USS Connecticut approximately 20 miles south of Cape 
Lookout. The USS Connecticut had been ordered to cruise offshore after "the 
moon went down" as several blockade runners in the Cape Fear were expected 
to attempt to escape. The morning after the Juno was captured, the Confederate 
steamer Phantom was forced ashore near Topsail Inlet by the USS Connecticut. 
Like Juno, the Phantom was discovered about 55 miles northeast of New Inlet. 
In a report to S. P. Lee, Commander John Almy of the Connecticut pointed out 
that, "both of these steamers were fallen in with on an east by north line from 
New Inlet. " The captures illustrated "the importance of having an offshore 
cruiser of two from among our fast steamers. "115 By mid-October Captain Sands 
reported that he had directed vessels coaling at Beaufort to: 
leave.... in the afternoon tide, when it is possible to steer south for 
50 or 60 miles, or until daylight, to be at that time about where 
blockade runners would be escaping out of New Inlet. This will 
give me an outsider nearly every day, and does not take any more 
time away from the immediate blockade of the coast. 116 
111 S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, 24 August 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 165-166, J. B. Breck to Captain A. L. 
Case, 18 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 165-166, J. B. Breck to Captain A. L. Case, 18 August 1863, 
ORN, I, 9, pp. 166-167, Pierce Crosby to S. P. Lee, 8 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 170-171 and W. 
H. C. Whiting to Secretary James a. Seddon, 24 August 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 173-174. 
112 S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, 11 September 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 193-194. 
113 Ibid. 
114 S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, 29 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 221. 
115 J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 216-217. 
116 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 235-236. 
68 
On 4 November, the inbound steamer Margaret and Jessie was 
discovered running south along the beach approximately six miles above Fort 
Fisher by the USS Niphon. USS Nippon chased the Margaret and Jessie toward 
New Inlet until the blockade runner sighted the Howquah guarding the bar. A 
shot from the USS Howquah forced the Margaret and Jessie to steam off shore. 
After an all night chase by USS Howquah, the USS Nanscinond and USS 
Keystone State took up pursuit and drove the blockade runner into range of an 
army transport, the Fulton, that took Margaret and Jessie in tow after a brief 
disagreement about authority over the prize. 117 No doubt capture of the 
Margaret and Jessie was in part due to Captain D. B. Ridgely's decision to order 
vessels to cruise offshore. Ridgley notified Lee that: 
I have ordered the three fastest vessels offshore, viz: the 
Nansemond, the Keystone State, and the Florida; the Nanscmond 
to cruise from Cape Lookout 60 miles south, and return to the 
same line north; the Keystone State to take a position 70 miles E. 
S. E. from New inlet and cruise 30 miles S. W. and 30 miles N. E. 
from the position of E. S> E. of New Inlet; the Florida to take a 
position 40 miles S. by E. from the light-boat off Frying Pan Shoals 
and cruise 30 miles E. N. E. from the position given her and 30 
miles W. S. W. 118 
Four days later the USS James Adger discovered the Confederate steamer 
Cornubia about three miles south of Masonboro Inlet. After a short chase 
ended with the appearance of the USS Niphon, the steamer was run ashore 
and abandoned. As the tide was rising, the James Adger was able to pull the 
vessel free-119 Two days later and enroute to Beaufort for coal the USS James 
Adger happened upon the steamer Robert E. Lee approximately 25 miles 
southwest of the Beaufort Bar. After a surprisingly short chase the Robert E. 
Lee hove to and a boarding party from the. USS James Adger took possession. 120 
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The USS Niplion made one of the most dramatic captures on 9 
November 1863. Returning from one chase the USS Nippon sighted a steamer 
running south along the surf near Masonboro Inlet. When it was apparent 
that escape was impossible, the unidentified steamer rammed the USS Nippon 
carrying away the bowsprit, part of the stem and the starboard boats. After 
firing on the steamer at point blank range the vessel was carried by boarding. 
The USS Niphon's prize proved to be the Ella and Annie. 121 On the evening of 
10 November, the USS Howquah also made a quick and important capture. 
While cruising near the shore 13 miles north of Fort Fisher, the USS Howquah 
discovered a steamer heading south along the shore. After a shot "glanced 
against the gallows frame of her engine" the vessel hove to, and was boarded. 
That steamer proved to be the Ella running in from Bermuda. 122 
Much to the chagrin of the North Atlantic Blockade Squadron, the army 
transport steamer Fulton, enroute from Hilton Head, South Carolina to New 
York, took possession of the blockade runner Banshee south of Cape Lookout 
on 21 November 1863. The Fulton sighted the Banshee early in the morning 
and gave chase. Shortly after giving chase to the blockade runner the `crew of 
the Fulton noticed another steamer following the Banshee. As the Fulton was 
faster that vessel took possession of the prize when shells from both the Fulton 
and the USS Grand Gulf forced the blockade runner to surrender. As had been 
the case with the Margaret and Jessie, the Fulton's officers and crew refused to 
give up their prize to the USS Grand Gulf. After a brief confrontation the army 
transport steamed northeast toward New York with the Banshee in tow. '23 
On the south side of Smith Island success and the blockade runners were 
more elusive. Only one vessel was destroyed during the period. Off 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet the day after the Phantom was destroyed, the crew of the 
USS Maratanza discovered the remains of a steamer. The vessel had been run 
ashore during the night and the cargo removed. Surprisingly, the steamer had 
been put to the torch without attracting the attention of any of the vessels on 
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the blockade. That ship ultimately proved to be the Elizabeth, inbound with a 
cargo of iron and saltpeter. 124 Although vessels continued to use the Western 
Inlet to the Cape Fear, Commander Harrell reported his "utter inability with 
my present force to prevent it. "125 Harrell complained of the poor condition of 
the vessels under his command and requested three more fast vessels to help 
make the blockade effective. 126 Commander Pierce Crosby of the USS Florida 
reported being quickly out distanced by a steamer south of Cape Fear on 30 
November. According to his calculations "the USS Florida, with a full head of 
steam, averaging 22 and 23 pounds, with all sail and strong fair wind, made 10 
knots. "127 
Arrival and assignment of the converted blockade runner USS Calypso 
provided at least one fast vessel for the Western Bar. 128 Ironically, the first 
prize of the USS Calypso was not one of the fast steamers but the schooner 
Herald from Nassau. 129 At dawn on 6 December another blockade runner fell 
into the hands of the Western Bar Squadron. The iron screw steamer Ceres 
was discovered aground on the south side of Smith Island by the USS Aries 
and tug Violet. Crews from both Union vessels attempted to put out the fires 
set by personnel of the Ceres but were forced to abandon the ship when 
batteries at Fort Caswell and Oak Island began to shell the wreck. Early the next 
day the Ceres was discovered to have floated off with the tide. After drifting 
out of range of Confederate batteries, the vessel was taken in tow by the USS 
Marataniza. 130 Although the vessel and cargo had been badly damaged by fire, 
letters captured by the boarding party provided insight into Confederate 
blockade running. 
Before the end of December two additional steamers were destroyed. On 
the night of 11 December the USS Howquah found the steamer General 
Beaureguard heading down the beach toward New Inlet. Howqualt succeeded 
in forcing the General Beaureguard ashore and reported that the blockade 
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runner became a total wreck as a consequence of the heavy sea that was 
running. 131 On the south side of Frying Pan the "notorious" steamer Herald 
was run on the shoal during the night on 19 December 1863. After being chased 
by the USS Connecticut, the Herald was discovered hard aground on the west 
side of the shoal on the morning of 20 December by the USS Governor 
Buckingham. In spite of five days of extensive efforts to pull the Herald into 
deeper water the hull broke across the bottom and the salvage effort was 
abandoned. Only a portion of the cargo was recovered. 132 
Although the vessels blockading the Western Bar had not achieved the 
success registered off New Inlet, effective techniques for capturing blockade 
breakers had been developed. By the end of 1863, S. P. Lee issued detailed 
instructions to the commanding officers of all vessels on the Wilmington 
Station. Lee's 16 December 1863 instructions reflected experience gained during 
two and a half frustrating years of efforts to close the port of Wilmington. 
Off each inlet to the Cape Fear, Lee designated three primary day stations. 
North of Frying Pan, stations were established off New Inlet, off Masonboro 
Inlet and at the eastern end of Smith Island. On the -west side of Frying Pan 
stations were located off the Western Bar, off Lockwoods Folly and off the 
southeast end of Smith Island. Between those primary stations, intermediate 
stations were to be established in accordance with the number of steam vessels 
available. During the day, vessels anchored at those stations were ordered to 
maintain watches but, the officers and crew on duty at night were encouraged 
to sleep for eight to ten hours after dawn. Unless absolutely necessary, steamers 
were not to move about during the day to conserve their coal. One-half hour 
before sunset vessels were to raise their anchors and get underway for their 
night stations in close to shore. 133 
Lee's strategy was based on two lines of vessels operating off each Cape 
Fear River inlet. On dark nights and before and after the moon had set, a small 
fast steamer was assigned to guard the bar. That vessel was to notify the fleet of 
an attempted escape using Coston's signals. Lee was careful to point out that 
the fleet should not be notified until the blockade runner's retreat could be "cut 
off by getting between him and the bar or coast. " Too many blockade runners 
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had been warned by premature signals and been able to return to the protection 
of Confederate batteries to await another opportunity. Because the bar was a 
dangerous place at night, Lee cautioned that "the distance to be kept from the 
bar, the batteries, and the beach, etc., must be regulated by the state of the 
weather and light, and the zeal and good sense of the commanding officer. "134 
To ensure that blockade runners did not escape to sea once discovered, a fast 
steamer was assigned to cruise five miles offshore of the senior officer's night 
station. Off New Inlet that vessel was to cruise slowly back and forth along a 
north to south course and off the Western bar that steamer was to cruise slowly 
back and forth along an east to west track. 135 Swift steamers on the outer line 
were to take over a chase from "dull" vessels unable to make sufficient speed to 
run down blockade runners. On special instruction from Lee, some swift 
steamers would be ordered to blockade off Cape Fear and Cape Lookout Light in 
order to intercept blockade runners that had escaped the inner line of the 
blockade or vessels like the Cornubia and Robert E. Lee that were laying to in 
order to time their final run through the blockade. 136 
To the north of New Inlet near Masonboro and to the south of the 
Western Bar off Lockwoods Folly, the senior officer was to station his fastest 
vessels. By December 1863, it was readily apparent the blockade runners 
approached the beach at those points before making a final run along the 
coastline to the protection of Fort Fisher or Fort Caswell. Where possible those 
locations should be occupied in force to permit more than one steamer to be 
chased without leaving the coastline unguarded for others. Unless prevented 
by thick weather, those vessels were to be underway all night with leadsmen on 
each side of the ship sounding constantly to prevent a reoccurrence of the loss 
of the USS Columbia. In thick weather vessels were not to be "huddled 
together" and every effort was to be made to avoid collisions. Collisions were a 
major consideration as Lee ordered that "each commanding officer should 
make sure that no lights, other than signals, should be seen from his vessel, 
and that the lights on board are so covered, placed, and used that they can not 
134 S. P. Lee to Commanding Officers of Blockading Vessels off Wilmington, 16 December 1863, 
ORN, I, 9, pp. 355-356. 
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ORN, 1,9, p. 358. 
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be seen through windows or portholes, in opening doors, mustering watch, etc. 
The senior had the discretion to position a steamer with a light that could be 
used by vessels cruising at night for taking bearings. 137 
Particular care was to be taken in coaling vessels on the blockade. If at all 
possible that was to be accomplished during the period when the moon was 
filling and "light nights" made blockade running less likely. The senior officer 
at Wilmington was authorized to schedule coaling, but was instructed to see 
that there should only be two, or, at the outside three, vessels at Beaufort for 
that purpose at a time. The commanding officer of each steamer going to 
Beaufort to coal was to take the most direct route and not delay the trip by 
cruising for blockade runners. However, in the event that a blockade runner 
was discovered enroute or returning from Beaufort, latitude was provided to 
give chase if there were fair prospects of success. 138 
To increase both safety and efficiency Lee ordered that each vessel be 
properly supplied and equipped. Each ship's boats were to be suitable for 
beaching and boarding and all were to be equipped with a good kedge and a 
strong cable. Each was to be manned by good oarsmen and a skillful officer. 
Each blockader was to carry a spare anchor, two anchor stocks and "a large, 
strong hawser, capable of towing or hauling off stranded vessels. " Each was to 
be supplied with double the usual supply of leads and lead lines. The officer of 
the deck was to be issued a deck board showing the time of high and low water, 
moon rise and set and sun rise and set. A varnished sketch of the navigation 
chart showing the shore line, the 1,2 and 3 fathom lines, significant soundings, 
the positions of ranges and the anchorages was also to be kept on deck along 
with a compass. 139 Each officer was also supplied: 
.... general squadron and 
blockading instruc: tions, the general 
orders and circulars of the Department and of this squadron, 
statement of periodical returns required from commanding 
officers, and extracts from consular dispatches lately received by 
me relative to the character and movement of vessels in the 
interests of the rebels. 14° 
137 S. P. Lee to Commanding Officers of Blockading Vessels off Wilmington, 16 December 1863, 
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The strategies developed during 1862 and 1863, and the buildup in vessel 
strength in 1864 produced more encouraging results. In addition, the closing of 
Savannah and more particularly the intense blockade at Charleston, South 
Carolina shifted the focus of blockade running to Wilmington in 1864. In 
addition several captured blockade runners were assigned to the Wilmington 
Squadron in 1864, thus increasing the speed of blockading vessels. 
While blockade running seemed to shift to New Inlet during the fall and 
winter of 1863, activity on the Cape Fear focused on the west side of Frying Pan 
Shoals in January 1864. On 3 January 1864, the USS Fahkee discovered the 
Bendigo aground and in flames. 141 A survey of the vessel revealed that the 
cargo had been entirely removed. Apparently the captain of the Bendigo 
mistook the remains of the Elizabeth as a blockader and ran into shoal water 
attempting to pass inside that wreck. 142 In attempting to get the Bcndigo off, the 
USS Iron Age got aground and ultimately had to be destroyed. 143 The USS 
Montgomery discovered another blockade runner, the Dare, to the southwest 
of Lockwoods Folly Inlet on the morning of 7 January. The USS Mongtomery 
gave chase and was joined by the USS Aries, a blockade runner converted for 
blockade duty. After a chase of more than six hours the Dare was run aground 
on the beach northeast of Georgetown, South Carolina and destroyed by fire. 144 
At daylight on the morning of 11 January two other steamers were 
destroyed on the beach west of Lockwoods Folly Inlet. The first was the Ranger 
chased ashore by the USS Daylight, USS Governor Buckingham and USS 
Aries. 145 While crews from those vessels labored to destroy the Ranger smoke 
was observed to the west in the vicinity of Shallotte Inlet. The USS Aries was 
dispatched to give chase but returned to report a double-screw steamer ashore 
and on fire. That vessel proved to be the Vesta, unsuccessfully chased during 
the night by the USS Quaker City, USS Tuscarora and USS Keystone State. 146 
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During the dark of the moon in February, seven vessels were captured or 
destroyed off Wilmington. With the exception of the small steamer Spunkie, 
which was discovered ashore on the beach west of Fort Caswell and the steamer 
Pet chased down by the USS Montgomery off Lockwoods Folly, all of the 
blockade runners were intercepted on the north side of Cape Fear. 147 The first 
was the Wild Dayrell which was found ashore and empty in Stump Inlet on 2 
February by the USS Sassacus. After efforts to pull the Wild Dayrell off proved 
unsuccessful, the vessel was set on fire and shelled by both the USS Sassacus 
and USS Florida. 148 After assisting in the destruction of the Wild Dayrcll, the 
USS Sassacus returned to her station along the "Bermuda line" about daylight 
on 4 February. At 7 a. m. lookouts discovered a steamer to the north and the 
Sassacus gave chase. Because of her speed, almost 13 knots, the USS Sassacus 
was able to overtake the steamer. Rather than be captured the captain of the 
blockade runner, the Nutfield, headed the vessel into New River Inlet where 
she was run ashore and abandoned. Being unable to refloat the Nutfield, the 
boarding party from the Sassacus recovered as much of the cargo as practical 
and put the ship to the torch. With the assistance of the USS Florida, the USS 
Sassacus shelled the wreck to destroy both the hull and machinery. 149 
Three days later on the morning of 6 February, the USS Fort Jackson 
discovered the twin-screw steamer Dee aground and on fire one mile south of 
Masonboro Inlet. Being unable to get the Dec off, the USS Fort Jackson shelled 
her hull and machinery. A boarding party from the USS Niplion threw 170 
pigs of lead overboard on 7 February and reported that the vessel was a 
complete wreck. 15° Cruising the same area at dawn on 10 February, the USS 
Florida found a paddle-wheel steamer, the Fanny and Jenny, heading 
southward along the beach and steamed to cut off the vessel. While underway 
the crew of the USS Florida noticed a screw steamer, the Emily, aground off the 
beach to the north of the chase. The captain of the paddle-wheel ran the vessel 
ashore north of Masonboro Inlet and was killed, along with the paymaster, 
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attempting to escape to the beach. The crew was captured and both the Fanny 
and Jenny and Emily were burned because the fire from Confederate 
sharpshooters and Whitworth rifled guns on the beach prevented attempts to 
get the vessels afloat-151 
Responding to a congratulatory letter from Gustavus Fox concerning the 
number of blockade runners captured or destroyed in February, Acting Rear- 
Admiral Lee reiterated the need for additional fast vessels and the necessity for 
maintaining cruisers offshore. He wrote: 
A modern blockading squadron has much more to do than merely 
threatening an entrance. It should intercept runners where 
daylight shows them after a long night's run from either end of 
their lines. In no other way can a wooden blockade be made 
effective. Out runners can not be stopped just off an entrance 
which -they can pass any dark night. 152 
Admiral Lee's point was well made in March and again in May 1864. With 
twenty-one steamers assigned to the Cape Fear, four could be assigned to cruise 
offshore along the preferred routes to Bermuda and Nassau. 153 In March the 
Scotia was captured 65 miles south-southeast of Cape Fear by the USS 
Connecticut and the Don was chased down off Beaufort by the USS Pequot. 154 
The USS Grand Gulf cruising south of Cape Fear captured the steamer Mary 
Ann. 155 The success of Lee's offshore cruisers was offset somewhat by the loss 
of the USS Peterhoff off the east side of Smith Island on 6 March 1864. The USS 
Peterhoff had only been on station off New Inlet for a few weeks when the USS 
Monticello rammed and sank the converted blockade runner. Although no 
one was lost the vessel was a total loss. 156 
The blockade failed to produce the kind of results in April that it had in 
February and March 1864. One indication of the reason was provided by the 
escaped mulatto servant of Colonel Lamb. The man informed Captain B. F. 
151 Pierce Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 473-474 and Pierce Crosby to S. P. 
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152 S. P. Lee to G. V. Fox, 20 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 495-497. 
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Sands that the blockade runners had altered their tactics and abandoned 
running along the shoreline. Instead they were running directly through the 
fleet at high speed. A light positioned on the Mound Battery was installed to 
assist the blockade runners in their dash for New Inlet. 157 In response, Captain 
Sands adjusted the stations of the vessels off New Inlet and the Western Bar. 158 
A sketch submitted to S. P. Lee identified a line of nine stations aligned parallel 
to the shoreline and approximately five miles offshore. Beyond that line two 
vessels were assigned to cruise back and forth parallel to the inner line of 
stations and two miles further offshore. Another fast steamer was assigned to 
steam back and forth, four miles beyond those and along a line parallel to the 
northern steamer in the secondary line. The steamers USS Nansemond, USS 
Britannia and USS Kansas occupied the center stations of the inshore line and 
the USS Mount Vernon and USS Niphon guarded the southern and northern 
extremities respectively. The two steamers on the second line were the USS 
Tuscarora and the USS Grand Gulf and the offshore vessel east of the USS 
Grand Gulf was the USS Fort Jackson. 159 
Sands also rearranged the stations on the south side of the Cape Fear. 
There the Bald Head Light served the same purpose as the Mound Battery light. 
Off the Western Bar seven vessels were stationed approximately five miles 
offshore in a line that roughly paralleled the shoreline of Oak and Smith 
islands. The center of the line was held by the USS State of Georgia and the east 
and west ends by the USS Victoria and USS Calypso respectively. Another mile 
offshore, the USS Fort Jackson was occasionally assigned to cruise back and 
forth parallel to the inshore line of stations. 16° 
By May twenty ships were assigned to blockade Wilmington. Ten were 
assigned to guard New Inlet and five were stationed off the Western Bar. The 
remaining four vessels were responsible for cruising offshore. On the north 
side of the Cape Fear they cruised along the line vessels took running to and 
from Bermuda. On the south side of Cape Fear they cruised along the line 
vessels took running to and from Nassau. An additional five vessels assigned 
to the Wilmington Squadron were away from the blockade for repairs. 161 In 
157 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 5 May 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 729-731. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 2 May 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 719-720. 
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spite of the vessels in Norfolk for repairs an increase in vessel strength and 
speed combined with Lee's changes in strategy produced results on the 
Wilmington Station in May, June and July 1864. In May, five steamers were 
captured at sea by the vessels assigned to cruise outside the inner line of 
blockaders. The steamer Young Republic was captured by the USS Grand Gulf 
after a chase of more than six hours. 162 The USS Connecticut captured the 
steamers Minnie on 9 May and Greyhound on 10 May east and southeast of 
Cape Lookout. 163 On 15 May, the Kansas chased down the Tristram Shandy 
northeast of New Inlet and two weeks later on 30 May the USS Keystone State 
and USS Massachusetts captured the Caledonia after a three hour chase. 
Throughout the summer and early fall of 1864, offshore cruisers 
registered the greatest success off Wilmington. With the exception of the 
Gcorgiana McCaw, which was driven ashore west of Fort Caswell by the USS 
Maratanza, and the Pevensey, run ashore on Bogue Bank by the supply steamer 
New Bern, offshore cruisers captured eight steamers between 2 June and 10 
September 1864.164 During the "dark of the moon" in early June the Thistle was 
captured by the USS Fort Jackson 130 miles southeast of Cape Lookout and the 
Siren was chased down by the USS Keystone State 80 miles east-northeast of 
Cape Fear. 165 Early the following month the steamer Rouen was captured 
southeast of Cape Fear by the USS Keystone State after a chase of four hours. 
Six days after the Rouen was captured, the USS Fort Jackson chased the steamer 
Boston and captured the vessel after her aging machinery failed. The 
following day 90 miles south of Cape Fear, the USS Gettysburg chased and 
captured the Little Ada. 166 During August only one vessel was captured. On 
the 24th, the USS Keystone State and the USS Gettysburg discovered, chased 
and shelled into submission a steamer at sea south of Cape Fear. The fact that 
the steamer was the Lilian provided no small amount of satisfaction as she had 
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District Court, 6 May 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 7. 
163 J, J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 9 May 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 41 and J. J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 10 May 1864, 
ORN, I, 10, p. 42. 
164 Alfred Everson to M. Haxtun, 2 June 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 114-115 and T. A. Harris to S. P. Lee, 
16 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 136-137. 
165 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 5 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 120 and Pierce Crosby to S. P. Lee, 5 June 
1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 121. 
166 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 8 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 242, W. M'Gloin to R. H. Lamson, 31 July 
1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 246 and S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, 5 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 245-246. 
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become-quite well known because of publicity and the success registered by 
Captain John N. Maffitt. Maffitt, however, was not on board when the little 
steamer was captured. 167 
Two additional vessels, the Elsie and A. D. Vance were captured at sea 
early in September. Like the Lilian, the Elsie was captured by the USS Keystone 
State and USS Quaker City after a shell exploded damaging the vessel and 
setting the cargo of cotton on fire. 168 The A. D. Vance was also captured at sea 
by the USS Santiago de Cuba. After running the guns and-crew aft to trim the 
ship the Union steamer got within range of the A. D. Vance. After a shot across 
the bow, the A. D. Vance hove to and was boarded. 169 
In late "September and early October three additional steamers were 
destroyed. The first, on 25 September, was the Lynx. That steamer was driven 
ashore by the USS Nippon, USS Howquah and USS Governor Buckingham. 
The Lynx steamed out of New Inlet and ran through the blockade at a high rate 
of speed. The USS Nippon, almost run down by the Lynx, fired into the 
blockade runner before it disappeared in the darkness. Next the USS Howquah 
tried to run the Lynx down but only succeeded in firing into the vessel as it 
passed. The Lynx passed so close to the USS Governor Buckingham that 
Captain John MacDairmid fired his revolver at the men on her bridge as the 
crew fired five shells at the speeding ship. Although the Lynx's speed was too 
much for the vessels on blockade, their shots damaged the blockade runner's 
machinery and may have set the vessel on fire. Less than an hour later the 
Lynx was discovered ashore near Half Moon Battery in flames. '7° 
Four nights later the USS Niplion discovered another steamer, the 
Night Hawk, heading in toward New Inlet and opened fire. In attempting to 
avoid the Nippon, that steamer ran aground on Caroline Shoal outside the 
inlet. A boarding party from the USS Nippon took the crew off after firing the 
vessel with coals from the boilers. Although the fires destroyed the cargo and 
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extensively damaged the vessel, Confederates were later able to salvage the 
Night Hawk. 171 The third vessel proved to be the Condor which was also run 
aground by the USS Nippon 7 October 1864. Unlike the Night Hawk, the 
Condor was not destroyed by a boarding party from the USS Niphon as a well 
directed fire was opened from Fort Fisher. Under the fort's protection, 
Confederates salvaged the Condor's cargo. ln 
With the exception of the loss of the tug Aster, the remainder of October 
proved to be productive for both the New Inlet and Western Bar stations. The 
Aster was in pursuit of the blockade runner Annie when both vessels ran 
aground on Caroline Shoals. To complicate matters the tug Bcrbcrry fouled her 
propeller in attempting to rescue the Aster. With little hope of getting off, the 
officers and crew of the Aster burned their vessel. Light from the fire 
illuminated not only the Aster, but the crippled Berberry and USS Niphon. 
Fire from Fort Fisher made saving the Aster impossible and protected the 
Annie until Confederate salvors could remove the cargo and refloat the ship. 173 
Off the Western Bar, the USS Montgomery captured the Liverpool 
steamer Bat about 1 a. m. on the morning to 10 October 1864. A shell from the 
USS Montgomery's 30-pdr Parrott hit the bow of the blockade runner 
wounding one of the crew and convincing the captain to surrender before 
another shell could be fired. '74 On 21 October, the outbound steamer Wando 
was captured about 60 miles southeast of Cape Fear by the USS Fort Jackson. 
The captain of the Wando surrendered after a chase of more than four hours 
during which the USS Fort Jackson fired at the steamer 98 times. 175 The 
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30 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 493 and E. N. Semon to Edmund Kemble, 30 September 1864, 
ORN, 1,10, pp. 493-494. 
172 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 7 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, pp. 531-532 and Edmund Kemble to 0. S. 
Glisson, 1 and 2 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 532. 
173 Samuel Hall to S. P. Lee, 8 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 541-542; Edmund Kemble to 
Lieutenant J. P. Robertson, 8 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 542-543; Milton Griffith to S. P. Lee, 8 
October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 543-544 and Edmund Kemble to D. D. Porter, 30 October 1864, ORN, 
i, lo, p. 545. 
174 E. H. Faucon to G. Welles, 10 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 548-549. 
17513. F. Sands to Gideon Welles, 21 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, pp. 578-579 and W. M'Gloin to R. H. 
Lamson, 31 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 246. 
81 
following day the Eolus chased and captured the steamer Hope of Wilmington. 
The Hope was sighted attempting to cross the Western Bar about 1 a. m. and 
was chased seaward for more than sixty miles before surrendering. 176 
Before S. P. Lee was replaced by Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter on 12 
October 1864, the First Division blockading New Inlet consisted of eleven 
vessels. The USS Governor Buckingham, USS Daylight, USS Hozvquah and 
USS Niphon served as bar tenders guarding the inlet. A second line of vessels, 
outside the bar tenders, was formed by the USS Monticello, USS Mercedita, 
USS Alabama and USS Santiago de Cuba. The faster USS Keystone State, USS 
Quaker City and USS Gettysburg operated as outside cruisers to intercept 
blockade runners before and after their attempt to pass through the blockade. 
The Third Division, off the Western Bar, was comprised of thirteen vessels and 
the steamer Fahkee which served as a coal tender for vessels guarding both 
New Inlet and the Western Bar. Five vessels, USS Eolus, USS Anemone, USS 
Victoria, USS Emma and USS Dumbarton were stationed close in on the bar. 
The USS Fort Jackson, USS Maratanza, USS Montgomery, USS Aries and USS 
Vicksburg formed the second line of vessels. Beyond that second line the USS 
Calypso, USS Mount Vernon and USS Kansas cruised the most commonly 
used course to Nassau. 177 
After Rear-Admiral David D. Porter took over the North Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron, he made changes in the strategy developed under Acting 
Rear-Admiral Lee's command. In his "General Orders Number 18, " Porter 
expressed his desire to have an equal number of vessels assigned to New Inlet 
and the Western Bar. The slowest vessels assigned to each side of Cape Fear 
were to be stationed near the bars to fire on blockade runners attempting to pass 
in or out and signal their presence and course to the faster vessels of the 
division. Vessels tending the bars were not to chase blockade runners off 
shore. Instead they were to abandon pursuit as soon as the chase was taken up 
by one of the faster vessels lying offshore. 178 
Vessels assigned to guard the bar were also charged with being careful to 
"ascertain the position of each and every blockader, so that there will be no 
danger of collision or firing into each other. " Once a steamer had been 
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identified and the second line warned, vessels on the bar were to "get in 
between her and the bar" to prevent the blockade runner's return to the safety 
of the Cape Fear River. "Bar tenders" were to take up a position as close to the 
bar as prudent once twilight provided protection from Confederate batteries. 
No lights were to be shown and no noise was permitted while on station. Each 
gunboat guarding the bar was to deploy a "good, swift boat" in fair weather to 
cruise over the bar and warn of vessels. Each of the boats was to be well armed 
and equipped with a boxed lantern with a bright red lens to signal the bar 
tenders when vessels were observed attempting to escape. 179 
Once a blockade runner had been identified, Porter instructed the officers 
of the Cape Fear divisions to signal the course of each chase using rockets and 
Coston's signals. Porter provided the following uniform signals to minimize 
the confusion inherent in firing a single rocket in the direction of the chase. 
Direction of Chase Signal 
Northward 1 rocket 
Northeastward 2 rockets 
Eastward 1 rocket and green Coston 
Southeastward 2 rockets and green Coston 
Southward 2 rockets and white Coston 
Southwestward 2 rockets and red Coston 
Westward 1 rocket and red Coston 
Northwestward 1 rocket and white Coston 
When, in pursuit blockade vessels were to periodically send rockets 
horizontally in the direction of the chase. 180 
In thick weather when visibility was limited, steam whistles were to be 
used to convey the direction of a blockade runner. Porter issued the following 
signals for close weather. 
Direction of Chase 
Northward 
Northeastward 
Eastward 
Southeastward 
Southward 
Southwestward 
Westward 
Northwestward 
Signal 
1 short whistle 
1 long whistle 
2 long whistles 
1 long and 1 short whistle 
3 long whistles 
1 short and 1 long whistle 
3 short whistles 
2 short whistles 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
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Porter also supplied the Cape Fear blockade vessels with recognition 
signals. Those signals were designed to provide some assurance that vessels of 
the Cape Fear divisions could identify each other before chasing or firing on a 
friend. Porter's attention to clarifying the recognition codes was, no doubt, 
associated with the fact that the steamer USS Aries fired into the USS Fort 
Jackson three times on 29 October after failing to receive or recognize answers 
to her challenges-181 Those signals consisted of the following: 
Day of Vessel Making Signal 
month First 
1 1 white flash 
2 2 white flashes 
3 3 white flashes 
4 1 red flash 
5 2 red flashes 
6 3 red flashes 
7 1 white flash, red burning 
8 2 white flashes, red burning 
9 3 white flashes, red burning 
10 1 red flash, white burning 
Vessel Answering 
3 red flashes 
1 red flash 
2 red flashes 
3 white flashes 
1 white flash 
2 white flashes 
3 red flashes, white burning 
1 red flash, white burning 
2 red flashes, white burning 
3 white flashes, red burning 
In thick weather when limited visibility precluded visual signaling, steam 
whistles were to be used to make recognition signals. 182 
Day of Vessel Making Signal 
month First 
1 1 short whistle 
2 2 short whistles 
3 3 short whistles 
4 4 short whistles 
5 1 short, 1 long whistle 
6 2 short, 1 long whistle 
7 3 short, 1 long whistle 
8 4 short, 1 long whistle 
9 1 long, 1 short whistle 
10 2 long, 1 short whistle 
Vessel Answering 
4 long whistles 
1 long whistle 
2 long whistles 
3 long whistles 
4 long, 1 short whistle 
1 long, 1 short whistle 
2 long, 1 short whistle 
3 long, 1 short whistle 
1 short, 1 long whistle 
1 short, 2 long whistles 
As a last resort the blockade vessels were to resort to Coston's signals to identify 
each other at night or in thick weather. Those signals were to follow another 
recognition code supplied by Porter. 
181 Abstract Log of the U. S. S. Fort Jackson, 29 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, pp. 10-11 and Abstract Log 
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Day of Vessel Making Signal Vessel Answering 
month First 
1 Coston's No. 1 Coston's No. 2 
2 Coston's No. 2 Coston's No. 3 
3 Coston's No. 3 Coston's No. 4 
4 Coston's No. 4 Coston's No. 5 
5 Coston's No. 5 Coston's No. 6 
6 Coston's No. 6 Coston's No. 7 
7 Coston's No. 7 Coston's No. 8 
8 Coston's No. 8 Coston's No. 9 
9 Coston's No. 9 Coston's No. 0 
10 Coston's No. 10 Coston's No. 1 
Porter's signal for warning the fleet of danger was the firing of a gun and 
burning a blue light. 183 Unfortunately, the number of rockets and Coston's 
signals required by Porter created a shortage that compromised the system of 
communication. 184 
Porter ordered that one or two fast vessels be kept offshore 
approximately 40 miles to the east and west of the Cape Fear inlets during the 
night. During the day those vessels were to cruise along the shore to look out 
for blockade runners lying to or anchored and waiting for night to run through 
the blockade. At night those vessels were to occasionally burn false signals 
resembling the lights of the Cape Fear lighthouses. Those signals were 
designed to "lead blockade runners astray" and increase the rate of captures. 
Later Commander Daniel Ammen suggested a more complex replication of the 
light system used by Confederates at Fort Fisher. Airmen proposed to use 
lights on vessels stationed off Masonboro Inlet to attract blockade runners and 
convince them that they were safe under the guns of Fort Fisher. 185 
Powerful calcium lights were also supplied to vessels of the Wilmington 
Station. They were to be mounted on the forecastle and used to illuminate 
blockade breakers attempting to cross the bar or being chased at night. To 
facilitate identification of steamers on the blockade, Porter ordered that "the 
pipes, hulls, and 
, 
all parts of blockaders should be painted one uniform 
color. "186 Each officer was also supplied with charts of the Cape Fear area so 
that the point of identification and course of each chase could be identified and 
183 Ibid. 
184 D. Ammen to D. D. Porter, 28 November 1864, ORN, 1,11, pp. 100-101. 
185 General Orders No. 18, D. D. Porter, 22 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, pp. 581 and D. Ammen to D. 
D. Porter, 28 November 1864, ORN, I, 11, pp. 100-101. 
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sent to Porter. Porter proposed to use that information to identify patterns of 
operation that could be disrupted by the vessels of the Wilmington Station. 
Officers were also to keep close track of the tides and maintain more intense 
vigilance near times of high water although, Porter cautioned that the "class of 
vessels now employed in illicit trade do not draw much water and can be run 
in and out at any time. "187 Orders also called for the destruction of all vessels 
"run on shore at the bar, or beached. " "At all hazards" officers were to destroy 
ships that could not be captured and refloated. 188 
Realizing the importance of the outside line of blockaders, Porter issued 
specific instructions for their operations. Those instructions were based on the 
observation that blockade runners would "likely try to cross the bar after dark 
or in the twilight. " By calculating their speed at approximately thirteen knots, 
Porter established the position of two outer lines along an arc offshore where 
outbound vessels would be at daylight and where inbound vessels would be 
between early afternoon and dusk to gauge their run through the blockade and 
make the bar around dawn. 189 If nothing was sighted at dawn vessels on the off 
shore line were ordered to cruise in toward shore for approximately twenty 
miles to identify blockade runners that might have run out as late as midnight. 
If no blockade runners were identified, they were to return to their stations and 
keep a lookout during the day for inbound vessels. To reduce the possibility of 
being spotted first, lookouts stationed aloft were ordered to wear light colored 
clothes-190 
Each ship on the outside lines was ordered to chase until any reasonable 
hope of capture was lost. Although the practice contributed to fouling fire 
tubes and several captains had been censured by S. P. Lee for abusing their 
machinery in efforts to get more speed out of their vessels, Porter authorized 
the use of pine wood to speed up the process of bringing boilers to full capacity. 
Each vessel was to carry a supply of pine specifically for that purpose. 191 When 
in chase captains were also instructed to take every opportunity to keep 
blockade runners from getting their "head to wind and sea" or running "before 
or off the wind. " Running to windward increased draft on the boilers and 
187 General Orders No. 18, D. D. Porter, 22 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 582. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
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running with the wind permitted the use of fore-and-aft sails to increase 
stability and speed. With more than one vessel in chase, captains were 
encouraged to try to keep blockade runners "in the trough of the sea" to 
minimize their speed. 192 
While Porter's strategy for blockading Wilmington was essentially that 
developed under S. P. Lee's command, his approach was perhaps more 
systematic. Three vessels were captured during the "dark of the moon" at the 
end of October and the first week of November. The outbound Lady Sterling 
was sighted passing over the Western Bar by the Eolus. Both the USS Calypso, 
responding to the Eolus' rockets, and the Eolus chased the Lady Sterling more 
than two hours before the Calypso's guns damaged the blockade runner's 
machinery and set the cargo on fire. The Lady Sterling was forced to 
surrender. i93 Off New Inlet the steamer Annie was captured the same day. The 
Annie, repaired after having been run aground on Caroline Shoals earlier in 
October, was outbound with 540 bales of cotton and 30 tons of tobacco. The 
Annie was discovered coming out of New Inlet just after sunset by the USS 
Nippon. Gunfire of the USS Nippon attracted the attention of the crew of the 
tug Wilderness which joined in the chase. The USS Wilderness quickly 
overtook, the Annie. After a chase of only thirty minutes and thirteen rounds 
from the USS Nippon and USS Wilderness, the Annie's captain threw the 
ship's papers, mail and $50,000 in gold overboard and surrendered. 194 
In spite of the value of the prize Rear-Admiral Porter issued a stern 
reprimand that chastised the captains of the USS Nippon and USS Wilderness 
for failing to properly alert the fleet using the signals authorized in October. It 
was the opinion of the senior officer at New Inlet, Lieutenant-Commander P. 
G. Watmough, that the officers "failed to make the proper, or any, signals 
indicating the direction of the chase, in order to be able to claim a sole share in 
- her. 11195 
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Rear Admiral S. P. Lee had justifiably referred to the North Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron as the "prize money command" having earned a total of 
$109,689.69 as his share of vessels condemned and auctioned as prizes under his 
command. 196 When the USS Connecticut captured the blockade runners 
Minnie and Greyhound off Wilmington in May 1864, the reward was 
staggering. Condemned and auctioned the Minnie and Greyhound and their 
cargoes of cotton, tobacco, and turpentine brought $353,943.42 and $497,858.55 
respectively. 197 Once the costs of litigation were deducted the United States 
received one half of the remaining funds. 
After deduction of adjudication expenses of $12,896.54 and deduction of 
the government's fifty per cent, a total of $242,481.00 remained to be shared 
from the Greyhound alone. Admiral Lee received $12,124.05 and recently 
appointed senior officer Captain Benjamin Sands' share came to $2,424.81. The 
largest share, $24,248.10, was allocated to Commander John J. Almy, the 
Connecticut's captain. Commander Almy's share represented the equivalent 
of ten years pay at his rank. The remainder of the officers and crew of the 
Connecticut received 'amounts proportional to their annual pay rate. A 
lieutenant was awarded $6,366.09 and an able seaman drew $733.38. A first class 
boy, frequently receiving only eight or nine dollars a month, was awarded 
$407.44.198 
While not all captured blockade runners produced this kind of reward 
the average steamer generated approximately $200,000 for those sharing in the 
capture. Rewards like those shared from the Greyhound provided considerable 
incentive. Yet, at the same time prize money generated intense competition 
and occasionally considerable animosity. As all vessels within signaling 
distance of a capture shared in the prize, claims periodically had to be settled by 
boards of inquiry. Porter's General Order No. 41 made it clear that "this is not 
being conducted for the benefit of officers or to enrich them by the capture of 
prizes... "199 
196 Robert W. Daly, "Pay and Prize Money in the Old Navy, 1770-1899. " United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 74, August 1948, p. 270. 
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88 
The USS Santiago dc Cuba captured another valuable prize on 2 
November 1864. That vessel proved to be the steamer Lucy bound for Nassau 
and fourteen hours out of Wilmington. The Lucy was loaded with 414 bales of 
cotton and 25 tons of tobacco. The prize produced $268,948.20 when adjudicated 
and only the officers and crew of the USS Santiago dc Cuba were entitled to 
shares. 200 Although the fact that the Lucy was discovered fourteen hours out of 
Wilmington seemed to confirm the wisdom of Porter's strategy, no other 
vessels were captured or destroyed in November 1864. Several were however, 
successful in passing in through New Inlet and across the Western Bar. 201 
A full month after the Lucy was captured, the steamer Vixen was taken 
eighty miles south of Cape Fear by the USS Rhode Island. The Vixen initially 
pulled away from the USS Rliode Island but after dark the blockade runner was 
discovered broken down and unable to make way. Both paddle wheels had 
been disabled due to a combination of heavy seas and the speed of the chase. 202 
Malfunctioning feed pumps disabled the steamer USS Emma Henry and 
permitted the USS Cherokee to capture that outbound vessel almost a week 
later on 10 December. 203 On 4 December, the USS R. R. Cuyler, USS Gettysburg 
and USS Mackinaw captured the outbound steamer Armstrong approximately 
140 miles south-southeast of Cape Fear. 204 
Vessels maintaining the inshore blockade were also successful during 
the first week of December 1864. On 2 December, the USS Pequot discovered a 
blockade runner near Little River Inlet. After a chase east to the vicinity of 
Shallotte Inlet the chase headed southeast to the point of Frying Pan Shoals and 
then turned north-northwest and ran along the shoal. The next morning 
Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Braine found the steamer ashore approximately 
1.5 miles southwest of Bald Head Point. At dawn the crew of the tug Emma 
had discovered the blockade runner heading for the Western Bar and chased 
the vessel ashore on Smith Island. After dawn the Emma, USS Pcquot, USS 
Huron, USS Chippewa, USS Britannia, USS Aries and USS Tristram Shandy 
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shelled the vessel. The following night a boarding party from the Emma 
boarded the wreck and discovered that the vessel was the Ella. After searching 
the ship for papers and other evidence, the vessel was set on fire and shells set 
to destroy the machinery. 205 
On the morning of 7 December, the USS Kansas discovered a steamer 
aground on the outer edge of Caroline Shoals off New Inlet. As the guns of 
Fort Fisher prevented getting in close and the seas were breaking over the 
vessel, the crew of the USS Kansas contented themselves with shelling the 
wreck from long range. 206 That vessel proved to be the steamer Stormy Petrel. 
During the night the Stormy Petrel had passed through the blockade 
undiscovered but had miscalculated making the entrance to New Inlet and 
grounded hard on the shoal. Near daylight the officers and crew abandoned 
the ship and escaped to Fort Fisher. 207 On 27 December, the Agnes E. Fry was 
also discovered inside the blockade but aground on Oak Island west of Fort 
Caswell. 208 Destruction of the steamer was prevented by the guns of Fort 
Caswell and Confederates immediately removed the cargo and tried to organize 
an effort to salvage the machinery. 209 
By December 1864,48 vessels were assigned to the Cape Fear Station. 21° 
In spite of the number of ships enforcing the blockade, steamers continued to 
run in and out successfully. The Wild Rover, Owl, Hansa, Stag, Vulture, 
Banshee II, Little Hattie, and Talisman were all operating out of Wilmington in 
December. 211 It was clear that the Cape Fear had not been closed by blockade. 
Wilmington finally became a strategic priority for the War Department 
in October 1864. With General William T. Sherman marshaling his forces for a 
campaign into North Carolina, control of that port city and the railroads 
connecting Wilmington to Florence, South Carolina and Weldon, North 
Carolina became an important objective. After years of unsuccessful urging by 
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Secretary Welles and proposals by officers of the North Atlantic Blockade 
Squadron, Wilmington was finally taken. In anticipation of a joint operation 
and to placate General U. S. Grant, the Navy Department had replaced the 
conservative and cautious Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee with Rear-Admiral 
David D. Porter. 212 Finally, the "importance of closing Wilmington and cutting 
off Rebel communication [had become] paramount to all other questions. "213 
By 20 October, Porter felt that the Navy was ready to support the expedition but, 
Grant was not disposed to commit the necessary troops until December. 214 
Grant placed Major-General Godfrey Weitzel in command of the 
expedition, however his superior Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, elected to 
lead the attack. Butler also proposed to incapacitate the garrison at Fort Fisher 
by exploding a vessel full of powder prior to an amphibious landing on the 
beach north of the massive Confederate fortification. 215 Although detractors of 
the plan produced extensive evidence of the impracticality of the project, it was 
approved. 216 At 1: 45 a. m. on the night of 23 December 1864, the gunboat 
Louisiana, containing 235 tons of powder, was blown up off the beach northeast 
of Fort Fisher. 217 In spite of Butler's dire predictions concerning the effect, there 
was no impact on the garrison at Fort Fisher. Colonel Lamb recorded in his 
diary "a blockader got aground near fort, set fire to herself & blew up. "218 
At 11: 30 a. m. the following day Porter's vessels, the largest American 
fleet ever assembled, moved into predetermined positions off Fort Fisher. 
After armored vessels anchored within a mile of the fort and drove the 
garrison into their bombproof shelters, the remainder of the fleet took up their 
stations and joined in shelling Colonel Lamb's defenses. 219 For two days the 
fleet kept up a bombardment so intense that Porter reported "it was impossible 
for anything human to stand it. " In all 20,271 projectiles of all calibers and 
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weighing 1,275,299 pounds were fired. 220 Colonel Lamb later wrote, to the 
contrary, that: "Never since the invention of gunpowder, was there so much 
harmlessly expended.... "22' When Butler's amphibious force of 2,300 
approached Fort Fisher on the afternoon of 25 December they found that little 
damage had been done and the garrison and most of the land face guns were 
waiting for their assault. 222 After consideration of his position Butler ordered a 
retreat and Porter reluctantly withdrew the fleet. 223 During the night before 
Christmas and in spite of the assembled fleet, the blockade runner Little Hattie 
ran in through New Inlet without incident. 224 
As a flurry of correspondence designed to establish responsibility for the 
failed assault arrived in Washington, D. C., Colonel Lamb used his limited 
resources to repair Fort Fisher. Once General Grant decided to replace both 
Butler and Weitzel, a-second attack was organized. General Alfred E. Terry 
would command the army expedition and lead the second attack. 225 The fleet 
carrying Terry's troops assembled at Beaufort during the first week of January 
1865. On the night of 12 January, Porter's fleet of over sixty warships carrying 
627 guns arrived off Fort Fisher. 226 The following morning the beach was 
shelled north of Fort Fisher and General Terry's force was landed. 227 Porter's 
fleet then initiated a second attack shelling the fortifications for two days while 
Terry moved into position north of the Confederate defenses. On the morning 
of 15 January, the fleet shifted its fire to the land face and at 10 a. m. a force of 
400 marines and 1600 sailors was landed to assist in the assault. 228 As the fire of 
the fleet lifted, the sailors and marines attacked the northeast bastion drawing 
the Confederates' attention and a murderous fire. At the same time Terry's 
force launched an attack on Shepherd's Battery at the northwest extremity of 
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the land face of the fortification. Hand to hand fighting inside the giant 
earthworks continued from traverse to traverse until the surviving 
Confederate defenders had been driven to Battery Buchanan. Without hope of 
reinforcement or the means to continue to resist, Major James Reilly 
surrendered Fort Fisher at 10 p. m. 229 
The fall of Fort Fisher caused the collapse of the Lower Cape Fear 
Defense System and Fort Caswell was destroyed and abandoned during the 
night of 15 January. On 18 January, Porter ordered Lieutenant-Commander 
W. B. Cushing to Smithville to occupy the town and secure the Western Bar 
entrance to the Cape Fear. The following day, Porter wrote to Rear-Admiral J. 
A. Dahlgren that with Union gunboats in the river "the place is hermetically 
sealed. "230 He also ordered that the system of range lights that had been used 
to guide blockade runners into port be "trimmed in a normal manner" to 
facilitate trapping any vessels that might not have been informed of the fall of 
Wilmington. 231 That night the blockade runners Stag and Charlotte ran 
through the fleet off the Western Bar and anchored off Smithville. Both 
were surprised and taken without incident by Lieutenant-Commander 
Cushing. 232 Early in the morning on 25 January 1865, the steamer Blenheim 
was discovered anchored under the Mound Battery off New Inlet. That 
vessel, the last captured off Wilmington during the war, was taken by two 
converted blockade runners the Tristram SIºandy and Lilian. 233 
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Chapter III The Anglo-Confederate Blockade Runners 
News of the attack on Fort Sumter and Abraham Lincoln's declaration of 
a blockade of Confederate ports from North Carolina to Texas was received 
with mixed emotions in the South. Most southerners, like many in the North, 
felt that it would be impossible for the United States Navy to blockade the 
Confederacy. Most felt that the war would not last long and that Great Britain 
and/or France would intervene in breaking the blockade because of their 
dependence on cotton and other southern raw materials. During 1861 and 
until the summer of 1862, a time when the blockade was virtually nonexistent 
and least effective, southerners initiated a self imposed blockade of considerable 
effect. That blockade was in the form of a quasi-official embargo on the 
exportation of cotton, the most important economic asset of the South. That 
unofficial embargo on the exportation of cotton virtually eliminated foreign 
commerce by removing foreign access to cotton that supported the mills of 
Great Britain. Only the availability of naval stores and other agricultural 
exports like tobacco kept southern trade alive. 
Southerners strongly believed in the potential economic and political 
power of "King Cotton. " Southern confidence in the power of "King Cotton" 
was based on the fact that for decades southern cotton had provided the very 
foundation of the "industry which appeared to underlie the' whole industrial 
and economic system of Great Britain. "1 In The Cotton and Commerce of India 
Considered in Relation to the Interests of Great Britain, etc., John Chapman 
pointed out that £29,000,000 of Great Britain's total exports of £54,000,000 
consisted of cotton fabric in 1851. Another £20,000,000 in cotton material was 
sold in Britain. Eight years later the London Economist reported that 
£48,209,000 in cotton products were exported. That was calculated to be 
approximately 40% of Great Britain's total exports. 2 In 1860, almost 80% of the 
cotton produced in the South was purchased by British textile firms. Those 
firms employed almost five million, and produced revenues of over £59 
million. 3 British economists frequently cautioned that disruption of the supply 
1Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931, p. 6. 
2 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 7. 
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of southern cotton could spell disaster and as Henry Ashworth wrote, could 
"amount to irretrievable ruin-millions of our countrymen would become 
deprived of employment and food-and, as a consequence, the misfortune 
would involve this country in a series of calamities, politically, socially, and 
commercially, such as cannot be contemplated without anxiety and dismay. "4 
The significance of those figures and opinions was not lost on 
Confederate politicians, merchants and economists. Southern writers quickly 
adopted the phrase "Cotton is King" from writer David Christy. 5 Publications 
like J. D. B. DeBow's Review published articles relating British concerns about 
their dependence on southern cotton and promoting the importance of cotton 
as a vehicle for political and economic agendas of the South. An almost 
universal consensus seemed to hold that England would not permit the supply 
of Southern cotton to be interrupted. During a visit to the newly established 
Confederate States of America, William H. Russell found that many 
southerners shared Jefferson Davis' opinion that if the supply of southern 
cotton was interrupted, England "would in less than six months be starved into 
subjection. "6 In Charleston, Russell was informed that ".... John Bull.... will 
make a great fuss about non-intervention at first, but when he begins to want 
for cotton he will come down off his perch. "7 Another Charlestonian 
informed Russell that "... we have only to shut off your supply of cotton for a 
few weeks and we can create a revolution in Great Britain. "8 
That philosophy led southern leaders to react to Lincoln's declaration of 
a blockade with an embargo designed to cut off Europe's cotton supply and 
force Great Britain and France to break the blockade and recognize the 
Confederacy. Southern newspapers were filled with support for the embargo 
and encouraged farmers and merchants to keep their cotton off the market 
until the blockade was broken. North Carolina newspapers "begged State 
authorities" to prevent "British" from carrying cargoes "composed of articles of 
which our enemies stood greatly in need. "9 Both the Wilmington Journal and 
4 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 11. 
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the New Bern Progress reported that goods were finding their way to northern 
ports by both direct, shipment and through British ports such as Halifax. '0 
On 27 July 1861, the "Committee on Foreign Affairs" was instructed by 
President Davis "to inquire into the expediency of reporting a bill to prevent 
the exportation of cotton, tobacco, and naval stores. "11 Although the 
Confederate Congress decided against the passage of legislation to prevent the 
exportation of those products, the idea was not abandoned. The Ways and 
Means Committee considered a resolution to restrict the accumulation of 
cotton and naval stores at southern ports. While the express purpose was to 
prevent those resources from becoming a target of opportunity for the United 
States, the underlying consideration was to use cotton as leverage for foreign 
intervention and recognition. 12 The Government of the Confederacy also 
considered several proposals to purchase all cotton produced in the south and 
control its sale and exportation. Although popular, those proposals also failed 
for a variety of political and economic reasons. 13 While no embargo was 
enacted, the Confederacy did pass a series of produce-loans that resulted in the 
transfer of 400,000 bales of surplus cotton to the Confederacy by December 1861. 
The popularity of that program was in no small part based on the premise that 
Confederate control of cotton and its exportation could be employed to 
influence foreign policy-14 
Although no official embargo was ever enacted 'many southern states 
and port cities took it upon themselves to restrict the exportation of cotton. In 
Louisiana, Governor Thomas Moore proclaimed that no cotton would be 
brought into New Orleans for overseas shipment after 10 October 1861. When 
Judah Benjamin, Confederate Attorney-General questioned the edict, Moore 
responded that he was simply responding to the opinion of the citizens of that 
city and his state. 15 On 18 August 1862, Florida Governor John Milton wrote 
the Senators and Representatives of the State of Florida at Richmond that the 
"villainous traffic" in cotton carried on by speculators "under the plea of 
10 Ibid. 
11 Journal of the Confederate Congress, Vol. I, p. 251-264 and Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 
32. 
12Journal of the Confederate Congress, Vol. I, p. 288 and Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 33. 
13 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 32-35. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Thomas O. Moore to Judah P. Benjamin, 9 January 1862, ORA, IV, 1, pp. 836-837. 
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furnishing the people of the South with prime necessities of life should be 
suppressed. " Milton, one of the most vocal advocates of an embargo 
maintained that: 
Foreign nations will not recognize the independence of the 
Confederate States until commerce with the Confederate States 
will become not only desirable but necessary to their own 
prosperity. Then and not till [sic] then, will our independence be 
recognized and suitable treaties be made to regulate our political 
relations and protect our commerce with other nations. 16 
Those sentiments were also reflected by the governors of North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Alabama. 17 On 15 October 1861, the Richmond Enquirer 
quoted a New Orleans Delta article that reported because Confederate and state 
authorities failed, local committees and municipal government authorities had 
stopped the exportation of cotton. 18 The self imposed embargo was extremely 
effective. Compared to the 1,500,000 bales of cotton that arrived in Memphis, 
New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston during the fall and winter of 1860, 
less than 10,000 bales arrived during the corresponding period in 1861 and 
1862.19 
To reinforce the quasi-cotton embargo, Confederates enthusiastically 
agreed to significantly reduce the amount of cotton planted in 1862. 
Approximately 1,500,000 bales were picked as opposed to 4,500,000 in 1861.20 In 
addition, hundreds of thousands of bales of cotton were burned to illustrate 
commitment to the cause of southern independence. On 22 June 1862, the 
British consul in Charleston reported to Lord Earl Russell that over one 
million bales of cotton had been put to the torch. 21 In Great Britain the 
perception was that the blockade was the "work of the South as much as the 
16 Governor John Milton to Florida Representatives in Richmond, 18 August 1862, ORA, IV, 2, p. 
57. 
17Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 35-37 and 42, Charleston Courier, 16 January 1862 and 
London Times, 10 January 1862. 
18 Richmond Enquirer, 15 October 1861. 
19 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 42. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Bunch to Russell, No. 85,25 June 1862, Foreign Office American, Volume 843, Public Records 
Office, London, hereinafter cited as PRO. 
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North. "22 The London Illustrated News questioned the purpose of fitting out 
vessels to run into the Confederacy if they were prevented from obtaining 
cotton for the outbound trip through the blockade. 23 
At the same time southerners imposed a quasi-embargo on the 
exportation of cotton, the Confederacy moved quickly to establish relations 
with traditional trading partners in Europe and the West Indies. Robert 
Toombs, Confederate Secretary of State, informed William L. Yancy, Pierre A. 
Rost and A. Dudley Mann that President Jefferson Davis had, with the consent 
of Congress, appointed them Special Commissioners to Europe. 24 Yancy, Rost 
and Mann were to make their way to Great Britain, France, Russia and 
Belgium, inform the governments of those countries of the formation of the 
Confederate States of America and seek recognition. The agents were 
instructed to negotiate treaties of "friendship, commerce, and navigation" and 
confirm that traditional trading patterns would be encouraged by nominal 
duties that would approximate "free trade. "25 In May, John T. Pickett was 
appointed as an agent of the Confederate States to Mexico to establish similar 
diplomatic and commercial relations. 26 
Two months later Toombs also informed Mr. Charles J. Helm that he 
had been appointed by President Davis as a Special Agent of the Confederate 
States to cultivate similar diplomatic and commercial relations with the 
Spanish, British and Danish islands of the West Indies. 27 Although those 
efforts to gain recognition failed, the work of Confederate Agents and 
Commissioners illustrate that the South was not unduly concerned about the 
impact of the blockade. In fact, Yancy, Rost and Mann pointed out in a 14 
August 1861 letter to Lord Earl Russell, that the blockade was not enforced in 
the Gulf of Mexico for weeks after it was declared. It had also been repeatedly 
broken since its establishment at Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile 
and New Orleans. 28 Assistant Secretary of State W. M. Browne wrote Yancy, 
22 London Times quoted in the Savannah Republican, 22 November 1861 and Owsley, King Cotton 
Diplomacy, p. 41. 
23 London Illustrated News quoted in the Charleston Courier, 30 September 1861. 
24 Robert Toombs to W. L. Yancy, P. A. Rost and A. D. Mann, Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, James D. Richardson, ed., United States Publishing Company, Nashville, 
Tennessee, 1905, p. 3. 
25 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
26 Ibid., pp. 20-26. 
27 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
281bid., p. 70. 
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Rost and Mann in late August 1861, to provide customs reports from 
Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah and Pensacola to illustrate that "the 
blockade of the coast of the Confederate States is nominal, not real, that it is in 
contravention of the now universally accepted law of nations... "29 
In a 23 September 1861 letter to Confederate Commissioner James M. 
Mason, Secretary of State R. M. T. Hunter pointed out that "there are more 
people without than within the Confederate States who derive their means of 
living from the various uses which are made of this important staple" and that 
"a war. .. which shuts up this great source of supply 
from the general uses of 
mankind is directed as much against those who transport and manufacture 
cotton as against those who produce the raw material. "30 
In a letter to Lord Earl Russell, dated 14 August 1861, Yancy, Rost and 
Mann confirmed that the cotton crop would be transported to Confederate 
ports on the Atlantic seaboard and Gulf of Mexico but, none would be shipped 
until "there shall be a prospect of the blockade being raised, and not before. "31 
That both Great Britain and France have not only an interest in 
breaking up the present blockade of the coasts of the Confederate 
States, but also the means of doing so when they desire it, is 
perfectly manifest. It will not be surprising, therefore, if they 
should endeavor to effect that end by an armed intervention in 
American affairs. 32 
In spite of Confederate diplomatic efforts, the British Government held that 
"assuming that the blockade was duly notified, and also that a number of ships 
are stationed, and remain at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent 
access to it, or to create an evident danger of entering it or leaving it, and these 
ships do not voluntarily permit egress or ingress, the fact that various ships 
29 William M. Browne to W. L. Yancy, P. A. Rost and A. D. Mann, Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, pp. 76-77. 
30R. M. T. Hunter to J. M. Mason, 23 September 1861, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, p. 
93. 
31 W. L. Yancy, P. A. Rost and A. D. Mann to Lord Earl Russell, Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, p. 70. 
32R. M. T. Hunter to J. M. Mason, 8 February 1862, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, pp. 
171-172. 
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may have successfully escaped through it... will not, of itself, prevent the 
blockade from being an effectual one by international law. "33 
Mason also pointed out that there was "no lack of this great article of 
export in the interior of the Southern States" and that "if Europe is without 
American cotton, it is because Europe has not thought it proper to send her 
ships to America for cotton. " The Confederate States Government had no 
policy to prohibit or discourage the export of cotton. 34 
John Slidell received a lengthy treatise on the Union blockade of 
Confederate ports from J. P. Benjamin in September 1863. Although Benjamin 
expressed his frustration at the lack of support for breaking the blockade he 
found it necessary to "renew the oft-repeated protests of this Government, lest 
silence be construed into acquiescence of the principles and policy avowed by 
one of the maritime powers of Europe, and tacitly adopted by all others. " 
Benjamin also enclosed figures from Charleston that supported his argument 
that in spite of the blockade both cotton exports and customs duties had risen 
dramatically during the period of the blockade. 35 
Quarterly figures for the export of cotton from Charleston were: 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Quarter ending 
Two Months ending 
30 September 1861 
31 December 1861 
31 March 1862 
30 June 1862 
30 September 1862 
31 December 1862 
31 March 1863 
31 May 1863 
24,312 pounds 
664,716 pounds 
351,586 pounds 
223,709 pounds 
701,109 pounds 
1,551,788 pounds 
1,401,505 pounds 
2,197,716 pounds 
Quarterly figures from Custom House receipts for Charleston were: 
Quarter ending 30 September 1861 $2,181.27 
Quarter ending 31 December 1861 $3,813.02 
Quarter ending 31 March 1862 $12,638.99 
Quarter ending 30 June 1862 $13,281.55 
Quarter ending 31 December 1862 $17,183.09 
Quarter ending 31 March 1863 $57,671.21 
Two Months ending 31 May 1863 $69,260.20 
33J. M. Mason to Lord Earl Russell, 8 February 1862, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, p. 
297. 
34J. M. Mason to Lord Earl Russell, 8 February 1862, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, p. 
300. 
35 J. P. Benjamin to John Slidell, 2 September 1863, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, pp. 
546-549. 
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There was no accounting of the goods brought in by government vessels or on 
government account. However, Benjamin reported that cotton and imports 
amounted to twice that carried on private accounts. 36 
At Wilmington, Benjamin reported that cotton exports increased from 
526,824 pounds in January 1863 to 2,144,887 pounds in July 1863. Predictions for 
August 1863 suggested that cotton exports would exceed 4,000,000 pounds. 
Wilmington's average monthly foreign commerce totaled about $270,000. That 
amounted to approximately $3,240,000, four times the entire foreign commerce 
of North Carolina in 1858.37 Benjamin also reported that Government vessels 
made 44 voyages through the blockade between January and September 1862, 
without a loss by capture. 38 
In spite of the intensity and validity of Confederate arguments for Great 
Britain and other foreign powers to break the blockade the efforts were 
unsuccessful. Although debated at length in Parliament, Great Britain 
steadfastly maintained their neutrality. 39 Although Queen Victoria formally 
recognized the state of hostilities between "certain states styling themselves the 
Confederate States of America and United States of America and decreed that 
British subjects would observe a strict neutrality in 1861, by fall 1863, 
Confederate hopes that Britain or France would break the blockade were 
fading. 4o 
Commissioner Mason wrote Secretary of State J. P. Benjamin in 
September 1863, to express his agreement with Colin J. McRae's proposed plan 
for the Confederate Government to take over cotton exportation and blockade 
running. Mason pointed out that: 
The experience of private enterprise seems to have adjusted trade 
through the blockade in such a manner as to have removed much 
of the risk and expense. Supplies are sent from here in sailing 
36j. P. Benjamin to John Slidell, 2 September 1863, Ibid., p. 549. 
37 J. P. Benjamin to John Slidell, 2 September 1863, Ibid., p. 550. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Volume CLXV (356 
Vols.; London: Cornelius Buck, 1862), 1235 and Lord Russell to J. M. Mason, 2 September 1863, 
Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, p. 560. 
40 Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers, pp. 26-34, and W. A. Simpson, "Britain and the 
Blockade, " Journal of the Confederate Historical Society, Spring, 1968, pp. 6-7. 
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vessels as English property, bona fide, and thence transshipped to 
the coast in fast sailing steamers of small draught, and they bring 
out cotton as return cargoes. I can see nothing to prevent the 
Government taking this whole business into its exclusive hands; 
and when the cotton is placed in one of the islands, its, value is 
available here at once, without further risk. Under the control of 
a separate bureau and in charge of naval officers, it must work 
well. If the war is prolonged, besides supplying all the wants of 
the Government in Europe at a cost cheapened by the absence of 
the immoderate profits now reaped by private enterprise, it would 
bring down exchange, and thus have an important influence in 
strengthening our currency at home; besides, its effect upon our 
credit in Europe, when results were attained, would be of 
immense importance in a political view. 41 
Mason also pointed out that Government control of the trade would eliminate 
the profits enjoyed by Union merchants shipping cotton from the West Indies 
to New York. 42 
While southern diplomats attempted to secure foreign recognition and 
assistance in breaking the blockade, Confederate agents and entrepreneurs 
attempted to develop successful and lucrative methods of trading through the 
Union squadrons. Initially that trade was dominated by schooners and other 
fast sailing vessels. Most of them were quickly reregistered as British vessels, 
loaded with salt, coffee, medicine, clothing and limited amounts of war 
material and run into the Confederacy. There they obtained agricultural 
products like tobacco and naval stores for the outward voyage. Until the 
summer of 1862, cotton was not readily available due to the quasi-embargo. 
The Federal blockade at Wilmington remained one of principal rather 
than practice until well into the summer of 1862. That was a consequence of 
focusing initial attention on blockading the epicenter of the rebellion at 
Charleston and efforts to arrest privateering off Cape Hatteras that led to the 
invasion of the North Carolina sounds. In late April 1861, the Wilmington 
Daily Herald reported that the "unsettled condition of the country" created 
apprehension that caused an immediate decline in the traditional southern 
commerce with northern ports. 43 On 1 May 1861, that same paper reported that 
41 J. M. Mason to J. P. Benjamin, 2 September 1863, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, p. 560. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Wilmington Daily Herald, 24 April 1861. 
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business with Northern ports "has become almost suspended ...... 
44 However, 
the Wilmington Journal continued to report vessel traffic with the United 
States until well into the summer of 1861. 
On the same date that the Daily Herald reported a decline in commerce 
with northern ports, the Wilmington Journal carried news of the arrival of the 
schooners G. W. Grice from Charleston and the A. J. DeRosset from New York 
and the departure of the schooners Jonas Smith for New York and the A. E. 
Smirk for Baltimore. 45 Vessels in port included the steamship North Carolina, 
the brigs John Balch loading for New York, the John Hathaway taking on cargo 
for Rio de Janeiro, the Robert Bruce loading for Liverpool, the Joseph Wilson 
taking on a cargo for Barbados and the S. P. Brown and Tocoa were both 
waiting for cargoes. Ten schooners were also in port. Two were loading for 
New York, two were taking on material for Baltimore and the remaining six 
were awaiting freight or passengers. 46 
Without Union vessels off the Cape Fear to enforce the blockade, long 
established patterns of trade simply continued. On 15 May, the schooner Sea 
Nymph cleared Wilmington for New York with a cargo of "naval stores and 
peanuts. "47 Two days later the schooner Gold Hunter and the sloop C. H. Prior 
arrived from Hertford, North Carolina with cargoes of corn and the ship 
Thomas Watson from Campeche, put into Wilmington in distress. The brig 
Tyne from Cardiff entered port on 20 May with a valuable cargo consisting of 
300 tons of iron for the railroad and the schooner Maracaibo arrived from 
Cardenas with molasses. The schooner Sheet Anchor of Rockport, Maine also 
arrived with a cargo of lime and news that the vessel had been turned away at 
Charleston by the United States Navy. 48 
In June, William Guyer of Norwalk, Connecticut reported in a letter to 
the United States Treasury Department: 
When I left Wilmington, N C., three vessels had just arrived, one 
with a cargo of railroad iron from Cardiff, Wales; one with a cargo 
of molasses, from Cardenas; and one with a cargo of lime from 
Maine. The latter vessel was bound for Charleston, but finding 
44 Wilmington Daily Herald, 1 May 1861, p. 2, col. 3. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., and Wilmington Journal, 2 May 1861, p. 3, col. 3. 
47 Wilmington Journal, 15 May 1861, p. 3, col. 2. 
48 Ibid., 20 May 1861, p. 2, col. 5. 
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that harbor blockaded, put into the port of Wilmington. When I 
left, no blockade was established off the Cape Fear River, and I 
have not seen any account of any since my arrival North. Unless 
Wilmington is blockaded, the blockade of Charleston Harbor is a 
practical nullity. 49 
In June, Jacob Brewster also related that: 
While Charleston and Savannah as well as Virginia ports are 
blockaded, our port [Wilmington, N. C. ] is overlooked. Vessels 
from England arrive and bring us what is wanted, our railroads 
distributing to every point of the compass aid and comfort to the 
Confederate States. Six British vessels have entered and cleared 
since the paper blockade was declared. One is now loading for 
England, her cargo furnishing funds to bring out munitions from 
England. More vessels are expected with railroad iron. 50 
Hiram Barney, a collector of customs at the New York Custom House informed 
Secretary of the Treasury S. P. Chase that: 
Two citizens of North Carolina have just passed through this city 
on their return home from Halifax, where they chartered British 
vessels for a trade between Nassau, Bermudas, and ports on the 
coast of North Carolina. To Beaufort, Wilmington, and New 
Berne, or Ocracoke, the entrance is almost unobstructed, and no 
blockade has been enforced or even announced. Every day vessels 
are passing in or out of these ports, carrying whatever cargoes they 
choose. British bottoms are chartered by Carolinians and carry on 
this trade. 51 
Less than a week later Barney penned another letter to Chase relating that he 
had received additional information from Mr. Benjamin Blossom to confirm 
that: 
Within a few days past four British vessels, direct from Nassau 
[New Providence], have entered the port of Wilmington, N. C., for 
the purpose of there receiving cargoes. One British vessel has 
entered Beaufort, N. C., for the same purpose. Vessels of that 
49 W. A. Guyer to Treasury Department, no date, ORN, I, 5, p. 746. 
501, Brewster to the Navy Department, no date, ORN, I, 5, p. 753. 
51Hiram Barney to S. P. Chase, 12 July 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 28. 
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nation have within two weeks entered this port direct from 
Nassau with cargoes of pitch, tar, and turpentine, evidently the 
product of North Carolina, thus lending confirmation to the 
statements of Mr. Blossom. He assures me that vessels belonging 
in Nassau and in the British provinces carry on an almost 
uninterrupted trade with the ports of New Berne, Ocracoke, 
Wilmington, and Beaufort, N. C... 52 
The collector wrote again on 9 August 1861, to confirm his earlier intelligence 
and point out that: 
.... the trade with the 
Bermudas by means of British vessels 
uninterrupted, but I have ample reason to suppose that some of 
our own vessels are concerned in it. It is currently reported that a 
schooner lately left Greenport (near Sag Harbor) [N. Y. ], bound 
direct for Ocracoke with a general cargo. Certain it is that she 
sought to obtain a pilot because of his knowledge of the Carolina 
coast. 53 
Earlier in the summer of 1861, the brig Arid of Belfast made a voyage 
from New York to Wilmington with a cargo of salt and "contrabands of war. " 
On the return the Ariel carried out a cargo of tar and turpentine. According to 
the New York collector of customs the round trip "paid the owner immensely- 
a fortune. " In August the Ariel departed for Baltimore intending to head to 
Wilmington again with a cargo of salt, contraband and arms. 54 In the South 
the price of salt had reached "$4 per sack" by August 1861.55 When Henry 
Wilding, the United States Consul in Liverpool, interviewed some of the crew 
of the bark Thomas Watson in Liverpool, he was informed that the vessel 
cleared Wilmington "without seeing any of the blockading vessels". 56 Wilding 
also confirmed the arrival of the Fraser, Trenholm and Company steamer 
Princess Royal which had run the blockade at Beaufort, North Carolina with a 
52 Hiram Barney to S. P. Chase, 12 July 1861, ORN, 1,6, p. 29. 
53Hiram Barney to S. P. Chase, 9 August 1861, ORN, 1,6, p. 29. 
54New York Collector of Customs, 2 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 98. 
55R. T. Waskro to Charles Moore, 6 August 1861, ORN, 1,6, p. 99. 
56Henry Wilding to F. M. Seward, 13 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 101. 
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cargo of naval stores. 57 Another vessel, the English clipper bark Hind departed, 
allegedly for Monrovia, on 24 July with 125 cases of arms and 1,000 kegs of 
powder for the Confederacy. 58 
William Schouler, Adjutant-General of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, informed William Seward on 26 August 1861, that a reliable 
source had reported the arrival of five North Carolina schooners in Halifax. 
They carried 1,400 barrels of turpentine through the blockade and one was 
observed "loading with herring and other 'blue nose' commodities" such as 
"tea, coffee, dry goods, etc. " for the return to North Carolina. 59 The New Bern, 
North Carolina schooner Susan Jane also loaded a cargo at Halifax in August. 
It consisted of blankets, cloth, iron, steel, brogans and axes which had been 
purchased in New York and Boston and shipped to Halifax. In fact, J. S. Farlow 
of Boston informed Gideon Welles on 6 August 1861, that: 
From information that has come to my knowledge I feel well 
assured that parties in New York, in connection with parties in 
the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, are now 
engaged in chartering and fitting out British schooners in those 
provinces, loading there with fish and other articles of contraband 
of war, and discharging same at Wilmington and the small ports 
of North Carolina, taking in return thence naval stores and 
tobacco. 
This tobacco is supposed to be taken to Wilmington and the other 
North Carolina ports by land from Richmond and Petersburg, Va. 
These naval stores and tobacco thus procured are moved from the 
provincial ports along shore by schooners and steamers to the 
near-by United States ports, when by false swearing or other illicit 
means it is admitted free of duty as returned American 
productions. 60 
The Argonaut of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia took on a cargo of fish, shoes, 
soap, coffee, cotton goods and tea in August and sailed for Key West. 
Schooners under English colors loading at Halifax cleared for Havana, the 
Bahamas, the West Indies and even Key West. Clearing for those ports 
571bid., ORN, 1,6, p. 117. 
58 Ibid. 
59 William Schouler to W. H. Seward, 26 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 165 and John S. Keys to 
Gideon Welles, 3 September 1861, ORN, 1,6, pp. 189-190. 
60j. S. Farlow to G. Welles, 6 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 68. 
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provided an explanation for their presence off the southeastern coast and 
provided the opportunity to run into Confederate ports with contraband 
cargoes. 61 
The schooner Harriet P. Ryan of Plymouth, North Carolina cleared Salt 
Cay, in the Turks and Caicos Islands, for New York with a cargo of salt in 
August 1861. U. S. Consular Agent C. P. Stamers informed Andrew G. 
Carothers, the U. S. Consul at Grand Turk that the captain of the Harriet P. 
Ryan intended to enter one of the blockaded ports along the North Carolina 
coast. According to the schooner's captain William Nixon, the vessel had 
already run the blockade twice and was employing an American flag to 
complete his deception. 62 
P. Godfrey confirmed the nature of the early contraband trade in a letter 
dated 17 August 1861. While in the vicinity of Bath, Maine, Godfrey found 
that: 
The design is to load for the South, make the coast of North 
Carolina under the British flag, lay off till a chance offers, and then 
run the blockade by running in under cover of the guns of Fort 
Macon, through Old Topsail Inlet, which is considered to have a 
depth of 20 feet. I further gather that the rebels are doing a very 
active business through the various inlets and sounds of North 
Carolina, thereby meeting the wants of the Army in Virginia 
directly through the railroad of those states. I further found the 
unscrupulous New England men are engaged in a lucrative 
business by aiding and abetting a contraband trade along the 
Atlantic coast from Virginia southward; that they take out papers 
for the West Indies, with a show of freight for that latitude, and by 
collusion with the rebels are taken as prizes, discharge such 
contraband goods as they have, are let off, pursue their voyage to 
their destined port, take in contraband goods, again in part, run 
down along the coast, fall a prey again, discharge all contraband, 
run out, and return to their New England port with the balance of 
their cargo with a show of honesty that is surprising. I also saw 
men whom I know to be Southern men purchasing vessels, 
giving a very unreasonable account as to what they were to be 
61j. S. Chauncey to S. H. Stringham, 13 September 1861, ORN, I, 6, pp. 205-206, M. M. Jackson to 
Gideon Welles, 7 September 1861, ORN, I, 6, pp. 227-228 and M. M. Jackson to Gideon Welles, 13 
September 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 210. 
62C. P. Stamers to A. G. Carothers, 22 August 1861 and M. M. Jackson to G. Welles, 13 September 
1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 210; pp. 229-230; C. P. Stamers to A. G. Carothers, 26 August 1861, M. M. 
Jackson to Gideon Welles, 13 September 1861, ORN, 1,6, pp. 230-231. 
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used for, making up sham cargoes in order to get out of port. It 
was suggested to me by reasonable parties that the Federal 
Government must have agents in the various seaports who are 
sharper than any we have now in some of them. 63 
The 22-ton schooner William H. Northrup of Wilmington continued to 
successfully trade with the Bahamas and West Indies in spite of the Cape Fear 
blockade. On 27 April, the Northrup returned to Wilmington from Eleuthera 
shortly after the declaration of the blockade. The William H. Northrup carried 
a cargo of fruit and was not aware of the declaration of a blockade until arriving 
in Wilmington. 64 
On 29 August 1861, F. W. Seward informed Gideon Welles that the U. S. 
Consul at Nassau had reported the repeated arrival of the schooner William H. 
Northrop from Wilmington. The William H. Northrop arrived with the 
Confederate flag flying and a cargo of lumber, peanuts and brand. 65 The 
William H. Northrup's prominent display of Confederate colors was reported 
in the Wilmington Journal on 9 September 1861.66 On the return trip to 
Wilmington the schooner carried out a cargo of coffee, sugar and 500 bushels of 
salt. 67 On 31 October, the William H. Northrop left Wilmington with a cargo 
of rice and lumber and sailed to Havana. There the vessel's captain, Joseph A. 
Silliman of Wilmington, sold the cargo and loaded coffee, drugs and other 
sundry material for the return trip to North Carolina. 68 After stopping in 
Nassau, where Joseph Roberts had been issued a Certificate of British Registry 
for the schooner on 12 August 1861, Captain Silliman headed the William H. 
Northrup for Cape Fear. Within 25 miles of Cape Fear the William H. 
Northrop was intercepted by the bark Fernandina and taken as a prize. Acting 
Volunteer Lieutenant George Brown of the Fernandina reported that the 
North Carolina built vessel had cleared for New York. 69 
63N. P. Godfrey to G. Welles, 17 August 1861, M. M. Jackson to Gideon Welles, 13 September 1861, 
ORN, 1,6, pp. 110-111. 
64Wilmington Journal, 2 May 1861, col. 6, p. 3. 
65 William Schouler to WIlliam H. Seward, 26 August 1861, ORN, I, 6, p. 165; William H. 
Seward to Gideon Welles, 29 August 1861, ORN, 1,6, p. 165-166. 
66 Wilmington Journal, 9 September 1861, p. 4, col. 6. 
67 William H. Northrup, Cargo Manifest, ORN, I, 6, p. 489. 
68 Wilmington Journal, 9 September 1861, p. 4, col. 6. 
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The North' Carolina built schooner Wingan was sold and transferred to 
British registry at Charleston, South Carolina on 10 July 1861. Under the 
ownership of Nehmiah K. Clements of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia and renamed 
the Albion, the vessel made a trip to Cuba in July. The following month the 
Albion cleared Cardenas, Cuba for Nova Scotia but, it was the opinion of Flag- 
Officer G. J. Pendergrast that the vessel was headed for Wilmington when it 
was captured off Charleston on 19 August. Pendergrast informed Flag-Officer 
Silas H. Stringham that: 
... the British consul 
for North and South Carolina is 
countenancing the transfer of American vessels and issuing 
provisional certificates of ownership. My opinion is that the 
business is destined sooner or later to involve the Governments 
in difficulty, and that the issuing of these certificates is only for the 
purpose of covering American vessels with the protection of the 
British flag and by that means avoid the operation of a blockade 
some extent. 7° 
The British schooner British Queen loaded 1500 bushels of salt, 23 bags of coffee 
and ship stores at Nassau, New Providence and cleared for Baltimore late in 
April 1862. On 1 March 1862, the schooner was captured off the Cape Fear. Her 
North Carolina master failed to provide satisfactory answers to Commander O. 
S. Glisson's questions and the captain of the USS Mount Vernon sent the 
British Queen to Philadelphia under a prize crew. 71 
On 29 July 1862, the brig Napier was captured attempting to run Turks 
Island salt into Wilmington. The Napier had cleared for either Beaufort, N. C. 
or Beaufort, S. C. in order to perpetuate the hoax that her cargo of salt was 
intended for Union consumption. 72 The 41-ton sloop Lizzie of Nassau was 
captured off New Inlet by the USS Cambridge on 2 August 1862. The Lizzie had 
loaded with salt, a bale of blankets, boxes of sheet tin, boxes of arrowroot, soda 
ash, and caustic soda in Nassau and cleared for Baltimore. When captured the 
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captain explained that the vessel was unseaworthy and he had been heading for 
the coast to discharge his cargo. 73 
The English schooner Revere of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia cleared Nassau, 
New Providence in September 1862 with a cargo of 800 sacks of salt, 100 barrels 
of pork, 39 cases of damaged leather trappings, 1 damaged lot of harness, 34 
cases of brooms, 13 cases of matches and 1 barrel of beef. The schooner had 
cleared for Baltimore but was captured by the USS Monticello off Cape Fear 
headed for Wilmington. The cargo was shipped by Henry Adderly and 
Company, a party "well known to be interested in running the blockade. "74 
The 200-ton English brig Robert Bruce cleared Hull for Halifax, Nova 
Scotia also attempted to get into Shallotte Inlet in October 1862. The cargo 
consisted of 37 bales and 14 cases of woolens, 4 bales of linens, 26 cases of boots 
and shoes, 20 barrels of drugs, 400 bundles of iron hoops, 225 pigs of iron, 8 
hogsheads of ale, 30 casks of bottled port, 186 crates of bottles, 3 crates and 1 
hamper of tinware, 60 bags of glue and 42 bags of corks. 75 On 21 November the 
schooner Carrie Sandford arrived at Wilmington with a cargo of 4,500 bushels 
of salt, 71 barrels of sugar and a quantity of arrowroot. The Wilmington 
Journal speculated that the material would produce a "very large profit" for the 
owners of the vessel. 76 
Shallow draft schooners were also able to operate out of the small and 
unblockaded inlets of the North Carolina coast. Shallotte Inlet, approximately 
20 miles west of the western entrance to the Cape Fear was frequently employed 
by blockade running schooners. 77 Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Braine 
reported that contrabands confirmed that: 
... a regular and uninterrupted trade is 
kept between Nassau, New 
Providence, and Shallotte Inlet, North Carolina, which inlet is 
about 20 miles to the westward of this place. Schooners are said to 
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arrive here weekly, and, after discharging, take in cotton, 
turpentine, and rosin, and sail for Nassau with papers purporting 
that they sailed from the city of Wilmington. 78 
An intercepted letter from Captain A. B. Magruder of the Confederate Bureau 
of Ordnance and Hydrography dated 27 October 1862, provided specific 
instructions for using Little River as a safe harbor for blockade runners. 
Magruder's instructions were for vessels to: 
Run into the mouth of Little River, a small stream of _ 
feet of 
water, near the boundary line of North and South Carolina, 
emptying into the Atlantic about 30 or 40 miles below Cape Fear. 
It is not down on the charts nor on the coast survey, and its 
existence even-certainly its harbor and anchorage ground-is hardly 
known to any Yankee. Communications from a little village or 
post-office called Little River, about 4 or 6 miles from the mouth, 
are readily had with the interior by country roads, etc., with 
Charleston and Wilmington. A pilot can be had at Wilmington to 
meet and bring in vessels from the coast, and rosin and turpentine 
in any quantity can be procured for return cargo; ` also cotton, 
lumber, etc. 79 
Schooners proved to be very versatile vessels for breaking the blockade. In 
addition to having the shallow draft required to navigate the shoal waters of 
southern inlets they were good windward sailors. That quality permitted them 
to work along the shore. In the shallow waters around False Cape, 
approximately 20 miles south of Cape Henry, a schooner of about 200 tons was 
discovered discharging freight into small boats for landing through the surf. 
On arrival of a Union warship the schooner weighed anchor, proceeded down 
the coast approximately four miles, reanchored in shallow water outside the 
surf and resumed discharging her cargo. 8° The schooner Racer was captured at 
anchor between Stump and New Topsail Inlet on 30 October 1862. That vessel 
was loaded with salt and the crew was apparently also waiting for assistance to 
unload through the surf. 8' 
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The 85-ton schooner Star of Washington, North Carolina ran through 
the blockade from North Carolina to Guadeloupe in March 1862. The Star 
carried a cargo of 60,000 shingles, 16,800 staves, 8 barrels of tar and 6 barrels of 
spirits of turpentine. After disposing of the cargo for almost $1,500, David 
Gaskell, the master, loaded the schooner with sugar, molasses, coffee and 
apothecary ingredients and returned to North Carolina. According to Master 
Gaskell, "the wants of Washington are great and things of immediate necessity 
are held at enormous prices. "82 
On 12 June 1862 the schooner Sereta was burned after being chased into 
Shallotte Inlet by the USS Penobscot. 83 Another schooner, the Emily of Nassau 
was chased ashore on 26 June 1862 off the Western Bar. The Emily was entirely 
loaded with salt and was burned and scuttled by the crew of the Mount 
Vernon. 84 
Apparently the cargoes carried by small schooners and other sailing 
vessels were more valuable than the ships themselves. On the morning of 6 
July 1862 the crew of the USS Monticello discovered a schooner ashore near 
Masonboro Island. The vessel was almost entirely consumed by flames and 
Lieutenant D. L. Braine reported that: 
Her cargo, I judge, had been landed and taken away, as there was 
none on the beach or evidences of it in the immediate vicinity. 
This, sir, confirms the opinion I have long entertained that 
vessels are run ashore near these small inlets and out of sight of 
the blockading vessels, where their cargoes are discharged and 
they are then burned. 85 
By March 1862, vessels like the 184 ton bark Rosina Claypole and 510-ton 
ship Konigen Augusta were taking on cargoes for the Confederacy. Consul 
Morse calculated that it was "not unlikely that all these vessels may land their 
cargoes at some of the West India ports and run them in upon steamers, rather 
than incur the risk of running the blockade with sailing vessels. "86 In 
February, the 200-ton schooner Industry, loaded with salt, was abandoned in 
the vicinity of New Topsail Inlet. Mary Elizabeth of Nassau was captured 
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running into Western Bar with salt and fruit. The vessel had cleared for 
Baltimore and had been cleared at sea by the USS Huntsville. 87 
Despite the increase in vessel strength associated with the Union 
blockade in 1863, sailing vessels continued to be used to run into the shallow 
inlets of the southeast and blockaded' Confederate ports. The Charleston built 
schooner Pride was intercepted heading for Little River or, Shallotte Inlet in 
January 1863. The Pride was carrying 175 sacks of salt, shoes and medicine. The 
master, Thomas Phillips, had cleared New Providence, Nassau for Baltimore. 88 
The schooner Time, also from Nassau, was caught off New Inlet with a cargo of 
soda, matches and shoes that same month. 89 The following month the 200 ton 
schooner Industry was abandoned off New Topsail Inlet with a cargo of salt and 
another schooner was lost on the bar at New Inlet. 90 
By January 1863, vessel traffic through the shallow inlets of the North 
Carolina coast was sufficient to induce Flag Officer S. P. Lee to caution Captain 
B. F. Sands, Senior Officer off Wilmington, to: 
Pay attention to the southern limit of this blockade. I have 
possession of intercepted information that the enemy make use of 
Little River, near the boundary line of North and South Carolina. 
Send a smart steamer there commanded by a reliable officer, say 
the Chocura. The rebels next to the Cape Fear entrance refer to 
their correspondents to the inlets on the coast north and south of 
these entrances. Of course, Western Bar and New Inlet are the 
points upon which they will concentrate if they are preparing, as 
we are advised, to force the blockade. Keep your best armed 
vessels at these points; a small, active steamer or two on the coast 
above and below, with a good, long-ranged gun, aided by the 
schooners, can guard against and perhaps catch those making the 
coast, either to run up it or down it at night or to enter the inlets 
Lockwood's Folly, Shallotte, Tubb's and Little River, on the south 
coast, and Masonboro, New Topsail, New River, etc., on the north 
coast. 91 
87 J. F. Armstrong to G. Welles, 24 August 1863, ORN, I, 7, p. 459. 
88 W. T. Truxtun to S. P. Lee, 21 January 1862, ORN, I, 7, p. 459. 
89 W. A. Parker to S. P. Lee, 24 January 1863, ORN, I, 8, p. 471. 
90 J. Trathen to S. P. Lee, 3 February 1863, ORN, I, 8, p. 499 and A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 24 January 
1863, ORN, I, 8, p. 547. 
91 S. P. Lee to B. F. Sands, 17 January 1863, ORN, I, 8, p. 448. 
113 
In February 1863 , the Nassau schooner Annie, loaded with salt and a box of 
drugs, was chased ashore near Little River. 92 
"Thick" weather also provided opportunities for sailing vessels to break 
the blockade. In March 1863, a schooner took advantage of a northeast gale to 
run through New Inlet at daybreak. Low visibility permitted the vessel to run 
through the blockade and into the inlet before being observed. 93 Later in 
March, the schooner Sue from Nassau, "an old offender" was captured off Little 
River. Sue had cleared for Beaufort, North Carolina with a cargo of 800 sacks of 
salt, twenty-five boxes of pipes, 14 cases and 5 bales of list goods, 4 bales and 1 
package' of leather, 25 boxes of soap, 10 boxes of tin, 2 half chests of tea, 1 box of 
tea, 2 boxes of gin, 1 unidentified barrel and 800 sacks of salt. The crew of Sue 
had apparently, unloaded 550 sacks of salt through the surf and had it not been 
for bad weather, would have completed putting the cargo ashore. 94 At dawn 
on 15 April 1863, the schooner Odd Fellow was discovered near Little River 
Inlet. The Odd Fellow had cleared North Carolina through Lockwoods Folly 
Inlet with a cargo of 82 barrels of spirits of turpentine and 8 barrels of rosin and 
was underway for Nassau. 95 Early on the morning of 22 April, the schooner St. 
George was discovered heading into New Inlet. The St. George -departed St. 
Georges, Bermuda with a cargo of salt, rum and general merchandise and the 
captain reported that his vessel was . 
headed for Baltimore. 96 
The schooner Wanderer from Nassau cleared for Beaufort in April 1863 
and was captured off Murrells Inlet, South Carolina on 2 May by the USS 
Sacramento. The Wanderer was transporting a cargo of salt and herring. 97 The 
following day the schooner Alma was captured off New Topsail Inlet after 
clearing Bermuda for Beaufort. The Alma was loaded with 1,400 bushels of salt 
and a lot of liquor. 98 The sloop Express from Nassau was also loaded with salt 
and headed for Wilmington when captured. One of the crew had previously 
been captured on a schooner headed for Wilmington. 99 
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On 22 April 1864, the USS Monticello discovered the schooner Douglass 
of Nassau abandoned and drifting off the Cape Fear. 100 On 13 November 1863, 
the schooner Alice Webb of New York was discovered "discharged, scuttled, 
and abandoned" in the breakers by the USS Mount Vernon. 101 The officers and 
crew of the USS Mount Vernon also discovered the schooner G. O. Bigelow 
near Bear Inlet on 16 December 1863. The schooner was run ashore upon being 
discovered and the crew escaped in the ship's boat. A prize crew from the USS 
Mount Vernon discovered that the schooner was empty but dunage had 
apparently been prepared for a cargo of cotton to be loaded. 102 
The USS Tosco captured the Nassau schooner Sybil off the Cape Fear with 
a cargo of cotton. Although the vessel's papers were not in order, the Sybil was 
reported to have sailed from Matamoras, Mexico and was enroute to New 
York. There was no evidence of having cleared that Mexican port and evidence 
suggested the outward cargo from New York might have been contraband was 
enough to prompt Commander John Guest to seize the schooner. 103 
Although sailing vessels, and particularly schooners, outnumbered 
steamers by more than ten to one in 1861, their numbers steadily declined. By 
1862, the ratio had dropped to three sail to one steamer and when the number 
of steamers on the blockade began to increase dramatically in' 1863 that ratio 
dropped sharply. During 1863, only 55 sail were engaged in blockade running 
while the number of steamers had increased to 73 vessels. By 1864, steamers 
outnumbered vessels powered by sail seven to one. In spite of that decline and 
the increased risks, in September 1864, Thomas Kirkpatrick, the United States 
Consul at Nassau, New Providence reported that a company was being 
organized to purchase and equip sailing vessels to run the blockade to and from 
the Bahamas to the coast of Florida. Kirkpatrick related that the organizers of 
the company felt that schooners were less suspicious than steamers and a better 
risk. 104 That sentiment was not widely shared and steam vessels rapidly 
became the standard for successful operations. 
By the summer of 1861, one of the most well established and powerful 
mercantile firms in the Confederacy and several firms in Great Britain were 
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turning their attention from sailing vessels to steam ships for running material 
through the Union blockade. The first firm to employ steamers in running the 
blockade was John Fraser and Company of Charleston, South Carolina. John 
Fraser and Company and their Liverpool subsidiary Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company were the most extensively engaged in Anglo-Confederate blockade 
running. Their personnel and ships provided the Confederacy with invaluable 
economic and logistical support throughout the war. 
By the time South Carolina seceded from the United States, John Fraser 
and Company had become one of the largest importing and exporting 
companies in the South. Although established by John Fraser earlier in the 
nineteenth century, the firm had been owned and operated by George A. 
Trenholm since 1853. In addition to the Charleston enterprise, George 
Trenholm also opened offices in Liverpool and New York. When South 
Carolina seceded from the Union the firm was operating five ships on routes 
that connected those offices. 105 
George Trenholm and his partners quickly realized that they were in an 
excellent position to benefit South Carolina and the Confederacy and to serve 
the commercial interests of their firms. After South Carolina seceded, and 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities in April 1861, Trenholm imported arms 
from Liverpool and New York for sale to the State of South Carolina and later 
to the Confederate Government. 106 In February 1861, the Spofford and Tileston 
steamer Nashville brought in a shipment of British rifled muskets procured to 
arm the Vigilant Rifles, a company formed from members of that city's first fire 
brigade. The weapons had been purchased by the Liverpool office and shipped 
to New York where they were put aboard the Nashville for delivery to 
Charleston-107 The Gondar, a Fraser, Trenholm and Company vessel, also 
delivered a heavy caliber Blakely rifled cannon from Liverpool to Charleston to 
strengthen Confederate works surrounding Fort Sumter. 108 
After the Union declaration of a blockade, George Trenholm decided to 
transfer several of the company vessels to British ownership. The ships 
Alliance and Gondar, for example, were transferred to friends of C. K. Prioleau 
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and two of the Liverpool office's company clerks. Following that "change of 
ownership" the vessels were issued certificates of British Registry in July 
1861.109 Shortly thereafter becoming a neutral vessel, the Gondar departed 
Liverpool for Nassau and the Alliance sailed for St. Johns, New Brunswick. 110 
Both vessels loaded cargoes that included military supplies and cleared 
with southern pilots. 111 The Alliance arrived at Beaufort, North Carolina 
during the first week of September 1861.112 Gondar followed the next week. 
The Alliance was the first "British-owned" vessel to test the Union blockade in 
North Carolina. Reveling in the Alliance's success, the Wilmington Journal 
reported that: 
This is the first instance, we believe, of the ingress of a vessel of a 
neutral power into our blockaded ports; and as such is entirely 
sufficient to furnish the occasion for freeing the neutral trade of 
the British Government from further restrictions. 113 
In analyzing the significance of the arrival of the Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company vessel, the Wilmington Journal editorial continued: 
When, however, as in the case of the Alliance, the vessel of a 
neutral power itself runs the blockade, through either the 
inefficiency or the remissness [sic] of the cruisers, or even though 
some accident unaccounted for, there is no doubt that in the 
common estimation of international law, the blockade is 
positively and permanently broken. 
The test of the blockade for England, so far as her own rights are 
involved, is positively determined; and the circumstances 
attending the adventure of the Alliance point to prompt and 
effective measures for the assertion of those rights. It is known 
that a number of British war vessels are now stationed 
immediately on the North Carolina coast, and that the running of 
the blockade by"a British merchantman at Beaufort was performed 
in sight of one of them. The late additions to and concentration of 
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the British squadron, or rather fleet, off the Southern coast, means 
something. There has never before been such a formidable array 
of modern war vessels around and about our coasts. 114 
While the British Government did not attach the desired significance to 
the Alliance's uncontested arrival at Beaufort, profits realized by Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company confirmed George Trenholm's confidence in the 
Confederate market. The cargo of the Alliance consisted of an assortment of 
"general articles and some cases of arms, perhaps it consists of 190,000 
percussion caps, large quantities of medicines, quicksilver, pig iron, sheet iron, 
tin plate, several thousand dozen of spool cotton, &c., &c. "115 The cargoes of 
the Alliance and Gondar were offered to the government. Unfortunately for 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company, the Alliance and Gondar became victims of 
the cotton embargo. Both vessels remained in port at Beaufort awaiting cargoes 
until Fort Macon surrendered and they were captured along with the valuable 
harbor that provided the United States Navy with a base of operations for the 
blockade. 
The potential of a permanent association with the Confederate 
Government and the necessity for operating steam powered blockade runners 
was not lost on Trenholm and his partners. They moved quickly to obtain 
steamers to run the blockade and offered the services of their Charleston and 
Liverpool branches to the Confederacy. For a nominal 1.5% commission, 
Trenholm agreed to accept specie and bonds in Charleston and provide 
Confederate agents in Europe with an equal amount of cash and credit to 
support their procurement activities. 116 
To support their agreement with the Confederate States, Charles K. 
Prioleau of Fraser, Trenholm and Company in Liverpool negotiated the 
purchase of five steamers. The Victoria and Adelaide were large screw 
steamers that had been built during the 1850s for the Australian trade and were 
in need of immediate repair before being put into service. 117 The screw 
steamers Bermuda and Bahama were also purchased, however unlike the 
Victoria and Adelaide they were new ships still on the stocks. Both were 
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under construction in Stockton-on-Tees at the yard of Pearse and Lockwood. 
The fifth vessel, named Southerner, was contracted for with Pearse and 
Lockwood but was not launched until 1863.118 
The association with Alfred Trenholm and his partners proved to be 
one, if not the most important foreign affiliations of the Confederate States of 
America. When Captain James Dunwoody Bullock and Captain Caleb Huse 
were dispatched to Great Britain to obtain ships and war materials for the 
Confederacy, their enterprises were supported by Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company in Liverpool. 119 That relationship also produced the first test of the 
blockade by a neutral steamer. During the summer of 1861, supplies obtained 
by Huse and Major Edward C. Anderson, another Confederate procurement 
agent, were loaded aboard the Fraser, Trenholm and Company steamer 
Bermuda. The Bermuda was a large new screw steamer purchased specifically 
to run the blockade. 
Bermuda was launched on 1 August 1861 and was dispatched 
immediately to run the blockade. The U. S. Consul in Liverpool described the 
Bermuda as a: 
Two-masted; brig-rigged; funnel, lower part black, upper part red; 
black hull with a narrow red stripe round the molding, level with 
the deck; no poop; wheelhouse white. Her bottom pink, up to the 
waterline; no figurehead; no bowsprit; armed with four guns; has 
six white boats slung in iron davits ... 120 
In addition to supplies and war materials obtained by Huse and Anderson, the 
Bermuda was loaded with shoes, blankets, drugs and dry goods owned by 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company and 200 short Enfield rifles, 20,000 Enfield 
cartridges and two 6 pdr rifled field pieces shipped on the account of Wade 
Hampton. 121 In spite of warnings from the United States Consul in Liverpool, 
the Bermuda arrived safely in Savannah, Georgia on 18 September 1861. After 
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unloading the cargo the vessel was packed with approximately 2,000 bales of 
cotton. On 29 October 1861, Bermuda cleared Savannah and returned to 
Liverpool without interference. 122 
John Fraser and Company also chartered and operated the steamer 
Gordon in conjunction with the Confederate Government during the fall of 
1861. Early on the morning of 12 October 1861, Captain Thomas Lockwood ran 
the Theodora out of Charleston and into Nassau. On board were Confederate 
commissioners Mason and Slidell, their aides, Slidell's family and Captain 
Louis Michael Coxetter, hired by Fraser Trenholm and Company to bring a new 
blockade runner back from England. After delivering Mason, Slidell and 
Coxetter to Cuba, Lockwood loaded the Theodora with swords, pistols, lead, 
coffee and cigars. Lockwood ran the Theodora up the coast of Florida and 
through the Georgia and South Carolina coastal waterways to Charleston. 123 
On 5 December, Theodora departed again for Nassau with a cargo of 
cotton and Louis C. Heyliger, Confederate Consul for Nassau, on board. After 
surviving a violent northeast gale, Captain Lockwood delivered Heyliger and 
loaded a cargo of coffee, sugar and West Indian fruit. On 17 December the 
Theodora cleared Nassau and headed back to Charleston but, because that 
South Carolina port was closely blockaded, Lockwood headed the steamer to 
Wilmington. There on the morning of 20 December 1861, Captain Lockwood 
ran the Theodora through the blockade under fire from the USS Mount 
Vernon. 124 The Mount Vernon's shot fell short and Theodora became the first 
steamer through the blockade at Wilmington. As he crossed the bar Lockwood 
jauntily "returned the salute by giving the Abe-ites three blows of his whistle 
and dipping his flag. "125 
The success Captain Lockwood registered with the Theodora and-the 
lucrative nature of blockade running convinced Trenholm and his partners in 
Charleston to invest in several additional steamers. In November 1861, the 
company purchased the Isabel, Cecil and Carolina. All three of the steamers 
had been designed and employed in the coastal trade. All three were in 
122 Liverpool Consul, Reel 19,6 December 1861. 
123Wise, Lifeline, p. 57. 
124 O. S. Glisson to L. M. Goldsborough, 20 December 1861, ORN, I, 6, pp. 483-484 and O. S. Glisson 
to L. M. Goldsborough, 10 January 1862, ORN, 1,6, p. 511. 
125 Wilmington Journal, 26 December 1861, p. 2, col. 1. 
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Charleston when the blockade became reality and their owners put them up for 
sale rather than assume the risks associated with running the blockade. 
The Cecil was a 156-foot side-wheel steamer built by Harland and 
Hollingsworth of Wilmington, Delaware in 1857. Since 1858, the vessel had 
been owned and operated by the Florida Steam Packet Company running 
between Charleston, Savannah and Jacksonville, Florida. 126 The Carolina was 
a 165-foot side-wheel steamer built by Samuel Sneden of Greenpoint, New 
York. Like the Cecil, the Carolina was engaged in the coastal trade prior to 
establishment of the blockade. 127 The third vessel, Isabel, was the largest of the 
three steamers. That 220-foot side-wheel steamer had been built in 1848 by S. H. 
Duncan in Baltimore. The Isabel had provided passenger and freight service 
between Charleston and New York prior to the attack on Fort Sumter. 128 
Of the three vessels, only the Isabel was ready for sea. On 5 December 
1861, the steamer cleared Charleston as the Ella Warley and headed for Nassau 
with almost a thousand bales of cotton. 129 At Nassau the Ella Warley was 
transferred to British ownership and registry with the assistance of H. Adderly 
and Company. After the cargo of war materials from the Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company ship Eliza Bonsall was exchanged for Ella Warlcy's cotton, the 
steamer returned to Charleston on 2 January 1862.130 
Because Trenholm and his partners charged rates commensurate with 
the risks involved in blockade running, Confederate agent Caleb Huse also 
entered into another agreement to ship supplies through the blockade that 
would ultimately lead to the operation of government owned vessels. Huse 
negotiated an arrangement with T. O. Stock and a group of English merchants 
to purchase the steamer Gladiator and run the vessel through the blockade 
with a cargo consigned by the Confederate purchasing agent. 131 Like Bermuda 
and Bahama, the Gladiator had been built at Stockton-on-Tees by Pearse and 
126 Edward A. Mueller, St. Johns River Steamboats, Jacksonville, Florida, 1986, p. 193. 
127 Ibid., and Nepveux, George Alfred Trenholm, p. 39. 
128 William M. Lytle and Forrest R. Holdcamper, Merchant Steam Vessels of the United States, 
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Nepveux, George Alfred Trenholm, p. 38. 
129 Nassau Guardian, 12 April 1862 and Correspondence of the Confederate Treasury Department, 
Reel 2, p. 451, NA. 
130 L. Heyliger to J. P. Benjamin, 27 December 1861, ORA, IV, 1, pp. 815-816, J. Fraser & Company 
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131 D. T. Bisbie to J. P. Benjamin, 16 December 1861, ORA, IV, 1, pp. 800-802 and C. J. Helm to L. 
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Company and launched in 1860.132 F. H. Morse, U. S. Consul in London, 
described the Gladiator as an: 
... iron screw 
boat, with a round stern, flush deck, upright stem, no 
figure or billet head, bottom painted copper colored, black from 
water to rail. She has three masts, with three yards on the 
foremast; smoke pipe between the fore and main masts. 133 
Stock and his associates would purchase the steamer and provide Huse with 
500 tons of cargo space at £8 per ton for the inbound voyage. Huse would also 
pay a 5% primage and provide insurance for the voyage. The remaining cargo 
space was for Stock and his associates. Upon arrival in a Confederate port the 
owners of the Gladiator could offer the vessel to the Confederacy at £18,000. If 
the Confederacy did not purchase the vessel, the owners could sell it on the 
open market. If no one purchased the vessel, the Confederate government was 
obligated to pay Stock and his associates £15,000 for the steamer. 134 This 
arrangement was precluded when newly appointed Confederate special agent 
Louis C. Heyliger was forced to purchase the Gladiator to prevent the captain 
from breaking the ship's contract and returning the vessel and cargo to 
England. 135 
Once under Confederate control the Gladiator took on coal and Heyliger 
secured the services of Captain Robert Lockwood to act as pilot. However, 
before the Gladiator could clear Nassau the USS Flambeau arrived in port. 
Both Captain G. G. Bird and Heyliger agreed that it would be very imprudent to 
attempt to escape Nassau with the faster Flambeau waiting for the Gladiator to 
sail. 136 Because of the Gladiator's size and lack of speed the decision was made 
not to attempt to run the blockade. The impasse was resolved when an 
agreement was reached with Fraser, Trenholm and Company to provide space 
for the Gladiator's cargo on smaller and faster steamers that John Fraser and 
Company had recently purchased. 137 
132 Wise, Lifeline, p. 570. 
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Rather than run the vessels in through Charleston, now closely 
blockaded, or Savannah, nearly closed by the capture of Tybee Island, Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company suggested that their steamers run the cargo into 
Mosquito Inlet near New Smyrna, Florida. While waiting to see if the services 
of John N. Maffitt could be obtained to captain one of the steamers, Captain 
Thomas Lockwood took the coastal steamer Carolina, renamed Kate, to Nassau. 
There Lockwood loaded 300 cases of Enfield rifles, 32 bales of blankets, 4 cases of 
surgical instruments, 94 boxes of mess tins, 15 cases of medicine, 1 barrel of 
medicine, 500 barrels of gunpowder, 514 boxes of cartridges, and 90 boxes of 
percussion caps aboard the Kate. 138 
Lockwood cleared for St. Johns, New Brunswick and ran the Kate 
into Mosquito Inlet where the cargo was quickly discharged. With a load of 
cotton onboard, Lockwood returned to Nassau for more of the Gladiator's 
cargo. There Kate rendezvoused with the Fraser, Trenholm and Company 
steamer Cecile, under the command of Captain Ferdinand Peck and carrying 
John Maffitt. Maffitt supervised loading the remainder of the Gladiator's cargo 
aboard the Kate and Cecile. Both vessels had delivered their consignments by 
mid-March and returned to Nassau with cotton. 139 Because the Gladiator was 
considered unsuited for transporting cargoes through the blockade the vessel 
was sold to Fraser, Trenholm and Company for transporting cotton to England. 
Although the first voyage of the Bermuda and shipping the Gladiator's 
cargo into Florida on the Kate and Cecile proved to be successful for both 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company and the Confederacy, the cost of shipping 
goods with private firms was considered excessive by Confederate agents in 
Europe. Both Edward C. Anderson and James D. Bullock felt that they should 
find additional means of shipping their munitions and supplies into the 
Confederacy. Working through British agents Andrew and Thomas Byrne, 
they located and ultimately purchased the screw steamer Fingal. 140 The screw 
steamer Fingal had been built by T and J. Thomson in Govan, Scotland in 1861 
for service along the Scottish coast. 141 
138 Bahamas Consul, Reel 10,19 January 1862; Nassau Guardian, 12 April 1862 and L. Heyliger to 
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When the Fingal cleared Greenock in October 1861, the vessel carried 
over 11,000 rifles, 24,000 pounds of gunpowder, 233,000 cartridges, over 
1,000,000 percussion caps, 500 swords, two 4.5-inch Blakely cannon, two field 
pieces, blankets, clothing, drugs and shot and shell for the cannon. 142 During 
the first week of November the Fingal reached Bermuda. There the vessel 
cleared Bermuda Customs on 4 November and secured a Georgia coastal pilot 
from the steamer CSS Nashville. On 7 November the vessel departed St. 
Georges for Savannah. 143 Although sighted by a United States steamer off 
Tybee Island, the Fingal entered the Savannah River and, after running 
aground under the guns of Fort Pulaski, delivered her cargo at Savannah. 144 
The Fingal, like the Gladiator was considered to be too large and slow a vessel 
to run the blockade and once Savannah was effectively closed the ship was 
trapped. Ultimately, the hull and machinery of the ship were used as a 
platform for construction of the ironclad CSS Atlanta. 145 
The success registered principally by the John Fraser and Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company vessels and increasing demands for both war material 
and commercial merchandise in the South provided the impetus for 
dramatically increased blockade running in 1862. With the exception of 
Charleston, the blockade was still weak, if not nonexistent due to the lack of 
United States warships and the logistical system necessary to keep them on 
stations off Confederate ports. The partners of John Fraser and Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company were already convinced of the potential profits and 
nominal risks associated with trading through the blockade. Insurance, 
although increasing in cost, was available for vessels engaged in running the 
blockade and risks were nowhere near as high as potential profits. 
By February 1862, John Fraser and Fraser, Trenholm and Company were 
consolidating their position as the dominant force in a rapidly developing 
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pattern of Anglo-Confederate commerce. Their steamer Bermuda was again in 
Liverpool and United States Consul, Thomas H. Dudley, reported that the 
vessel was being loaded as rapidly as possible with a cargo of 525 cases of shells, 
seven rifled cannon, 18 carriages, nineteen cases of small arms, several "heavy' 
cases of unknown contents, -ten tons of telegraphic wire and 156 tons of 
saltpeter provided by Faucett, Preston & Company. 146 Dudley reported in 
February that the Bermuda was to take the cargo to Bermuda where it would be 
divided between the steamers Caroline and Herald for the run through the 
blockade at Savannah or Charleston. Trenholm's firms had not failed to 
observe the significance of using small fast vessels rather than larger oceanic 
steamers to run goods through the blockade. Fast steamers involved in the 
British mail and passenger services appeared to be ideal for the task at hand. 
Perhaps the first to be purchased was the Herald. 
Purchase of the Herald had been effected by the firm of Cunard, Wilson 
& Company. That steamer had been in the Dublin and Glasgow service and 
was reported to be extremely fast. Henry B. Hammond, U. S. Consul in Dublin 
reported that: 
The spirit of brag is already displayed by those citizens of Dublin 
who have gained the knowledge of the steamer's new errand. 
They think there is no steamer in our whole Navy that can catch 
the Herald. I hope her valuable qualities will soon be tested by our 
fleet. 147 
After landing a cargo of war material the Herald would return to Bermuda for 
her share of the Bermuda's cargo. The cargo capacity of the Bermuda could be 
employed to deliver material to Bermuda and the speed of the Caroline and 
Herald could be used to take cargoes through the blockade. 148 The pattern of 
trading between neutral British possessions off the Confederate coast and 
Confederate ports at Charleston and Wilmington was conceived by the partners 
of John Fraser and Fraser, Trenholm and Company early in 1862. As the war 
146 T. H. Dudley to W. H. Seward, 22 February 1862, ORN, 1,6, pp. 683-684; T. H. Dudley to W. 
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148 T. H. Dudley to W. H. Seward, 22 February 1862, ORN, I, 6, pp. 683-684. 
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progressed, that strategy would evolve into the most successful formula for 
blockade running that the war produced. 
In addition to the Bermuda, John Fraser and Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company purchased the large steamers Rangoon, Economist, Gladiator, 
Leopard, and Minho to be loaded with cargoes for Bermuda and Nassau. 149 On 
28 February the Economist arrived at Bermuda. 150 By 11 March the Bahama 
was ready to sail from the docks at West Hartlepool with a cargo of shot, 
gunpowder and munitions. 151 The Bermuda arrived on 22 March after a 
voyage from Liverpool and theHerald arrived two days later on 24 March 1862 
after a fourteen day trip from Liverpool by way of Madeira. The vessel was 
consigned to John Tory Bourne, the St. Georges agent for thel Confederate 
Government. According to U. S. Consul C. M. Allen the Herald was a "narrow 
iron vessel of about 600 tons burden, and draws but 9 feet of water, is white 
below water line, and black above, has one smoke stack and two masts, with 
yards on the foremast. "152 Although the Herald and Caroline were to establish 
a service between Bermuda and Wilmington, the Herald ran into Charleston 
and joined Kate in regularly transporting material between Nassau and 
Charleston. During 1862, the vessels owned by John Fraser and Company and 
Fraser Trenholm and Company ran almost exclusively between Charleston and 
Nassau. 153 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company also purchased the steamer North 
Carolina at Wilmington early in 1862. That new screw propeller was one of a 
number of southern steamships offered for sale as a' consequence of the 
blockade. The vessel had been built by Novelty Iron works in New York in the 
fall of 1860 and had been launched in January 1861. The 169-foot vessel was 29 
feet 2 inches in beam and had a depth of hold of 13 feet 3 inches. The iron hull 
was double riveted and a 250 horsepower single cylinder engine turned a 12- 
foot propeller. The North Carolina could make 14 miles per hour and 
consumed only 10 tons of coal every 24 hours. In August 1861, Thomas 
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Walker, Edward Kidder and P. K. Dickinson offered the vessel for sale for the 
Cape Fear and Ocean Steam Navigation Company. 154 
The North Carolina was subsequently purchased by Fraser, Trenholm 
and Company, renamed the Annie Childs, and on 4 February 1862, ran through 
the blockade at Wilmington with 634 bales of cotton, 788 barrels of rosin, 225 
boxes of manufactured tobacco, one box of peanuts and one box of unidentified 
contents. The Annie Childs also brought out of Wilmington some of the 
officers and midshipmen that would be assigned to the CSS Florida as well as 
Confederate Agent Captain James D. Bulloch. Bulloch was returning to Europe 
to continue his purchasing operations for the Confederate Government. 155 
The Annie Childs, also operated between Charleston and Nassau under the 
names Julie Usher and T. D. Wagner and was part of the John Fraser and 
Company fleet until the vessel was sold in May 1863. 
Although George Trenholm's companies were the dominant force in 
early steam blockade running, other firms entered the business in 1862. One of 
the most prominent was the firm of Zachariah C. Pearson and Company of 
Hull. The firm was owned by Zachariah C. Pearson, the mayor of Hull and a 
successful merchant with a fleet of vessels that included the steamers 
Circassian, Modern Greece, Stettin, Lodona, Phoebe, Merrimac and Peter hoff. 
Pearson entered into an agreement with Huse to transport military supplies to 
the Confederacy. Unlike Fraser, Trenholm and Company, Pearson and his 
associates found their efforts to run the blockade disastrous. Six of the seven 
vessels that Pearson and Company dispatched to the South were captured and 
one, the Modern Greece, was run ashore and lost north of New Inlet. 
The first Pearson steamer to be dispatched to the Confederacy, Circassian, 
was a large ship-rigged iron screw steamer of 1,387 tons. When the vessel 
cleared Constantinople on 20 December 1861, the hull was black "with a yellow 
stripe round the molding, level with the deck" and the chimney was pink with 
a black top. The stem was decorated with a female figurehead that was painted 
white-156 According to the Consul in Constantinople, the Circassian had for 
several years been engaged in trading between Liverpool, Constantinople and 
Trebizond. 157 Although the captain cleared the Circassian for the United 
154 Wilmington Journal, 2 August 1861, p. 3, col. 1. 
155 F. H. Morse to W. H. Seward, 12 March 1862, ORN, I, 7, p. 217. 
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States, by 21 February the ship was in Liverpool taking on coal for a voyage to 
Bermuda. 158 When the Circassian was captured by USS Somerset on 4 May 
1862 approximately 20 miles from Havana, documents that Captain Edward 
Hunter failed to destroy confirmed that the ship had put into Bordeau. There, 
according to an agreement between Z. C. Pearson and J. Soubry, Esq., of Paria, 
the Circassian was loaded with a cargo consisting of "about 150 tons of wine and 
brandy. " The remainder of the cargo was "coffee, preserved meats, & etc. " and 
the destination was New Orleans. The vessel and cargo were completely 
insured against "marine and war risks" by British insurance companies that 
charged 25% for assuming the risk. 159 
Pearson and Company also dispatched their new screw steamer Stettin 
in March 1862. The Stettin arrived in Bermuda from Hull around mid-April 
in search of coal. While in St. Georges the Stettin's disbursements were 
handled for Captain Johnson by John T. Bourne. On 23 April 1862, Bourne 
reported to Zachariah C. Pearson and Company that their steamer had departed 
for "her port of destination. "160 According to the U. S. Consul in Bermuda, 
that destination was Tampico, Mexico but, in fact, the ship headed for Nassau 
to take on coal. 161 On 21 May, the Stettin cleared Nassau for St. John's 
Newfoundland. The vessel was discovered and captured off Cape Romain, 
South Carolina on 24 May 1862, by the USS Bienville. 162 The vessel's cargo 
consisted of powder, saltpeter, pig lead, iron and tin plates, tea,, coffee, brandy, 
gin, quinine, and other valuable articles that had been insured in England for 
16% premium. 163 The vessel owned by Z. C. Pearson & Company was not 
insured. 164 When captured the Settin's masts were found to have been 
"stripped of spars and sails, leaving nothing but her lower masts standing" and 
the hull had been "painted lead color. "165 
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Pearson's iron screw steamer Modern Greece was also engaged in- the 
company's Mediterranean trade for almost two years. Like the Circassian, the 
753 ton Modern Greece was withdrawn from her traditional routes to engage in 
the more lucrative trade with the Confederacy. The Modern Greece was a large 
deep-draft vessel 210 feet in length, 29 feet in beam and drawing 17 feet 2 inches 
when loaded. After taking on coal at Cardiff, the steamer cleared for Gibraltar 
on 19 February and sailed to Liverpool to take on a cargo of arms and military 
supplies for Fraser, Trenholm and Company. The vessel took on a civilian 
cargo of "wine, spirits, tea and necessaries" at Hull before clearing for 
Falmouth. The Modern Greece cleared Falmouth for Tampico on 2 May and 
steamed for Wilmington by way-of Madeira. 166 
On 27 June 1862, the Modern Greece attempted to enter New Inlet but 
was driven ashore by the USS Cambridge and USS Stars and Stripes. 
Fortunately the vessel was under the covering fire of the guns of Fort Fisher 
when finally aground. Major Hendrick, commander of Fort Fisher, quickly 
brought his artillery to bear on the USS Cambridge and USS Stars and Stripes, 
thus preventing their destruction of the steamer. Both the crew and passengers 
aboard the Modern Greece made it safely to shore. A salvage party under the 
direction of Colonel Leaventhorp landed a large quantity of the steamer's cargo 
including ordnance, arms and ammunition and a variety of commercial 
freight. 167 The entire non-military cargo was subsequently auctioned off in 
Wilmington on 8 July and the "HULL, SPARS, RIGGING, ANCHORS AND 
CHAINS" of the vessel were auctioned on the beach at Fort Fisher at noon on 
30 July 1862.168 For Z. C. Pearson and Company the Modern Greece was not a 
total loss. Both the vessel and cargo were insured at 25% premium by Lloyds 
and recovery of a portion of the "wines and spirits" carried as cargo could 
generate an anticipated 1200% profit. 169 Although the vessel became a total 
loss, Confederate salvage of the Modern Greece 's cargo confirmed the lessons 
learned in bringing cargoes through the surf from schooners. Under the 
protection of shore batteries, valuable cargoes could be recovered. 
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On 3 June 1862, the U. S. Consul in Falmouth reported that the Pearson 
steamer Lodona had arrived at that port from Hull. The Lodona was a bark 
rigged screw steamer of 573 tons burden with one black funnel between the 
main and mizzen masts. The lower part of the hull was painted brown and the 
bulwarks were black with a white after rail. 170 Under the command of Captain 
Luckie the Lodona was to take in a supply of coal and sail for Tampico, 
although the vessel had received a license from the U. S. Consul in Hull to put 
into Port Royal, South Carolina. 
After, crossing the Atlantic, Lodona put into Bermuda for coal on 29 
June. Finding none available, the vessel took on a supply of wood from a 
wrecked vessel to use as fuel and sailed for Nassau on 16 July. 171 There 
sufficient coal was obtained to permit the Lodona to attempt to run into a 
Confederate port. On 3 August, the Lodona appeared off Savannah and, had it 
not been for a well-placed shot from a Union battery on Tybee Island and 
shallow water on the bar, would have run into the Savannah River. The 
following day Captain Luckie ran the steamer into Ossebaw Sound. Before 
being able to enter the Ogeechee or Vernon River southeast of Savannah, the 
Lodona was captured by the USS Unadilla. The cargo proved to be "Brandies of 
the best brands, cooling claret, genuine gin with Holland labels, dry goods and 
gentlemen's ready-made garments, boots and shoes with one item of 3,000 
ounces of quinine.... "172 
Pearson also shipped a cargo of brandy, rum, wine, 12,000 small arms and 
four cannon in the steamer Phoebe in June 1862. Like the Modern Greece and 
the Circassian, Phoebe was a large iron screw steamer. The vessel had been 
built in Dumbarton in 1851, and was fitted with a single cylinder steam engine 
of 120 horsepower. 173 Before departing the Phoebe was also loaded with 16 
casks of tobacco and 100 packages of slops, ' consisting of serge for clothing for 
soldiers, sailors, and marines" at Bermuda and more than 1,500 barrels of 
cannon powder. 174 The Phoebe arrived in Bermuda and was reported to be 
discharging her cargo of powder on 19 August. 175 While in Bermuda the 
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Phoebe was also painted a light lead color in preparation for running the 
blockade. 176 Because Pearson's creditors sought legal means for recovering past 
due accounts, the Phoebe was ultimately sold by Overed Guerney and Company 
of London to the Australian Steam Packet Company to settle accounts and 
never ran the blockade. 177 
After the crew attempted to take over the ship and had to be was paid off 
and discharged, the Pearson screw steamer Merrimac was also sold at Bermuda. 
The Merrimac arrived in Bermuda on 5 September 1862, and word of Z. C. 
Pearson and Company's bankruptcy caught and creditors had the ship seized. 
Being unable to have the Merrimac's cargo discharged due to proceedings 
against Pearson and Company, Huse negotiated with Pearson and Company 
creditors to purchase the steamer using £7,000 in Confederate cotton certificates. 
The decision to purchase the Merrimac was made in spite of recommendations 
of Captain Thomas Lockwood to John Fraser and Company. Lockwood 
inspected the Merrimac while enroute to Liverpool and found that the vessel 
was "too slight" to be suitable for Fraser, Trenholm and Company's blockade 
running operations. 178 
Finally in December 1862, the Ordnance Bureau purchased the side- 
wheel steamer Merrimac and in February 1863 the vessel ran into Wilmington 
under the command of Captain Porter. 179 The Merrimac had been owned by 
the firm of Z. C. Pearson and Company and was previously under contract to 
carry a cargo of military supplies and ordnance. Upon arrival in a Confederate 
port the vessel was to be purchased and shipping on the cargo paid. As the 
vessel proved to be unsuitable, the Ordnance Bureau sold the vessel and the 
merit of their judgment was confirmed when the Merrimac. was captured by 
the USS Iroquois while running out of Wilmington on 24 July 1862. According 
to Captain A. L. Case the Merrimac would not have been captured had her 
machinery been in good order and properly managed. 180 
In spite of insurance coverage the loss of every one of the Pearson 
steamers drove the firm into bankruptcy by late summer. Z. C. Pearson and 
176 E. F. Devens to S. F. Du Pont 7 September 1862, ORN, I, 7, pp. 317-318. 
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178 Bourne to John Fraser & Company, 11 December 1862, Vandiver, Blockade Running, p. 27. 
179 J. Bourne to C. Huse, 10 February 1863, Vandiver, Blockade Running, p. 39 and US Consular 
Dispatch, Bermuda, 18 April 1863, RG 84, NA. 
180Report of A. L. Case, USS Iroquois, 24 and 27 July 1863, ORN, I, 10, pp. 131-133. 
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Company had accumulated £345,000 of debt in blockade running and creditors 
resorted to litigation to recover what they could. By September 1862, creditors 
of Z. C. Pearson had accepted a proposal to pay off bad debts incurred in 
blockade running. The proposal was for: 
All the bills of the firm not yet due, but accruing, are to be retired, 
the creditors to receive 10c in the pound immediately, and the 
payment of the remainder to be dependent to a certain extent on 
the nature of the remittances from the Confederate States. The 
amount due to the firm from these States it is said will be 
sufficient to meet all claims in full, and have a large surplus. A 
gentleman is already in the South on behalf of Mr. Pearson 
endeavoring to turn £75,000 worth of Confederate paper money 
into goods. The steamer Peterhoff, which is now trying to run the 
blockade, belongs to Mr. Pearson. She has on board a cargo valued 
at $900,000 and, if she gets safely in, the sale of her stores will be a 
golden harvest for Mr. Pearson's creditors. 181 
Both the Phoebe and Merrimac were in Bermuda when Pearson's creditors 
filed injunctions against the company. John Bourne served as agent for the 
vessels and incurred "considerable expense" as a consequence. Sale of the 
steamer Merrimac was anticipated to generate at least £131,574 and the sale of 
the cargo and steamer Peterhoff was expected to cover all company liabilities. 182 
Fortunately for Pearson and the firm's creditors, the new steamer 
Peterhoff was successful in making one run through the blockade. The 
Peterhoff was a new 669 ton screw steamer built in Sunderland. The vessel was 
220 feet in length, 29 feet in beam and had a depth of hold of 16 feet and 9 
tenths. Two cylinder engines produced 90 horsepower. Pearson had built the 
Peterhoff for the Baltic trade but contracts with Huse induced the ship owner to 
commit the vessel to blockade running. Like the Lodona, Phoebe and 
Merrimac, the Peterhoff arrived in Bermuda late in the summer of 1862. The 
U. S. Consul in Bermuda reported that the vessel arrived on 30 July and on 2 
August the vessel cleared Bermuda Customs at St. Georges. 183 After clearing 
London for Matamoras, the Peterhoff also arrived in Bermuda during the 
181Liverpool Daily Post, 9 September 1862, enclosed in US Consular Dispatch No. 128,12 
September 1862. 
182Wilmington journal, 17 September 1863, p. 4, col. 1. 
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Liverpool Daily Post, 6 September 1862 and St. Georges Customs Records, Inbound 1863. 
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summer of 1862.184 The Liverpool Daily Post reported that the vessel arrived 
on 30 July with a cargo of wine, merchandise and an "immense quantity of 
quinine" worth approximately $900,000.185 On 9 September 1862, the Liverpool 
Daily Post reported that the sale of the Peterhoffs cargo would be a "golden 
harvest" for the Z. C. Pearson and Company Creditors. 186 
Unlike the Merrimac and Phoebe, the Peterhoff departed Bermuda for 
the Confederacy and ran successfully in to Charleston. At Charleston the 
Peterhof fs cargo was discharged and a load of cotton was taken on for the 
return voyage. By 21 November the Peterhof f had returned to Liverpool, 
discharged her cargo and was waiting to load. 187 A portion of the cargo was 
loaded at Liverpool and the Peterhoff departed for London. There her new 
owner, London shipbuilder Joseph Spence, commissioned a survey to identify 
necessary repairs and put the vessel into the floating dry dock at Victoria Dock. 
In dry dock the hull was scraped and painted in preparation for a voyage to the 
Gulf of Mexico. 188 
After coming out of the dry dock the Peterhoff was loaded with a cargo of 
"boots, shoes and clothing, salt petre, machinery mainly casks & cases the 
contents of which are yet unknown". 189 The Peterhoff cleared London for 
Matamoras and sailed on 9 January 1863.190 The Peterhoff was captured by the 
USS Vanderbilt coming out of St. Thomas in the West Indies on 25 February 
1862. Although the Peterhoff s owners entered protests and complained to the 
British Government, the United States persisted and the vessel was 
condemned by the Key West Prize Court. 191 
It was not readily apparent early in 1862, but by the end of the year the 
nature of blockade running was in the first stages of an important transition. 
As the number of steam vessels on the blockade increased the advantages of 
operating steam-powered blockade runners had become readily apparent. 
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Experience with the Gladiator and Fingal provided valuable insight into the 
evolving mechanics of the nascent trade. At Nassau, Louis Heyliger, with 
assistance from Henry Adderly, negotiated perhaps the most important 
concession of all from the British. That was the right to break bulk and reship 
cargoes through the blockade on smaller faster vessels. In a 27 December 1862, 
letter to J. P. Benjamin, Heyliger reported that: 
We have succeeded in obtaining a very important modification of 
the existing laws, viz, the privilege of breaking bulk and 
transshipment. This, as you are aware, was not previously 
accorded, so that if matters come to the worst we may make such a 
division of the cargo into other vessels as will diminish the 
risk. 192 
That strategy was first conceived by agents of Fraser, Trenholm and Company. 
As the intensity of 'steamer activity between Nassau and Charleston 
began to attract increasing Union attention, additional and more serious 
consideration was given to running vessels between Bermuda and 
Wilmington. In December 1861, the steamers Ella Warley and Theodora had 
run into St. Georges from Charleston with cargoes of cotton for John Fraser and 
Company. 193 In January, February and March 1862, the Kate, formerly the 
Theodora, made runs into Bermuda from Charleston before being sold to the 
Confederate Navy and captured off Wilmington on 28 May 1862. Three other 
John Fraser and Company Charleston based steamers, Ella Warley, Economist 
and Cecile also made runs into Bermuda along with the Kate. 194 In September 
their vessel Minho ran into Bermuda with cotton and rosin from Charleston 
before being sold to the Navigation Company and lost in October attempting to 
enter Charleston Harbor. The following month the Herald ran out of 
Charleston and arrived in Bermuda on 17 October 1862. After unloading a 
cargo of cotton, Herald returned to Charleston with a cargo composed of war 
materials, dry goods and supplies brought in by Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company ships Gladiator and Ella and a quantity of goods from the packet 
Delta that provided monthly service between Bermuda and Halifax, Nova 
Scotia. 
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At Bermuda, St. Georges commission merchant John Tory Bourne was 
retained to act on behalf of the Confederacy late in 1861. Bourne's first 
opportunity to serve a Confederate vessel came when the CSS Nashville 
arrived at St. Georges. During that visit Bourne assisted with customs and 
coaling of the vessel. 195 During the time the Nashville was in port the Fingal 
also put into St. Georges on 3 November 1861.196 While it is unclear if Bourne 
assisted with the Fingal, it is likely that he conferred with Confederate agents 
Anderson and Bulloch and briefly met with Confederate Commissioner James 
M. Mason during his visit. Bourne clearly recognized the potential for 
conducting Confederate business through Bermuda. On 22 January 1862, he 
wrote Mason: 
I regret that your visit was very unexpected and our interview so 
short that you could not avail yourself of judging the facilities 
offered at this Port in a business point of view, as a half way house 
for commerce between the Confederate States of America and the 
Mother Country. 
With reference to the question now at issue I shall continue to 
tender my services on every occasion which may come up and 
trust I may be beneficial in furthering the cause. Any business 
intrusted to my care shall have my personal attention as 
heretofore. 197 
In March, Bourne also wrote John Fraser and Company to outline the 
advantages of routing shipments through the Bermudian ports of St. Georges 
and Hamilton where he could be of assistance. According the Bourne: 
The port of St. George as you will observe in the Chart is easy of 
ingress and egress for steamers and sailing vessels of large class, 
say drawing 20 feet. Our pilots are very skillful and all natives, the 
facilities for coaling steam ships are greater than in Madeira, the 
coal there being carried off in lighters; at this Port I put the ships 
alongside the wharf, coaling with Barrows, which considerably 
facilitates their movements and in fifteen minutes after their 
anchor is weighed the ships are at sea. Labor just at this time is 
195 Vandiver, Bermuda Blockade Running, p. 8. 
196 Bermuda Customs, St. Georges, Fingal, 3 November 1861, 
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high, namely 5s per diem, 6s & 4d is the usual rate but there are so 
many ships arriving here and discharging their cargoes to make 
repairs the labor is scarce. 198 
Bourne also provided the following information on the Port of Hamilton and 
the Royal Naval Dockyard at Ireland Island: 
The Port of Hamilton is navigable for middle class vessels, 
drawing 8-12 feet water at 1/2 tide; the passage is narrow and no 
ship of the "Bermuda" class was even attempted to be taken in 
there. Vessels bound for the Port of Hamilton generally pass 
round St. Georges and go a distance of 18 miles before reaching 
Hamilton and return the same before being at sea. The moorings 
of all the Man of War are in an open roadstead called Grassy Bay, 
immediately opposite the Dockyard and when they undergo 
repairs they are hauled into the Camber which is a kind of Dock 
built at a very heavy expense by the Admiralty Department. 199 
Before closing Bourne also provided a detailed cost proposal regarding 
the charges made by Bermuda merchant factors. According to Bourne, 
Bermuda merchants charged "5% on disbursements of ships paid in cash or 
bills. 2 1/2% on all goods reshipped, 5% on all articles sold at Private sale or 
auction. " Interest on loans ranged from 5 to 30% although he pointed out that 
Colonial Law allowed a legal interest of only 7%. Bourne proposed to charge 2 
1/27o' on disbursements belonging to John Fraser or Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company and 5% commission on any sales he would be requested to negotiate. 
Bourne proposed to handle reshipments and transshipments in an unusual 
manner. For those activities he proposed that: 
... 
As your risk and that of Messers Fraser Trenholm & Co with 
the party concerned are very great, and wishing to use every 
economy and at the same time furthering the cause at issue, I will 
defer making any charge for trans shipment of produce either 
way, but will execute all the Custom House business, writing, &c 
(which will be considerable) and when you close up all 
transactions on the acknowledgment of the Confederacy by the 
European Powers, you will renumerate me as you feel disposed; 
by this means I risk with all concerned, what my circumstances 
198 Bourne Letter Books, Bermuda Archives, p. 14., and Vandiver, Blockade Running, p. 9- 
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permit, any loss which may be sustained in transshipment, I also 
lose a little. At the Custom House in this port I have to Detail 
myself in the Inward Record Book, every item with marks from 
manifest, and make inward entries when the cargo (or even a 
box) is transshipped. I have to repeat the same in the Outward 
Record Book, pass Outward Entry and clear vessel for Sea. 20° 
Bourne also pointed out the difficulty of negotiating large foreign bank bills 
and cautioned that: 
My offering bills for liquidating the disbursements of steamers 
arriving here from England and clearing at Customs for the West 
Indies with Authority opens the business to inquisitive people, 
therefore it would save considerable trouble for the parties in 
England to put on board three or four hundred pounds in Gold 
and insure it, by that means the supercargo with my assistance 
will be independent; he can put his hands in his pocket and pay 
down for what he wants at the lowest rate... 201 
Bourne's proposal was apparently acceptable to Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company and he began to act as their agent in Bermuda. In subsequent letters 
Bourne also pointed out that the amount of traffic at Nassau made that port 
dangerous. In corresponding with both John Fraser and Company and Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company in June 1862, Bourne pointed out that: 
The Federal Cruizers having instructions to intercept all steamers 
bound to Nassau, I have suggested to Messers Jno Fraser & Co per 
Herald that they divide their business between that port and this, 
the Cruizers can go to Key West, coal and return to the Bahama 
Channel in 48 hours, where they can anchor at pleasure, but they 
cannot do that in these waters, distant 700 to 800 miles from any 
coal depot-ocean water outside the reef all round Bermuda, they 
cannot hold on, any accident happening to their machinery the 
Dock Yard authorities will be very cautious what leniency they 
give them. Several parties have sent steamers and other vessels 
of all sorts concerned in this trade, which makes it appear 
dangerous. We have not had a visit from any of them. 202 
200 Bourne Letter Books, Bermuda Archives, p. 15., and Vandiver, Blockade Running, p. 11. 
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Bourne's suggestion to John Fraser and Company preceded a similar 
suggestion from Confederate agent Caleb Huse. On 4 August 1862, Huse wrote 
to Colonel Josiah Gorgas that "the port of Nassau has become so dangerous 
even as a port of destination for arms in British ships that I have thought it 
prudent not to order anything more to that port, for the present at least. "203 To 
facilitate shifting operations to Bermuda, Gorgas assigned Major Norman S. 
Walker to Bermuda to oversee Confederate activities and act as disbursing 
agent. Gorgas also recommended that it was "highly important that light-draft 
steamers should be purchased and used solely for the transportation of cargoes 
from Bermuda. "204 4 
During the summer and fall of 1862, Nassau became even more 
dangerous due to an outbreak of yellow fever. Sickness and deaths in the 
islands had a serious impact on both blockade running and those in the trade. 
The wife of Captain Thomas Lockwood was one of the victims. 205 On 6 August 
and again on 18 November, Thomas Lockwood ran the John Fraser ° and 
Company steamer Kate from Nassau through the blockade and into 
Wilmington. Unfortunately, the crew of the celebrated steamer carried the 
fever through the blockade and into Wilmington. At Wilmington vessels 
from Nassau, including the Kate, were quarantined in an effort to control the 
disease. 206 Blockade runners shifting their activities north to Bermuda brought 
the fever to those islands creating both a medical and a logistical crisis. 
As cool weather began to reduce the incidence of yellow fever during the 
fall of 1862, the Confederate Ordnance Department began to operate several 
light draft steamers. The base of their operations was established at St. Georges, 
Bermuda rather than Nassau and the ships would run to Wilmington. No 
doubt Huse's recommendation of that port and Bourne's promotion of St. 
Georges had an impact on that decision. Gorgas proposed to have the Bermuda 
based steamers run into Wilmington for several reasons. That port was not 
heavily blockaded as was Charleston and it was also the closest open 
Confederate port to Bermuda. Material brought into Wilmington could be 
conveniently shipped out on one of several rail connections. The most 
203 Huse to Gorgas, 4 August 1862, in Letters Received by the Secretary of War, 1862, document G. 
W. D. 733, Confederate Records, NA. 
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206 Wilmington Journal, 3 October 1862, p. 2, col. 2. 
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important of those being the Wilmington and Weldon railroad that connected 
Wilmington with Petersburg and Richmond and thus the Army of Northern 
Virginia. 207 
Gorgas' brother-in-law, Major Thomas L. Bayne, was appointed to 
organize the Ordnance Bureau's blockade running operations. 208 James M. 
Sexias was placed in charge of a depot established at Wilmington and Major 
Norman S. Walker and later Major Smith Stansbury were dispatched to 
Bermuda to oversee a depot established at St. Georges. 209 The first of the 
Ordnance Department vessels was the new sidewheel steamer Cornubia. The 
Cornubia was built by Harvey and Son of Hayle in 1858 and operated in 
passenger service on the Thames. On 14 August the Cornubia arrived in Cork 
from London to take on coal for a voyage to Havana. 210 After clearing for 
Havana the Cornubia's crew experienced problems with the boilers and 
returned to Scotland for repairs. 
On 1 September the United States Consul in Glasgow reported that the 
Cornubia was in Greenock at the mouth of the Clyde for repairs to the steam 
machinery. 211 There the vessel was rapidly fitted with replacement boilers. 212 
Apparently the repairs were carried out without unloading any of the cargo as 
Union informants reported that the vessel was filled to the decks with coal and 
suggested that the coal was shipped to hide other material. 213 Early in 
November the new boilers were tested and the Cornubia cleared for the West 
Indies under the command of Captain John Thomas Holmes. On 3 December 
1862, Cornubia arrived at Bermuda in "Ballast" after refueling at Fayal. After a 
brief stop in St. Georges, Captain Holmes cleared for Trinidad and took the 
Cornubia into Wilmington, arriving without incident on 17 December 1862.214 
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The voyage of the Cornubia marked the beginning of systematic efforts to run 
between Bermuda and Wilmington. 
Although not yet part of the Ordnance Department's fleet, a second 
Confederate owned steamer was also run into Wilmington in December 1862. 
That vessel arrived just before midnight on 29 December under the command 
of Lieutenant John Wilkinson. Wilkinson's vessel was the Giraffe, a fast 
sidewheel steamer purchased by the Treasury and War Department. The 
Giraffe had been employed as a packet between Glasgow and Belfast until 
purchased for £28,000 by Alexander Collie and Company to run the blockade. 
At the insistence of Lieutenant Wilkinson, Collie consented to sell the Giraffe 
to the Treasury Department for £32,000 in Confederate bonds with the proviso 
that the vessel could not be subsequently sold to any private party without his 
consent. 215 Treasury Department agent Benjamin F. Ficklin proposed to use 
the Giraffe to deliver a cargo consisting of munitions for the War Department 
and presses, lithographic supplies, paper and lithographers for the Treasury 
Department to Charleston. 216 
Under the supervision of Ficklin and Captain Wilkinson, the Giraffe 
was converted to run the blockade. The vessel had been built by J. and G. 
Thomson and Company of Glasgow in 1860 and was fitted with a "beautiful 
saloon and cabins" for passengers. Those accommodations were dismantled 
and less attractive but more functional quarters for officers and crew 
constructed. Conversion of the vessel was accomplished in only a month and 
the Giraffe was ready for sea by November. 217 Under the command of Captain 
James Alexander Duguid the vessel sailed for Nassau. After stops in Madeira 
and San Juan, Puerto Rico, Duguid brought the ship into Nassau where he 
discharged the officers and crew and turned command over to Lieutenant 
Wilkinson. 218 Wilkinson signed another crew, took on pilots for Charleston 
and Wilmington and sailed for the South on 27 December. Finding the 
weather at Charleston "too thick", Wilkinson took the Giraffe in at 
215Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 17 October 1862 and J. A. Seddon to W. G. Crenshaw, 21 June 1863, 
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Wilmington. There the vessel was turned over to the Ordnance Department 
and renamed Robert E. Lee. 219 
During 1863, the connection established between Bermuda and 
Wilmington by the Confederate Ordnance Department was developed into a 
reliable and highly effective service. The Cornubia and Robert E. Lee made 
monthly trips through the blockade until their capture in November of that 
year. The Ordnance Bureau also purchased the side-wheel steamer Merrimac 
in 1863. The Merrimac was owned by the firm of Z. C. Pearson and Company 
and under contract to carry a cargo of military supplies and ordnance. 220 Upon 
arrival in a Confederate port the vessel was to be purchased and shipping on 
the cargo paid. After the Merrimac arrived in Bermuda on 5 September 1862 
word of Z. C. Pearson and Company's bankruptcy caught up with the vessel 
and creditors had the ship seized. Being unable to have the Merrimac's cargo 
discharged due to proceedings against Pearson and Company, Huse negotiated 
with Pearson and Company creditors to purchase the steamer using £7,000 in 
Confederate cotton certificates. 221 The decision to purchase the Merrimac was 
made in spite of recommendations of Captain Thomas Lockwood to John 
Fraser and Company. Lockwood inspected the Merrimac while enroute to 
Liverpool and found that the vessel was "too slight" to be suitable for blockade 
running. 222 
By February Bourne wrote Huse that the Merrimac was ready for sea and 
her captain, S. G. Porter, was waiting to secure a crew. Bourne assured Huse 
that: 
The saving to the CS Govt. will be considerable if quick steamers 
can be purchased to run in the goods and bring me cotton for 
reshipment; one trip in and out will very nearly cover ship and all 
expenses, the "Cornubia" only brought in 300 bales, no more could 
be got at but she could have carried more. Should the war be 
prolonged after the closing of Parliament, quick and light draft 
2198, P. Lee to G. Welles, ORN, I, 8, pp. 418-419. 
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steamers may be bought on the Lakes in Canada which will 
answer during the summer months, particularly about Mobile 
and no doubt at low rates. 223 
On 13 April, Captain Porter ran the Merrimac into Wilmington and delivered 
three valuable Blakely guns designed to fire 170 pound projectiles. Upon 
inspection at Wilmington the Merrimac's machinery was found to be in poor 
condition and the vessel was sold. 224 
In addition to the Merrimac, the Ordnance Bureau also purchased the 
sidewheel steamer Eugenie. That vessel was built by M. Samuels & Company 
of Hull and was purchased new. By May 1863, the Eugenie joined the Cornubia 
and Giraffe in running into Wilmington. The less successful Eugenie was also 
put into service May but damage suffered running into Wilmington in 
September required months to repair. The repairs appear to have not been 
entirely satisfactory and in December the ship was dispatched to Nassau and 
ultimately back to Liverpool where it was eventually sold. 225 
When contracts with English captains expired during the summer of 
1863, Gorgas transferred registration of vessels to the Confederate Government 
and placed Confederate Navy officers in command. Lieutenant Richard N. 
Gayle was assigned to command the Cornubia and Lieutenant Joseph Fry was 
assigned to the Eugenie. Instructions for the operation of Ordnance Bureau 
steamers was spelled out in a communication from Sexias to Lieutenant 
Gayle. 226 
According to Sexias' instructions, engineers on the vessel had to have 
the written approval of the captain to serve on the ship, no passengers or 
private freight was permitted aboard without Sexias' permission and cargo 
manifests were to be presented to War Department personnel as soon as the 
vessel made port in either Bermuda or Wilmington. The captain was to 
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approve in writing all disbursements made by the purser and all accounts 
related to the operation and maintenance of the vessel were to be submitted to 
Sexias' office. The officers and crew of War Department vessels were to be paid 
in gold but bonuses for a successful run could be paid in Confederate currency. 
The officers and crew were paid according to the following scale and received a 
bonus, equal, or almost equal, to the amount of pay received for each round 
trip run from Wilmington to Bermuda. 227 
Position Round Trip Bonus 
Wage 
First Officer $200 $200 
Second Officer $100 $80 
Third Officer $60 $50 
Pilot $300 $100 
Purser $60 $60 
Quartermaster $50 $40 
Boatswain $50 $50 
Seaman $40 $40 
First Engineer $300 $200 
Second Engineer $150 $100 
Third Engineer $100 $80 
Fourth Engineer $80 $70 
Fireman $50 $50 
Trimmers $40 $40 
Engineer Storekeeper $25 $25 
Chief Steward $60 $60 
Second Steward $40 $40 
Chief Cook $50 $50 
Waiters $25 $25 
Mess Boys $25 $25 228 
Ordnance Bureau wages and bonuses were not comparable with the civilian 
market and did not permit vessel captains to compete for reliable officers and 
crew. The officers and crew of the Venus owned and operated by Captain 
Crenshaw and Alexander Collie paid considerably more than that allowed by 
the Confederate Government. The following wage scale illustrates the 
disparity: 229 
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Position Round Trip Bonus 
Wage 
Captain $2,500 $2,500 
First Officer $600 $600 
Second Officer $375 $375 
Third Officer $375 $375 
Pilot $1,750 $, 750 
Crewman $125 $125 
Chief Engineer $1,250 $1,250 
In July 1863, Fraser, Trenholm and Company sold the Ordnance Bureau 
a fourth steamer. That vessel was the steel screw steamer Phantom built by W. 
C. Miller and Son for Fraser, Trenholm and Company and powered by Fawcett, 
Preston and Company machinery. Fraser, Trenholm and Company captain 
Eugene L. Tessier brought the Phantom out to Bermuda and in July ran the 
steamer into Wilmington. There title was transferred to the Confederacy and 
S. G. Porter took command. 230 
In spite of the well publicized vessel losses and bankruptcy of Z. C. 
Pearson and Company in 1862, the success of the John Fraser and Company and 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company steamers induced more British and 
Confederate companies to engage in running steamers through the blockade. 
That was reinforced by Confederate abandonment of the quasi-cotton embargo. 
The success of the Fraser, Trenholm and Company , and 
Ordnance Bureau 
steamers demonstrated that the blockade could be successfully broken on a 
reliable basis and attracted considerable attention. In 1863, the intensity of 
blockade running also increased because Confederate demands for both civilian 
and military imports increased. 
Those high profits and increased, demand attracted a number of 
additional firms to the trade that developed between England and the 
Confederacy. One of the most important British firms was Alexander Collie 
and Company of London and Manchester. Collie and Company put the 
Dudgeon built double screw steamer Flora into service in January 1863 and the 
sidewheel steamers Ruby and Granite City into service between in February 
230 Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 1 May 1863, Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 21 June 1863 and 
Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 5 July 1863, Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 5 July 1863, S. 
Stansbury to Captain S. G. Porter, 16 August 1863, Stansbury Letterbook, BA, Hamilton and Wise, 
Lifeline, p. 235 and J J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 216-217. 
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1863.231 The Granite City made one run into the Cape Fear on 25 February and 
was captured near Eleuthera after running out of Wilmington on 22 March 
1863. The Ruby was more successful and ran in and out of Charleston until 
run ashore near Lighthouse Inlet on the South Carolina coast on 11 June 
1863.232 The Dudgeon twin screw Flora proved to be the most successful and 
operated between Nassau and both Wilmington and Charleston until being 
sold by Collie and Company in September 1863.233 
Alexander Collie and Company also entered into an agreement with 
Captain William G. Crenshaw and the Confederate Government to establish 
and operate a small fleet of blockade runners. Captain Crenshaw, an artillery 
officer and prominent Richmond, Virginia merchant, had made a proposal to 
supply war materials to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon. Seddon 
accepted Captain Crenshaw's proposal and dispatched him to Europe. There he 
was to identify and contract with a suitable firm to procure and ship war 
materials through the blockade. 234 Crenshaw was authorized to purchase 
necessary war materials and supplies and to purchase or contract for the 
construction of ships to transport cargoes to the South. He and an acceptable 
firm would receive a 2.5%a commission on purchases, ships and the sale of 
cotton their steamers brought out of Confederate ports. 235 
By March, Captain Crenshaw was in London working in conjunction 
with Confederate Commissioner James Mason to secure loans backed by cotton 
that would support his enterprise. In London Mason met Alexander Collie and 
with Mason's assistance a formal business agreement was negotiated. 
Although the arrangement was not entirely satisfactory with Caleb Huse, the 
agreement with Alexander Collie and Company was signed and soon produced 
the desired results. On 30 March 1863, Captain Crenshaw reported that he had 
been able, with permission from Collie and Company to take over that firm's 
231 L. Heyliger to J. A. Seddon, 10 January 1863, ORA, IV, 2, pp. 335-336. 
232 S. F. Du Pont to G. B. Balch, 28 June 1863, ORN, I, 14, p. 301 and G. B. Balch to S. F. Du Pont, 29 
June 1863, ORN, I, 14, p. 301-302. 
233 J. T. Gordon notebook captured on Cornubia, 4 September-7 November 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 277- 
279 and "Vessel Papers. ", Reel 11, Flora, NA. 
234 A. R. Lawton to J. B. Fergerson, 12 October 1863, ORA, IV, 2, p. 870, A. R. Lawton to J. B. 
Fergerson, 12 October 1863, ORA, IV, 2, p. 870 and C. Huse to J. M. Mason, 4 July 1863, ORA, IV, 2, 
pp. 628-629. 
235 J. A. Seddon to J. M. Mason, 18 December 1862, ORA, IV, 2, pp. 244-245 and Samuel B. 
Thompson, Confederate Purchasing Operations Abroad, University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill, 1935, p. 22. 
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contract for a series of four double screw steamers from William and John 
Dudgeon. The steamers were to be constructed on the lines of the Flora which 
was already operating successfully through the blockade. 236 On 11 April, 
Crenshaw reported the purchase of a "fast side-wheel steamer for £26,000" that 
could be used within the week to take out material already purchased and in 
great demand in the South. 237 Crenshaw's letter also contained a reminder 
that Secretary Mallory had indicated several "first-rate" naval officers would be 
assigned to command the steamers. 
With Seddon's approval, Crenshaw proposed to set up one or more 
depots for war material and supplies in "the islands. " Like the plan first 
proposed by John Fraser and Company, fast steamers would operate between 
the island depots and ports on the Confederate coast. Crenshaw felt that their 
operation could be almost as regular as "packets. "238 The John Fraser and 
Company vessel Kate had already established an impressive record of regularly 
running between Charleston and Nassau and the Cornubia was making 
consistent runs into Wilmington from Bermuda. To facilitate and coordinate 
logistics, Collie's agents in Bermuda and Nassau would also service vessels 
under the Collie and Crenshaw Contract. In Bermuda that agent was John T. 
Bourne and in Nassau, a Collie employee, Mr. Watson, would represent the 
firms. Captain Crenshaw's brother James R. Crenshaw was appointed to 
oversee and manage the operations at Charleston and Wilmington. 239 
The first Collie and Crenshaw steamer to arrive at Bermuda was the 
Venus. The new side-wheel river steamer entered at St. Georges on 10 June 
1863 and cleared customs the following day with a cargo of "general 
merchandise. " After repainting the vessel white and removing all but the 
lower masts the Venus cleared for Nassau two days later. On 14 June the 
Venus departed for "Nassau" and arrived safely at Wilmington with the first 
cargo shipped by Crenshaw and Collie 
four days later. Under the command of 
Charles Murray the Venus maintained a monthly service between 
Wilmington and Bermuda until October. 240 
236 W. G. Crenshaw to J. A. Seddon, 30 March 1863, ORA, IV, II, pp. 480-482. 
237 W. G. Crenshaw to J. A. Seddon, 11 April 1863, ORA, IV, II, pp. 478-489. 
238 Ibid., pp. 480-482. 
239 Ibid., pp. 497-498. 
240Bermuda Consular Dispatches, 12 June 1863 and St. Georges Customs Book, inbound 1862-1863, 
BA. 
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The first of the Dudgeon vessels purchased by the Confederacy in 
conjunction with Crenshaw and Collie, Hebe, cleared and departed London on 
12 May. Although Collie and Crenshaw had loaded their 25% of the cargo, not 
all of that consigned to the Confederate Government was "shut out" and not 
put on board. Because of bad weather in the channel the captain laid over 
several days at Falmouth. 241 By 30 June the Hebe was in Nassau. There with 
assistance from Louis Heyliger and L. G. Watson the vessel was coaled and took 
on additional cargo for the run into Wilmington. Hebe made the first run 
through the blockade without incident and cleared Wilmington for the return 
trip to Nassau on 6 August 1863.242 There Hebe quickly unloaded a cargo of 
cotton and loaded much needed winter supplies shipped from England by 
Collie and Crenshaw for the Quartermaster General. During the second week 
of August the Hebe cleared Nassau and headed back to Wilmington for a 
second attempt at running the blockade. On the morning of 18 August 1863, 
the Hebe was discovered heading down the North Carolina coast north of New 
Inlet by the USS Niphon. Upon being discovered, the captain headed Hebe 
west and ran the vessel onto the beach immediately east of a small earthworks 
approximately nine miles north of Fort Fisher. 243 
A prize crew from the USS Niplion under the command of Acting 
Ensign W. W. Crowninshield boarded the Hcbc to determine if the vessel 
could be salvaged. However, the ship was full of water and rough seas were 
already breaking over the hull. Acting Ensign Crowninshield decided that the 
Hebe could not be saved and set the vessel ablaze before abandoning the ship 
under fire from Confederate infantry and cavalry on the beach. While the 
Confederate infantry and cavalry fired at Crowninshield's party, Confederate 
artillery in the dunes engaged the USS Niplion with a 12 pdr rifled Whitworth 
field piece. 244 
On 23 August, the USS Minnesota and five other vessels returned to 
destroy the Hebe. Again, Captain Munn engaged the fleet with a Whitworth 
and two other small rifled cannon from the earthworks in the dunes. Munn 
kept up an effective fire until his ammunition was exhausted and his position 
241J. R. Crenshaw to J. A. Seddon, 15 May 1863, ORA, IV, II, pp. 554-555. 
242 Wise, Lifeline, p. 243. 
243 J. B. Breck to A. Ludlow Case, 18 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 166-167. 
244 Ibid. 
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was threatened by a superior force which was landed on the beach north of his 
batteries. When the Confederates retreated towards Fort Fisher they were 
unable to withdraw the field pieces by hand and the artillery was captured. 245 
In his report concerning the Hebe skirmish, Major-General Whiting lamented: 
The efforts of the enemy to stop our steamers is increasing. Their 
force is largely increased. I have met with a serious and heavy loss 
in that Whitworth, a gun that in the hands of the indefatigable 
Lamb has saved dozens of vessels and millions of money to the 
Confederate States. I beg that a couple of the Whitworth guns 
originally saved from the Modern Greece may be sent here at 
once. Their long range makes them most suitable for a seaboard 
position. Could I get them with horses we could save many a 
vessel that will now be lost to us. 246 
Two months after the destruction of the Hebe, the Venus broke her 
traditional pattern of running between Bermuda and Wilmington. In October 
1863, the vessel sailed to Nassau to take on material for the Quartermaster 
General that had been accumulating there during the late summer and early 
fall. At 12: 30 am on 21 October, the Venus was discovered attempting to reach 
New Inlet. Southeast of Masonboro Inlet, the USS Nansemond overtook the 
blockade runner and opened fired. One of the USS Nansemond 's shot struck 
the port paddle guard near the waterline and sprung a plate. With the vessel 
rapidly taking on water Captain Murray decided to run the ship ashore near the 
wreck of the Hebe. 247 
A boarding party from the Nansemond immediately captured the 
officers and crew of the Venus and attached hawsers to the stern. The 
Nansemond and Niphon attempted to pull the stranded steamer into' deep 
water without success. As the steamer could not be pulled off, Lieutenant 
Lamson ordered the vessel burned and the boarding party was forced to 
abandon the ship as the light exposed them to a sharp fire from the beach. 
Before dawn the Nansemond, Niphon and Iron Age shelled the vessel until 
2451bid. 
246 W. H. C. Whiting to J. A. Seddon, 24 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 173-174, Z. B. Vance Papers, 
P. C. 153, p. 299, NCDAH and Wilmington Daily Journal, 24 August 1863, p. 2, col. I. 
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both the hull and machinery were completely destroyed. 248 " Destruction of the 
Venus, and particularly her cargo, was disastrous for the Quartermaster 
Department. 
At the end of September, the second Dudgeon vessel arrived in Bermuda 
under the command of Captain G. H. Beir. On 28 September, the Dec cleared 
St. Georges customs with 220 packages of "General Merchandize. 11249 After 
being repainted a light lead color the Dee took on 30 cases of bacon and 100 bags 
of coffee from warehouses in St. Georges and cleared for Nassau on 3 October. 
Four days later Captain Beir ran the Dec into Wilmington. On 20 October Dec 
was back in St. Georges with a cargo of more than 500 bales of cotton, 175 
packages of tobacco, and 135 barrels of turpentine. 250 
On 8 November, the third twin screw vessel, Ceres arrived in Bermuda. 
In St. Georges the Ceres discharged 499 fire bars, 8 bearing bars, 3 backing plates, 
3 dead plates and 150 boiler tubes. After receiving "a coat of light paint" and 
discharging that portion of her cargo, Ceres cleared for Nassau and ran to 
Wilmington on 2 December. 251 The Ceres was not as fortunate as the Venus 
and Dec and was destroyed during the first attempt to run the blockade. On the 
night of the sixth the Ceres was run aground on Western Bar Shoal at the old 
entrance to the Cape Fear. Before abandoning ship the crew set fire to the 
vessel. At high tide the following morning the vessel refloated and was towed 
off by the Union tug Violet. 252 
Vesta, fourth of the Dudgeon vessels, arrived in Bermuda from 
Plymouth on 28 December 1863 under the command of Captain J. V. Eustice. 253 
Like the Ceres, Vesta cleared customs in St. Georges with a cargo of "general 
manufactured merchandise" and was painted a light lead color. Additional 
cargo, including whiskey, beer, bacon and 
books, from a half-dozen vessels that 
had been stored in St. Georges warehouses was quickly put onboard and the 
steamer cleared for Nassau on 2 January. 
254 On the morning of 11 January, 
Captain Eustice ran the steamer ashore on the North Carolina coast west of 
248 R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, 21 October 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 249-250. 
2-49 Bermuda Customs, Inbound Record Book 1862-1863, BA. 
250 Bermuda Customs, Inbound Record Book 1862-1863, Dee, 20 October 1863, BA. 
251 Ibid. 
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ORN, I, 9, pp. 336-338. 
253 Bermuda Customs, Inbound Record Book 1862-1863, 
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254 Bermuda Customs, Outbound Record Book 1863-1864, Vesta, 3 January 1863, BA. 
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Tubbs Inlet. By morning the officers and crew had abandoned the ship and set 
it on fire. 255 
The following month Dec, most successful of the Dudgeon vessels 
running for Crenshaw, Collie and the Quartermaster Department, was lost in 
February 1864. About 3: 30 a. m. on the morning of 5 February, Captain Beir ran 
the Dee ashore at Masonboro Inlet. Being unable to get the vessel off, Captain 
Beir ordered the ship and her cargo burned. Once the vessel was fired most of 
the officers and crew escaped to the beach in one of the ship's boats. 256 
Loss of the Crenshaw, Collie and Confederate steamers attracted both 
government and public attention to the arrangement. In August 1864, the 
Raleigh Standard questioned the significance of the loss of all of the vessels 
running in association with the Confederate contract. The editorial also 
pointed out that virtually all of the vessels being run by and for Alexander 
Collie and Company were still operating successfully. The article bluntly 
pointed out that the Vesta had been senselessly run aground and burned. 
When an inquiry was set up at Wilmington to investigate the matter, the 
captain and first officer secretly boarded another Collie vessel, the Hansa, and 
departed for England. 257 
In a 14 November 1863, report on the Confederate States Navy Office of 
Provision and Clothing Paymaster John De Bree complained that: 
Under a contract of Messrs. Crenshaw & Co. with the navy 
Department we have received two or three small shipments, but I 
feel constrained to say that they are ill assorted and not of the 
quality we had a right to expect. The schedules furnished the navy 
Department (as I presume for this contract) have not been 
complied with, and articles especially ordered for first shipment 
have never come. 
Shoes were particularly specified as being of great want. Not one 
pair have we received. 
It may be that their losses by sea have prevented a better execution 
of this contract, but as far as is known to me neither in quantity, 
quality, nor manner has it come up to a proper standard. 258 
255 E. F. Devens to S. P. Lee, 11 January 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 403-404. 
256W. F. Spicer to B. F. Sands, 6 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 467-468. 
257Raleigh Standard, 24 August 1864. 
258 J. De Bree to S. R. Mallory, 14 November 1863, ORN, II, 2, p. 556. 
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The agreement with Crenshaw and the Quartermaster Department was 
not the only one Alexander Collie made in 1863. In August 1862, North 
Carolina Adjutant General James G. Martin concluded that it would be 
necessary to procure supplies for North Carolina regiments in Europe. Unlike 
the rest of the South, North Carolinians elected to supply and equip the 
soldiers they provided for the defense of the Confederate States. Although 
North Carolina anticipated few problems in producing or obtaining the 
necessary clothing, equipment and arms, shortages began to appear by the 
summer of 1862 and, it was apparent that supplies would not be sufficient for 
the coming winter. In August Adjutant General James G. Martin suggested 
that the State obtain the necessary supplies and arms in England and purchase a 
vessel to bring them through the blockade. Martin made the suggestion to 
Governor Henry T. Clark but the decision fell to newly elected Governor 
Zebulon B. Vance. 
Vance conferred on the matter with attorney Bartholomew F. Moore and 
Raleigh Standard editor William W. Holder. Although Moore warned Vance 
and Martin that they could be exposing themselves to impeachment charges, 
Martin: 
.... took the ground that the 
laws of the state made it his duty to 
supply clothing for the troops....; that a large sum of money was 
appropriated for the purpose without any restriction as to where 
purchases were to be made; [and] that the supplies of the State 
were not adequate;.... As to the purchase of a ship, General Martin 
took the ground that he had as much right to do that as purchase 
many other articles not mentioned in the law, it being known that 
transport ships are a part of the equipment of all modern 
armies. 259 
Governor Vance agreed with Martin and on 19 November 1862, he privately 
presented the plan to members of the General Assembly. In a secret session 
held on 27 November, the legislators approved the Governor's proposal and 
appropriated two million dollars to purchase both the necessary supplies and a 
259 A. Gordon, "Organization of Troops, " in Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions 
from North Carolina in the Great War, 1861-1865, Walter Clark editor, 5 Vols.; Goldsboro North 
Carolina, Nash Brothers 1901, Vol. I, pp. 28-29. 
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suitable vessel. As Vance had already dispatched John White to England to act 
as a special purchasing agent, the legislature also approved any contracts that 
White might have negotiated. 260 Martin was to pay for the supplies and vessel 
using money obtained by selling cotton bonds secured by cotton purchased 
using the appropriation of the legislature. The bonds paid 7% interest until the 
bondholders took delivery at any Confederate port east of the Mississippi 
River. 261 
After White began selling the bonds he entered into an agreement with 
the firm of Alexander Collie and Company of London and Manchester. Collie 
and Company agreed to assist with marketing the bonds and securing and 
shipping war and industrial material for a 5% commission. They also agreed to 
provide and advance $1,500,000 so White could purchase the Glasgow steamer 
Lord Clyde and more than two hundred fifty tons of merchandise that included 
leather for shoes and accoutrements, material for uniforms, blankets, thread 
and buttons. 262 
White placed approximately half of the goods he had purchased aboard 
the Lord Clyde and on 30 May the steamer departed Cardiff for Bermuda. The 
Lord Clyde, under the command of Joannus Wylie, arrived at St. Georges on 14 
June, fifteen days out of Cardiff. While in St. Georges the Lord Clyde was 
painted a light color, the top masts and spars were removed and the ship was 
loaded with coal for the trip through the blockade. 263 Because a suitable 
Wilmington pilot could not be found, Captain Wylie delayed the Lord Clyde's 
departure until 22 June. 
The Lord Clyde's first run through the blockade was uneventful and the 
steamer arrived in Wilmington with a cargo of shoe leather, uniform material, 
thread, buttons, blankets, 100 bags of coffee, 180 kegs of rum and 69 boxes of 
brandy. 264 When Captain Wylie brought the renamed A. D. Vance back to 
Bermuda in July, the vessel carried 500 bales of cotton and 10 barrels of 
260North Carolina, General Assembly, Public Laws, "Resolution from the Joint Select Committee 
on the Verbal Message of the Governor, " Secret Session, Raleigh, 1865, pp. 71-72. 
261North Carolina General Assembly, Public Laws, "An Act Making an Appropriation to 
Purchases in Europe, "Adjourned Session, 1863, p. 28. 
262 Report of John White, Governor's Papers, File 182; John White to Z. B. Vance, 20 May 1863, 
Governor's Letter Book, Vol. I, p. 229, NCDAH. 
263 Consular Dispatches, Bermuda, 17 June 1863. 
264 Bermuda Customs, Outbound Record Book 1863-1864, Lord Clyde, 20 June 1863, BA. 
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turpentine. 265 The speed of the A. D. Vance and the skill of her master made 
the North Carolina steamer highly successful. However, by September, 
Governor Zebulon B. Vance wrote John White that he felt: 
blockade running is becoming more and more perilous.... In 
view of this danger, you are instructed to make no more 
purchases of goods for the present. The amount received and now 
at Bermuda, with the home supplies, will keep our troops well 
going for twelve months and of course it is not desirable to have 
goods on hand which we cannot ship. 266 
The Governor's instructions did not reach White until 21 October 1863. By that 
time White had purchased a great deal of additional material. Realizing that it 
would be too much for the A. D. Vance to transport, he had given tentative 
approval to an expansion of the agreement with Alexander Collie and 
Company. The new agreement proposed by Collie was: 
To furnish with as little delay as possible four steamers of the 
most suitable description for blockade running, in each of which 
your State will own one fourth interest, the other three fourths 
being held by myself and friends. 
To give up to the Government of your State when required, the 
entire inward carrying power of said steamers from the Islands to 
the Confederacy at a modest rate to be fixed hereafter. 
That the Government of your State be entitled to one, fourth space 
of the outward carrying power of each steamer, for cotton or other 
produce; and this arrangement will I estimate yield to your State 
funds sufficient to pay costs and all charges on inward cargo, cost 
of its share of the outward cargo and (if cotton of good quality be 
sent out) a very large surplus will be left at the credit of your State 
on each trip. 267 
The Collie proposal was convincing and Governor Vance received 
General assembly approval for the contract following a secret session held on 12 
265 Bermuda Customs, Inbound Record Book 1863-1864, Lord Clyde, 27 July 1863, BA. Historical 
Sources Identify the Vessel As Ad Vance, A. D. Vance and Advance. 
266 Z. B. Vance to J. White, 3 September 1863, Governor's Letter Book, I, p. 324. 
267 A. Collie to J. White, 1 October 1863, Governor's Papers, File 170. 
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December 1863.268 Under the expanded contract Collie provided 25% interest 
in the sidewheel steamer Hansa and twin-screw steamer Don that had been 
put into service in July and August 1863. A third steamer would be placed in 
service within four weeks and the final vessel added to the fleet within two 
months. 269 Control of the vessels' schedules created immediate friction 
between Governor Vance and Collie's Wilmington agent Theodore Andrea 
and the loss of the Don after only two runs on joint account in March 1864 got 
contract activity off to a bad start. 270 
Operation of the Hansa proved to be equally controversial but 
considerably more successful. On the first trip out of Wilmington under the 
joint contract the Hansa was chased and forced to throw overboard 70 bales of 
cotton to avoid capture. 271 In March, the vessel became the object of a 
jurisdictional dispute between the Confederate Army and Confederate Navy 
which required President Jefferson Davis' attention to resolve. 272 The Hansa 
was also taken out of service for eight months and returned to England to 
replace badly deteriorated boilers. 273 When the Hansa returned to service, it 
ran successfully until the fall of Fort Fisher closed the Port of Wilmington in 
January 1865. 
On 18 March the third Collie steamer arrived at Nassau. 274 The Annie, 
like the Don, was one of the fast Dudgeon twin screw steamers. Between 
March and October 1864 the vessel made six round trips through the blockade 
at Wilmington. On the final trip into the Cape Fear on 8 October, Annic was 
chased ashore on Caroline Shoal at New Inlet. After guns from Fort Fisher 
drove vessels of the blockade away, the cargo was removed and the following 
day the vessel was refloated and towed into the safety of the Cape Fear. That 
narrow escape prompted Vance to accept an offer from Collie's new agent in 
Wilmington to purchase the state's share in the vessel. The offer was accepted 
268 North Carolina, General Assembly, Public Laws, "Resolution Authorizing the Governor of the 
State to Unite with Alexander Collie and Company in Purchase of Vessels, " Secret Session, 1865, 
pp. 74-75. 
269 Agreement, A. Collie and J. White, 27 October 1863, Governor's Papers, File 170, NCDAH. 
270Wise, Lifeline, pp. 296 and S. P. Quackenbush to S. P. Lee, 4 March 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 525. 
271 Nassau Guardian, 9 January 1864, p. 3, col. 2. 
272 Z. B. Vance to J. A. Seddon, 7 January 1864, ORA, IV, 3, pp. 10-11; J. Davis to Z. B. Vance, 26 
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3, pp. 28-29. 
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for $24,000 in gold. 275 That decision proved fortuitous as the Annie was 
captured on 1 November 1864 after running aground leaving Wilmington. 276 
The fourth steamer promised under the contract was never delivered. 
Collie proposed to purchase and employ a larger and faster vessel that 
"lengthened experience has proven to be best suited to the service... i277 
Collie's proposal received no response and Collie wrote Vance again on 14 
March to inform the Governor that: "Summer-is coming on when the chances 
of success are lessened, unless great speed can be obtained. We prefer therefore 
to delay a month or two to get the sort of boat we can send out with 
confidence... "278 The final decision was ultimately made to cancel the fourth 
vessel and the Collie contract due to Confederate regulation of vessels engaged 
in blockade running and criticism concerning the loss of the steamer A. D. 
Vance in September 1864.279 
In 1863, a number of individuals, joint ventures and smaller firms also 
initiated blockade running operations that served Wilmington. Unlike ships 
that were owned and operated by the Confederacy, the State of North Carolina 
or the Collie and Collie and Crenshaw vessels, most ran to Nassau. London 
ship owner and merchant Thomas Sterling Begbie, owner of the Columbia 
which was captured in 1862, put the screw-steamer Emma in service in 
February. Before being captured in July, Emma made more than a dozen round 
trips through the blockade off Wilmington. 280 Otto T. Fallenstein's screw 
steamer Douro ran into Wilmington in February 1863 before being captured the 
following month. 281 A joint venture, the "Steamship Pet Company, " was 
formed specifically to purchase and operate that screw steamer as a blockade 
runner. The enterprise was highly successful and Pet made sixteen round trips 
through the blockade before being captured in February 1864.282 
275North Carolina, Executive and Legislative Documents, 1864-1865, Document Number 7, 
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277 A. Collie to Z. B. Vance, 13 February 1864, no. 1, Governor's Papers, File 174, NCDAH. 
278 A. Collie to Z. B. Vance, 14 March 1864, Governor's Letter Book, I, pp. 508-509. 
279 Z. B. Vance to A. Collie, 2 November 1864, Governor's Letter Book, I, p. 604. 
280 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, enclosure identified "Capture of the anglo-rebel steamer Douro" ORN, 
I, 8, pp. 592-593 and Wise, Lifeline, p. 298. 
281 Wise, Lifeline, p. 296. 
282 Ibid., p. 316. 
155 
The Great Lakes steamer Arabian built by the Niagara Harbor Company 
was purchased by Robert H. Sawyer and Ramos A. Menendez and converted for 
blockade running in June 1863. Although unsuited for the Atlantic 
environment the Arabian made profitable runs from Nassau to Wilmington 
in June, July, August and September before being captured in an attempt to run 
out of New Inlet in late September 1863.283 
Leech, Harrison, Forewood and Company was a Liverpool firm that 
began running the sidewheel steamer Scotia during the summer of 1862 That 
vessel was captured on 24 October 1862 attempting to enter Charleston through 
Bulls Bay. In February, Leech, Harrison and Forewood put the sidewheel 
steamer Britannia in service between Wilmington and Nassau. That vessel 
proved to be more successful but, was captured after five months of 
operation. 284 
One of the larger Confederate firms that sprang up in the wake of John 
Fraser and Company was the Chicora Importing and Exporting Company of 
South Carolina. That Charleston based firm was owned and operated by a 
group of Charleston merchants and businessmen. Archibald Johnson, a 
prominent Charleston merchant served as the president. Shareholders 
included banker George W. Williams and merchant Theodore Wagner, also 
one of Alfred Trenholm's partners in John Fraser and Company. 285 The firm 
began operations in September 1862 with the steamer Herald, purchased from 
John Fraser and Company. Under the command of Robert Lockwood, Herald 
made voyages between Nassau and Charleston and in the fall, Wilmington. 
During a run into Wilmington under the command of W. F. Adair, the vessel 
was driven ashore and destroyed off Frying Pan Shoals on 19 December 1863.286 
Chicora also purchased the Glasgow and Dublin steamer Havelock and 
operated the vessel between Charleston and Nassau in February 1863. By 
autumn, the operations of the Havelock, renamed General Beaureguard, were 
283 Ibid., p. 288. 
284 Ibid., p. 291. 
285 Cotton and Captured Property, Depositions of R. Dowie, F. Richards, A. Johnson and G. 
Williams, T. D. Wagner Papers, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, Marcus W. Price, 
"Blockade Running as a Business in South Carolina during the War Between the States, 1861- 
1865. "American Neptune IX, January 1949, pp. 31-62. 
286 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 26 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 362. 
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also shifted to Wilmington and only eight days prior to the loss of the 
Antonica, the General Beaureguard was driven ashore near Flag Pond Battery 
north of Fort Fisher. 287 
The Importing and Exporting Company of South Carolina shifted a 
portion of its steamer traffic to Wilmington in 1863. The company had been 
formed in 1862 and purchased and operated the coastal steamer Cecile until the 
vessel ran aground on Abaco Reef in the Bahamas. Primarily because of the 
success of the Cecile, the company authorized the sale of additional stock 
amounting to $200,000.288 With new capital the firm purchased the Southern 
Steamship Company vessel William G. Hewes in Havana and the sidewheel 
steamers Sirius and Orion in West Hartlepool, England. To run the blockade 
those vessels were renamed Ella and Annie, Alice, and Fannie respectively. In 
June 1863, the company also purchased the steamer Margaret and Jessie from 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company. During the latter half of 1863, Importing and 
Exporting Company of South Carolina steamers ran consistently out of 
Wilmington under the direction of William C. Bee and directors that included 
William Ravenel, W. P. Magarth, Benjamin Mordecai, C. T. Mitchel, E. L. 
Kerrison and Theodore Jervey. 289 
The British owned joint-venture Anglo-Confederate Trading Company 
also shifted operations to Wilmington in 1863. The company was organized by 
members and associates of the firm of Edward Lawrence and Company. After a 
partially successful experience with the vessel Despatch in 1862, the firm 
contracted with Jones, Quiggan and Company for a fast new steamer. That 
vessel was the Banshee, a steel side-wheel steamer. Although registering 
acceptable speed during her trials, the vessel was only capable of nine knots 
loaded and the thinner steel plates used in construction of the hull leaked 
excessively. Under a full press of steam the engines were capable of pushing 
the hull into seas that crushed plates and sprung rivets. In spite of those 
problems the Banshee made fifteen trips through the blockade before being 
captured attempting to enter Wilmington on 21 November 1863.290 
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In spite of Union efforts to curtail the Confederacy's foreign commerce, 
blockade running activity increased dramatically during 1864. Unfortunately, 
the impetus for much of that activity was the high potential for profit 
associated with success. While vessels operated by Confederate government 
agencies, states and private enterprises with government contracts or in 
partnership with Confederate agencies or states brought in significant 
quantities of war materials and supplies, many vessels were loaded with non- 
essential goods selected to command the highest market prices. Because of 
competition created by the civilian market, many vessels refused to carry war 
materials at government established freight rates. Such abuses were the subject 
of a continuous stream of correspondence from General W. H. C. Whiting to 
the Confederate War Department. Although General Whiting was informed 
that the War Department had no authority to interfere with commerce unless 
loyalty was in question, he was accused of forcing the captains of vessels 
running the blockade to obtain military authorization to sail. Whiting was also 
accused of delaying the assignment of pilots in order to secure space for 
government cargoes. 291 Whiting's action received some encouragement in 
June when Seddon suggested that he use his authority to require the 
transportation of cargoes on government account. 292 
The situation was acerbated in the fall by the loss of ships owned by the 
Confederate government. During September 1863, the Phantom was run 
ashore and burned near Topsail Inlet and in October, the Cornubia and Robert 
E. Lee were captured leaving the Confederacy with no vessels to carry military 
freight. Secretary of War Seddon determined that by the fall of 1863, the cost of 
shipping 300 tons of freight by steamer from one of the West Indies islands was 
"upwards of two million dollars. "293 Ultimately the lack of vessels and 
exorbitant rates forced the Confederacy to take unpopular steps to control 
blockade running. 
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Some Confederate officials recommended that the government take 
over all trading through the blockade. In a letter to J. P. Benjamin, 
Commissioner Mason related the position of Treasury Agent McRae on 5 
September 1863. McRae urged that the government take over the trade and 
control the exportation of cotton to end the abuses caused by speculators. 
Mason agreed that "private enterprise seems to have adjusted trade through 
the blockade in such a manner as to have removed much of the risk and 
expense" by trans-shipping materials through ports in the west Indies and 
Bermuda. 294 Mason agreed that there was "nothing to prevent Government 
from taking this whole business into its exclusive hands" and placing control 
under a separate bureau in charge of naval officers. 295 Ultimately, a less 
extreme solution to the problem was adopted. 
Both Mallory and Seddon initiated a program to impress space on 
privately owned vessels engaged in running the blockade. Initially, vessels 
were required to make one third of their cargo space available for government 
cargo at uniform rates set by the War and Navy Departments. The policy was 
neither popular nor simple to enforce. Owners of many privately operated 
vessels balked, threatening to withdraw their vessels from trading with the 
South. When North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance was informed that 
vessels running on account of the state would not be exempt from the 
regulations he complained bitterly. In his opening message to the North 
Carolina State Legislature he remarked that "the port of Wilmington is more 
effectively blockaded from within than without. "296 In January 1864 he wrote 
Seddon that: 
It is a little remarkable to me that the entire importing operations 
of this State, which have been so successful and so beneficial to the 
cause, seems to have been met with little else than downright 
opposition rather than encouragement from the Confederate 
Government. 297 
Seddon temporarily exempted the Don and Hansa so that North Carolina's 
goods in Bermuda and Nassau could be shipped through the blockade. Other 
294 Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, United 
States Publishing Company, Nashville, 1905, pp. 560-562. 
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southern governors joined Vance in protesting Confederate regulation of state 
blockade running operations. 
The first legislative step in relieving the problems associated with the 
importation of nonessential freight was taken by the Confederate Congress in 
1863. Under considerable public and military pressure Confederate legislators 
passed a bill prohibiting the importation of goods such as furs, antiques, coin 
collections, jewelry, wallpaper, bricks, glass and coconuts during the Fourth 
Session. 298 That same session legislators also passed "A Bill to Impose 
Regulations Upon the Foreign Commerce of the Confederate States to Provide 
For the Public Defense. "299 That law authorized the President of the 
Confederate States to promulgate regulations concerning the export of 
agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco, rice and sugar or naval stores. 6015 
A circular, issued by Secretary of the Treasury C. G. Memminger and Secretary 
of War Seddon on 5 March 1864, identified regulations designed to control 
commerce through the blockade. 300 In addition to establishing a complex set of 
bureaucratic requirements the regulations required the compliance of all 
privately owned vessels trading with the Confederacy. Each vessel was to 
provide one half of the tonnage available for shipping for Confederate freight 
at rates set by the government. Each owner or master was also required to post 
a security bond in an amount equal to twice the value of the vessel. 301 Both 
the Confederate government and states within the Confederacy were exempted 
from the regulations, no doubt as a consequence of the criticism raised by 
North Carolina Governor Z. B. Vance. 
Those engaged in blockade running were in agreement with James R. 
Randall's assessment that: 
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The blockade runners swear that they will not bring in a single 
cargo under the present arrangement viz one-half the cargo. It is 
unjust and extortionate. If the Govt. does not prove successful in 
running its own steamers it will suffer rather than gain by such a 
regulation. 302 
In April Randall observed that: 
Mr. Memminger has stopped blockade running almost entirely by' 
his exorbitant demands. Not one fifth of the vessels will return 
under the present regulations. 303 
Although only eight steamers entered the Port of Wilmington in April, 
Randall and other critics of the new regulations proved to be wrong. In a 20 
December 1864 report to the Confederate House of Representatives, Jefferson 
Davis defended the 6 February 1864 legislation and the subsequent regulations 
that were enacted to control foreign commerce. Davis pointed out that: 
the withdrawal of vessels was an experiment, by a combination 
among their owners, on the firmness of the Government. The 
result proved the correctness of this view, for after various 
attempts to obtain increased advantages the vessels resumed their 
voyages. 304 
Davis based his assessment of the situation on figures from the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of War that confirmed "many new steamers are 
understood to be on the way to engage in the trade.... "305 Davis pointed out 
that: 
The number of vessels which arrived at two ports of the 
Confederacy between the 1st of November and the 6th of 
December was forty-three, averaging more than one per day, and 
indicating no check in the trade. A further conclusive proof that 
the profits of this commerce under the present regulations are 
sufficiently tempting to secure its increase, is afforded by the fact 
302 James R. Randall to Kate Hammond, 10 March 1864. Randall Papers, Southern Historical 
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that the shares of one of the companies engaged in it have greatly 
advanced in value. The shares of one company, originally $1,000 
each, were selling in July last for $20,000 each, and now command 
$30,000. Those of another company have increased in the same 
period from $2,500 to $6,000; and all exhibit a large advance. 306 
Even with one half of the cargo shipped on government account, the 
potential for profit remained attractive. In May 1864, at least twenty-one 
steamers arrived in Wilmington from Nassau and Bermuda. 307 The following 
month Randall noted "the Helen the "seventeenth steamer this moon, arrived 
last night. More on the way. "308 
In April, the London Daily News carried an article on the-formation of a 
new company specifically to engage in running cargoes through the blockade to 
Confederate ports. According to the Daily News the Atlantic Trading Company 
was issuing £1,000 shares to raise capital in the amount of £200,000 with 
authorization to increase capital to £500,000. According to their prospectus: 
The Atlantic Trading Company has been formed for the purchase 
of first class paddle wheel steamers of light draught, great speed, 
and an average capacity of 800 bales of cotton, which form the basis 
of the business to be transacted. It is intended to employ the 
steamers in the Confederate States, and participating in the large 
profits attendant on this business. The practical experience in the 
trade enjoyed by the promoters, affords a guarantee of success, and 
they are enabled to offer the additional advantage of trading with 
open ports, where a full supply of the finer descriptions of cotton 
is obtainable, for which the light draught of the steamer is 
peculiarly adapted. Arrangements are being perfected with C. J. 
McRae, Esq., agent of the Confederate States, to carry in 
merchandize, and bring out on the return voyage full cargoes of 
cotton in exchange for supplies, or for Confederate States Cotton 
Loan. The first steamer will be dispatched in April, the second 
and third in May, the fourth in June, and the fifth in July. The 
vessels are in the hands of builders of celebrity, the materials of 
the best description, with all the modern improvements in 
machinery and boilers which guarantee suggests, with a 
guaranteed speed loaded, of 17 1/2 statute miles per hour. 309 
306Ibid. 
307 Wise, Lifeline, pp. 238-239. 
308 James R. Randall to Kate Hammond, 11 June 1864. Randall Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina. 
309Wilmington Journal, 26 May 1864, p. 5, col. 2. 
162 
The prospectus provided two financial scenarios as an inducement for 
potential subscribers that illustrated the range of profits that might be 
anticipated from investment in the Atlantic Trading Company enterprise. 
Those profit projections were based on a minimum of two successful runs per 
steamer and a more likely five successful voyages. According to their 
projections: 
The following sketch of accounts shows the amount of 
capital required and probable results: Expenses---Five paddle 
steamers, £25,000, outfits, £10,000; appropriation for purchase of 
cotton loan bonds (and) merchandize, £40,000; reserved for 
additional steamers, £25,000. Total £200,000. Results of two 
successful trips, 8,000 bales of cotton, 450 pounds each, sold in 
Liverpool to net 2s per lb. free of all charges and commissions, 
£360,000; freight charged by steamers between neutral ports and 
Confederacy, say £4,000 per voyage, £50,000-£416,000; less working 
expenses between neutral port and Confederacy, £30,000. Total 
£380,000. Allowing, as above for only two successful trips of each 
vessel, the profits realized will amount to £150,000. 
This calculation, however, may be considered the least 
favorable one that should be taken. The rule of vessels of the class 
to be employed by the company may be computed as worth five 
trips each, with the following result: 20,000 bales of cotton, net in 
Liverpool, £900,000; freight earned between neutral ports and 
Confederacy, £120,000; less working expenses; five steamers, each 
five trips, at £3,000, £75,000; cost of steamers, outfit, merchandize, 
cotton loan, &c., £200,000; profit £750,000.310 
In spite of regulations that made it appear, at least initially, that the 
Confederacy would initiate another highly effective blockade like the quasi- 
embargo, not one individual, joint stock company or commercial firm 
abandoned their blockade running enterprises. John Fraser and Company and 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company continued to run their steamers Bendigo, 
Spunkie, Lucy and Heroine into Wilmington from Nassau and occasionally 
Bermuda until Bendigo was run ashore and burned at Lockwoods Folly Inlet in 
January and Spunkie was driven ashore on Oak Island west of Fort Caswell in 
February 1864. A boarding party from the USS Fahkee found that the Bendigo 
310 Ibid. 
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had been completely unloaded and the vessel scuttled and set afire. 311 Like 
Bendigo, the cargo of the Spunkie had been unloaded by the time the vessel 
was discovered. 312 
The more successful Lucy was captured in November of that year. 
Heroine was sent to operate in the Gulf of Mexico during the summer and was 
trapped in the harbor at Mobile in August. 313 For a number of reasons 
including the fact that Alfred Trenholm resigned to become Confederate 
Secretary of the Treasury, the John Fraser and Fraser, Trenholm and Company 
firms gave up their dominant' position in the trade and initiated a significant 
reduction in the level of their vessel operations. 
When War Department negotiations with the Mercantile Trading 
Company operated by Edwin P. Stringer and Edward Pembroke failed to 
produce an agreement to develop a new line of steamers, Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company agreed to furnish eight vessels. 314 Contracts with Jones, Quiggin and 
Company for two vessels, Bat and Owl, being constructed for Fraser, Trenholm 
and Company were immediately transferred to Confederate control. Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company also agreed to pay for two vessels, Stag and Deer, 
ordered from the same Liverpool firm by James Bulloch. 315 Four additional 
vessels, Albatross, Lark, Penguin and Wren were to be built by Laird and Sons. 
Arrangements were also made with John K. Gilliat to finance six additional 
steamers from Jones, Quiggin and Company using funding from the Erlanger 
cotton bonds. 316 
The Owl, first of the Jones, Quiggin and Company steamers to be 
delivered, made its maiden run into Wilmington in late August 1864 and was 
turned over to the Confederate War Department in December. 317 The Bat was 
captured attempting to run into Wilmington in October and the Stag was 
captured after running into the Cape Fear River in January 1865, following the 
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fall of Fort Fisher. 318 Fraser, Trenholm and Company also placed the Hope in 
operation in August and Colonel Lamb in November. While the Hope was 
captured enroute to Wilmington in October, Colonel Lamb was never captured 
and ultimately returned to England following the war. 319 
As it was clear that the Jones, Quiggin and Company and Laird and Sons 
vessels would take valuable time to deliver, Confederate agents McRae, Bayne 
and Bulloch extended the contract with Crenshaw and Company. In May 1864, 
Crenshaw put the Mary Celestia in service between Bermuda and Wilmington. 
Although Francis Middleton complained about the Mary Celestia's seakeeping 
qualities, the vessel ran successfully until September when a Bermuda pilot ran 
the ship on the reefs south of Gibbs Hill Lighthouse. 320 In September and 
October Crenshaw added the Agnes E. Fry and the Armstrong to help meet his 
Confederate contract obligations and replace the Mary Celestia. Both of those 
vessels ran until December when the Armstrong was captured and the Agnes 
E. Fry was forced ashore and destroyed on Oak Island west of Fort Caswell. 321 
Alexander Collie and Company weathered criticism associated with the 
earlier loss of vessels partially owned by the Confederacy and continued to 
operate blockade runners throughout 1864. Under the Collie and Company 
contract with the State of North Carolina, the firm operated the Hansa, Don 
and Annie. 322 While the Hansa survived the war, the Don was captured off 
Beaufort in March 1864. The Annie operated quite successfully from March 
1864 until the vessel was run aground and captured at New Inlet on 1 
November 1864. Collie and Company also operated the steamer Index from 
January until June 1864, when the vessel was returned to England due to 
insufficient speed. 
Although the Index proved to be dangerously slow, the faster screw 
steamer Edith was briefly successful for Collie and Company and made four 
round trips between Wilmington and Nassau or Bermuda before being sold to 
318D, L, Braine to G. Welles, 10 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 547-548 and D. D. Porter to G. 
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the Confederacy for use as a raider. In July, Collie and Company put the first of 
four Randolph, Elder and Company steamers into service to support the 
Confederate contract. That vessel was the Falcon. The following month the 
Flamingo and Ptarmigan were put in service. All three ships survived the war. 
Only the fourth vessel, Condor, was lost. On her maiden voyage to 
Wilmington the ship was run aground on Caroline Shoals and became a 
complete wreck before Confederate salvors could refloat the ship. 323 
The Anglo-Confederate Trading Company also increased their blockade 
running operations at Wilmington in 1864. After the Banshee was captured in 
November 1863, the company put Wild Dayrell, a second Jones, Quiggin and 
Company steamer, in service. Wild Dayrell appears to have made only one 
successful trip into Wilmington in January before being run ashore and 
destroyed in Rich's Inlet on 1 February 1864.324 Will of the Wisp began making 
runs to Wilmington from Nassau in April and the following month Tristram 
Shandy ran into the Cape Fear. While Will of the Wisp was poorly 
constructed, the ship proved to be successful after a being put into a yard for 
repairs in Halifax and ran until being sold to Power, Low and Company in 
October 1864. The Tristram Shandy was captured on the first run out of 
Wilmington on 15 May 1864.325 
Although the Anglo-Confederate Trading Company's losses were 
substantial the success of Banshee and Will of the Wisp permitted them to 
meet contract obligations with Power, Low and Company to deliver 
Confederate freight and acquire additional vessels. In September the J. & G. 
Thomson steamer Wild Rover and the Night Hawk began to run into 
Wilmington from Nassau and Bermuda. Unfortunately Night Hawk was run 
aground entering the Cape Fear on 29 September 1864.326 After being repaired 
at Wilmington, the vessel was run out to Nassau in January 1865. The Wild 
Rover made successful monthly trips to Nassau or Bermuda until the fall of 
Fort Fisher closed the Port of Wilmington. The Anglo-Confederate Trading 
Company added a final vessel to their line in October 1864. That vessel was the 
Jones, Quiggin and Company steamer Banshee II. Like the Wild Rover, 
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Banshee II made successful runs first to Bermuda and then to Nassau until the 
Cape Fear was closed by occupation in January 1865. 
. 
The Importing and Exporting - Company of South Carolina also 
continued to run a line of steamers. Their most successful steamer, Fannie, 
operated throughout the remainder of the war and was joined by the steamer 
Alice which ran into Wilmington until being transferred to the Gulf in August 
1864.327 The Annie was replaced on the Wilmington route by the William 
Denny steamers Ella in August and Carolina in November. The Ella was lost 
attempting to enter Old Inlet in December but, the Carolina survived the war to 
return to England in March 1865. A third vessel, Emily, arrived in Bermuda 
too late to run the blockade. 328 
Importing and exporting companies based on the South Carolina model 
were also formed in Virginia and Georgia. The Virginia Importing and 
Exporting Company was formed in 1863 and began to operate the City of 
Petersburg in December. In June 1864, the Old Dominion joined the City of 
Petersburg. Both vessels ran until Wilmington was closed. 329 The Importing 
and Exporting Company of Georgia was formed during the summer of 1864 and 
operated the steamers Lilian, Little Hattie, Mary Bowers, Florio and Emma 
Henry. The Lilian ran from June until her capture in August and the Little 
Hattie ran from July until Wilmington was closed. 330 The Mary Bowers and 
Emma Henry were less successful. The Mary Bowers ran into Wilmington in 
July but, was lost attempting to enter Charleston on 31 August 1864. Florie 
arrived in Wilmington in June 1864 and operated between Wilmington and 
Bermuda until October when the vessel was reported to have run aground in 
the Cape Fear River. 331 The Emma Henry made one run into Wilmington in 
late November but was captured on the outward voyage on 7 December 1864.332 
A number of smaller firms and individuals also operated blockade 
runners out of Wilmington in 1864. One of the most successful was the Syren 
owned by the Charleston Importing and Exporting Company. Syron made 
monthly trips into the Cape Fear from November 1863 until shifting 
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operations to Charleston in September 1864. The officers and crew of the Syren 
gained a reputation for boldness by running through the blockade in conditions 
like daylight or the full moon which almost all others avoided. By the fall of 
1864 a single share of the firm's stock was worth $3,000, three times the amount 
it originally sold for in 1863.333 The North Heath and Helen operated by 
Thomas Sterling Begbie for the Universal Trading Company ran between both 
Bermuda and Nassau and Wilmington after April and May 1864. Although 
the Helen survived the war the North Heath was damaged running into 
Wilmington in October and was ultimately sunk as an obstruction following 
the fall of Fort Fisher. 334 Chicora Importing and Exporting ran the Chicora 
from June until the Cape Fear was closed and the Wando from July until the 
vessel was captured after clearing Wilmington for Nassau in October 1864.335 
After their negotiations with the Confederate War Department fell 
through Edwin P. Stringer and Edward Pembroke of the Mercantile Trading 
Company attempted to set up operations with the steamers Nuffield and 
Pevensey. The enterprise proved to be a disaster as both steamers were 
destroyed on their first attempt to run the blockade at Wilmington. The 
Nutfield was forced ashore at New River Inlet on 4 February 1864 and the 
Pevensey was forced ashore on Bogue Bank and destroyed on 9 June 1864.336 In 
December, Stringer and Pembroke tried running a third steamer, the Charlotte. 
That ship made one successful round trip through the blockade at Wilmington 
in December before being captured in the Cape Fear River along with the Stag 
in January 1865 after the fall of Fort Fisher. 337 
The fall of Fort Fisher brought an end to blockade running through the 
Port of Wilmington only three months before the Confederacy collapsed. At 
the end of the war Confederate agents in Europe closed their operations and 
most returned to the South. That proved to be a disaster for most of the firm's 
engaged in blockade running. The firm of Fraser, Trenholm and Company was 
saddled with the overwhelming responsibility for £170,000 -in Confederate 
debts. Charles K. Prioleau and James Armstrong were left to resolve the firms 
333Price, "Blockade Running as a Business", pp. 45-46., and Charleston Mercury, 18 February 
1864. 
334 Wise, Lifeline, p. 314. 
335 B. F. Sands to G. Welles, 21 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 578-579. 
336 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 14 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 137-138 and F. A. Roe to S. P. Lee, 4 
February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 459-460. 
337 D. D. Porter to G. Welles, 20 January 1865, ORN, I. 11, pp. 618-620. 
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difficulties in the best manner possible. Although they attempted to dispose of 
most of the company's assets, the United States filed suit to recover 
Confederate property and assets. That prevented Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company from recovering much of what remained from their blockade 
running enterprise. Ultimately, they were forced to close the books on unpaid 
Confederate debts and in 1867 the company declared bankruptcy. Although, the 
Charleston based John Fraser and Company struggled to recover and pay its 
debts, pressure from the United States Government and creditors forced the 
firm to declare bankruptcy in 1872.338 
Alexander Collie and Company suffered similar consequences. With the 
collapse of the Confederacy, cotton owned by the State of North Carolina was 
confiscated and the bonds issued to finance the State's foreign commerce 
became completely worthless. The firm's major assets were the vessels that 
survived the war and Collie attempted to dispose of them to recover some 
company losses. Because the blockade running economy had collapsed with 
the Confederacy, the value of vessels built to engage in the trade fell 
dramatically. The Falcon, Ptarmigan and Flamingo sold for £18,000 each. 
When Collie closed his books on the Confederate accounts there were no 
profits to be distributed to investors. 339 
The Importing and Exporting Company of South Carolina, Chicora 
Importing and Exporting Company and the Charleston Importing and 
Exporting Company were all able to pay investors dividends before closing 
their books. The Importing and Exporting Company of South Carolina paid 
investors £120 per share on their stock during the war and an additional £70 
after disposing of its vessels and assets in England. Both the Charleston 
Importing and Exporting Company and Chicora Importing and Exporting 
Company paid their investors dividends at the close of business in January 1865 
and Chicora paid a final $100 in gold after the vessel Chicora and the company's 
remaining assets were sold. Ironically, the largest firms engaged in blockade 
338 U. S. Congress, House, Fraser, Trenholm & Company, Executive Document, No. 63,39th 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1867, The United States vs. John Fraser and Company, Walker, Evans and 
Cogswell, Charleston, 1873, pp. 1-23 and Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 9& 19 May 1865. 
339 Wharncliffe Manuscripts, A. Collie to Lord Wharncliffe, 28 February 1865,3 and 7 April 
1865,25 August 1865, Edward Spence to Wharncliffe 3 January 1865,22 July 1865,10 February 
1866, and 15 April 1868, Edward Stringer to Lord Wharncliffe, 9 April 1868. 
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running suffered the greatest losses as a consequence of over extending and 
reinvestment of company assets in supporting the Confederate cause. 340 
Anglo-Confederate blockade running at Wilmington was carried out by a 
variety of government agencies and private companies. Agencies of the 
Confederate War Department and the State of North Carolina were clearly the 
most aggressive, but certainly not the only government entities engaging in the 
trade. In spite of inevitable losses, their operations were successful. Private 
firms like Fraser, Trenholm and Company, John Fraser and Company, 
Alexander Collie and Company and William Crenshaw and Company shipped 
vast quantities of material on government account and also engaged heavily in 
commercial trading through the blockade. Despite the experience of firms like 
Z. C. Pearson and Company, the risks associated with enterprise were clearly 
acceptable and the potential benefits sufficient to maintain their interest until 
the very last. When the Confederacy collapsed in the spring of 1865, new 
blockade runners were at sea headed for Bermuda and the Bahamas and still 
more were under construction in the shipyards of Great Britain. 
340 Price, "Blockade Runners as a Business", pp. 31-62 and Wise, Lifeline, p. 224: 
Chapter IV Elements of the Blockade Runners' Strategy 
The strategies that evolved in association with blockade running at 
Wilmington were neither clearly defined nor systematically developed. They 
were factors of geography, politics, military strategy, technology and enterprise. 
Most significant perhaps is the fact that the diverse elements of Anglo- 
Confederate strategy evolved to produce a largely successful response to Union 
efforts to isolate the Confederacy. 
Because the United States Navy was entirely unprepared to enforce it, 
President Abraham Lincoln's declaration of a blockade of Confederate ports had 
little initial impact on the South's foreign commerce. When the USS Daylight 
arrived and Captain Samuel Lockwood declared that the port of Wilmington 
was closed on 21 July 1861, the condition of that vessel and logistical 
requirements kept it off station so much of the time that the Cape Fear, for all 
practical purposes, remained open to commerce. 
In addition, the two navigable entrances to the river made it impossible 
for the Daylight to be effective. The geography of the Cape Fear was a factor of 
North Carolina's unique and dynamic coastal environment. Since the 
Pleistocene Epoch that environment has consisted of a complex of low sandy 
barrier islands that separated the inland sounds from the Atlantic and shoals 
that extended seaward from three distinct capes. At the time of the Civil War 
the Cape Fear River emptied into the Atlantic Ocean through navigable inlets 
separated by the southern of those island, cape and shoal complexes (Figure 2). 
That semi-tropical barrier island was known as Smith Island. It formed Cape 
Fear, from which Frying Pan Shoals extended seaward for more than twenty 
miles. The primary entrance to the Cape Fear River was through Old Inlet 
between Smith Island and Oak Island. Although characterized by a complex of 
constantly migrating shoals, that entrance to the Cape Fear had served 
navigation since the earliest attempt to settle the Cape Fear region in the 
seventeenth century. 
The second entrance to the Cape Fear was New Inlet. New Inlet had 
been formed by a hurricane in 1768. Although the inlet was not as well 
developed as that at Old Inlet, successful navigation of the shifting channels 
was possible. Although principally employed by small vessels, New Inlet 
offered blockade runners an important option and greatly complicated efforts 
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to eliminate Wilmington's commerce. Initially, vessels running into the Cape 
Fear could determine the position of U. S. Navy vessels and run into or out of 
the unguarded entrance. Outbound vessels could anchor in the Cape Fear 
between the two inlets, observe the position of blockading vessels and run 
safely to sea through the unguarded inlet knowing that vessels in pursuit 
would have to sail around Frying Pan Shoals before giving chase. That unique 
geography provided important options for blockade runners that would make 
the Cape Fear the most difficult port to close to Confederate commerce. 
It was not until September 1861, that three vessels could be assigned to 
enforce the blockade and only one of those was a steamer. As repairs and 
logistical demands almost constantly kept one or more of the vessels off 
station, vessels breaking the "paper blockade" had little difficulty running 
either into or out of the Cape Fear River. While outbound vessels used either 
New Inlet or Old Inlet as was convenient, most of those running into 
Wilmington came through Old Inlet because the guns of Fort Caswell provided 
protection during the critical passage through the complex of shoals between 
Oak Island and Smith Island. 
Although the development of fortifications around the entrances to the 
Cape Fear River were designed to frustrate Union plans to launch the type of 
amphibious invasion that had proven successful at Hatteras and Beaufort, that 
defense system had a profound impact on the character of blockade running. 
The protection offered by Confederate artillery provided vessels running the 
blockade with a number of important options as they navigated the most 
critical part of their voyage. During the course of the war that protection 
proved to be one of the most critical elements in successfully trading through 
the blockade. 
At the outset of hostilities in 1861, only the Old Inlet entrance to the 
Cape Fear was protected. The defenses of Old Inlet consisted of Fort Caswell 
and Fort Johnson. Fort Caswell, located on the east end of Oak Island on the 
west side of Old Inlet, was a classic but undeveloped masonry fortification. It 
had been constructed by the United States Army between 1826 and 1838.1 Fort 
Johnson was a small aging fortification at the junction of the Cape Fear and 
Elizabeth Rivers. It had originally been constructed during the colonial period 
and by the nineteenth century was used more as command center than a 
1 Ethel Herring and Carolee Williams, Fort Caswell in War and Peace, Broadfoot, Wendell, N. 
C., 1983, pp. 9-31. 
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fortification. 2 When North Carolina Governor Ellis ordered the forts seized in 
January 1861, - they were each occupied by a single sergeant, responsible for 
maintenance. 3 
In corresponding with Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown, Governor 
Ellis confirmed that: 
The U. S. forts in this state are indefensible. The armament is 
incomplete and of a very ordinary kind. The best fort, Caswell, 
has, indeed but two serviceable guns and they of light caliber. 4 
Shortly after North Carolina troops occupied forts Caswell and Johnson, 
Governor Ellis appointed Major William Henry Chase Whiting of the 
Confederate Army to command North Carolina's coastal defenses. By the end 
of April 1861, Major Whiting had begun to strengthen the Cape Fear defense 
system. 5 Within less than a month Whiting had been able to obtain and 
mount 21 cannon on the parapets of Fort Caswell and sand and sod were being 
piled against the masonry walls to resist explosive ordnance. To carry the 
weight of heavier ordnance, the casemates were reinforced with heavy timber 
and railroad iron. 6 By October the Wilmington Journal was confident enough 
to assert that the guns of Fort Caswell could blow any Yankee fleet back into the 
sea "quicker than chain lightening could run round a turnip patch. "7 
Initially, Captain Charles P. Bolles was ordered to assist Major Whiting 
in strengthening the existing fortifications and secure more modern ordnance 
for their defense. 8 As chief engineer, Captain Bolles' first assignment was the 
construction of batteries at Confederate Point (previously Federal Point) to 
defend New Inlet. In May, Bolles' replacement, Captain William L. DeRosset 
mounted two 24-pdr cannon in the earthwork fortifications before turning 
2 Bill Reaves, Southport (Smithville) and Environs, Vol. 1, The Southport Historical Society, 
1978; pp. 3-6. 
3 Ibid., p. 58. 
4 Ibid., p. 59. 
5 Headquarters, Provisional Forces, Wilmington, North Carolina. General Orders No. 1,22 April 
1861. Chapter II, Volume 331. Military Departments. Letters sent, North Carolina April-May, 
1861. Record Group 109, NA. 
6 Ethel Herring and Carolee Williams, Fort Caswell in War and Peace, Broadfoot, Wendell, 
N. C., 1983, pp. 9-31. 
7 Wilmington Journal, 22 October 1861. 
8 Bolles, Charles, Bolles Papers. NCDAH, Raleigh, N. C. 
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continued development of the defenses over to Captain John J. Hedrick. 9 
Hedrick worked to expand and strengthen the fortification which was renamed 
for Colonel Charles F. Fisher of the 6th North Carolina Regiment, who had 
been killed during the first battle at Manassas. 10 Under Captain Hedrick's 
supervision the Confederate Point fortifications were constantly expanded. 
Although still only a series of earthwork gun emplacements constructed of 
sand, they formed the number "7" shape that would characterize what was to 
become the largest and most powerful fortification of its type in the world. " 
Colonel William L. Lamb took command of Fort Fisher on 4 July 1862. 
Following a tour of his new command he described the works as: 
Situated at the extreme left of the works facing the sea, with its 
rear close to the river shore was the recently erected Shepherd's 
Battery with two guns. Next, toward the ocean was a quadrilateral 
field work known as Fort Fisher. Constructed partially out of 
perishable sand bags, it was a small work--its longest face was only 
about 100 yards. It housed four guns but only two eight-inch 
Columbiads were suitable for seacoast defense. To the right of the 
Fort Fisher facing the sea was a well constructed casemated battery 
known as Meade's Battery. It contained four eight-inch 
Columbiads and was constructed of turfed sand over a heavy 
timbered framework, the embrasures made of palmetto. A one- 
gun battery, Cumberland's Battery, was situated to the right of 
Meade's and protruded well out on the seashore. This 
emplacement contained a long-range, rifled gun. Two hundred 
yards to the right and rear of this were two batteries, Hedrick and 
Bolles, each having two guns of large caliber in barbette. In 
addition to the gun emplacements, there was a large commissary 
bombproof. 12 
Nevertheless, Colonel Lamb knew the works and ordnance were completely 
inadequate and "amounted to nothing" as a "defense of New Inlet against a 
Federal fleet. "13 
9 Ibid. and Honeycutt, A., "Fort Fisher, Malacoff of the South". M. A. Thesis, Department of 
History, Duke University, 1964. 
10 William Lamb, "Fort Fisher" manuscript on file, Historic Sites, NCDAH, Wilmington 
Morning Star, 15 July 1881. 
11 William Lamb, "Fort Fisher, " 1864. 
12 Ibid. 
13 William Lamb, "Battles of Fort Fisher, " Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 21, p. 260; 
Lamb, "Story of Fort Fisher", p. 2. 
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To remedy the situation, Lamb immediately began to strengthen the 
fortification. That work was carried out by the garrison under Lamb's 
command and by slaves and free negros. The North Carolina General 
Assembly had approved the impressment of slave labor for the construction of 
fortifications along the lower Cape Fear in December 1862.14 At times several 
hundred were engaged in construction of Fort Fisher. '5 
At the suggestion of Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, the land face of 
the fort was substantially reinforced. From Shepherd's Battery on the Cape 
Fear River marsh to the bastion named Fort Fisher in 1862, a 23-foot high 
rampart was constructed over a series of bombproof shelters and magazines. 16 
The top of the land face contained sixteen gun emplacements each separated by 
a nine foot high traverse to provide protection from enfilading fire. The land 
face gun chambers held 23 heavy cannon mounted in barbette. In front of the 
land face Lamb erected a pallisade nine feet high and buried a series of 
electrically detonated sub-terra torpedoes. '? 
Lamb also enlarged and strengthened the northeast bastion that was 
originally designated Fort Fisher. The redesigned 32-foot high fortification 
mounted two heavy guns, one 8-inch Columbiads and one 8-inch Blakely rifle. 
Like the land face they were mounted in barbette and protected from enfilading 
fire by traverses. South of the northeast bastion a 100 yard long four gun 
emplacement similar to the land face was constructed. A crescent shaped 
emplacement originally built for casemated guns was converted into a 
bombproof hospital. The remainder of the 1,300 yard sea face of the fort 
consisted of a series of eight self contained batteries mounting eighteen pieces 
of heavy ordnance including a 150-pounder Armstrong rifle. 18 Those batteries 
were connected by a trench and berm of sand designed to facilitate movement 
and communication between the batteries and protect riflemen. 
At the south end of the sea face, Lamb constructed a mound of earth 
more than fifty feet high. To speed construction Lamb built a frame tower and 
incline plane. A cart that carried sand was pulled up tracks on the incline plane 
14 Robert lobst, "Fort Fisher: A Study". unpublished M. A. Thesis, Department of History, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1962 and A. Honeycutt, "Malakoff of the South, " 
1964. 
15 lobst, Fort Fisher, 1962. 
16 Gordon Watts, "Excavation of a Fort Fisher Bombproof, " NCDAH, 1981. 
17 Lamb, "Battles of Fort Fisher, " p. 260; Lamb, "Story of Fort Fisher, " p. 2. 
18 Ibid. 
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by small steam engines. At the top of the ramp the cart was positioned inside 
the tower and each load was dumped to build the mound. When completed 
"the Mound", or Battery Lamb as the works was officially designated, was 
visible for miles along the coast and was fitted with signal lights for vessels 
running the blockade and two heavy guns to protect New Inlet. 19 
New Inlet was also protected by Battery Buchanan on the north side of 
the inlet and an emplacement on Zeek's Island on the south side. Battery 
Buchanan was an elliptical earthwork that mounted four heavy guns, two of 
which were 150-pounder Blakely rifles. 20 Battery Buchanan was also designed 
to serve as a "citadel" of last resort in the event that the garrison of Fort Fisher 
was forced to retreat from the northern works. 21 The fortification on Zeek's 
Island was a "small open battery mounting two or three guns. "22 
In addition to Fort Fisher, Confederates under Colonel Lamb's command 
constructed a series of small earthwork fortifications above Fort Fisher. Those 
batteries were to serve two purposes. They would provide a first line of defense 
against any landing of Union troops and also provide protection for vessels 
running down the coastline. Flag Pond Battery was constructed adjacent to a 
small pond approximately four miles north of Fort Fisher. Battery Gatlin was 
located three miles farther north near the southern extremity of Masonboro 
Sound. Both batteries were reported to have two guns each. 23 Along the beach 
a series of unoccupied earthworks were constructed to protect a Whitworth 
field piece that was transported up and down the beach as needed to provide 
protection for vessels run ashore. 24 
A similar complex of fortifications also protected the Old Inlet and the 
Western Bar Channel. By mid-May 1863, Captain Charles Boggs of the USS 
Sacramento reported that work on, Fort Caswell had apparently been almost 
completed. In describing the works Boggs stated that: 
19 Ibid. 
20 Honeycutt, Malakoff of the South, Lamb, "Battles of Fort Fisher, " p. 260 and Lamb, "Story of 
Fort Fisher, " p. 2. 
21 Lamb, "Story of Fort Fisher", p. 2 and Lamb Manuscript, 1864. 
22 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 8 September 1864, ORN, I, 10,441-444 and W. A. Parker to S. P. Lee, 28 
November 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 329-331. 
23 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 8 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 441-442. 
24 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 3 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 57-58. 
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It presents to us the appearance of impregnability from assaults by 
ironclads or land batteries. All the guns of the main work are 
casemated; covered with at least two thicknesses of railroad iron, 
backed with palmetto logs. The original work has been faced with 
15 feet of sand. The eastern face of the fort appears to be (even 
between the casemates) ironclad; and the sand hills for a distance 
of 2 1/2 miles to the westward of the fort have been plowed up 
and leveled, leaving no cover for an advance on that side. 25 
Ultimately Fort Caswell was to be armed with sixteen guns and a 'mortar 
battery. 26 
Confederate defenses equipped with long range artillery were also 
constructed on Oak Island west of Fort Caswell. The most complex and 
powerful was an earthwork fortification named Fort Campbell approximately 
half way between Fort Caswell and Lockwoods Folly Inlet. Although smaller 
than Fort Caswell, Fort Campbell was a "heavy casemated battery" equipped 
with rifled ordnance. It was positioned to command the Western Bar and 
provide protection for blockade runners navigating the entrance to Old Inlet. 
In August 1863, S. P. Lee reported that an additional fortification was being 
constructed on Oak Island between Fort Caswell and Fort Campbell. He 
speculated that it might be "a huge mound, to mount heavy, long-ranged guns, 
like the Mound now completed and the one building, both justwest of Fort 
Fisher, on Federal Point, New Inlet entrance. "27 That single gun emplacement 
became Battery Shaw. 28 The Oak Island defenses were additionally reinforced 
by a battery of Whitworth guns that were transported along the beach and set 
up in a series of earthwork emplacements similar to those north of Fort 
Fisher. 29 
In order to better defend Old Inlet and provide some assurance that a 
Union force would not be landed on Smith Island, an earthwork fortification 
was constructed. In May 1863, Captain Boggs reported that earthworks were 
also being constructed on Smith Island near the Bald Head Lighthouse. He 
warned that "Smith's Island is the key of the position, and if allowed to perfect 
25 C. S. Boggs to S. P. Lee, 14 May 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 21-22 and S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 8 
September 1864, ORN. I, 10, pp. 441-444. 
26 Herring and Williams, Fort Caswell in War and Peace, pp. 9-31. 
27 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 26 August 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 182. 
28 Herring and Williams, Fort Caswell in War and Peace, pp. 9-31. 
29 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 8 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 441-442. 
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their defenses there no human means can dislodge them. "30 By 1864, those 
earthworks had been developed into Fort Holmes, a heavy fortification on the 
point of Bald Head on the southwest point of Smith Island. Under the 
command of General Hebert, the fortification was expanded to consist of a 
complex of batteries and earthworks that extended from Bald Head Point 
approximately 1 1/2 miles east along the south beach and north across the 
island to Light House Creek. When Colonel Lamb visited Fort Holmes in 
November 1864 he was impressed with the strength of the eleven gun works. 31 
With the construction and arming of the fortifications at New and Old 
Inlet, vessels on the blockade were obliged to maintain stations and break off 
their pursuit at a respectable distance offshore. Initially, the smoothbore 
ordnance of Fort Caswell and Fort Fisher did not have sufficient range to drive 
Union vessels away from the inlets or the forts. In fact, the early construction 
of fortifications to protect New Inlet was periodically interrupted when Union 
vessels shelled the Confederate positions. The problem was initially solved by 
rifling old 32-pdrs using equipment shipped from Charleston to Wilmington. 32 
The steadily increasing strength of Confederate fortifications defending 
New Inlet was also occasionally and effectively illustrated for the Union fleet. 
On 22 June, 1863, at 4: 30 a. m., the USS State of Georgia was struck and badly 
damaged by a Whitworth rifle bolt weighing 120 pounds. 33 Fort Fisher was 
ultimately equipped with more than forty heavy pieces of ordnance that 
included a rifled 130-pounder Armstrong and a 170-pounder Blakely rifle 
brought through the blockade. Fort Caswell also received one of the 170-pdr 
Blakely rifles. 34 
On 21 February 1863, James Trathen, captain of the USS Mount Vernon, 
reported that a lead colored screw steamer ran in "under the guns of Fort 
Fisher" and was lost in the darkness. At daylight the following morning the 
vessel was discovered offshore of the fort. Before guns could be brought to 
bear, the steamer ran through New Inlet and anchored in the Cape Fear 
30 C. S. Boggs to S. P. Lee, 14 May 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 21-22. 
31 William Lamb Diary, 9 November 1864 and Memorandum for Lieutenant-Colonel Frobel from 
W. H. C. Whiting, 8 September 1863 and ORA, I, 29, II, pp. 705. 
32 "Reminiscences of the Lower Cape Fear, " Wilmington Morning Star, 26 September 1873. 
33 J. F. Armstrong to A. L. Case, 22 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 78-79. 
34 Liverpool Consul, Reel 23,11 January 1863; Bermuda Consul, Reel 6,3 February 1863; Vessel 
Papers, Reel 22, Merrimac and W. H. C. Whiting to D. H. Hill, 25 April 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 871- 
872. 
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River. 35 In reporting on the situation off New Inlet in March 1863, 
Commander A. L. Case of the USS Iroquois reported that "the batteries are so 
numerous that we can do but little, if anything, after they are once by us. "36 On 
15 June, Case reported that he had identified a total of thirteen fortifications in 
the vicinity of New Inlet. During the summer of 1863, three of the five north 
of Fort Fisher were reoccupied and communicated with Fort Fisher concerning 
both blockade runners and the union fleet. 37 
On February 1863, Commander A. Ludlow Case summed up the 
situation off New Inlet in a letter to S. P. Lee. Case deduced that: 
As the vicinity of the inlet is now covered by the new batteries, I 
think our chief hope of success in preventing the inward 
violation of the blockade will be in finding the vessels farther 
away. 38 
For vessels running the blockade, Confederate ordnance frequently made a 
critical difference between success and failure. The size and range of 
Confederate ordnance at Fort Holmes, Fort Caswell and Fort Fisher provided a 
critical "pocket" of protection at New and Old Inlet. 39 The Whitworth rifles 
from the Modern Greece and others subsequently shipped through the 
blockade provided the means to extend that protection along the beaches 
adjacent to New and Old Inlet. 
Although of much smaller caliber, rifled 12-pounder Whitworth field 
pieces recovered from the wreck of the Modern Greece in July 1862, provided 
Fort Fisher and Fort Caswell with ordnance of much greater range and higher 
accuracy. 40 Rifled Whitworth guns placed in Fort Campbell surprised the USS 
Maratanza with a shell through the port quarter on the morning of 11 October 
1862. Commander Scott of that vessel reported that projectiles from the battery 
passed over his ship at a range of 4.5 miles and confirmed that it was no longer 
35 J. Trathen to A. L. Case, 21 February 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 547-548. 
36 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 12 March 1863, ORN I, 8, p. 599. 
37 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 15 June 1863, ORN I, 9, p. 75. 
38 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 21 February 1863, ORN, I; 8, pp. 547-548. 
39 P. G. Watmough to D. D. Porter, 15 November 1864, ORN, I, 11, pp. 66-67. 
40 Walter Clark, Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the 
Great War, 1861-1865. (5 Volumes) State of North Carolina, Raleigh and Goldsboro, 1901; D. L. 
Braine to G. H. Scott, 22 September 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 88 and J. F. Armstrong to L. M. 
Goldsborough, 19 August 1862, ORN, I, 7, p. 659. 
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safe to assume stations 2.5 miles from Old Inlet. 41 Those guns provided 
Confederate defenders of the Cape Fear with highly mobile artillery. Those 
flying batteries were used to extend the protection of Confederate artillery as far 
north of Fort Fisher as Masonboro Inlet and as far west of Fort Caswell as 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet. In November 1862, those Whitworth rifles were used to 
drive blockade ships away from the wreck of the British bark Sophie of 
Liverpool which was run ashore south of Masonboro Inlet and burned by a 
boarding party from the Mount Vernon. 42 
Late in the afternoon of 14 January 1863, the USS Columbia grounded 
near Masonboro Inlet and was driven ashore before assistance could be 
summoned. On the morning of 16 January a southeasterly gale drove the 
vessel closer in to shore. The guns had hardly been spiked and thrown 
overboard and the foremast cut away when Confederates set up a Whitworth 
battery on the beach and drove off the USS Cambridge and USS Penobscot 
attempting to assist the crew of the stranded USS Columbia. 43 
In March 1863, Brigadier-General Whiting wrote Major-General D. H. 
Hill to justify leaving the Whitworth guns at Fort Fisher and Fort Caswell. 
According to Whiting: 
The Whitworth guns are all we have to depend on to keep the 
blockaders at such a distance as will enable the steamers to run the 
blockade. One is at [Fort] Caswell, one at Fort Fisher, and one about 
5 miles above [Fort] Fisher, on the beach. We have now four 
British and one Confederate steamers in port daily expecting to 
leave and several steamers are expected to arrive. We have had 
an engagement with the enemy over each one of these vessels, the 
enemy's sloops of war fiercely attacking the forts, while their 
smaller vessels attempt to cut off the steamers. This has happened 
at both forts. Without the disposition alluded to at Fort Fisher we 
should have lost the Cornubia inevitably three days ago. She had 
been thrice chased off the coast and became short of coal. Running 
into the land at Masonboro, she communicated with Colonel 
Lamb, and the disposition being offered, boldly made for the bar, a 
fleet of five vessels firing into her. She had the most valuable 
41 Commander G. H. Scott to S. P. Lee, 11 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 127 and S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 
27 October 1862, ORN, I, 8, pp. 152-153. 
42 J. Trathen to W. A. Parker, 5 November 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 194, A. E. Barnett to J. D. Warren, 5 
November 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 195, J. D. Warren to W. A. Parker, 5 November 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 
197-198 and T. M. Peakes to G. Welles, 2 December 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 199. 
43 J. S. Williams to S. P. Lee, 21 January 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 423-424. 
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cargo of powder and arms she has yet brought. Under these 
circumstances, unless for a matter of greater and pressing 
importance, I should not like to take the responsibility of 
detaching the gun from the coast defense. 44 
In July, Whitworth rifles were used to defend the twin screw steamer Kate, 
which was run aground on the east beach on Smith Island in July 1863.45 
Under the protection of those field pieces, Confederates refloated the Kate and 
towed the steamer toward New Inlet. In spite of accurate and intense fire from 
Armstrong and Whitworth guns on Smith Island, the Mount Vernon was able 
to drive the salvage crew away. 46 
Unfortunately for vessels running the blockade, the Whitworth batteries 
at Fort Fisher were captured during a skirmish over the screw steamer Hebe. 
That vessel was run ashore north of Fort Fisher in August 1863 and a boarding 
party from the USS Niphon attempted to destroy the vessel. Union warships 
and Confederate artillery fought a heated action over the wreck until two 
valuable Whitworth field pieces were captured by a landing party from the USS 
Minnesota. 47 Following the loss of the Whitworth rifle during the Hebe 
skirmish, Whiting wrote Secretary of War Seddon that: 
I have met with a serious and heavy loss in that Whitworth, a 
gun that in the hands of the indefatigable Lamb has saved dozens 
of vessels and millions of money to the Confederate States. I beg 
that a couple of the Whitworth guns originally saved by him from 
the Modern Greece may be sent here at once. Their long range 
makes them most suitable for a seaboard position. Could I get 
them with horses we could save many a vessel that will not be 
lost to us. 48 
44 W. H. C. Whiting to D. H. Hill, 6 March 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 860-861. 
45 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 13 July 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 120-121; S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 28 July 1863, 
ORN, I, 9, p. 121 and J. E. De Haven to A. L. Case, 12 July 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 122. 
46 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 6 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 142; A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 2 August 1863, 
ORN, I, 9, pp. 142-143 and J. Trathen to S. P. Lee, 3 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 143-144. 
47 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 24 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 165-166; J. B. Breck to A. L. Case, 18 August 
1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 165-166; J. B. Breck to A. L. Case, 18 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 166-167; P. 
Crosby to S. P. Lee, 8 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 170-171 and W. H. C. Whiting to J. A. Seddon, 
24 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 173-174. 
48 W. H. C. Whiting to J. A. Seddon, 24 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 173-174. 
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After the General Beaureguard was forced ashore on 11 December 1863, 
the Howquah and Tuscarora returned to destroy the wreck. Both Flag Pond 
Battery immediately south of the wreck and Battery Gatlin to the north opened 
fire on the Union steamers and drove them away. Apparently Whiting's 
request for Whitworth rifles was fulfilled. On 10 February 1864, a Whitworth 
battery opened fire on the USS Florida as that vessel was attempting to pull off 
the blockade runner Fanny and Jenny at Masonboro Inlet. Instead of moving 
the Whitworth up the beach where the guns were exposed to capture, 
Confederate artillerists moved the gun up a road cut along the western side of 
Masonboro Sound. The Confederate fire proved to be highly accurate in spite 
of the long range and shots hit the USS Florida so consistently that the vessel 
was obliged to abandon the Fanny and Jenny and pull offshore. 49 Commander 
Crosby reported that "the precision of the enemy's fire with those guns is very 
remarkable. "so 
The Whitworth guns from Fort Caswell were also used to frustrate 
Union efforts to salvage blockade runners that were forced ashore. The 
steamer Bendigo was discovered at Lockwoods Folly Inlet on 3 January 1864. 
Union efforts to refloat the Bendigo not only failed but the gunboat Iron Age 
was lost in the attempt. A battery of rifled ordnance brought down the beach 
from Fort Caswell was used to disrupt the Union salvage attempt. 51 Less than 
two weeks later, early on the morning of 20 January 1864, the North Carolina 
steamer A. D. Vance ran aground on the Western Bar attempting to run into 
Wilmington. The vessel remained aground for four days before being pulled 
off and towed into the Cape Fear. Salvage operations on the A. D. Vance were 
"well protected by the batteries of Fort Caswell and Bald Head. "52 Efforts to 
salvage the steamer Spunkie, which ran aground west of Fort Caswell in 
February were also well protected but tugs dispatched from Wilmington could 
not pull the blockade runner off before weather deteriorated and the hull broke 
up in the surf. 53 During the summer night of 2 June of 1864, the Georgia na 
McCaw was chased aground on Oak Island. Although boats from the USS 
49 p. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 473-474. 
50 P. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 11 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 474-476. 
51 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 8 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 441-444. 
52 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 6 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 413. 
53 J. M. Frailey to S. P. Lee, 13 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 472 and J. M. Frailey to S. P. Lee, 17 
February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 472-473. 
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Victoria captured 29 of the officers and crew of the blockade runner, "at daylight 
Fort Caswell and the adjacent batteries opened fire on our boats with shot and 
shell, which compelled them to return without accomplishing her 
destruction. "54 In December 1864, the steamers Ella and Agnes E. Fry were 
chased aground attempting to enter Old Inlet and Confederate artillery 
frustrated Union efforts to destroy both vessels. The Ella, aground on Marshall 
Shoal, was under the guns of both Fort Caswell and Fort Holmes. The Agnes E. 
Fry was chased ashore on Oak Island near the remains of the Georgia na McCaw 
and "rapid firing from shore batteries chased the Eolus and Monticello away as 
soon as daylight revealed their positions. " One of the Whitworth bolts "passed 
through the paymaster's office and cut off the rim and one of the arms of the 
starboard wheel. "55 
Development of Confederate defenses along the Cape Fear provided an 
expanding pocket of protection for vessels running the blockade. As the 
blockade tightened, that played an increasingly critical role in the success of 
vessels engaged in the trade. That protection also had an impact on the 
strategies adopted by Anglo-Confederate blockade runners. 
In 1861 and 1862, the tactics employed by blockade runners were both 
simple and effective for running in and out of the Cape Fear. Schooners, a few 
sloops and brigs and the occasional steamer made up the overwhelming 
majority of all vessels engaged in blockade running at Wilmington in 1861 and 
1862.56 Fore and aft vessels were fast to windward and from their anchorage 
could select their most advantageous "airs" and tides and put to sea when 
blockade ships were in their lee. Brigs, barks and the occasional ship that 
performed best off the wind could select channels, "airs", tides and conditions 
that provided a downwind, advantage. Frequently, more than one vessel 
would put to sea at the same time thus significantly reducing the possibility of 
being chased. 
When blockade vessels left their stations in pursuit of one vessel, others 
were unrestrained. A Union naval officer noted that: 
54 A. Everson to M. Haxtun, 2 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 114-115. 
55 Abstract log of the USS Eolus, 27 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 385. 
56 Marcus W. Price, "Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Carolina Ports, 1861-1865. " American 
Neptune, Vol. XV, April 1948, p. 222. 
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If the vessels were captured, even in entering principal ports it 
was due rather to the stupidity of the persons attempting to run 
the blockade than to the effectiveness of the force employed to 
prevent it. 57 
Vessels were brought to anchor in the river so that their anchorage offered a 
view of the position of Union vessels guarding both Old and New Inlet. If one 
inlet was left unguarded because ships were away for repairs and/or resupply, it 
was a simple matter to sail out the unguarded inlet once environmental 
conditions were favorable. In the event that both inlets were guarded, vessels 
attempting to run out could wait at their anchorage until the weather, darkness 
or both offered an advantage that reduced the odds of capture to an acceptable 
level. 
As the number of Union vessels on the blockade increased, the officers 
of sailing vessels departing neutral ports like Halifax, Bermuda, Nassau or 
Havana became very particular about clearing for another neutral port. At 
Halifax, Yarmouth and St. Johns, Nova Scotia vessels were cleared for the 
Bahamas and Havana. Conversely, vessels departing ports like Havana and 
Nassau were cleared for Halifax, St. Johns and Yarmouth. Clearing for neutral 
ports also promoted the important appearance of maintaining British 
neutrality. That provided some protection from capture as long as the vessels 
were not carrying contraband or found to be outside the normal shipping lanes 
on a heading for a Confederate port. Although the practice continued 
throughout the war, the ruse was thoroughly exposed by the fall of 1862. 
Vessels running into New or Old Inlet hove to offshore to determine the 
positions of blockaders and attempted to time their arrival so that their run 
through the inlet would occur shortly after dawn. That would permit them 
sufficient light to navigate the shifting inlet channels safely. Because of 
protection offered by the forts, vessels could run through the Federal cordon at 
night and safely anchor under the guns of the forts until daylight. With 
visibility, blockade runners could then make their way safely across the bar. 
Timing was, however, a critical issue. 
57 Daniel Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast. Charles Scribners Sons, New 
York, 1898, p. 11. 
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Steamers had a distinct advantage in that they could operate 
independently of the winds. Sailing vessels on the blockade offered no real 
threat to steam powered blockade runners. The first steam vessels to run the 
blockade at Wilmington simply steamed in or out the most convenient inlet. 
Most, like the North Carolina, were never observed and few were chased. 
During 1861, only the wooden side-wheel steamer Theodora ran the blockade 
into Wilmington from Nassau on 20 December. That inward voyage and the 
subsequent departure of the Theodora; on 1 May 1862, were unobserved by 
Union vessels. Due to the sporadic presence of the United States Navy vessels, 
neither the North Carolina (Annie Childs) nor the Nashville (Thomas L. 
Wragg) were observed making passages in February, April and May 1862. The 
inconsistent nature of the blockade required little, save caution and 
observation of the stations that were being kept by Union vessels, to assure 
success in a steamer. 
With the increase in Union vessels on station off the Cape Fear during 
the summer of 1862, a slightly different tactic was adopted. Rather than 
running boldly through the "paper" blockade in the daylight without sighting a 
United States vessel, the Gordon, Modern Greece and Sunbeam arrived off the 
Cape Fear during the previous day or night. Like many of the sailing vessels 
engaged in the trade, they waited offshore gauging their approach to the bar for 
morning when visibility decreased the risk of navigating the inlets. 58 
Apparently, no system of range lights had been developed for the Cape Fear 
and running across the bar at night was an extremely hazardous undertaking. 
Unfortunately for their owners, the officers of the Gordon, Modern 
Greece and Sunbeam timed their approaches poorly. All three vessels were 
discovered and cut off before reaching the Cape Fear River. When boarded at 
daylight on 28 September 1862, Sunbeam was only 1.5 miles from Fort Fisher. 
That British steamer was discovered running along the eastern shoreline of 
Smith Island. In spite of fire from the USS State of Georgia, the Sunbeam "paid 
no attention to it, ran on for Fort Fisher" which opened fire on' the Union 
blockader. After a shell from the State of Georgia was fired over the Sunbeam, 
the vessel "rounded to, head offshore. " Much to the surprise of the officers and 
crew of the State of Georgia the Sunbeam began "backing in toward the fort" 
58 j F. Armstrong to U. S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, 28 September 1862, ORN, 
8, p. 96. 
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and another was fired astern before the vessel surrendered. 59 In addition to 
confirming that it was not realistic to expect to run through the blockade 
unchallenged, loss of the Modern Greece and Sunbeam helped illustrate the 
fact that small coastal steamers and large trans-oceanic ships, although 
seaworthy and capacious, were not well suited to running a blockade 
maintained by steamers. 
Coastal steamers like the Gordon, although of shallow draft, lacked 
seaworthyness, cargo capacity and speed. Large trans-oceanic ships like the 
Modern Greece and Sunbeam also lacked speed, were of deep draft and were 
highly visible because of their size and rig. Capture of the Z. C. Pearson and 
Company steamers, Circassian, Patras, Stettin, Lodona, Phoebe, Merrimac and 
Peterhoff and the destruction of the Modern Greece clearly illustrated the point. 
While that type of vessel was appropriate for carrying trans-Atlantic freight, it 
did not prove to be an effective blockade runner. Most were either captured or 
assigned to run between the islands and Great Britain. 
When the tightening blockade and end of the cotton embargo reinforced 
the wisdom in shifting to steamers in 1862, the officers and pilots of those 
vessels adopted many of the tactics developed by the sailing ships that engaged 
in blockade running. The practice of clearing for another neutral port was 
equally important in maintaining the superficial trappings of legitimate trade. 
Cargoes of military supplies and weapons prohibited by British neutrality, were 
disguised for the blind eye of the customs inspectors by labels and declarations 
such as "merchandise", "machinery" or "hollow ironware. " The ownership of 
vessels sailing on Confederate account and/or under Confederate command 
was concealed by registering them through British agents. 
Following the successful amphibious invasion of the North Carolina 
sounds and the April 1862 capture and establishment of a base of naval 
operations at Beaufort, North Carolina, Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough began 
to significantly increase the number of vessels on station off Wilmington. By 
May, six steamers had been assigned to the Cape Fear and in July that number 
was increased to ten. Although service, repairs and logistical demands 
continued to reduce the number of those vessels on station at any given time, 
the impact of their presence was dramatic and forced a shift in the strategy and 
tactics employed by vessels running the blockade. Their presence and the 
59 Ibid. 
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threat of an amphibious invasion in the Cape Fear Region focused attention on 
developing the defenses of the Cape Fear. Those defenses would play the most 
critical role in both the success of blockade running at Wilmington and the 
tactics employed by vessels in the trade. 
The increase in vessel strength enforcing the Cape Fear blockade during 
the summer of 1862 and the loss of the steamers Gordon and Modern Greece 
brought a shift in the strategy employed by both sail and steam powered vessels 
trading at Wilmington. Although fast schooners could avoid the slower 
Union steamers under the right conditions, the presence of several enemy 
vessels greatly increased the odds against successfully running through the 
blockade at either entrance to the Cape Fear. In response sailing vessels shifted 
the focus of their activities to yet unguarded inlets along the North Carolina 
coast. 6o 
North of New Inlet blockade runners found the shallow shifting 
channels of Masonboro Inlet, Topsail Inlet, New River Inlet and Bogue Inlet to 
be convenient alternatives. To the west of Old Inlet, Lockwoods Folly Inlet, 
Shallotte Inlet and Little River Inlet were employed with a high degree of 
success especially by schooners. The cargoes of brigs and barks of deeper draft 
and reduced maneuverability were often lightered ashore in small boats and 
sloops. Soldiers and coast guards stationed in the vicinity provided what 
protection they could for the vessels and frequently assisted with handling 
cargoes. Freight was shipped by cart and wagon to Wilmington for distribution. 
The strategy proved remarkably successful until Union vessels were assigned to 
sporadically reconnoiter the inlets. Although that caused the captains of a 
number of those blockade runners to run their vessels aground and abandon 
them, it by no means stopped the traffic. In fact a reinterpretation of British 
neutrality in the winter of 1862, actually opened the door to smaller vessels of 
the type already engaged in using the shallow inlets. 
A major step in solving the neutrality problems associated with running 
large trans-Atlantic vessels through the blockade occurred in December 1862. 
Confederate agent Louis Heyliger and Nassau merchant Henry Adderly 
negotiated the privilege of breaking bulk and trans-shipment with British 
colonial authorities. That concession formally opened the door for vessels to 
operate through the blockade out of British colonial possessions at Nassau, 
60 j. M. B. Clitzto to S. P. Lee, 3 November 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 190. 
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Bermuda and Halifax. Problems encountered with large and slow steamers like 
the Fingal, Nashville, Gladiator and the loss of the Bermuda had made the 
necessity for employing fast, low profile steamers readily apparent to Fraser, 
Trenholm and Company. In January 1862, John Fraser and Company put the 
coastal steamer Kate into service between Nassau and Charleston. Kate had 
been built as the Caroline for the Florida Steam Packet Company by Samuel 
Sneden at Greenpoint, New York in 1852.61 The 477-ton Kate was powered by a 
beam engine and was not particularly fast but reasonably seaworthy. Under the 
command of Captain Thomas Lockwood, Kate proved to be one of their most 
successful vessels. 
In February 1862, Cunard, Wilson and Company negotiated the purchase 
of the Dublin and Glasgow ferryboat Herald for Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company. The 283-ton sidewheel steamer Herald was powerful, fast, 
seaworthy and had good cargo carrying capacity with a draft of only 12 feet fully 
loaded. 62 Herald was the first of many British public service steamers to be 
purchased to run the blockade. In July, Herald joined Kate in running back and 
forth from Charleston to Nassau and occasionally Bermuda to establish a 
pattern to be followed for the remainder of the blockade. At Nassau and 
Bermuda the steamers discharged shipments of cotton, agricultural products 
and naval stores and were loaded with freight and military cargoes from 
England and Europe. 
To support steamers like Kate and Herald, Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company began to ship goods out from England to Nassau and Bermuda in 
their remaining sailing ships and the trans-oceanic steamers that proved to be 
unsuitable for blockade running. Those vessels received protection from 
British neutrality by clearing for British colonial ports at Bermuda, Nassau and 
occasionally Halifax, Nova Scotia. Although the Z. C. Pearson and Company 
steamer Peterhoff was captured enroute to its neutral destination at Matamoras 
most vessels made the voyage between "neutral" ports without interruption. 
Trans-shipment of cargoes also permitted vessels to be insured at least as 
far as Halifax and the islands. Initially, insurance could be obtained for vessels 
running the blockade. According to the U. S. Consul in Liverpool the Z. C. 
Pearson and Company steamers Modern Greece, Circassian, Settin, Ladona, 
61 Nepveux, Alfred Trenholm, p. 39. 
62 U. S. Consul, Liverpool, 12 February 1862, RG 84, NA. 
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Merrimac, Cleopatra, Khersinus and Patras, all of which had been chartered to 
carry "Rebel Government" freight, were "fully insured to run the blockade. " 
The Consul also reported that Pearson and Company had settled with the 
underwriters "for the hull of the steamer Settin at 75%" of the value after that 
vessel was captured. 63 In an article on the loss of the Pearson and Company 
steamer Modern Greece, the Liverpool Daily Post confirmed that both the 
vessel and cargo were "fully insured by her owner. " The Lodona captured on 4 
August 1862 was also reported to have been "heavily insured at Lloyd's. "64 
As the blockade became more of a liability, underwriters were less 
inclined to insure vessels and rates climbed. When the Minho was chartered 
for £15,000 to run the blockade in July 1862, Lloyds was paid a premium of 60% 
on the ship and cargo. 65 The Tubal Cain, captured off Charleston on 24 July 
1862, was also insured at Lloyd's. 66 Two unidentified steamers reported to be 
preparing to run the Charleston blockade were also reported to be insured by 
Lloyd's at a rate of "60 guineas per cent. "67 
As the blockade tightened and firms like Z. C. Pearson and Company 
filed huge claims, underwriters began to realize the increasing liability 
associated with attempting to trade through the Union fleet. By December 1862, 
Thomas Dudley reported: "I learn that the Insurance offices refuse to take risks 
on steamers to run the blockade .... "68 Five days later Dudley wrote Secretary 
Seward to defend his conduct against accusations that he had not been zealous 
in protesting the construction of Confederate privateers. In that letter Dudley 
pointed out that "all the merchants here with very few exceptions are 
underwriters therefore concerned in the Insurance business.... " In the letter 
Dudley identified Fraser, Trenholm and Company, Leech Harrison and 
Forwood and Fernie Brothers, all heavily involved with the Confederate 
government and in trading through the blockade, as underwriters insuring 
vessels engaged in blockade running. 69 
63 Liverpool Consular Dispatch, 25 July 1862, RG 84, NA. 
64 Liverpool Daily Post, "Sinking of the Modern Greece", 29 July 1862 and Liverpool Journal of 
Commerce, "Capture of Ladona, " 2 August 1862. 
65 Liverpool Journal of Commerce, "The Steamer Minho, " 6 August 1862. 
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67 Liverpool Journal of Commerce, "The Steamers at Charleston", 2 August 1862. 
68 Liverpool Consular Dispatch, 6 December 1862, RG 84, NA. 
69 Liverpool Consular Dispatch, 11 December 1862, RG 84, NA. 
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In spite of the fact that increased risks convinced underwriters to stop 
writing policies for vessels running the blockade, Lloyds and several other 
London companies continued to provide limited insurance for blockade 
runners. For example, policies written in 1863 by the Commercial Union 
Assurance Company for vessels and cargoes extended only as far as the neutral 
ports of Matamoras, Bermuda and Nassau. Voyages beyond those neutral ports 
and into the Confederacy was considered an unacceptable risk. Between 
January and December 1863, Commercial Union Assurance Company wrote 
policies for the Peterhoff and Miriam in January, the Denbigh in October, the 
Nutfield in November and the Vesta and Caledonia in December. 7° Policies 
continued to be written for voyages to neutral ports, but rates increased and 
particular attention was given to the specific nature of cargoes following the 
capture and condemnation of the Peterhoff. Having cleared for Matamoras 
with contraband aboard, that steamer was considered a legal prize. 
Although the Kate ran into Wilmington in August and again in 
November 1862, the pattern of trans-shipment in fast steamers was not 
implemented at Wilmington until December of that year. At the suggestion of 
Confederate agent Caleb Huse, several blockade runners owned by the 
Ordnance Department were to be operated between Wilmington and St. 
Georges, Bermuda. The Cornubia, ran into Wilmington on the morning of 18 
December 1862. Like the Gordon, Modern Greece and Sunbeam, the Cornubia 
gauged her arrival off the Cape Fear to permit a run through New Inlet near 
daylight. To minimize the chances of being sighted, Captain Holmes ran the 
blockade runner south along the beach outside the breakers. Because of 
environmental conditions, the vessel "was scarcely visible from the deck and 
presented the appearance of whitish streaks on the undulations of the shore. "71 
Once blockade runners ran inshore "getting.... under cover of the woods" it was 
extremely difficult to maintain visual contact. 72 Because of the difficulty in 
seeing the ship and the vessel's speed, the Cornubia was able to succeed where 
the Gordon, Modern Greece and Sunbeam had failed. 73 
70 Commercial Union Assurance Company, Voyage Book-1863, Guildhall Library. 
71 W. H. Macomb to B. F. Sands, 19 December 1862, ORN, I, 8, pp. 314-315. 
72A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 9 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 64. 
73 C. S. Boggs to S. P. Lee, 25 March 1863, ORN, I, 8, p. 626. 
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Running in "under the land" became one of the most important tactics 
employed by blockade runners entering and clearing Wilmington. Late on the 
morning of 28 December 1862, the second Ordnance Department steamer 
Giraffe was sighted southwest of Old Inlet near Little River. When the steamer 
headed inshore, the dark hull of the vessel disappeared against the coastline. 
Two hours later the crew of the Giraffe fired up their boilers and under, a cloud 
of black smoke the rakish vessel "rapidly" disappeared. 74 
Running along the beach proved to be advantageous for several reasons. 
First, the coast line offered a valuable aid to navigation. Once a position had 
been established using landmarks and inlets on the barrier islands, a blockade 
runner was on a familiar path to the entrances of the Cape Fear. Although 
hazardous, the breaking surf and beach provided a reference to parallel. Even 
on the darkest moonless night the surf and beach were readily apparent. On 14 
February 1863, B. F. Sands reported that one of his picket boats anchored in only 
12 feet of water off Oak Island was almost run down by a blockade runner. The 
unidentified vessel passed between the picket boat and the beach "evidently 
having tracked the beach along, where, under the cover of the dark land, she 
could not be seen a quarter of a mile off in the obscurity of the hour before 
daylight. "75 
On 25 February, Acting Master Richard Hustace reported that "at 3: 30 
a. m. a steamer suddenly hove in sight between me and the land, coming out 
from under the cover of the woods; she passed between the boat and the shore, 
going at full speed. "76 Occasionally, running "under the land" provided 
sufficient cover to make successful runs even in daylight. A. L. Case reported 
that a "long, very low paddle-wheel steamer, with two pipes and two masts 
without yards" ran along the coast and into New Inlet near sunset on 2 March 
1863. According to Case "she came from the northward and eastward, close 
along the land, under its shadow, and from her lowness was not visible until 
she threw up a dense volume of smoke, within a mile and a half of Fort 
Fisher. "77 
74 E. Hooker to B. F. Sands, 29 December 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 336. 
75 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 14 February 1863, ORN, 8, pp. 527-528. 
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In March 1863, a contraband "in the habit of going in pilot boats" 
provided a revealing description of a successful run into Wilmington by the 
steamer Cornubia. According to his account: 
... the 
Cornubia arrived off Big Hill, some 12 miles N E. of New 
Inlet, at 9 a. m. of the 2d instant, and was ordered in the afternoon 
by Major Lamb, commandant of Fort Fisher, to be prepared to run 
in as soon as he could return to the fort and get his guns ready. 
She was run very close along the breakers by Jim Burroughs (a 
pilot living on the beach), who reported she ran five miles in 
twenty minutes. 78 
Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting confirmed the contraband's report in a 
communication to Major-General D. H. Hill on 6 March 1863, and requested 
that the Whitworth guns recovered from the Modern Greece remain at Fort 
Fisher and Fort Caswell. 79 
Running along the beach provided a backdrop against which vessels 
were extremely difficult to observe. To increase the chances of success in 
making that run, most vessels engaged in the trade were attempting to blend in 
with the shoreline environment and reduce their visible profiles by the fall of 
1862. Although the majority of the vessels departing Great Britain to run the 
blockade were traditionally painted black, most running the blockade by the fall 
of 1862, had been painted a "light lead" color to blend in with sand and surf. 
On 7 June 1862, Thomas H. Dudley, U. S. Consul at Liverpool, reported 
that the Julie Usher was being prepared to run the blockade. Dudley's 
informants confirmed that the ship's "whole outward appearance will be 
altered so far as they can do it as soon as she 
leaves Queenstown. "80 Dudley 
also presumed "these vessels will use paint 
freely after they leave port .... 1,81 
When the steamer Anglia departed Liverpool in June she put into Bristol and 
"repainted part of her sides, took onboard a quantity of Black paint to repaint 
the ship.... " and requested the "most effective 
dryers" to cure it. The captain 
boasted that "a daguerrotype had been taken of the ship at Liverpool but she 
would have a very different appearance when 
she got over. "82 Near midnight 
78 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee 26 March 1863, ORN, 
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81 Ibid. 
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on 29 December 1862, Acting-Volunteer E. Hooker of the USS Victoria reported 
a "very rakish" two-masted steamer off Shallotte Inlet that was disguised with 
"dark-colored paint. "83 
By the summer of 1862, vessels were being painted for a different reason. 
Instead of changing the outward appearance of the ship, paint schemes were 
used to make the vessel more difficult to see at night. One of the first was the 
Z. C. Pearson and Company steamer Phoebe. After arriving in Bermuda, the 
black-hulled Phoebe was painted "a light lead color" to camouflage her 
appearance. 84 Light colored vessels were more difficult to see against the surf 
and sand than dark ones. In July 1863 the U. S. Consul at San Juan, Puerto Rico 
reported on the presence of the steamer Juno and pointed out that, "this class of 
vessel is generally painted white, lead, or some neutral color, as being less 
discernible at night than those of a darker [color]. "85 
Perhaps to preserve some semblance of legitimate trade, virtually every 
vessel departing Britain to run the blockade was painted the traditional black. 
However, most carried a supply of "light lead" paint to apply at sea or in the 
harbor at St. Georges, Bermuda. Two days after the screw steamer Onachetoo 
arrived at St. Georges in September 1862, the crew "commenced painting her a 
lead color. "86 In December 1862, the Confederate steamer Cornubia was 
reported to have "had her color changed since her arrival here from black to 
light lead color. "87 When the steamer Merrimac was being prepared to run the 
blockade in March 1863, the "hull and upper works [were] painted lead color. "88 
In November 1863, Captain Daniel B. Ridgely complained that "the blockade 
runners are now all painted white, and run so close to the beach that it is 
impossible to see them 100 yards off at night. "89 
Although "lead color" was the most frequently selected color for vessels 
engaged in blockade running, it was by no means universally adopted. White 
was also popular. The Collie and Company steamer Venus was painted white 
following her arrival at St. Georges in June 1863 and the Dare was painted 
83 E. Hooker to B. F. Sands, 29 December 1862, ORN, 8, p. 336. 
84 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 28 August 1863, RG 84, NA. 
85 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Puerto Rico, 27 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 128. 
86 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 17 September 1862, RG 84, NA. 
87 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 8 December 1862, RG 84, NA. 
88 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 23 March 1863, RG 84, NA. 
89 D. B. Ridgely to S. P. Lee, 10 November 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 294-295. 
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white in December. 90 The steamer Constance was also painted white in April 
1864.91 In January 1864, the Nutfield was painted a "light color" in St. Georges. 92 
The Lord Clyde was quickly painted a "light color" upon her arrival in 
Bermuda the following week. 93 The Ceres received "a coat of light paint" in 
November. 94 The U. S. Consul in Bermuda reported that the Vixen, Vulture, 
Emma Henry and Evelyn all had been painted white since their arrival in 
November 1864.95 Another unidentified steamer was sighted by the crew of the 
USS Keystone State on 7 November 1863, off Wilmington. That vessel had a 
"long, low hull, painted gray" with "two smoke pipes, painted white. "96 
Not all of the blockade runners were painted white, gray or a light color. 
The steamer Harriet Pinckney received a coat of "light blue paint" at St. Georges 
in preparation for running the blockade in May 1863.97 The Gladiator arrived 
in Bermuda "having been partly painted a light brick color. "98 J. B. Breck of the 
USS Niphon reported chasing a "greenish white" sidewheel steamer off 
Masonboro Island. 99 When the Constance and Falcon arrived at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia in August 1864, their smokestacks had been "painted red instead of 
white" as previously reported. '°° The Owl, one of the last blockade runners 
purchased and operated by the Confederacy, was painted pink while under the 
command of John N. Maffitt. An unidentified screw steamer discovered off 
Wilmington on 11 January 1864, was distinctly painted a combination of both 
white and dark lead. "Her smoke pipe and from that forward was painted 
white, while the after part was painted a dark lead color. "101 
By late in the war a vessel's color and appearance on departing Great 
Britain was apparently less important. By the time the Colonel Lamb was 
launched in September 1864, maintaining the guise of legitimate commerce 
90 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 12 June 1863, RG 84, NA and U. S. Consular Dispatch, 
Bermuda, 21 December 1863, RG 84, NA. 
91 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 20 April 1864, RG 84, NA. 
92 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 18 January 1864, RG 84, NA. 
93 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 17 June 1863, RG 84, NA. 
94 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 10 November 1863, RG 84, NA. 
95 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 16 November 1864, ORN, I, to, p. 601. 
96 E. Donaldson to D. B. Ridgley, 13 November 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 272. 
97 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 9 May 1863, RG 84, NA. 
98 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 27 August 1862, RG 84, NA. 
99 J. B. Breck to W. A. Parker, 10 May 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 43-44. 
100 G. Welles to S. P. Lee, 23 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 386. 
101 E. Donaldson to S. P. Lee, 11 January 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 403. 
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suggested by the traditional black hull must have been less of a consideration 
for blockade runners. As the name and design no doubt confirmed, the 
Colonel Lamb was clearly built for blockade running. When American Consul 
Thomas Dudley reported the launch of the steamer he confirmed that it had 
already been painted "slate color" with black smoke pipes and paddle box 
insets. 102 Vessels like the Gem had already been painted white by the time she 
arrived at Cork in November 1864.103 When the Stag arrived in Bermuda that 
same month, the vessel had already been painted white. 104 
A coat of paint was not the full extent to which the owners and officers 
of some blockade runners went to effect their disguise. While the Minho was 
in Bermuda in September 1862, the mainmast was taken out and the fore and 
mizzen topmasts and yards were removed. When the screw steamer Aries was 
captured on 28 March 1863, the vessel was found to have been equipped with 
hinged masts and a retractable funnel. The masts and crutches into which they 
were stowed when lowered represented a design similar to those on vessels 
operating on rivers where fixed bridge crossings represented an obstruction to 
navigation. The retractable pipe was an equally early design developed and 
used by some of the first steamers built to operate as tugs on the canals 
developed in Europe and Great Britain early in the nineteenth century. The 
Confederate steamer Merrimac was also equipped with two "smokestacks, 
hinged for lowering and only a short mast forward to serve as a station for 
lookouts and staysails. "105 The City of Petersburg had "two strike masts and 
telescopic funnels. "106 One of the disadvantages of retractable smoke pipes was 
that they had a tendency to flare when lowered to reduce the vessel's profile. A 
"strange light" reported by the lookout of the USS Eolus shortly after midnight 
on 20 October 1864, proved to be the "flame out of the smoke-stacks of a 
steamer at full speed. "107 
When the Emily was found ashore and ablaze in February 1864, a 
boarding party form the USS Florida noted that the vessel had 'two masts that 
had "apparently been dismantled to run the blockade. "108 In fact, taking down 
102 T. H. Dudley to W. H. Seward, 7 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. -438-439. 
103 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 28 November 1864, RG 84, NA. 
104 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 23 March 1863, RG 84, NA. 
105 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 27 July 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 133. 
106 p. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 11 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 474-476. 
107 W. O. Lundt to D. L. Braine, 20 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 575. 
108 p. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 11 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 474-476. 
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all but the lower masts was apparently a common practice at Bermuda. Before 
the Merrimac left Bermuda in March 1863, the mainmast was removed at the 
same time the upper works were painted. 109 In June 1863, the steamer Venus 
arrived at St. Georges, Bermuda. In addition to putting on, a coat of white paint, 
the crew took down all of the vessel's topmasts and yards. "" Two paintings, 
possibly commissioned by U. S. Consul Charles M. Allen, illustrate the rigging 
of the Venus both before and after alterations were made for running the 
blockade. "' Allen retained Bermuda artist Edward James to produce water 
color likenesses of at least some of the blockade runners that entered at St. 
Georges. 112. The yards of the steamer Hawk were also taken down at St. Georges 
in July 1864.113 a 11 
The effect of a coat of light paint and reduced profile was documented by 
a 20 February 1863 report from H. H. Savage to, B. F. Sands. Acting Master 
Savage described a blockade runner that escaped his vessel off Little River as a 
".... very low and long boat, with propeller wheels; no masts; painted lead color, 
and a telescope funnel, which was lowered down most even with the top of her 
paddle boxes. " Savage admitted; "She was a hard boat to see in a fog. "114 
Taking down the masts and yards significantly reduced the profile of the 
blockade runners and made them all the more difficult to identify. That 
difficulty was further compounded by scheduling runs through the blockade 
primarily at night. The September 1862 escape of the steamer Kate caused S. P. 
Lee to chastise the officers of the Wilmington Squadron for maintaining 
consistent stations that could be observed during, the day and recorded to 
facilitate running out at night. 113 The use of highly maneuverable steamers 
made running the blockade at night an infinitely less risky proposition. By the 
fall of 1862, virtually all attempts to run out and most of the inward attempts to 
run the blockade were made under the cover of darkness. In December 1862, 
Captain B. F. Sands wrote to S. P. Lee of the rigors of maintaining an effective 
nocturnal surveillance complaining that ".... I never pretend to turn in at night, 
109 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 23 March 1863, RG 84, NA. 
110 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 12 and 17 June 1863, RG 84, NA. 
111 Paintings of the steamer Venus at Bermuda in the collections of the National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich. 
112 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 23 March 1864, RG 84, NA. 
113 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 13 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
114 H. H. Savage to B. F. Sands, 23 February 1863, ORN, I, 8, p. "562. 
115 S. P. Lee to Commander Scott, 21 September 1862, ORN, I, 8, p. 80. 
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and am frequently on deck during the night inspecting the lookouts in person, 
taking what sleep I can get in my clothes, ready for a moments call. " Captain 
Sands admitted that he could not see how the blockade could be made effective 
"unless we string the whole coast with steamers; for, on dark nights, I am sure, 
from my own personal observation, that vessels cannot be seen half a mile 
distant, and under favorable circumstances, in the absence of the moonlight, 
we can not see a vessel a mile off. "116 Less than two months later Sands 
complained that another blockade runner had succeeded in getting into the 
Cape Fear River. No one except the crew of a picket boat anchored on the bar 
that was almost run down by the blockade runner saw the vessel pass. 117 
By running during the "dark of the moon" blockade runners could take 
advantage of the nights of lowest visibility. By December 1863, the practice was 
so universally adopted that S. P. Lee wrote Gideon Welles that the blockade 
breakers do not run on a moonlight night. 118 By 1864, the stage of the moon 
was so important that the entire trade revolved around scheduling a round trip 
into and out of the Confederacy during the dark period of the lunar cycle. 
During the summer and early fall phosphorescence could also be a 
problem for blockade runners and blockade vessels alike. In chasing a blockade 
runner on the night of 7 September 1864, Captain B. F. Sands found that the 
USS Fort Jackson was "showing so much luminous water under her paddle 
wheels that I stopped to await events and not expose my whereabouts to the 
runner ...... 119 
That same month the USS Alabama reported "a steamer passing 
to the southward with a perfect halo of white foam around her. "12° 
To facilitate running the blockade during the "dark of the moon" 
Confederates developed a system of lights and signals to communicate between 
Anglo-Confederate steamers and serve as navigation references. Although 
difficult to identify, primary elements of a system of communication were 
apparently in place by the spring of 1862. When the steamer Bermuda was 
captured in May of that year, a captured light signal code book confirmed that 
such a system was in place at Charleston. The signal book onboard the 
Bermuda included the following complex combination of messages. 
116 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 23 December 1862, ORN, I, 8, pp. 313-314. ' 
117 B, F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 14 February 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 527-528. 
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119 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 7 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 435. 
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Place the steamboat in a position which will bring me in W. N. W. and burn a 
single blue light. 
A blue light with a white light above it will signify: The chances are bad for 
getting in Maffitt's Channel; try Ship Channel tomorrow night at high water. 
A blue light with a white light to the south of it will signify: The chances are 
bad for your getting in here at present. 
A blue light with a white light to the north of it will signify: Try Pumpkin Hill 
Channel to-morrow night at high water. 
A single red light will signify: Steer in for us. 
A red light with a white light above it will signify: Go to Bermuda and await 
orders from your owners. 
A red light with a white light below it will signify: Steer in W. S. W. 
A red light with a white light to the north of it will signify: Steer in W. by S. 
A red light with a white light to the south of it will signify: Steer in west. 
Two red lights, one above the other, will signify: Steer in W. by N. 
Two red lights alongside each other will signify: [imperfect] 
Two rockets from the boat will signify: We are ashore, all safe. 
One rocket from the boat will signify: We are captured. 
121 
To assist vessels running the blockade at Wilmington the Confederate Signal 
Corps developed a series of signal stations to guide vessels in under the 
batteries protecting each inlet. 122 By the fall of 1862, blockade runners making 
the shoreline north of New Inlet followed the breakers south and near Craig's 
Pole or Big Hill, approximately two miles south of Masonboro, signaled the 
shore using a hooded lantern. That signal could not be seen by vessels on the 
blockade but identified the vessel as a blockade runner and communicated a 
request for navigation lights. 
Confederate pickets on the beach, possibly as far north as Swansboro, 
manned fifteen foot high scaffolds and waved a lighted torch in the direction of 
Fort Fisher. 123 The torch was constructed using a ball of cotton soaked in 
turpentine. That signal was repeated and quickly extinguished by stations 
121 S. F. Du Pont to G. Welles, 5 May 1862, ORN, I, 12, p. 797. 
122 S. P. Lee to Commanding Officers, 16 December 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 355-356. 
123 A. Murry to S. P. Lee, 4 February 1863, ORN, 8, p. 503. 
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along the beach as the blockade runner passed. "The batteries on the coast, one 
about 5 miles and another 10 above Fort Fisher, show bright lights in the night 
for the guidance of the blockade runners. "124 As communications reached Fort 
Fisher before the blockade runner, Colonel Lamb and the garrison could 
prepare to provide covering fire for the vessel at New Inlet. 125 At Fort Fisher 
the blockade runner called for range lights to navigate New Inlet by hanging a 
hooded red lantern over a hooded white lantern on the inshore side of the 
vessel near the waterline. Upon receiving that signal the bar would be lighted 
and range lights positioned to identify the channel. 126 In March 1863, A. L. Case 
reported that communications with steamers running the blockade were 
"telegraphed along the beach from station to station" and information 
concerning vessels headed for New Inlet could dispatched to Fort Fisher well in 
advance of their arrival. 127 
A brilliant light, perhaps calcium, was mounted on top of the mound 
constructed at Fort Fisher in 1864, and was used to identify and illuminate the 
inlet for vessels running the blockade. 128 The escaped mulatto servant of 
Colonel Lamb reported that "the coast was now so strongly guarded by the 
Yankee gunboats, the runners must take their chance to run directly through 
the fleet in and out, and the light was to aid them in doing so. "129 By March 
1864, Confederates had also established a reference light at Masonboro to 
inform blockade runners of their position on the coast. 130 
To ensure reliable communication, Confederate Signal Corps officers 
were frequently assigned to blockade runners. 131 A captured letter from the 
purser of the Juno confirmed that a signal officer aboard that vessel 
communicated a request for setting range lights for New Inlet with the garrison 
at Fort Fisher in September 1863.132 By late fall of 1864, signal officers or signal 
124 W. A. Parker to S. P. Lee, ORN, I, 9, pp. 369-370. 
125 Report of J. J. Orrell, S. P. Lee, 12 November 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 300-301 and W. A. Parker to 
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127 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 2 March 1863, ORN 1,8, p. 582. 
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operators were aboard most vessels. In his diary Colonel Lamb noted that the 
steamer Vulture arrived on 29 November, the Owl arrived on 2 December and 
the Talisman arrived on 8 December with signal operators as part of their 
crew. 133 When the A. D. Vance was captured in September 1864, Cyrus Neel 
was aboard as the vessel's signal officer and was sent to New York as a prisoner 
of war. 134 In October 1864, the Confederate signal officer aboard the Condor was 
able to effectively direct the protective fire of Fort Fisher from his stranded 
vessel. 135 That was not always possible and the Beatrice arrived on 31 October 
1864, with no signal officer was on board. 136 Almost a month later the steamer 
Emma Henry came through the blockade under the command of Captain E. C. 
Reid without either a signal officer or a pilot. 137 
A similar system of lights was established along the coast west of Old 
Inlet. On 14 February 1863, William Earle reported that while his picket boat 
was anchored in only 12 feet of water off Oak Island the crew discovered the 
light of a steamer running rapidly along the coast for the Western Bar Channel. 
As the side-wheel vessel passed between the picket boat and the beach, Acting 
Master Earle reported that the light was extinguished, ship's engines were 
stopped and a rocket was fired over the stern. After the vessel resumed her 
course Earle reported that the signal light reappeared and was answered by a 
light from Fort Caswell. "138 On 19 February, Sands confirmed that the vessel 
was the Confederate steamer Giraffe. 139 
In 1864, the system of communication along the western approach to the 
Western Bar was enhanced by the construction of a telegraph system that 
connected Lockwoods Folly Hill with Smithville. 140 That no doubt was used to 
facilitate both navigation and salvage of vessels run ashore. On 6 March the 
133Colonel Lamb Diary, 29 November 1864 and 1 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
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crew of the USS Mount Vernon discovered that a fixed light had been placed in 
the Bald Head Lighthouse to assist blockade runners in passing through the 
Western Bar Channel. 141 
When a blockade runner attempted to run out of Old Inlet on 6 
September 1864, Acting Master E. S. Keyser reported that the Confederate 
garrison at Fort Holmes sent a "small balloon" aloft from Bald Head 
Lighthouse. The balloon was attached to a string and allowed to rise 
approximately 50 yards above the light before being pulled down. The previous 
night a balloon was sent up 200 yards above the light from a point north of the 
lighthouse. After approximately ten minutes it was raised another 100 yards 
and carried along the beach to the south before being pulled down. Acting 
Master E. S. Keyser speculated that the balloon might have been a distraction to 
"draw our attention that way in order to favor the escape of a blockade runner 
along the northern shore, which was at that time shaded by a dense, black 
cloud .... 11142 
Some blockade runners carried flares, rockets and other pyrotechnic 
signals similar to those distributed to vessels on the blockade. When 
discovered, the pyrotechnics were used to make false signals. An unidentified 
steamer running out of New Inlet on 5 October fired two rockets and "showed a 
white light twice" before being lost in the darkness. 143 An unidentified 
blockade runner running along the south shore of Smith Island answered the 
challenge of the USS Emma with a "common blue light" on 26 July 1864.144 
Using pyrotechnics brought in through the blockade, the garrisons at 
Fort Fisher and Fort Caswell also sent up signals in an effort to confound the 
communications of the blockade fleet. A steamer running to the southeast out 
New Inlet in September 1864 was fired on by the USS Niphon, and the garrison 
at Fort Fisher sent up a rocket to the northeast and fired three guns "with the 
intention of confusing the fleet. "145 The garrison also fired rockets similar to 
those employed by the Union fleet in an effort to confuse matters as much as 
possible when vessels made their final approach at New Inlet. 146 At least one 
141 Log of the Mt. Vernon, 6 March 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 781. 
142 E. S. Keyser to B. F. Sands, 7 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 436-437. 
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report suggests that the men under Colonel Lamb's command attempted to 
emulate the signals of the blockade squadron to draw attention away from 
vessels attempting to enter New Inlet. On 30 September 1864, Acting Master 
Edmund Kemble reported that "the fort threw up a rocket to the N. and E., 
firing three guns at the same time, doubtless with the intention of confusing 
the fleet. "147 Later on 6 October 1864, Acting Master Kimball also reported that a 
steamer "threw up two rockets and showed a white light twice, of which the 
fort and batteries seemed to take notice, as they opened fire ...... 148 
On the night of 9 September the Confederate garrison at Fort Caswell 
used rockets to help cover the escape of one of the new class of fast blockade 
runners. The rockets were fired to the northwest to suggest a vessel running in 
along the south side of Smith Island. In getting underway to intercept a vessel 
on that course Acting Volunteer Lieutenant William Dennison of the USS 
Eolus discovered a paddle wheel steamer running out to the west along the 
coast line of Oak Island. 149 The USS Montgomery reported rockets apparently 
thrown up by a "picket station" on Oak Island on the night of 7 August 1864.1-10 
The system of communication and navigation proved to be so important 
that on 11 March 1864, Lieutenant John Wilkinson was ordered to Wilmington 
to take charge of standardizing and supervising those operations. According to 
his orders Wilkinson was to: 
.... establish and preserve 
in operation such lights at Bald Head, the 
Mound, and at other places as, in your judgment, will best aid 
trading vessels to enter and depart from the Cape Fear River. In 
connection with this subject you will establish day and night 
signals and sailing directions for all such vessels; determine from 
time to time any changes in the depth of water of the entrances; 
examine the qualifications of pilots and give them certificates of 
such examinations. You will also exercise such a general 
supervision over vessels engaged in trade, and on board of which 
cotton is being shipped, as will enable you to determine whether, 
in character and condition, as well of the vessel as of the officers 
and crews, they justify the shipment by them of Government 
cotton. You will also establish such port regulations necessary to 
147 E. Kemble to O. S. Glisson, ORN, I, 10, p. 492. 
148 E. Kemble to S. P. Lee, ORN, I, 10, p. 527. 
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facilitate and exclusively connected with the exportation of cotton 
and importation of Government supplies, and not inconsistent 
with the rights of the State of North Carolina, as you may deem 
necessary. 151 
Lieutenant Wilkinson was also instructed "to establish day and night signals 
and sailing directions for all such vessels.... "152 To set up and operate the 
navigation lights Wilkinson received authorization to transfer 20 men from 
the military force at, or near, Wilmington. Another fifty men were to be made 
available for Wilkinson to organize a small force to facilitate saving lives and 
salvaging cargoes from vessels run ashore in attempting to run the blockade. 153 
The light at Cape Lookout was also used by blockade runners to establish 
their position and time their runs into Wilmington. 154 That was also the case 
off Cape Fear. Although there was no light like those at Cape Lookout and 
Cape Hatteras, the United States had replaced the lightship captured and 
removed by the Confederates in 1862. The captain of the Cape Fear lightship 
reported frequently sighting blockade runners and complained that the Navy 
did not keep a ship in the vicinity to halt the practice. 155 In January 1864 John 
Almy, Commander of the USS Connecticut reported: 
In many instances, as is well known, they make the light-ship and 
hover about there watching for an opportunity to run in. This is 
the testimony of the captain of the light-ship. He has lately visited 
Washington, I understand, and has been commenting upon the 
blockading squadron down here in not being more about the 
vicinity of the light-ship and using greater exertion to capture 
blockade runners, which show themselves about there so often. 156 
S. P. Lee reported "inbound blockade runners hovering off Cape Lookout 
Shoals with a view to run in at night. "157 Vessels running in and laying to off 
Cape Lookout and Cape Fear could bank their fires during the day and thus not 
produce the telltale plumes of black smoke that distinctly identified their 
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position. At dusk they would run westward along the coast until making 
contact with the line of signal stations established along the beaches. With 
communication and lights to help navigate, steamers could run along the 
beach literally at full speed just outside the line of the surf until under the guns 
of Confederate fortifications near New Inlet. 
On a quiet night the sounds of paddle wheels could be distinctly heard 
and were often reported by Union officers. 158 Running along the beach in the 
noise of the surf also masked the sounds of a blockade runner's passage. Acting 
Master Richard Hustace reported that "the breaking of the surf on the beach 
drowned the noise of her paddles" in describing the successful passage of a 
steamer that was "very long, low hull, side-wheels, short smokestack, no 
masts. " 
As noise carries exceptionally well over water, blockade runners adopted 
a number of techniques to ensure that it was minimized. In order to avoid the 
sound created by blowing off excess steam the Kate was equipped with "a steam 
pipe on the boiler leading to the donkey suction pipe to blow steam through 
the bottom, because if stopped among them and, blow off the least [we] are 
made, so I carry a good head of steam, and [if] suddenly stopped can keep it in 
check without damping my fires for going ahead again. "159 When the steamer 
Lilian was captured her crew reported an "efficacious English remedy practiced 
on board the Lilian, to have good steam, yet keep position and prevent noise" 
associated with blowing off excess steam. That exercise consisted of turning in 
short circles to use excess steam generated by keeping the fires hot while 
maintaining a station. 160 The critical nature of such a consideration can be seen 
in the destruction of the Herald/Antonica. It was "by the escape of steam" that 
the attention of watches aboard the USS Aries was focused in the direction of 
the Herald. That sound carried over four miles and gave the position of the 
blockade runner away. 161 
One distinct advantage of screw propulsion was the lack of noise 
produced by the vessel's machinery. When the Dudgeon steamer Kate entered 
Charleston early in the summer of 1863, she was almost captured or sunk when 
158 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 6 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 421-422 and J. M. Williams to B. F. 
Sands, 2 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 538. 
159 Unsigned letter to M. Dudgeon, 30 June 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 123. 
160 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 1 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 413-414 and S. P. Lee to F. D. Stuart, 
22 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 474-475. 
161 E. F. Devens to S. P. Lee, 23 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 363. 
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"a large paddle steamer coming in at the same time, close to us, alarmed them 
with her wheels flapping. " In an unsigned letter to M. Dudgeon captured 
aboard the Kate in July, the author related that "we are not the fastest here, but 
we have a great advantage by running so quiet. "162 
Once a vessel was discovered success often depended on speed. The 
increase in steamers on the blockade in 1862 made that a priority for blockade 
runners. On 14 November 1862, the U. S. Consul at Liverpool reported that: 
They have recently been buying all the fast vessels-steamers-they 
can find for sale, and are now in treaty for three of the very fastest 
and best boats that have been built in England. They are new, all 
alike, 480 tons each, and built to run between Dover and Calais. 
They are side-wheel, built in the best possible manner, covered 
with steel plates instead of iron, and are very fast and of light draft 
of water, and are wanted to run in with cargoes from Bermuda 
and Nassau. 163 
By early 1863, vessel commanders on the Wilmington Station began to 
report the appearance of much faster vessels entering the trade. One of the first 
of those reports was from the captain of the USS Victoria. In a 12 January 1863 
letter from S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, Lee alluded specifically to the Giraffe's 
"greatly superior speed" and confirmed that the vessel had "easily managed to 
elude the blockader. "164 The following month J. D. Warren Acting Master of 
the USS Daylight, not the fastest vessel on the blockade, reported being outrun 
by an unidentified steamer attempting to enter Old Inlet. 165 In March, A. L. 
Case of the USS Iroquois complained that "none but quick vessels in good 
order can be of any service off New Inlet" because "the class of vessels now 
violating the blockade is far different from those attempting it a year ago. "166 
The speed of vessels engaged in running the blockade continued to 
steadily increase during 1864. Shortly after midnight on 27 July 1864, the 
officers and crew of the USS Alabama heard the paddlewheels of a blockade 
runner approaching close along Frying Pan Shoals. On being discovered, the 
sidewheel steamer quickly out distanced the Alabama and disappeared. After 
162 Unsigned letter to M. Dudgeon, 30 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 123. 
163 Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 14 November 1862, ORN, 1,8, p. 266. 
164 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 12 January 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 418-419. 
165 J. D. Warren to S. P. Lee, 16 February 1863, ORN, I, 8, pp. 531-532. 
166 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 12 March 1863, ORN, 1,8, p. 599. 
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attempting to follow the vessel's wake the Alabama discovered the steamer 
again at daylight and resumed the chase. When a breeze sprang up from the 
south, the steamer turned into the wind to provide better draft and the 
Alabama was dropped quickly astern as "his speed increased amazingly. "167 In a 
report on the "uselessness" of the USS Dacotab, a frustrated Commander A. G. 
Clary also wrote: 
I wish to furnish you with some information relative to the speed 
of blockade runners as experienced during the temporary 
command of the USS Keystone State and while passenger in her 
to join this ship. 
There were nine chases in all, in about thirty days; of these, 
two captures and 92 bales of cotton picked up. Three or four were 
compelled to throw their cargo overboard. In one of these chases 
where the Connecticut joined (and beating her), the Keystone 
State, going at the speed of nearly 13 knots for the best part of a 
day, was compelled to give up the chase. The speed of these 
contraband steamers is beyond all precedent of late. I have never 
experienced anything like it. 168 
In a similarly frustrated communication to Gideon Welles, Rear-Admiral 
David D. Porter admitted that "the new class of blockade runners is very fast, 
and sometimes come in and play around our vessels; they are built entirely for 
speed. "169 
As faster vessels appeared on the blockade in response to requests from 
the officers on the Wilmington Station and chases became more dangerous, 
blockade runners adopted another tactic. When they were unable to outrun 
one of the fast steamers being assigned to the Wilmington Station in 1864, 
blockade runners would lighten their vessel by throwing cargo overboard. In 
reporting on an unsuccessful chase, the captain of the Santiago de Cuba 
reported that his vessel was the "fastest vessel on the blockade. " However, he 
admitted that after the unidentified steamer he was pursuing started to throw 
cotton overboard "she began to leave us" and within seven hours was 
completely out of sight. He cautioned S. P. Lee that "there are but few blockade 
runners that go less than 14 miles per hour. "loo 
167 F. Smith to S. P. Lee, 27 July 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 314. 
168 A. G. Clary to S. P. Lee, 18 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 160-161. 
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Commander James Madison Frailey of the USS Quaker City reported a 
similar incident on 30 June 1864. That vessel was chasing a sidewheel steamer 
south of Cape Fear when the blockade runner began to throw cotton overboard. 
As soon as the vessel was lightened, the blockade runner began to pull rapidly 
away from the USS Quaker City and Commander Frailey gave up the chase. 171 
Commander Clary of the USS Dacotah reported that "13-knot cruisers may gain 
on them during the early part of the chase, but after they lighten by throwing 
overboard part of their cargo their speed is unprecedented. "172 
When the British steamer Rouen was captured by the USS Keystone 
State, Commander Pierce Crosby reported that one of the fifteen knot blockade 
runners engines was "out of order. "173 A few days later on 11 July another 
steamer ran away from the Keystone State after the crew dumped a part of the 
deck cargo of cotton overboard. Much to Commander Crosby's chagrin "as 
soon as she found she could outrun us, she hoisted the rebel flag and kept it 
flying during the time we were in sight of her. "174 Like the Rouen, the British 
steamer Boston was captured when her machinery broke down while 
attempting to outrun the USS Fort Jackson. 175 
One of the Falcon class blockade runners was briefly chased by the USS 
State of Georgia at daylight on 8 August 1864. The blockade runner never 
changed course and by 7: 30 a. m. was completely out of sight. 176 Apparently that 
same vessel was chased on the night of 6 August by the Santiago de Cuba. 
Although the Santiago de Cuba was able to keep a dim light on the steamer in 
sight during the night, at dawn the blockade runner began to throw overboard 
cotton and quickly disappeared. 177 In July 1864, the USS Nereus reported a 
steamer off Lockwoods Folly Inlet rapidly leaving them astern after throwing 
overboard a substantial portion of the' cargo. 178 
After throwing overboard a portion of the cotton stowed on deck, 
another unidentified steamer out ran the Banshee, one of the fast captured 
blockade runners sent to reinforce the blockade, the Monticello and 
171 J. M. Frailey to S. P. Lee, 30 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 219-220. 
172 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 1 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 221-222. 
173 p. Crosby to G. Welles, 2 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 223-224. 
174 p. Crosby to G. Welles, 11 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 257-258. 
175 B. F. Sands to G. Welles, 8 July 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 242. 
176 S. Nicholson to 0. S. Glisson, 8 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 328. 
177 0. S. Glisson to S. P. Lee, 8 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 359-360. 
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theAlabama on the morning of 10 August 1864.179 A propeller steamer used 
the same tactic to outdistance the USS Mount Vernon on 29 August 1864. 
Following the discharge of a quantity of "heavy packages" the chase left the 
Mount Vernon "very fast" and within three hours was completely out of 
sight. 1so 
A chase of the USS Iroquois lasted throughout much of the day and into 
the night of 17/18 August 1863. At sunset the Union steamer was gaining on 
the blockade runner in spite of more than 100 bales of cotton that had been 
thrown overboard. As the night was moonless, the vessel was able to lose her 
pursuer after sunset by reducing fuel to the boilers until the U. S. steamer 
passed and then steering another course. 181 
A "long, low, and narrow steamer with two masts and two smokestacks, 
very rakish build, and smokestacks painted a light lead color, nearly white" that 
resembled the Banshee "in every way" eluded capture by heading into thick 
mist on the horizon and immediately cutting back on coal to the boilers to stop 
producing telltale black smoke. 182 
Although speed was a critical element in late war, success of blockade 
runners, slower vessels were still making successful runs in and out of 
Wilmington even in 1864. The USS Britainnia discovered a "side-wheel 
steamer, with one smokestack and two masts" leaving New Inlet shortly after 
midnight on 10 September 1864. Although the Eolus was not able to run the 
steamer down Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Samuel Huse reported that the 
vessel was "not going apparently over 8 knots per hour. "183 
At times when darkness, camouflage, ruse and speed were not sufficient 
to escape, the officers of blockade runners often resorted to running their 
vessels ashore under the protection of Confederate artillery. Once the vessel 
was ashore the cargo could be salvaged and on several occasions the vessels 
were refloated and towed into the Cape Fear for repair. To ensure that Union 
efforts to refloat grounded steamers were not successful, the vessels were often 
flooded and occasionally set afire. Paddlewheel shaft bearing caps were 
179 J. Trathen to S. P. Lee, 13 August 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 383. 
180 J. Trathen to S. P. Lee, 14 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 428. 
181 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 20 August 1863, ORN, 1,9, pp. 158-159. 
182 W. H. Garfield to S. P. Lee, 15 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 364. 
183 C. Huse to S. P. Lee, 10 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 451. 
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frequently removed to disable machinery. That quickly rendered the vessel's 
engines inoperable. In the event that circumstances permitted Confederate 
salvors to refloat the ship, they could be replaced in a matter of minutes. 184 
Confederate response to vessels aground was well orchestrated and 
produced highly satisfactory results throughout the war. The first significant 
attempt involved the Modern Greece. That steamer was run aground 
northeast of Fort Fisher during the summer of 1862. A salvage party under the 
direction of Colonel Leaventhorp landed a large quantity of the steamers cargo 
including ordnance, arms and ammunition and a. variety of commercial 
freight. 185 That exercise and the experience gained unloading schooners and 
other sailing vessels through the surf provided Confederates with a formula 
for success that was enhanced throughout the war. 
On 23 April 1863, Commander J. F. Armstrong of the USS State of 
Georgia attempted to destroy a vessel chased ashore north of Fort Fisher by the 
USS Daylight. When the USS State of Georgia and the USS Florida reached 
the grounded steamer, it was protected by two Whitworth field pieces 
recovered from the Modern Greece. Approximately two to three hundred men 
of the beach were in the process of lightening the vessel inspite of the surf 
breaking over the hull. Just as Commander Armstrong made signal to 
"Prepare for Battle", the grounded steamer backed off the beach and ran down 
the surf line toward Fort Fisher. Although the Union vessels gave chase the 
speed of the steamer and fire from the Whitworths, Confederate batteries on 
the coast north of Fort Fisher and the guns of Fort Fisher frustrated their 
efforts. 186 
When the Dudgeon twin screw steamer Kate was driven ashore on 
Smith Island in July 1863, the efforts of enterprising Confederate salvors 
surprised Union officers on the blockade. As soon as the steamer was aground 
it was abandoned by her officers and crew. They escaped to Smith Island in the 
vessel's boats. Union efforts to refloat the Kate proved fruitless and when 
Confederate infantry and artillery were reported to be advancing in force from 
the south side of the island, Commander Armstrong of the USS State of 
184 Watts, 1975 Field School Report and Watts, "Carolina Beach Inlet Shipwreck Assessment", 
Wilmington Corps of Engineers, 1985. 
185 Wilmington Journal, 27 June 1862, p. 2, col-1., and 28 June 1862, p. 2 col. 2. 
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Georgia ordered the steamer destroyed. 187 In addition to totally disabling the 
machinery the boilers were drained and the furnace doors closed with fires 
raging inside. The bonnets from the reservoirs were removed to flood the hull 
and the ship was set ablaze with four twenty pound charges of powder placed 
inside the hull. As the ship flooded and burned, IX and XI inch shells were 
fired into the hull. 188 
In spite of Union efforts to destroy the vessel, Assistant Paymaster H. E. 
McDuffie was able to make it through the surf to the wreck. With the 
assistance of two scouts from Fort Fisher and two civilians, McDuffie was able 
to extinguish the blaze and remove the charges placed in the hull. Once the 
fire was extinguished and the Union vessels had withdrawn out of range of 
Confederate artillery, Colonel Lamb boarded the vessel and posted armed 
guards to protect the vessel and surviving cargo. 189 
As the hull was found to have been struck by only two shot, Confederate 
salvors ascertained that the wreck could be refloated. At night using small 
boats they removed the cargo, shipping what could be sold to Wilmington and 
throwing the remainder overboard. 190 Much of the damaged machinery was 
also disassembled and thrown overboard and the engines salvaged to lighten 
the ship. Only the "boilers, bed plates, shafts and a quantity of coal" remained 
inside the hull-191 On the night of 31 July, the' hull was pumped out, the jib and 
main sail bent on and the vessel towed toward New Inlet by a number of small 
boats. 
Upon being discovered and fired upon by the USS Mount Vernon, 
Confederate salvors were forced to abandon their prize. In hopes of defending 
the ship, the Kate 's anchors were let go under the protection of batteries at 
New Inlet. Under a "terrific" fire from Confederate artillery intent on sinking 
the Kate, a boarding party from the USS Mount Vernon took possession of the 
steamer and attached a hawser to the bow. After the anchor cables were slipped 
the USS Mount Vernon backed seaward with the prize in tow. 192 
187 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 12 July 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 120-121. 
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On 11 August an inbound screw steamer went ashore on Caroline Shoals 
off New Inlet. Because the vessel was under the guns of Fort Fisher, little could 
be done to disrupt the work of Confederate salvors. Using tugs and small 
vessels, they quickly lightered or threw overboard most of the cargo. The 
North Carolina steamer A. D. Vance was also run aground on Caroline Shoals 
attempting to enter Old Inlet in August 1863. "By the aid of soldiers from the 
forts and of Colonel Crossan, who went down from Wilmington with a large 
work force, enough of the cargo was transferred to lighters to ease the vessel off 
the shoal. " Colonel Thomas M. Jones, in command of Fort Caswell 
commended a group of coast guards of Captain John W. Galloway's company 
for saving goods that were washed overboard. In October 1863, a steamer was 
discovered ashore at Lockwoods Folly Inlet. The vessel had been run aground 
and the cargo entirely removed before being set ablaze. Only the hull and 
machinery remained and that was deeply buried in the sand. 193 
When a blockade runner was discovered ashore and ablaze off 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet on the morning of 3 January 1864, the USS Fahkee 
dispatched several boats to the wreck. Under the guns of the USS Fahkee the 
boarding parties attempted to refloat the steamer. Although that proved to be 
impossible they discovered that the vessel was the Bendigo and that her crew 
and Confederate salvors had removed the entire cargo from the wreck. The 
vessel had been scuttled prior to being set on fire and seven feet of water filled 
the engineering space and cargo holds. 194 When Confederate artillery was 
moved into position to command the Bendigo, the USS Fahkee's boarding 
party was forced to withdraw and, the Union gunboat fired into the wreck to 
destroy the hull and machinery. 195 The following week two additional vessels, 
the Ranger and the Vesta were also run ashore west of Old Inlet. The Ranger 
was run ashore by her pilot off Holdens Beach and the Vesta was run ashore off 
Sunset Beach. Although neither vessel could be refloated, material from both 
proved to be salvageable and Confederate troops continued to recover material 
from both vessels after they were declared total wrecks. Working under the 
193 A. D. Harrell to B. F. Sands, 5 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 229. 
194 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 4 January 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 385-386. 
195 Ibid. 
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protection of darkness and "thick weather", Confederate salvors recovered 
tools and rifled muskets from the Ranger and the Parrott rifle thrown 
overboard from the USS Iron Age. 
196 
The A. D. Vance ran aground again attempting to enter the Cape Fear 
through Old Inlet on 20 January 1864. Fortunately, the vessel was protected by 
the guns of Fort Caswell and Fort Holmes on Smith Island. Large tugs and 
steamers were quickly dispatched to lighter the cargo and pull the vessel into 
deep water. Although it took almost two days the operation was successful and 
both vessel and cargo were saved. 197 
When the Wild Dayrcll went aground in Rich Inlet on 1 February 1864, 
the crew threw overboard as many packages of merchandise, shoes, blankets 
and provisions as possible and set the ship on fire before being discovered and 
chased away by the USS Sassacus. Much of what they were able to throw 
overboard floated to the beach and was recovered. 198 Because the wreck was 
above Masonboro Inlet, Confederate forces could not protect the steamer by 
bringing artillery up the beach to drive Union vessels away from the wreck. 
When the USS Florida returned to the wreck on 5 February, a battery of rifled 
Whitworth cannon opened fire from the mainland hitting the vessel 
wounding one member of the crew. 199 
When Lieutenant Wilkinson was ordered to Wilmington in March 1864 
one of his duties was to: 
procure boats and will render such aid in saving life and 
Government stores from stranded vessels as your means and 
opportunities may admit. To aid in the execution of these duties, I 
have requested the Secretary of War to order a transfer of such 
men as you may require from the military force at or near 
Wilmington; and I have supposed that 20 men for your lights and 
signals and 50 for other duty would meet your wants, and you will 
designate the men you require. 20° 
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Perhaps as a consequence of Lt. Wilkinson's work, the results were quite 
different when a steamer resembling the A. D. Vance was run ashore on the 
western point of Oak Island in March 1864. On 14 March, Acting Volunteer 
Lieutenant Edward F. Devens of the USS Aries reported: 
At 5 a. m. saw a steamer bearing north from night station No. 7, 
which station was occupied for the night by this vessel; stood in to 
cut her off, when she ran upon the beach, about 1 mile below Fort 
Campbell. Got the boats ready to board her, when we saw a large 
number of troops and several pieces of artillery coming down the 
beach from the direction of the fort. At 5: 20 a. m. opened fire on 
her; at the same time rebels opened fire on us from the beach 
above and below the steamer with several Whitworth guns, the 
shell all falling close to us or going over us. At 6: 10 a. m., having 
had reason to believe two shells had struck her, one through the 
bow and one through her just forward of the wheel house, I 
deemed it prudent to withdraw.... 201 
During the night Confederate troops garrisoned at Fort Campbell and Fort 
Caswell helped lighten the steamer and tugs from Smithville were able to pull 
the vessel into the Cape Fear. 202 According to the 26 May 1864 Wilmington 
Journal the vessel was the steamer Lucy under the command of Captain 
Duguid. Captain Duguid ordered the vessel flooded to frustrate any attempt to 
pull the Lucy off by Union ships. 203 
Confederate salvors from Fort Fisher were also able to recover the 
steamer Badger. That vessel was run aground off Fort Fisher in July 1864. 
Although determined to be a "total loss" the hull was plugged and pumped 
out, coal and cargo removed and the vessel towed into the Cape Fear. 204 The 
Badger was ashore on Caroline Shoals for nine days before the hull and 
machinery could be salvaged. 205 The USS Emma drove the paddlewheel 
steamer Elsie ashore on Oak Island west of Fort Caswell on 26 August 1864, but 
was unable to destroy the vessel due to the combined fire from Fort Caswell, 
201 E. F. Devens to S. P. Lee, 14 March 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 551-552. 
202 j. M. Frailey to S. P. Lee, 15 March 1864, ORN, I, 9, p. 551. 
203 Wilmington Journal, "Gallant but Bloodless Attack by the Blockading Squadron", 26 May 
1864. 
204 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 26 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 390-391. 
205 T. C. Dunn to S. P. Lee, 26 August 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 393-395. 
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Fort Campbell and batteries on the beach. Confederate salvors were able to 
repair the USS Emma's shot damage and using two schooners, lighten the 
vessel. It steamed into the Cape Fear River the following day. 206 
On the night of 29 September 1864, the steamer Night Hawk was driven 
aground on Caroline Shoals off New Inlet by the USS Niphon. 207 Although the 
wreck was under the guns of Fort Fisher, a boarding party from the Niphon set 
the vessel ablaze and took off most of the officers and crew before the 
Confederate garrison drove them from the stranded vessel. 208 Because the 
Night Hawk was within range of Fort Fisher, Confederate salvors began to 
recover material from the vessel as soon as the weather permitted. Before the 
vessel could be salvaged however, the Condor attempted to enter New Inlet 
and ran aground trying to avoid the wreck of the Night Hawk. Again the guns 
of Fort Fisher prevented the destruction of the blockade runner. 209 Although 
the cargo of the Condor was saved by the quick work of the Fort Fisher garrison 
the vessel became a complete wreck before Colonel Lamb's proposal to "take 
the Condor off" could be effected. 210 That same storm helped free the hull of 
the Night Hawk and with the assistance of Negro slaves the vessel was brought 
inshore, the remains of her cargo removed and with the boilers fired up the 
burned out hull was brought into the Cape Fear. 211 After being repaired and 
rebuilt at Wilmington the Night Hawk ran out again on 3 January 1865.212 
By October 1864, the salvage of vessels ashore off Fort Fisher required so 
much attention from the garrison that Major-General Whiting complained: 
"My men, who ought to be at their work and at their drill, have been 
transformed into boatmen and wreckers, and at night have to stay in these 
wrecks to keep off the enemy's boats. "213 When the Stormy Petrel went ashore 
in December 1864, it was on the south breaker on Caroline Shoals. The wreck 
was within the limits of Fort Fisher's protection but, was also within range of 
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the Union blockaders. Although they could not destroy the Stormy Petrel, they 
shelled the steamer until they were driven away by the fort's artillery. The 
following day Power, Low and Company sent down 50 Negros to assist the 
garrison in recovering the Stormy Petrel's cargo. Unfortunately a northeast 
gale prevented salvaging material from the wreck and the steamer was beaten 
to pieces in heavy surf. Although most of the freight aboard the steamer was 
destroyed, Colonel Lamb dispatched two boats to recover cloth from the wreck 
on 14 December. They returned filled with material for the garrison. The 
Stormy Petrel was the last blockade runner to go aground under the protection 
of Fort Fisher but vessels continued to run into the Cape Fear until news of the 
fall of Wilmington reached Bermuda, Nassau and Halifax. 214 
Although no comprehensive strategy was formally developed for 
Anglo-Confederate blockade running, the collective response to demands of 
the trade produced an effective system for maintaining foreign commerce. 
The techniques that were employed to circumvent the blockade proved to be 
efficient enough to keep a sometimes sporadic but uninterrupted supply of 
war materials and civilian goods flowing into Wilmington until the Cape 
Fear was closed by occupation in January 1865. Although a deliberate 
program of blockade running would unquestionably have been more 
effective, the strategies that evolved helped Anglo-Confederate, blockade 
runners provide both the necessities of war and the essentials of civilian 
society in spite of the efforts of the United States Navy. 
214 Colonel Lamb's Diary, 7,8,9 and 14 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
Chapter V Location, Identification and Description of the Wrecks 
As a consequence of blockade running during the American Civil War, the 
coastal waters of southeastern North Carolina contain the remains of more 
than thirty steam vessels associated with that clandestine trade. Those wrecks 
lie in the shallow waters off the barrier islands or in the shallow inlets that 
separate those islands. The wreck sites are scattered from Bogue Bank west of 
Topsail Inlet in the north down the coastline to Cape Fear and west to Shallotte 
Inlet (Figure 3). Those vessels include the Modern Greece and Kate lost in 1862, 
the Hebe, Phantom, Arabian, Elizabeth, Douro, Venus, Beaureguard and 
Herald lost in 1863 and the Bendigo, Ranger, Vesta, Wild Dayrell, Dee, Spunkic, 
Emily, Fanny & Jenny, Georgiana McCaw, Pevensey, Lynx, Ella, Stormy Petrel 
and Agnes E. Fry lost in 1864. Two blockade runners, the Columbia and 
Peterhoff, that were captured and taken into service by the United States Navy 
were also lost on the North Carolina coast. 
The first efforts to locate, identify and recover material from those 
wrecks were carried out during the Civil War Centennial in the 1960s. The 
impetus of those early investigations was a result of the highly publicized 
salvage of material from one wreck in particular. In 1962, divers from the 
United States Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit at Indian Head, 
Maryland discovered that a storm had uncovered the remains of the blockade 
runner Modern Greece. On exploring the wreck they found that much of the 
ship's cargo had not been salvaged during the war. When word of the 
discovery reached the North Carolina Department of Archives and History, 
divers were rapidly recovering the valuable cargo. At the request of the 
Governor of North Carolina the United States Navy agreed to assist in 
recovering the remaining artifacts from the wreck. During two summer 
projects more than ten thousand artifacts were recovered. Although no 
archaeological provenience, was maintained, the number-of artifacts recovered, 
more than ten thousand, was impressive. 1 
Work on the Modern Greece stimulated interest in locating other 
blockade runners. With assistance from local divers and historian Charles 
Foard, the Navy located and examined several additional vessels including the 
1Leslie Bright, The Modern Greece and Her Cargo, NCDAH, 1977. 
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USS Peterhoff, Condor, Beaureguard, Phantom, Ranger and a wreck 
traditionally identified as the Ella. 2 The location of these wrecks and recovery 
of artifacts focused additional attention on North Carolina's Civil War 
shipwrecks. The formation of Nautical Archaeological Associates (NAA), a 
not-for-profit organization, provided the vehicle for a small group of Civil War 
shipwreck enthusiasts to continue the exploration initiated by the Navy. 
Working under a permit from the State of North Carolina, NAA carried out 
investigations on the Modern Greece, Ranger, and Ella Site until 1974.3 
That year the North Carolina Division of Archives and History 
(NCDAH) entered into an agreement with the University of North Carolina at 
Wilmington to carry out shipwreck surveys in conjunction with a field school 
in underwater archaeology. During field schools in 1974,1975 and 1976, 
additional reconnaissance investigations were carried out on the Modern 
Greece, USS Peterhoff, Condor, Lynx, Hebe, Fanny and Jenny, and the Ella Site. 4 
In 1982, and again in 1984, the United States Army Engineer District, 
Wilmington contracted with Tidewater Atlantic Research, Inc., a Washington, 
North Carolina contract archaeology firm, for investigation of Civil War 
shipwrecks in the vicinity of Federally maintained navigation channels at 
Carolina Beach and Lockwoods Folly inlets. Those investigations included 
reconnaissance examinations of the Elizabeth and Bendigo at Lockwoods Folly 
Inlet and the Douro and Venus at Carolina Beach Inlet. On-site research was to 
establish a precise location for each wreck and assess the condition of surviving 
vessel remains. Historical and archaeological investigations at Carolina Beach 
Inlet established the identify of the Douro and Venus. 5 
In the interest of providing protection for the Civil War shipwrecks in 
the Cape Fear region, NCDAH nominated the known vessel sites collectively to 
the National Register of Historic Places in 1985. Personnel from that agency 
2Gordon Watts and Leslie Bright, "Progress in Underwater Archaeology in North Carolina, 
1962-1972. " International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 1973, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 131-136. 
3 Gordon Watts, Report on the 1974 Field School in Underwater Archaeology, unpublished 
manuscript on file at NCDAH. 
41bid. 
5Gordon Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance, Carolina Beach Inlet, New 
Hanover County, North Carolina" Report submitted to the Wilmington District, U. S. Army 
Corps of Engineers by Tidewater Atlantic Research, August 1984 and Gordon Watts, 
"Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance and Historical Investigation of Shipwreck Sites 
in Lockwoods Folly Inlet, Brunswick County, North Carolina" Report submitted to the 
Wilmington District, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers by Tidewater Atlantic Research, 15 August 
1986. 
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also initiated a series of reconnaissance investigations to collect additional data 
on the wrecks and document their condition. 6 Those activities were expanded 
in 1989 when East Carolina University's Program in Maritime History and 
Nautical Archaeology (PMHNA) and the Underwater Archaeology Unit of 
NCDAH carried out a survey of Cape Fear Civil War shipwrecks in 
conjunction with a Field School in Maritime History and Underwater 
Archaeology. During that field school twelve sites were examined and 
reconnaissance level site plans were developed.? 
Between 1983 and 1986 the staff and students of PMHNA also joined the 
Bermuda Maritime Museum in investigating the wrecks of two blockade 
runners lost in Bermuda (Figure 4). In 1983, archaeological investigation 
concentrated on the wreck of the Mary Celestia. A preliminary plan of the site 
was prepared and exposed hull structure and machinery documented. Three 
years later in the fall of 1986, a less comprehensive reconnaissance was carried 
out on the remains of the Nola. Archival resources in the Bermuda Archives 
and the collections of the Hamilton Library and St. Georges Historical Society 
were surveyed to identify material associated with the wrecks. 8 
The remains of blockade runners lost in the immediate vicinity of New 
Inlet off Fort Fisher was also carried out by the staff and students of PMHNA 
and the Underwater Archaeology Unit in 1994 and 1995. That research was 
funded by the National Park Service and was designed to document the 
remains of Union warships and blockade runners geographically associated 
with Fort Fisher. Survey activities focused on the wrecks of the blockade 
runners Condor, Arabian, Modern Greece and Stormy Petrel. Data from the 
survey supported identification of the wrecks, development of management 
plans and assessment of their suitability for development as an underwater 
park. 9 
6 Richard Lawrence, et. al., National Register of Historic Places Nomination for Cape Fear 
Civil War Shipwreck District, NCDAH, 1985. 
7 Gordon P. Watts, Jr., Report on the 1989 Field School in Underwater Archaeology, 
unpublished manuscript on file at East Carolina University. 
8 Watts, Gordon P., Jr. "Bermuda in the American Civil War: A Reconnaissance Investigation of 
Archival and Submerged Cultural Resources. " International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 
Vol. 17, No. 2,1988, pp. 159-171 and Watts, Gordon P., Jr., "Runners of the Union Blockade. " 
Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 5, September/October, 1989, pp. 32-39. 
9 Gordon Watts, et. al., "A Reconnaissance Investigation of the Civil War Shipwrecks at New 
Inlet" a draft report on file at East Carolina University, 1996. 
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During the past thirty years of salvage and archaeological research, 
eighteen wrecks have been located, identified and to some degree investigated 
in North Carolina and two have been examined in Bermuda. In North 
Carolina those vessels include the Modern Greece and Kate lost in 1862, the 
Hebe, Phantom, Arabian, Elizabeth, Douro, Venus and Beaureguard lost in 
1863 and the Bendigo, Ranger, Wild Dayrell, Dee, Fanny & Jenny, Lynx, Ella 
and Stormy Petrel lost in 1864. In Bermuda, the wrecks of the Nola, lost in 1863 
and the Mary Celestia, lost in 1864, have been examined and documented. 
Those wrecks represent the entire spectrum of steam powered blockade 
runners employed in circumventing the Union blockade. Identification of the 
wrecks has been based on geographical location, historical data and comparing 
surviving design, construction and engineering data with the vessel remains. 
With the exception of the wreck traditionally identified as the Ella, the remains 
of each vessel were found to have sufficient diagnostic characteristics to permit 
reliable identification. 
Modern Greece 
Date of Loss 27 June 1862 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 54' 37" Latitude 33° 58' 38" 
The wreck of the Modern Greece lies one half mile northeast of Fort 
Fisher and one quarter mile offshore (Figure 3). Surviving vessel structure 
rests on a coquina rock and sand bottom in 30 feet of water. The hull lies 
parallel to the beach with the bow to the south. Exposed remains of the 
Modern Greece consist of intact sections and disarticulated fragments of the 
hull structure and the vessel's machinery and boiler. 
Identification of the Modern Greece is based on a combination of site 
location and the surviving hull structure. The location of the wreck of the 
Modern, Greece was well established at the time of her loss on 27 June 1862. 
Historical sources confirm that the ship was run aground off the beach one half 
mile northeast of Fort Fisher. The remains are those of a large iron single 
screw steamer. Although the overall length of the hull is difficult to establish 
because of deterioration of the structure, the overall length of the wreck is 
sufficient to accommodate the 224 foot length of the Modern Greece recorded 
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on the Certificate of British Registry (CBR). 10 The 29 foot 6 inch beam and 32 
foot 6 inch length of the engine room recorded at the wreck site correspond 
closely with those recorded on the CBR and an Annual Survey carried out 7 
October 1861 at London. 11 
One curious disparity concerns the number of engines (steam cylinders) 
on the Modern Greece. The CBR records that there were three engines. 
Evidence at the site confirms the remains of only one engine. However, 
historical sources suggest that one or more of the engines of the Modern Greece 
may have been removed for use in one of the ironclads being built in 
Wilmington in 1862. In a report to Major-General H. W. Halleck, Major- 
General J. G. Foster suggested that engines "from the Modern Greece and the 
Uncle Ben" were to power the North Carolina and Raleigh. 12 The Modern 
Greece was also known to have a donkey engine but it is unlikely that it would 
have been counted along with the propulsion plant cylinders. The remains of 
the Peterhoff, another Z. C. Pearson steamer sunk southeast of Fort Fisher, has 
two engines listed on the CBR and two direct acting vertical cylinder steam 
engines were identified in the remains of the vessel. 13 
The hull of the Modern Greece has broken into three distinct elements. 
Those include the bow, engineering space amidships and stern (Figure 5). A 38 
foot long section of the bow lies virtually upright on the bottom and extends 
more than 10 feet into the water column. That section extends from the lower 
stem to the forward bulkhead. Aft of the forward bulkhead, the hull has 
collapsed to the turn of the bilge and sections of plate and frames from the sides 
of the hull lie on the bottom adjacent to the hull. Deck beams and small 
sections of the deck clamps lie on the sand within the confines of the surviving 
lower hull structure. 
Aft of the forward cargo hold the remains of a second watertight 
bulkhead identify the forward extent of the engineering space. That section of 
the wreck is characterized by a 32 foot long section of the lower hull remains. 
The forward section of the engineering space contains the remains of a single 
boiler. The boiler is 9 feet 4 inches in length and 18 feet 6 inches in width. The 
10Certificate of British Registry, 2 August 1859, Modern Greece, BT108-6, PRO. 
11Lloyds, Annual Surveys, No. 3262, Modern Greece, Hull, NMM, London. 
12 J. G. Foster to H. W. Halleck, 11 October 1862, ORA, I, 18, p. 416 and D. L. Braine to G. H. 
Scott, 22 September 1862, ORN, I, 8, pp. 87-88. 
13Watts, Report on the 1989 Field School, manuscript on file at East Carolina University. 
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design is based on fore and aft fire tubes that pass through the water chamber. 
A5 foot wide space between the boiler and the bulkhead provided access to the 
fire boxes and ash pits. Coal bunkers were constructed along the sides of the 
hull within the engine room and their remains survive in the form of 
longitudinal bulkheads 4 feet inboard of the hull. 
Aft of the boiler 18 feet of additional engineering room space contain the 
remains of the vessel's steam machinery. The machinery has been destroyed, 
but sufficient evidence remains to confirm that the Modern Greece was 
equipped with a direct acting double cylinder vertical engine with at least one 
40 inch diameter cylinder. A geared jack shaft connected the crankshaft to the 
propeller shaft aft of the aft engine room bulkhead. Additional material in the 
engine room includes steam pipes, valves, engine eccentrics, parts of the 
governor, a steam bilge pump and the remains of the air pump and condenser. 
The propeller shaft extends aft from a point immediately aft of the aft 
engine room bulkhead through a shaft alley under the after cargo hold. The 
forward end of the shaft contains a 36 inch diameter gear that meshed with a 
gear on the aft end of the jack shaft. The shaft extends 91 feet through the 
remains of the shaft alley to the sternpost and packing gland. Four pillow block 
bearings support the shaft and a thrust bearing was employed to prevent 
longitudinal movement of the shaft during operation. Outside the hull the 
shaft was fitted with a cast iron two blade propeller 13 feet 4 inches in diameter. 
The blades are cast on a hub 2 feet 8 inches in length. 
The stern section of the wreck consists of 34 feet of the hull aft of the 
after cargo hold bulkhead. The section lists heavily to port and the rudder post 
extends more than 28 feet into the water column. The 14 foot long blade of the 
rudder remains attached to the stern post. The fantail, which separated from 
the hull near the waterline, lies on the bottom aft of the stern section of the 
hull. 
Kate 
Date of Loss 18 November 1862 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 59'46" Latitude 33° 55' 35" 
The wreck of the Kate lies in the Cape Fear River one half mile south of 
Price's Creek and one eighth mile offshore (Figure 3). Surviving vessel 
structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 20 feet of water. The hull 
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remains are oriented parallel to the west, bank of the river with the bow. to the 
south. Exposed remains of the Kate consist of the boiler, the largest feature of 
the wreck, brick from the boiler bed and disarticulated wooden fragments of the 
hull structure (Figure 6). Machinery from the vessel was salvaged during the 
Civil War. 
Identification of the Kate is based on the site location and the nature of 
surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm that the 
ship sank in the Cape Fear River near Smithville after hitting a snag or 
obstructions. 14 Nineteenth century cartographic sources indicated that a wreck 
was located near the west bank of the Cape Fear south of Price's Creek. 15 The 
location of the wreck one half mile south of Price's Creek corresponds 
favorably with that general description of the area of loss. Exposed remains at 
the site are those of a small wood hull steamer. Although the dimensions of 
the hull have been impossible to establish because of deterioration of the 
structure, one of the artifacts recovered from the site during a survey carried 
out by the NCDAH Underwater Archaeology Unit confirmed identification of 
the wreck. That artifact was a large fragment of British ironstone china plate 
with a transfer printed design that includes a snake that encircles a palmetto 
tree and the name "Carolina". 16 Carolina was the name of the steamer before 
being changed to Kate in December 1861. 
Hebe 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
18 August 1863 
Longitude 77° 52' 35" Latitude 34° 03' 58" 
The wreck of the Hebe lies in the Atlantic Ocean one half mile south of 
Carolina Beach Inlet and 700 feet offshore (Figure 3). Surviving vessel 
structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 16 feet of water. The hull 
remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow inshore to 
145, P. Lee to Gideon Welles, ORN, I, 8, p. 260., and North Carolina Standard, 26 November 
1862. 
15 U. S. Coast Survey, Chart No. 1103,1872. 
16 Glenn C. Overton and Richard W. Lawrence, "A Maritime History and Survey of the Cape 
Fear and Northeast Cape Fear Rivers, Wilmington Harbor, N. C., " Vol. 2: Submerged Cultural 
Resources Survey, manuscript on file with NCDAH, 2 Vols., NCDAH, 1996. 
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the west northwest and the stern offshore to the east southeast. The hull of the 
Hebe has broken into three distinct elements. Those include the bow, 
engineering space amidships and stern. 
Identification of the Hebe is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Battery Gatlin constructed in 
the dunes at the south end of Masonboro Sound. 17 The Hebe was one of four 
blockade runners lost in that vicinity. 18 The location of the wreck one half 
mile south of Carolina Beach Inlet corresponds favorably with the historical 
description of the area of loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a small 
steel hull steamer. Although the dimensions of the hull have been impossible 
to establish because of deterioration of the structure, the overall length of the 
wreck is sufficient to accommodate the 176 foot length of the Hebe recorded on 
that vessel's CBR. The 22 foot 6 inch beam and 39 foot length of the engine 
room recorded at the wreck site also correspond closely with those recorded on 
the CBR. 19 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Hebe is 
based on the vessel's steam machinery (Figure 7). Unlike the other ships, 
Douro, Venus and Lynx, lost in the vicinity, the Hebe was the only twin screw 
vessel. Although the screws are not exposed, both propeller shafts are visible. 
Both shafts are connected to twin-cylinder horizontal trunk engines located 
low in the hull. The Hebe's CBR confirms that the vessel contained four 
engines, or steam cylinders and historical data associated with other vessels of 
the class confirm the unique configuration of the engines. 20 
A 14 foot long section of the Hebe's bow lies on the bottom, and 
although listing dramatically to starboard, extends more than five feet into the 
water column. That section extends from the stem near the waterline to the 
forward watertight bulkhead. Between the forward bulkhead and the 
engineering space amidships, the hull has collapsed and nothing associated 
with the forward cargo hold remains exposed above the bottom surface. 
17J. B. Breck to A. L. Case, 18 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 166-167. 
18Gordon Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance, Carolina Beach inlet, " 1984. 
19 Certificate of British Registry, 27 April 1863, Hebe, BT108-10, PRO. 
20The Engineer, 1 May 1863, p. 252. 
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Forty-five feet east southeast of the bow, the vessel's engineering space is 
characterized by a 46 foot long section of the lower hull remains. That section 
extends from a bulkhead three feet forward of the boiler to the aft engine room 
bulkhead 36 feet 6 inches aft of the boiler. The forward section of the 
engineering space contains the remains of a common flue double boiler. The 
boilers are 10 feet 8 inches in length and 19 feet 6 inches in width. The design is 
based on fore and aft fire tubes that pass through the water chamber. A5 foot 
wide space between the boiler and a coal bunker bulkhead provided access to 
the fire boxes and ash pits. Coal bunkers were also constructed along the sides 
of the hull within the engine room and their remains survive in the form of 
longitudinal bulkheads 2 feet inboard of the hull. 
Aft of the boiler 30 feet of additional engineering room space contains 
the remains of the vessel's steam machinery. That space contains the steam 
cylinders, shafts, air pumps and condensers. Each engine consists of two 
horizontal steam cylinders with piston rods attached to a crankshaft with bell 
cranks set at forty-five degrees. The crank shafts extend aft to the aft engine 
room bulkhead and terminates in a gear. The forward end of each shaft 
contains a flywheel and cams for the eccentrics. The port engine steam 
cylinders are oriented athwartships with the pistons along the centerline of the 
hull and are located forward of the starboard steam cylinders. The starboard 
steam cylinders are also oriented athwartships with the pistons along the 
centerline of the hull but are located aft of the port steam cylinders. Four 
pillow block bearings support each crankshaft. Additional material in the 
engine room includes steam pipes, valves, engine eccentrics, a steam bilge 
pump and the air pump and condenser for each engine. An iron plate 
provides a walkway over the steam machinery. 
The propeller shafts extend aft from a point immediately aft of the aft 
engine room bulkhead through shaft alleys under the after cargo hold. The 
forward end of the shaft contains a large diameter gear that meshed with a gear 
on the aft end of the crankshaft. Each shaft extends aft but disappears into the 
sand less than fifteen feet from the aft engine room bulkhead. The hull aft of 
the engine room bulkhead has collapsed to the level of the bottom surface. 
Twenty-seven feet aft of the aft engine room bulkhead the hull structure 
is exposed on the starboard quarter. That exposed section of hull extends aft to 
the sternpost and rudder. The stern section of the wreck consists of 31 feet of 
structure. The section lists slightly to starboard and the rudder post extends 4 
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feet into the water column. The rudder remains attached to the sternpost. The 
fantail, which separated from the hull near the waterline, lies aft of the stern 
section ofýthe hull almost completely covered by sediment. 
Arabian 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
15 September 1863 
Longitude 77° 5438" Latitude 33° 57' 46" 
The wreck of the Arabian lies on the northern extremity of Caroline 
Shoals north of the historic location of New Inlet and southeast of Fort Fisher 
(Figure 3). Surviving vessel structure rests on a silt, sand and shell hash 
bottom in 25 feet of water. The wood hull of the Arabian has deteriorated 
leaving no structural remains exposed above the level of the bottom surface. 
Only the remains of the vessel's steam machinery are exposed at the site. That 
consists of a walking beam, with attached piston and web crank rods, fragments 
of the steam cylinder, the remains of a cylindrical return fire-tube boiler and a 
paddle wheel shaft. 
Identification of the Arabian is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery. Historical sources confirm that the ship sank 
in the immediate vicinity offshore of Fort Fisher on Caroline Shoals north of 
the entrance to New Inlet. The location of the wreck corresponds favorably 
with that description of the area of loss and the other two vessels in and near 
the inlet have been identified as the Condor, an iron hull vessel, and the USS 
Flambeau a wood hull screw steamer. The machinery matches the walking 
beam, single boiler, paddle wheel configuration identified in historical source 
data associated with the Arabian. 
Phantom 
Date of Loss 23 September 1863 
Location of Wreck Longitude 770 39' 29" Latitude 34° 20' 14" 
The wreck of the Phantom lies in the Atlantic Ocean one quarter mile 
southeast of Topsail Inlet and one half mile offshore (Figure 3). The exposed 
remains of the vessel consist of the boiler and a small amount of hull structure. 
231 
The surviving structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 24 feet of 
water. The hull remains are oriented on a southeast to northwest axis and the 
orientation of the boiler suggests that the bow lies to the northwest. 
Identification of the Phantom is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery at the wreck site. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship was the only blockade runner that sank in the immediate vicinity 
of Topsail Inlet. 21 The location of the wreck one quarter mile southeast of 
Topsail Inlet corresponds favorably with the general description of the area of 
loss. 
Exposed remains at the site are those of a steel-hull steamer. The 
dimensions of the hull could not be ýestablishd because of deterioration and 
sediment covering the structure. The only exposed structural evidence at the 
site consisted of the boiler and a small section of the hull. The 22 foot beam 
recorded at the boiler correspond exactly with those recorded on the Phantom's 
CBR and a set of hull plans from the Webb Institute on Long Island, New 
York. 22 
With the exception of the immediate vicinity of the boiler, the hull of 
the Phantom has deteriorated to the level of the bottom surface. Only a small 
section of a bulkhead 6 feet forward of the boiler and a 38 foot long section of 
the port side just above the turn of the bilge are exposed. The exposed 
bulkhead measures 22 feet in length and appears to represent the beam of the 
vessel. The horizontal fire tube boiler is 12 feet 6 inches in length and 18 feet in 
width. 
Elizabeth 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
26 September 1863 
Longitude 78° 14' 01" Latitude 33° 54'47" 
The wreck of the Elizabeth lies in the entrance to Lockwoods Folly Inlet 
1/8 mile offshore of the west end of Long Island (Figure 3). Surviving vessel 
structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 15 feet of water. The hull 
remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow inshore to 
21John J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 216-217. 
22Certificate of British Registry, 21 May 1862, Phantom, BT108-81, PRO and "Plan of Steel 
Steamship Built in Liverpool 1862, " Gustav Hillman Collection, Mariners Museum, Newport 
News, Virginia. 
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the northwest and the stern offshore to the' southeast. The wood hull of the 
Elizabeth has deteriorated to leave no structural remains exposed above the 
level of the bottom surface. Only the remains of the vessel's steam machinery 
are exposed at the site (Figure 8). 
Identification of the Elizabeth is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery. Historical sources confirm that the ship sank 
in the immediate vicinity of Lockwoods Folly Inlet. 23 The location of the 
wreck corresponds favorably with that general description of the area of loss 
and the other two vessels in and near the inlet have been identified as the 
Bendigo and Iron Age. 
Vessel remains exposed at the site are those of a walking beam steamer. 
An examination of the exposed structure confirmed the presence of a 20 foot 
long walking beam, piston rods, cylinder, condenser, air pump cylinder, and 
steam exhaust pipe. The walking beam was found partially exposed. The top of 
the beam protruded above the sediment at an angle of approximately twenty- 
five degrees and was observed to be oriented roughly east/west. The east end of 
the beam remained connected to dual 9 foot long rods which extended east to 
the top of the cylinder. Attached to the north side of the cylinder was a5 foot 
long chest for the exhaust steam. At the base of the steam cylinder the remains 
of a condenser were visible. Between the cylinder and walking beam, the 
remains of an air pump were observed along with a section of lead steam pipe 
that remained attached to the cylinder. Although no evidence of the ship's 
boiler or remains of the hull structure were found, both magnetometer data 
and probing confirmed that additional material exists below the bottom surface. 
Douro 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
11 October 1863 
Longitude 77° 52' 01" Latitude 34° 04' 41" 
The wreck of the Douro lies in Carolina Beach Inlet and 800 feet offshore 
of the west end of Masonboro Island (Figure 3). Only a small section of the bow 
and a section of the machinery of the Douro was exposed (Figure 9). The 
majority of the surviving vessel structure was covered by sand and shell hash 
23Report from Douro Prisoners, 12 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 234. 
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associated with Carolina Beach Inlet Shoals. The wreck lies in 9 feet of water. 
The hull remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow 
inshore to the southwest and the stern offshore to the northeast. 
Identification of the Douro is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Battery Gatlin constructed in 
the dunes at the south end of Masonboro Sound. 24 The Douro was one of four 
blockade runners lost in that vicinity. The location of the wreck in Carolina 
Beach Inlet corresponds favorably with that general description of the area of 
loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a small iron hull steamer. 
Dimensions of the hull have been impossible to establish because only a 
limited amount of the structure has been examined. 25 
Unlike the other ships, Hebe, Venus and Lynx, that were lost in the 
vicinity, the Douro was the only single screw vessel. Although the screw was 
not exposed, the top of a massive gear was identified approximately one 
hundred feet aft of the bow. 26 That gear appeared to be similar in design to 
engines employed by John Penn for the Great Britain or J. & G. Thomson to 
power the screw steamer Bordeaux. 27 A survey of the Douro carried out on 9 
June 1862, after being captured described the ship's machinery as "a geared 
propelling power consisting of two engines connected so that the propeller 
makes two and one half revolutions to one of the engine. Cylinders are each 30 
inches in diameter and 30 inches stroke. "28 
An exposed section of the bow 20 feet in length preserved evidence of 
riveted plate-over-iron-frame construction. Coal samples and the presence of a 
steam-powered anchor windlass on the bow provided a reliable indication that 
steam also provided a source of power. An anchor, chain, and ship's bell 
associated with the bow offered confirmation that much of the ship remains 
intact and undisturbed by contemporary or modern salvage activity. However, 
the distribution of material associated with the vessel's hull and structural 
24R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, 12 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 233. 
25Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance, Carolina Beach Inlet", 1984. 
261bid. 
27J. Bourne, "A Comparative View of Screw Engines" in The Practical Mechanics Journal. The 
Great Exhibition of 1862, Proprietor's Office, London, 1862. 
28"Appraisement of the Steam Propeller Douro" by Charles H. Pierson, New York, 19 June 1863, 
RG 100, Regional Archives, Bayonne, New Jersey. 
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remains (hull plate fragments) found outside the confines of the hull 
confirmed damage caused by activities surrounding the loss of the ship and/or 
the dynamic shoal environment. 
The longitudinal axis of the exposed bow section lies roughly east to 
west. The bow lies to the west and extends well into the eastern side of the 
deep water channel leading to the bar. The hull lists to starboard approximately 
forty-five degrees, and this orientation places the port deck clamp, one of the 
major longitudinal supports of the hull structure, at the top of the exposed hull 
remains. 
Venus 
Date of Loss 21 October 1863 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 52' 28" Latitude 34° 04' 11" 
The wreck of the Venus lies in the Atlantic Ocean one mile southwest 
of Carolina Beach Inlet and one quarter mile offshore (Figure 3). Surviving 
vessel structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 12 feet of water. The 
hull remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow inshore 
to the west northwest and the stern offshore to the east southeast. Only one 
section of hull of the Venus remains exposed. That section consists of the 
paddle wheel shaft, hull structure associated with the engineering space 
amidships, a small portion of one of the boilers and a section of the stern 
(Figure 10). 
Identification of the Venus is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Battery Gatlin, constructed in 
the dunes at the south end of Masonboro Sound. 29 The Venus was one of four 
blockade runners lost in that vicinity. 30 The location of the wreck southwest of 
Carolina Beach Inlet corresponds favorably with the general description of the 
area of loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a small paddle wheel 
steamer. 
29 R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, 21 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 249-250. 
30Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance, Carolina Beach Inlet", 1984. 
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Although the dimensions of the hull have been impossible to establish 
because of deterioration of the structure, features associated with the 
engineering space correspond with measurements recorded on that . -vessel's 
CBR and a cross section of the hull found at the National Maritime Museum in 
Greenwich. 31 Beam measurements taken at the wreck correspond to the 26 
foot beam recorded on the Venus' CBR. The CBR of the Venus also confirms 
that the vessel was fitted with two engines and the design of the paddle wheel 
shaft confirm that two oscillating engines provided power for the wreck in 
question. 32 Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Venus 
is based on the design and size of the paddle beams and their supports 
documented in the cross section of the hull found at the National Maritime 
Museum in Greenwich (Figure 11). The 42 foot 6 inch length and 16 inch 
square dimensions of the beams correspond with those identified in the 
National Maritime Museum document. 33 
The major concentration of exposed vessel structure proved to be 
associated with the engineering space. A series of large box beams that 
reinforced the hull structure defined the extent of the engine room and paddle 
boxes. Additional internal box beams were found to have been installed to 
provide support for the paddle wheel shaft. The athwartships box beams that 
supported the paddle wheel boxes were found to be 42 feet 6 inches in length 
and approximately 16 inches square. The beams were placed 24 feet apart, 
roughly equi-distant forward and abaft of the paddle wheel shaft. A second 
series of box beams installed perpendicular to the paddle wheel shaft were 
found to lie adjacent to and immediately inboard of the amidships hull 
structure. The vessel's beam, measured outboard of this set of box beams, was 
found to be 26 feet 2 inches. 
The paddle wheel shaft measured 37 feet from the outside rim of the 5 
foot diameter paddle wheel hubs. Inboard of the smaller longitudinal box 
beam, two additional box beams were placed athwartships to retain 10 foot long 
longitudinal box beam supports for the outboard paddle wheel shaft pillow 
block bearings. Inboard of the paddle wheel shaft, rod bearing journals and 
31Certificate of British Registry, 17 April 1863, Venus, BT108-10, PRO and "Section Profile of 
the Venus", Iron Ships Survey Records, NMM, Woolwich. 
32Iron Ships Survey, 6 February and 4 March 1863, Millwall, NMM Lloyds Collection at 
Woolwich. 
33 Ibid. 
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Figure 11. Section of the Hull of the Venus. 
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iron stanchions provided support for additional pillow block bearings. Both 
the pillow block bearing caps and the piston rod bearing caps had been 
removed. 
Forward of the engine room, the remains of the vessel's forward boiler 
was partially exposed above the bottom sediment. The exposed portion of the 
boiler was roughly 20 feet in athwartships length and 3 feet in both height and 
width. No evidence of the exhaust stack vent was visible on the exposed 
portion of the forward boiler and no evidence of a second boiler could be found 
aft of the engine room. However, due to heavy sanding around the wreck's 
exposed machinery, this was not considered unusual. 
One hundred feet southeast of the ship's machinery and along the 
vessel's longitudinal axis, a small portion of the stern was identified. The 
exposed portion of the stern proved to be the port quarter at and above the deck 
level. Inboard of the waist, an iron mooring bitt was attached to the main deck 
clamp just forward of the mooring throat. The exposed stern section was found 
to list approximately 35 degrees to starboard and extended only 4 feet above the 
bottom sediment. 
General Beaureguard 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
11 December 1863 
Longitude 77° 5332" Latitude 34° 01' 35" 
The wreck of the General Beaureguard lies in the Atlantic Ocean 4 miles 
northeast of Fort Fisher and approximately 700 feet offshore of Carolina Beach 
(Figure 3). The exposed remains of the vessel consist of an extensive amount 
of hull structure, two boilers and a relatively intact engine room. The 
surviving structure rests on a sand bottom in 14 feet of water. The hull of the 
General Beaureguard consists of five distinct elements. Those include the bow, 
forward cargo hold, engineering space amidships, aft cargo hold and stern. The 
hull remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow to the 
northwest and the stern offshore to the southeast. 
Identification of the General Beaureguard is based on both the site 
location and the nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical 
sources confirm that the ship was run aground immediately off shore of Flag 
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Pond Battery, located in the vicinity of Flag Pond in Carolina Beach. 34 The 
General Beaureguard was the only Civil War vessel lost in that vicinity. Thus 
the location of the wreck corresponds favorably with the historical description 
of the site of loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a large iron hull 
steamer. Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the General 
Beaureguard is based on the vessel's location, dimensions and steam 
machinery. Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely 
establish because of deterioration of the structure, the 215 foot overall length of 
the wreck and 6 foot section of the displaced fantail corresponds closely with 
the 223 foot length of the General Beaureguard recorded on the Havelock's, the 
vessel's previous name, CBR. 35 The 26 foot beam and 53 foot 10 inch length of 
the engine room recorded at the wreck site also correspond very closely with 
those recorded on the CBR. The General Beaureguard's CBR and historical 
data associated with the vessel confirms that the ship was powered by two side 
lever engines and a like number were identified at the wreck site. 
The bow section of the General Beaureguard measured 30 feet long and 
protruded from the bottom sediment. Most of the stem and much of the 
forward section is covered by sediment and lists to port at an angle of 
approximately forty-five degrees. The exposed section of the bow extends from 
the vicinity of the bulkhead forward of the forward cargo hold to the stem. The 
exposed portion extends more than 8 feet into the water column at the point of 
separation from the forward cargo hold. Though heavy fouling prevented 
highly accurate measurement, frames appeared to be on 18 inch centers. Deck 
beams appeared to be a T-bulb design on 36 inch centers. A 24 inch main deck 
stringer. plate remained intact inside the exposed section of the bow. 
Aft of the bow the hull comprising the forward cargo hold has collapsed 
to a level approximately 3 feet above the turn of the bilge. That section of the 
wreck is almost entirely covered by sand, shell hash and the fragmented 
remains of the upper hull and deck. On the starboard side of the cargo hold 28 
feet forward of the aft cargo hold bulkhead are the remains of a steam powered 
deck windlass. The windlass was equipped with two warping heads and 
measured 5 feet in width and 4 feet in length. 
34S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 16 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 354-355. 
35Certificate of British Registry, 1 July 1858, Havelock, BT108-206, PRO. 
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The forward extremity of the engine room was defined by the bulkhead 
at the aft end of the forward cargo hold. The remains of that bulkhead were 5 
feet forward of the steam machinery. The aft end of the engineering space is 
identified by another bulkhead. That bulkhead is 54 feet aft of the one that 
defines the forward extent of the engineering space. The General 
Beaureguard's steam machinery consists of two side level engines mounted 
forward of and connected to a paddle wheel shaft. Each engine consists of a 
vertically mounted 48-inch diameter steam cylinder, 6 feet in length. The 
piston rod is connected to a crosshead above the cylinder. Each end of the 
crosshead is connected to the forward end of port and starboard side levers by a 
4 inch-diameter rod. Each side lever is mounted to the engine frame aft of the 
steam cylinder using a trunnion and bearing arrangement that permits the side 
levers to transfer the motion of the piston to air pumps mounted on the 
engine frame aft of the cylinders to the paddle wheel shaft by means of a rod 
connecting the aft end of the side levers to the cranks of the paddle wheel shaft. 
The center line of each engine is 4 feet 6 inches outboard of the centerline of the 
hull and both are surrounded by rails that form a walkway between the two 
engines. The paddle wheel shaft is mounted above and aft of the steam 
machinery. The 12 inch diameter shaft is 44 feet in length and is mounted on 
plummer-block bearings attached to an 18 foot long by 8 foot-wide plate 
supported by eight stanchions. The outboard ends of the paddle wheel shaft 
have a5 foot diameter 5 foot wide hub mounted 24 inches inside the end of the 
shaft. The ends of the paddle wheel shaft are designed to ride in bearings on 
the sponson beams. 
Immediately aft of the paddlewheel shaft is a coal bunker formed by two 
bulkheads 8 feet apart and spanning the entire 26 foot width of the hull. Five 
feet aft of that coal bunker bulkhead are the remains of the forward boiler of the 
General Beaureguard's two boilers. The boilers were mounted back to back in 
the hull. Each boiler is 12 feet in length and 20 feet in width. Both boilers were 
constructed with three furnaces and the forward face of the forward boiler and 
the aft face of the aft boiler is fitted with three fire box doors and three ash pits. 
The top of the forward boiler contains the remains of three steam drums that 
were located inside a common uptake. Five feet aft of the second boiler the 
remains of a bulkhead identify the extremity of the engine room and suggest 
the presence of a second coal bunker forward of the aft cargo hold. 
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Between that bulkhead and the remains of the stern, the hull has 
collapsed and the after cargo hold is almost entirely covered by sand. On the 
starboard side of the wreck the lower hull is exposed. That section was 51 feet 
in length and consisted of hull plating, frames on 18 inch centers and a double 
angle iron side stringer. Aft of a break in the exposed hull structure on the 
starboard side, the remains of the port quarter and fantail are exposed. The 
forward extremity of that section of the hull contains the remains of the 
bulkhead that separated the after cargo hold from the stern. The 28 foot long 
section of the stern lists heavily to starboard. That list exposes the port side of 
the hull below the transom. The interior of the stern section preserves the 
main deck stringers and deck beams and contains the remains of a large water 
tank. The head of the rudder post was intact along with the tiller bars and the 
rudder remains attached to the sternpost. 
Bendigo 
Date of Loss 2 January 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 78° 14' 22" Latitude 33° 54' 35" 
The wreck of the Bendigo lies in the Atlantic Ocean on the west side of 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet and one eighth mile offshore (Figure 3). Surviving 
vessel structure rests on a sand and shell hash bottom in 4 to 9 feet of water. 
The hull remains are oriented parallel to the shoreline with the bow to the east 
southeast and the stern to the west southwest. With the exception of sections 
of the hull and engineering space amidships, most of the steamer's remains are 
covered by sediment (Figure 12). 
Identification of the Bendigo is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Lockwoods Folly Inlet. 36 The 
Bendigo was one of three Civil War vessels lost in that vicinity. The location 
of the wreck corresponds favorably with the general description of the area of 
loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a small iron hull steamer. 
Although the dimensions of the hull have been impossible to establish because 
of deterioration of the structure, the overall length of the wreck is sufficient to 
accommodate the 162 foot length of the Bendigo recorded on that vessel's CBR. 
The 20 foot beam and 38 foot 6 inch length of the engine room recorded at the 
36F. S. Wells to S. P. Lee, 13 January 1862, ORN, I, 9, pp. 400-401. 
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wreck site also correspond closely with those recorded on the CBR. The 
Bendigo's CBR confirms that the vessel contained two engines, or steam 
cylinders and historical data associated with the vessel confirms that 
configuration of the engines. 37 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Bendigo is 
based on the vessel's location and steam machinery. Unlike the other ships, 
Iron Age and Elizabeth, that were lost in Lockwoods Folly Inlet, the Bendigo 
was the only iron hull paddle steamer. Both the Iron Age and Elizabeth, had 
wood hulls and neither was equipped with a two cylinder engine 
configuration. 38 In addition, the port paddle wheel of the Bendigo was 
destroyed by gunfire from the USS Fahkee. 39 The port paddle wheel hub and 
port section of the paddle wheel shaft are missing from the wreck. 
Vessel remains at the Bendigo site are those of an iron-hull, paddle 
wheel steamer. An examination of exposed structure confirmed that the 
longitudinal axis of the hull lies on a magnetic bearing of approximately 130° 
with the bow to the southeast. Forward of the engineering space the remains of 
the vessel are covered by sediment accumulations of more than 10 feet. During 
periods when the channel migrated into the immediate vicinity of the wreck, 
the remains of the bow scour settled into the channel shoulder creating a break 
in the hull in the vicinity of the forward coal bunker. With the exception of a 
10 by 10 inch structure that may have served as the support for a forward mast, 
no evidence of hull structure could be identified. 
The engineering space amidships contains the remains of the vessel's 
boilers and steam machinery. The hull, reinforced to carry the weight of the 
machinery, and the machinery itself survives in a good state of preservation to 
the level of the main deck. Deck beams survive throughout the engineering 
space. Preservation of the hull structure is due at least in part to the depth of 
sediment surrounding the hull. The port paddle wheel and a portion of the 
paddle wheel shaft outboard of the port steam cylinder have separated from the 
wreck, and are no longer visible at the site. The starboard paddle wheel hub, 
lower spokes, bucket mounts, and the remainder of the shaft survive intact 
supported by stanchions and the rods that connect the shaft to the air pumps 
37Certificate of British Registry, 16 July 1863, Bendigo, BT108-81, PRO. 
38Gordon Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance and Historical Investigation of 
Shipwreck Sites in Lockwoods Folly Inlet, " 1986. 
39E. E. Stone to G. Welles, 14 January 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 396-398. 
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and oscillating steam cylinders located below. Pillow-block bearing caps on the 
shaft have been removed. Measurement of the hull immediately forward of 
the aft boiler produced a beam of 20 feet 2 inches. Paddle boxes 8 feet in width 
increased the maximum beam of the vessel to 36 feet 2 inches. Remains of the 
starboard paddle wheel confirmed that the diameter of the wheel was 14 feet 
and buckets were 5 feet in length. No evidence of a feathering mechanism was 
observed but only a limited amount of the extremities of the exposed wheel 
assembly was exposed. 
Forward and aft of the steam machinery, the remains of the vessel's two 
boilers are exposed. Plating on the 8 foot 5 inch by 4 foot 10 inch steam 
chambers has deteriorated but frames survive to preserve evidence of design 
and construction. The boilers were covered by sediment to the base of the 
steam chamber but a length of 8 feet 8 inches and a width of 8 feet was 
determined by washing sediment out around the aft boiler. The top of each 
steam chamber was constructed to provide a2 foot 4 1/2 inch diameter exhaust 
for the smoke pipes. Coal bunkers were constructed between the boilers and 
the hull on both the port and starboard sides of the ship. 
Aft of the engineering space, shoal sediment covers most of the hull 
structure. Although probing confirmed that much of the hull survives intact 
to the level of the deck, examination of the structure was not possible. Only the 
rudder quadrant located 63 feet aft of the after boiler was exposed above the 
bottom surface. Probing in the vicinity of the exposed quadrant confirmed that 
the hull structure terminated at a point immediately aft of the quadrant. 
Specifications for the vessel developed from survey data include a length 
between perpendiculars of approximately 176 feet, a displacement hull beam of 
20 feet 2 inches, a maximum beam of 36 feet 2 inches, and a depth of hold of 10- 
feet. Draft calculated from these dimensions might be expected to be in the 
vicinity of 7 feet. 
Ranger 
Date of Loss 11 January 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 78° 15' 32" Latitude 33° 54' 39" 
The wreck of the Ranger lies in the Atlantic Ocean two miles west of 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet and 600 feet offshore of Holdens Beach (Figure 3). The 
exposed remains of the vessel consist of an extensive amount of hull structure, 
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two boilers and machinery associated with the engine room. The surviving 
structure rests on a sand bottom in fourteen feet of water. The hull of the 
Ranger consists of five distinct elements. Those include the bow, forward cargo 
hold, engineering space amidships, aft cargo hold and stern. The hull remains 
are oriented parallel to the shoreline with the bow to the east and the stern to 
the west. 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Ranger is 
based on the vessel's location, dimensions and steam machinery. Historical 
sources confirm that the ship was run ashore two miles west of Lockwoods 
Folly Inlet. 40 The Ranger was the only blockade runner lost in that vicinity. 
The location of the wreck two miles west of Lockwoods Folly Inlet corresponds 
favorably with the general description of the area of loss. Exposed remains at 
the site are those of a large iron paddle wheel steamer. 
Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely 
establish because of deterioration of the structure, the 225 foot overall length of 
the wreck and 6 foot section of the displaced fantail corresponds closely with 
the 232 foot length recorded on that vessel's CBR. 41 A 25 foot beam and 47 foot 
5 inch engine room measurement taken at the wreck correspond closely with 
the 25 foot 4 inch beam and 47 foot 5 inch engine room dimensions recorded 
on the Ranger' s CBR. The CBR of the Ranger also confirms that the vessel was 
fitted with two engines and two oscillating engines provided power for the 
wreck in question. 
The bow section of the Ranger measured 34 feet long and protruded 
from the bottom sediment. Most of the stem and much of the forward section 
is exposed and lists to starboard at an angle of approximately 75 degrees. The 
exposed section of the bow extends from the vicinity of the bulkhead forward of 
the forward cargo hold to the stem. The exposed portion extends more than 6 
feet into the water column at the point of separation from the forward cargo 
hold. Though heavy fouling prevented highly accurate measurement, frames 
appeared on 18 inch centers. Deck beams appeared to be on 36 inch centers. A 
24 inch main deck stringer plate remained intact inside the exposed section of 
the bow. The port anchor davit remains in its socket immediately aft of the 
hawse hole. 
40S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, 11 January 1863, ORN, I. 9, p. 402 and George W. Gift to Catesby 
ap R. Jones, 27 January 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 405. 
41Certificate of British Registry, 6 November 1863, Ranger, BT108-81, PRO. 
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Aft of the bow the hull comprising the forward cargo hold has collapsed 
to the turn of the bilge. That section of the wreck is almost entirely covered by 
sand but the area immediately aft of the bow contains the exposed remains of 
some of the upper hull and deck. One section of the upper hull contains 
several intact port lights. Between that concentration of wreckage and the 
engineering space amidships sediment covers all evidence of articulated lower 
hull structure and only a few sections of hull plate were exposed. 
The forward extremity of the engine room was defined by the bulkhead 
at the aft end of the forward cargo hold. The remains of that bulkhead were 8 
feet forward of the forward boiler. The aft end of the engineering space is 
defined by another bulkhead. That bulkhead is 47 feet 6 inches aft of the one 
that defines the forward extent of the engineering space. The Ranger's steam 
machinery consists of two oscillating cylinder engines mounted directly below 
the paddle wheel shaft. Each engine consists of a vertically mounted 54 inch 
diameter steam cylinder, 6 feet in length. Piston stroke, based on the paddle 
wheel shaft web cranks, was 4 feet. 
The largest section of the paddle wheel shaft contains the web cranks 
associated with both oscillating steam cylinders and the eccentric and air pump 
crank web between the steam cylinders. That section of the shaft is supported 
by the piston rods which protrude from the steam cylinders and eight 
stanchions supported plummer block bearings. The caps of each of the 
plummer blocks had been removed. The air pump was mounted over the top 
of the condenser between the steam cylinders. 
Outboard of the starboard steam cylinder the starboard section of the 
paddle wheel shaft with the hub and other half of the starboard steam cylinder 
crank web lies on the bottom. That section of shaft measures 12 feet 8 inches in 
length and contains a4 foot diameter 36 inch wide paddle wheel hub. Just 
inside the hull and outside the starboard steam cylinder are the remains of a 
small steam bilge pump. The outboard section of the port paddle wheel shaft 
with the hub and other half of the port steam cylinder crank web lie on the 
bottom outside the port side of the surviving hull structure. That section of 
shaft measures 12 feet 8 inches in length and contains the other paddle wheel 
hub. 
Five feet aft of the forward engine room bulkhead are the remains of the 
forward of the Ranger 's two boilers. The second boiler was mounted 8 feet 
forward of the aft engine room bulkhead. Each boiler is 10 feet 6 inches in 
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length and 16 feet in width. Both boilers are constructed with three furnaces 
and the forward face of the forward boiler and the aft face of the aft boiler is 
fitted with three fire box doors and three ash pits. The tops of both boilers have 
been destroyed exposing the horizontal fire tubes and a common uptake. The 
remains of a bulkhead between the boilers and the side of the hull of the ship 
suggest the presence of coal bunkers that run the entire length of the 
engineering space. 
Between the aft engineering space bulkhead and the remains of the 
stern, the hull has collapsed and the after cargo hold is almost entirely covered 
by sand. On the starboard side of the wreck the lower hull is exposed. That 
section was 51 feet in length and consisted of hull plating, frames on 18 inch 
centers and a double angle iron bilge stringer. On the port side the hull is also 
broken down to a line just above the turn of the bilge. Below the turn of the 
bilge the remains of wood bilge ceiling survive intact. Much of the remains of 
the upper hull structure lie along the inshore side of the wreck. 
Aft of a break in the exposed hull structure on the port side, the remains 
of the stern and fantail are exposed. The forward extremity of that section of 
the hull contains the remains of the bulkhead that separated the after cargo 
hold from the stern. The 37 foot long section of the stern lists slightly to 
starboard. The interior of the stern section preserves the main deck stringers 
and deck beams and the remains of a large water tank. The head of the rudder 
post was intact along with the tiller bar and the rudder remains attached to the 
sternpost. 
Wild Dayrell 
Date of Loss 1 February 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 42' 39" Latitude 34° 1748" 
The wreck of the Wild Dayrell lies in the entrance to Rich's Inlet off the 
west end of Figure Eight Island (Figure 3). Surviving vessel structure rests on a 
sand and shell hash bottom in 15 feet of water. The hull remains are oriented 
perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow inshore to the northwest and the 
stern offshore to the southeast. The hull of the Wild Dayrell has broken into 
five distinct elements. Those include the bow, forward hold, engineering space 
amidships, aft hold and stern (Figure 13). 
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Identification of the Wild Dayrell is based on both the site location and 
the nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources 
confirm that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Richs Inlet. 42 The 
location of the wreck corresponds favorably with that general description of the 
area of loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of an iron hull steamer. 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Wild Dayrell is 
based on the vessel's location and steam machinery. Although the dimensions 
of the hull has been impossible to precisely establish because of deterioration of 
the structure, the overall length of the wreck corresponds closely with the 215 
foot length of the Wild Dayrell recorded on that vessel's CBR. The 20 foot 
beam and 50 foot length of the engine room recorded at the wreck site also 
correspond precisely with those recorded on the CBR. The Wild Dayrell 's CBR 
and historical data associated with the vessel confirm that the ship was 
powered by two engines, or steam cylinders and a like number were identified 
at the wreck site. 43 
A 12 foot long section of the starboard bow of the Wild Dayrell protrudes 
from the bottom to mark the forward section of wreckage. Most of the bow 
section is covered by sediment and lists dramatically to port. The small exposed 
portion extends less than 4 feet into the water column. The exposed hull 
extends from the vicinity of the forward cargo hold forward less than 8 feet 
before disappearing into the bottom. Five feet aft of the small exposed section 
of the bow, the remains of the forward cargo hold bulkhead protrude from the 
bottom. 
Between the forward bulkhead and the engineering space amidships, the 
hull has collapsed and the forward cargo hold is almost entirely covered by 
sand. On the starboard side 18 feet aft of the forward cargo hold bulkhead, a 
section of the starboard side of the hull is exposed. That section was 29 feet in 
length and consisted of the bulwark stays and plating, main deck stringers, deck 
beams and stanchions, and forward hatch combings. Aft of a break in the 
exposed hull structure the forward end of the paddle box spur beam was 
attached to the hull. On the port side of the forward hold a section of the hull 
19 feet in length was exposed. That section consisted of the remains of bulwark 
stays and plating, main deck stringers and deck beams and stanchions. 
42F. A. Roe to S. P. Lee, 3 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 438-439. 
43Certificate of British Registry, 12 November 1863, Wild Dayrell, BT108-81, PRO. 
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The forward extremity of the engine room was defined by the bulkhead 
aft of the forward cargo hold. The remains of that bulkhead were 5 feet forward 
of the forward boiler. Both boilers listed heavily to port and were more than 
half covered by sediment. The boilers of the Wild Dayrell both measured 10 
feet in length and 16 feet 10 inches in width. The top of each boiler was 
constructed with a9 foot long by 8 foot wide steam collector that was a 
maximum of 4 feet 5 inches in height. The top of each steam collector 
contained a3 foot 7 inch diameter uptake vent for the smoke pipe. The 
forward face of the forward boiler contained the fire tube inspection plates and 
fire box and ash pit doors. Those same features were on the aft face of the after 
boiler. 
The 18 foot 6 inch space between the boilers contained the remains of the 
vessel's steam machinery. Although the engine room was covered in 
sediment to the level of the deck, most of the paddle wheel shaft and one of the 
paddle wheel hubs were exposed. The port paddle wheel hub proved to be 4 
feet in diameter and 30 inches in width. None of the spokes remained attached 
to the hub. The 8 inch diameter shaft extended 40 inches beyond the hull on 
the port side. The bell crank for the port steam cylinder was located 7 feet 8 
inches inboard of the paddle wheel hub. The bell crank arm widths measured 
11 inches and the center to center measurement from the paddle wheel shaft to 
the piston rod journal was 2 feet. The bell crank for the eccentrics and air 
pump was located 2 feet 1 inch inboard of the port cylinder bell crank. 
Starboard sections of the paddle wheel shaft had been dislodged and the paddle 
wheel hub was not exposed. Exposed sections of the starboard paddle wheel 
shaft mirrored the port shaft measurements. The shaft was supported by four 
plummer block bearings. The caps of each bearing had been removed. 
Five feet aft of the after boiler a third bulkhead identified the forward 
end of the after cargo hold. Between that bulkhead and the remains of the 
stern, the hull has collapsed and the after cargo hold is almost entirely covered 
by sand. On the port side 10 feet aft of the forward cargo hold bulkhead, a 
section of the hull is exposed. That section was 21 feet in length and consisted 
of the bulwark stays and plating, main deck stringers and deck beams. Two 
similar sections of the hull, 14 and 8 feet in length, identify the starboard side of 
the after cargo hold. The remains of a small steam windlass were attached to a 
small section of the deck that is exposed between sections of the hull structure. 
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Aft of the break in the exposed hull structure on the port side, the 
remains of the port quarter and fantail are exposed. The forward extremity of 
that section of the hull contains the remains of the bulkhead that separated the 
after cargo hold from the stern. The 38 foot long section of the stern lists 
heavily to starboard. That list exposes the port side of the elliptical fantail, the 
bulwark stays and plating, main deck stringers and deck beams. The head of 
the rudder post was also exposed. 
Lynx 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
25 September 1864 
Longitude 77° 52' 45" Latitude 34° 03'36", 
The wreck of the Lynx lies in the Atlantic Ocean one mile south 
southeast of Carolina Beach Inlet and one quarter mile offshore (Figure 3). The 
exposed remains of the vessel consist of a small amount of exposed hull 
structure, the remains of the vessel's boilers and a concentration of steam 
machinery. The surviving structural remains lie on a sand bottom in 18 feet of 
water. The hull of the Lynx consists of three distinct elements. Those include 
the bow, forward cargo hold and engineering space amidships. No evidence of 
the hull aft of the engineering space was exposed at the wreck site. The hull 
remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow to the west 
northwest and the machinery offshore to the east southeast. 
Identification of the Lynx is based on both the site location and the 
nature of surviving machinery and hull structure. Historical sources confirm 
that the ship sank in the immediate vicinity of Battery Gatlin, constructed in 
the dunes at the south end of Masonboro Sound. 44 The Lynx was one of four 
blockade runners lost in that vicinity. The location of the wreck south 
southeast of Carolina Beach Inlet corresponds favorably with the historical 
description of the area of loss. Exposed remains at the site are those of a large 
paddle wheel steamer. 45 
44 J. W. Balch to S. P. Lee, 26 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 479-480 and John MacDiarmid to 
0. S. Glisson, 26 September 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 480-481. 
45Gordon Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance, Carolina Beach Inlet, " 1984. 
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Although the dimensions of the hull have been impossible to establish 
because of deterioration of the structure, details associated with the engineering 
space correspond with measurements recorded on that vessel's CBR. 46 Beam 
measurements taken at the wreck correspond to the 24 foot beam recorded on 
the Lynx's CBR. The CBR of the Lynx also confirms that the vessel was fitted 
with two engines. Two oscillating engines provided power for the wreck in 
question. Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Lynx is 
based on the beam measurement, the number and design of the engines and 
the fact that each of the three other wrecks in the vicinity of Carolina Beach 
Inlet have been identified by highly conclusive design and construction details. 
Two sections of hull structure identify the location of the bow of the 
Lynx. The largest represents the port bow and measured 29 feet long. Most of 
the stem and much of the forward section was covered by sediment and lists to 
starboard at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees. The exposed section 
of the bow extends from the vicinity of the bulkhead forward of the forward 
cargo hold to the stem at the main deck. The exposed portion extends more 
than 5 feet into the water column at the point of separation from the forward 
cargo hold. Heavy fouling prevented highly accurate measurement but frames 
were on 16 inch centers. Deck beams appeared to be on 32 inch centers. A 24 
inch main deck stringer plate remained intact inside the exposed section of the 
port bow. 
The smallest section of the bow measured 12 feet long and represents the 
starboard side of the hull. The forward section was covered by sediment and 
lists to port at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees. The smaller section 
of the bow was located immediately forward of the forward cargo hold 
bulkhead. The exposed portion extends 3 feet into the water column at the 
point of separation from the forward cargo hold. Deck beams associated with 
the section appeared to be on 32 inch centers and a 24 inch main deck stringer 
plate remained attached inside the section. 
Aft of the sections of the bow, the hull comprising the forward cargo 
hold has collapsed to the level of the turn of the bilge. That section of the 
wreck is almost entirely covered by sand, shell hash and concentrations of the 
fragmented remains of the deck structure. On the starboard side of the cargo 
hold only a 23 foot section of the hull remains exposed. On the port side of the 
46Certificate of British Registry, 6 April 1864, Lynx, BT108-86, PRO. 
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cargo hold the exposed section of the hull extends 85 feet from the section of 
port bow to the steam machinery. The forward end of that section of hull 
structure contains a set of cast iron bitts. That section of the hull is defined by 
hull plate, frames on 16 inch centers and the remains of a wood bilge ceiling. 
Within the exposed confines of the forward cargo hold three 
concentrations of material and debris were identified. Near the bow an anchor 
lies amid the remains of a section of the deck and hatch combings. Midway 
between the sections of the bow and the machinery and adjacent to the port 
side of the surviving hull structure, a steam windlass lies on the bottom. The 
windlass measured 5 feet in width and 4 feet in length. Two of its four warping 
heads are exposed. Just forward of the machinery, the bottom surface 
amidships is covered with debris associated with one of the vessel's boilers. 
The major exposed feature of the site is a concentration of steam 
machinery. That concentration consists of sections of the paddle wheel shaft 
and the steam cylinders. The largest section of the paddle wheel shaft contains 
the port paddle wheel hub, the web cranks associated with both oscillating 
steam cylinders and the eccentric and air pump crank web between the steam 
cylinders. The crank webs confirm that the stroke of the engines was 5 feet. 
That section of the shaft is supported by the piston rods which protrude from 
the intact steam cylinders and four stanchion supported plummer block 
bearings. The caps of each of the plummer blocks had been removed. The 
diameter of the steam cylinders measured ,4 feet. The air pump intake mounts 
on top of the condenser and extends up behind the air pump cylinder. 
Outboard of the starboard steam cylinder another section of the paddle 
wheel shaft with the other half of the starboard steam cylinder crank web lies 
on the bottom. That section of shaft measures 12 feet 6 inches in length and 
contains a4 foot diameter 30 inch wide paddle wheel hub. Forward of the hub, 
the remains of the starboard paddle wheel eccentric and the spokes that 
controlled the feathering buckets lie on the bottom. Sections of one of the 
bucket mounts confirm that each bucket was 30 inches in width. Just inside the 
hull and outside the starboard steam cylinder are the remains of a small steam 
bilge pump. 
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Aft of the paddle wheel shaft, steam cylinders and air pump intake are 
the remains of one of the vessel's boilers. Only a few fragments are exposed on 
the bottom surface. Those appear to consist of sections of the furnace and fire 
tube spacer plates. Aft of the remains of the boiler no additional structure was 
identified. 
Mary Celestia 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
26 September 1864 
Longitude 64°42'15" Latitude 32°12'10" 
The wreck of the Mary Celestia lies in the Atlantic Ocean approximately one 
half mile south of the Gibb's Hill Lighthouse in Southhampton Parish, 
Bermuda (Figure 4). The exposed remains of the vessel consist of sections of 
hull structure and the remains of boilers and machinery associated with the 
engine room. The surviving structure rests on a sand bottom in 60 feet of 
water. The hull of the Mary Celestia consists of five distinct elements. Those 
include the bow, forward cargo hold, engineering space amidships, aft cargo 
hold and stern (Figure 14). 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Mary 
Celestia is based on the vessel's location, dimensions and steam machinery. 
Historical sources confirm that the ship was run on the reefs offshore of Sinky 
Bay south of Gibb's Hill Lighthouse. The location of the wreck corresponds 
with the historical description of the area of loss. 47 
Exposed remains at the site are those of an iron paddle wheel steamer. 
Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely establish 
because of disarticulation of the structure, the overall length of the wreck 
corresponds closely with the 221 foot length of the Mary Celestia recorded on 
that vessel's CBR. 48 A 22 foot beam and 51 foot engine room measurement 
taken at the wreck correspond closely with the 22 foot 2 inch beam and 51 foot 3 
inch engine room dimensions recorded on the Mary Celestia's CBR. The CBR 
of the Mary Celestia also confirms that the vessel was fitted with two engines. 
Two oscillating engines provided power for the wreck in question. 
47Bermuda Royal Gazette, 13 September 1864. 
48Certificate of British Registry, 28 April 1864, Mary Celestia, BT108-11, PRO. 
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The exposed remains of the Mary Celestia consist of three basic 
concentrations of ship structure. Those include the bow section, engineering 
space and stern. The remains of the bow were found to consist of a 28 foot 10 
inch section extending from the stem aft to the immediate vicinity of a 
bulkhead aft of the anchor windlass. The bow section lay on the port side 
which was entirely covered by sediment. An iron anchor davit located 11 feet 
aft of the stem remained on the starboard side above one of the ships anchors 
that was partially embedded in the bottom sediment. While exposed wood 
decking on the bow had almost entirely deteriorated, iron deck beams 
remained intact. 49 
With the exception of exposed fragments of hull that consisted of hull 
plate, iron frames, knees and deck beam fragments, little of the ship was visible 
between the bow and the engineering space. Only the remains of an 
athwartships coal bunker forward of the forward boiler remained to separate 
the forward cargo hold from the engine room machinery. From the forward 
coal bunker aft to a second bunker aft of the after boiler, the remains of the hull 
were found to survive below the turn of the bilge. Within the confines of the 
hull were two 16 foot 2 inch by 10 feet 8 inch horizontal fire tube boilers. The 
top of each boiler formed a2 foot high, 7 foot 11 inch by 8 foot 11 inch steam 
chamber equipped with two blow-off valves. Smoke pipes 3 foot 6 inches in 
diameter provided an exhaust for combustion gasses. so 
In between the two boilers, the composite paddle wheel shaft formed 
offset bell cranks for two air pumps amidships and two steam cylinder pistons. 
Each piston operated in an inverted oscillating cylinder. Both paddle wheels 
were found to have separated from the shaft at the bell cranks. The starboard 
wheel remained upright while the port wheel lay outside the wreck amid 
fragments of the hull and deck structure. Each wheel was fitted with eccentric 
operated 36 inch wide feathering buckets 51 
49Watts, "Bermuda and the American Civil War" International Journal of Nautical 
Archaeology, pp. 159-171. 
50 Ibid. 
51Ibid- 
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Aft of the engineering space, little evidence of the hull structure was 
exposed. Only a 32 foot 7 inch section of the stern could be identified 98 feet 7 
inches aft of the after coal bunker. The stern section, like the bow, had 
collapsed to port exposing a portion of the starboard plate, iron frames and deck 
beams. The after extremity of the stern contained the rudder head and crank. 52 
Condor 
Date of Loss 1 October 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 54' 43" Latitude 33° 58' 13" 
The wreck of the Condor lies in the Atlantic Ocean seven miles south of 
Carolina Beach Inlet and one mile offshore of the Fort Fisher State Historic Site 
(Figure 3). The exposed remains of the vessel consist of an extensive amount 
of hull structure, the remains of three boilers and machinery associated with 
the engine room. The surviving structure rests on a sand, shell hash and 
coquina rock bottom in 16 to 19 feet of water. The hull of the Condor consists 
of five distinct elements. Those include the bow, forward cargo hold, 
engineering space amidships, aft cargo hold and stern (Figure 15). The hull 
remains are oriented perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow to the east 
and the stern to the west. 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Condor is 
based on the vessel's location, dimensions and steam machinery. Historical 
sources confirm that the ship was run ashore on Caroline Shoals at the mouth 
of New Inlet. 53 The location of the wreck one mile northeast of the historic 
location of New Inlet corresponds favorably with the general description of the 
area of loss. 
Exposed remains at the site are those of a large iron paddle wheel 
steamer. Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely 
establish because of deterioration of the structure, the two hundred and fifteen 
foot overall length of the wreck corresponds closely with the 220 foot length of 
the Condor recorded on that vessel's CBR. 54 A 25 foot beam and 59 foot engine 
521bid. 
53S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 7 October 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 531. 
54Certificate of British Registry, 8 August 1864, Condor, BT108-243, PRO. 
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room measurement taken at the wreck correspond closely with the 25 foot 2 
inch beam and 59 foot 7 inch engine room dimensions recorded on the 
Condor's CBR. 
The CBR of the Condor also confirms that the vessel was fitted with two 
engines and two oscillating engines provided power for the wreck in question. 
Perhaps the most conclusive evidence in identifying the site as the Condor was 
the remains of three boilers. The sister ships Condor, Falcon, Flamingo and 
Ptarmigan were all equipped with three "haystack" boilers and three distinctive 
smoke stacks. 55 
The bow section of the Condor measured 12 feet long and protrudes 
from the bottom sediment on the starboard side of the forward lower hull 
remains. The upper stem and much of the port side is exposed and the section 
lists to starboard at an angle of approximately 90 degrees. The exposed section 
of the bow extends from the vicinity of the collision bulkhead forward of the 
forward cargo hold to the stem. The exposed portion extends less than 4 feet 
into the water column at the point of separation from the remains of the 
forecastle. Deck beams appeared to be on 36 inch centers. A 24 inch main deck 
stringer plate remained intact inside the exposed section of the bow. 
Beside the section of upper bow structure the extreme forward end of the 
lower hull survives below the turn of the bilge. That section of the wreck is 
almost entirely covered by sand and shell hash and the area immediately aft of 
the forefoot contains the exposed remains of some of the upper hull structure. 
Other sections of the bow lie on the bottom outside the remains of the lower 
hull structure. 
The aft end of the forecastle and the forward end of the forward cargo 
hold is defined by the remains of two bulkheads and a water tank. The first 
bulkhead is 23 feet 6 inches aft of the exposed remains of the lower bow. The 
second bulkhead is 5 feet aft of the first. In between the two are the remains of 
a4 foot 4 inch long by 12 foot 6 inch wide water tank resting on the floors. 
Between the wreckage associated with the bow and the engineering space 
amidships the hull has deteriorated to the level of the turn of the bilge. The 
remains of the lower hull are exposed along the entire 50 foot length of the 
forward cargo hold. Although sand and shell hash covers the bilge to the level 
of the ceiling, the top of the keelson is exposed and was found to consist of a 10 
55Consular Dispatch, Halifax, 26 September 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 484. 
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inch iron plate reinforced by angle iron riveted to both sides of the top and the 
bottom. Sockets for iron deck stanchions were located every 3 feet 5 inches 
along the top of the keelson. The aft end of the forward cargo hold is defined by 
the remains of a coal bunker and bulkhead. The remains of the 5 foot long and 
15 foot wide coal bunker are forward of the bulkhead and do not extend all the 
way across the hull structure. 
The forward section of the Condor's engineering space is characterized by 
the remains of three "haystack" boilers. The remains of the base of the forward 
boiler are located 2 feet 8 inches aft of the coal bunker bulkhead. That circular 
base is located on the centerline of the hull and has a diameter of 12 feet. It 
contains the ash pits, furnace and vertical fire tubes that extend through the 
water jacket. The conical smoke chamber, was fitted with a3 foot 7 inch 
diameter flue. The forward boiler was intact in 1975 but, it had collapsed by 
1994. 
The bases of two additional boilers of similar dimensions 'are located 
immediately aft of the forward boiler. The center boiler base was heavily 
damaged and offset to starboard. It lies over the hull at the turn of the bilge. 
Remains of the aft boiler lie on the centerline forward of the steam machinery. 
The entirety of the hull space dedicated to the boilers is littered with the 
fragmented components of the boilers. Outside the hull, fragments of the hull 
are partially exposed on the bottom surface. The remains of a bulkhead 
between the boilers and the hull of the ship suggest the presence of coal 
bunkers that run the entire length of the engineering space dedicated to the 
boilers. , 
The Condor's steam machinery' consists of two oscillating cylinder 
engines mounted directly below the paddle wheel shaft. Each engine consists 
of a vertically mounted 60 inch diameter steam cylinder, 6 feet in length. 
Piston stroke, based on the paddle wheel shaft web cranks, was 4 feet. Each 
cylinder oscillated on 12 inch diameter trunnions that also admitted steam into 
and out of the cylinder. A4 foot 6 inch diameter oscillating air pump was 
mounted between the two oscillating cylinders and underneath the center 
crank web. The top of the air pump contained a series of valves that admitted 
air to the cylinder through heavy rubber impregnated fabric diaphragms. 
Levers to regulate the amount of steam admitted to the engine and control 
forward and reverse on the valve chest were mounted on a brass pedestal 
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behind the air pump. A5 foot long vertical steam pump lay near the port side 
of the hull aft of the port steam cylinder. 
- The paddle wheel shaft measured 34 feet 5 inches in length inside the 
hubs and each hub was 3 feet wide and 4 feet in diameter. The shaft is 
supported by six plummer block bearings that are mounted on ten iron 
stanchions. The caps are missing from each of the blocks. The port paddle 
wheel hub contained the remains of four sets of spokes and three, 7 foot long by 
3 foot wide, iron floats. Each float was mounted on bearings and contained a 
lever that was connected to an eccentric on the - sponson beam by rods. The 
eccentrically controlled rods changed the orientation of the floats as the wheel 
turned to produce a more vertical entry and exit from the water. All of the 
spokes on the starboard hub have been broken and their remains, several floats 
and eccentric rods lie on the bottom below the hub. 
Four feet aft of the steam cylinders another bulkhead defines the aft end 
of the engineering space and the forward end of the aft cargo hold. That 
bulkhead is 59 feet 5 inches from the bulkhead associated with the coal bunker 
forward of the boilers. Between the aft engine room bulkhead and a bulkhead 
that isolates the stern from the aft cargo hold, the hull of the Condor has 
deteriorated to the turn of the bilge. Although sand and shell hash covers the 
bilge to the level of the ceiling, the top of the keelson is exposed. It was found 
to consist of a 10 inch iron plate reinforced by angle iron riveted to both sides of 
the top and the bottom. Sockets for iron beck stanchions were located every 3 
feet 5 inches along the top of the keelson. The hull has broken apart 32 feet aft 
of the aft engine room bulkhead and the aft section of the keelson and half a 
dozen floors are suspended in the water column. Outside the hull on the port 
side, sections of the vessel litter the bottom. 
Aft of the cargo hold, the remains of the stern are exposed on the bottom 
surface. The forward extremity of that section of the hull contains the remains 
of the bulkhead that separated the after cargo hold from the stern. The 33 foot 
long section of the stern lists slightly to starboard. The interior of the stern 
section preserves the main deck stringers and deck beams and the remains of a 
water tank. The head of the rudder is missing but the rudder itself remains 
attached to the sternpost. Thirty feet aft of the sternpost the remains of the 
Condor 's round fantail lie partially exposed on the bottom. 
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Fanny & Jenny 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
1 October 1864 
Longitude 77° 48' 21" Latitude 34° 11' 07" 
The wreck of the Fanny & Jenny lies in the Atlantic Ocean immediately 
north of the north jetty at Masonboro Inlet (Figure 3). The exposed remains of 
the vessel consist of a limited amount of hull structure and machinery 
associated with the engine room. The exposed structure and machinery 
protrudes from a sand bottom in 8 feet of water (Figure 16). Based on the 
orientation of the paddle wheel shaft, the hull remains are oriented 
perpendicular to the shoreline with the bow to the west and the stern to the 
east. 
Identification of the wreck as the remains of the Fanny & Jenny is based 
on the vessel's location, one hull dimension and the configuration of the 
steam machinery. Historical sources confirm that the ship was one of four run 
ashore in the immediate vicinity of Masonboro Inlet. 56 The location of the 
wreck fifty feet north of the north jetty at Masonboro Inlet corresponds 
favorably with that general description of the area of loss. 
Exposed remains at the site are those of an iron paddle wheel steamer. 
Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely establish 
because of deterioration of the structure and overburden, the 27 foot 6 inch 
beam measured at the site corresponds with the same figure recorded in a 
survey of the Scotia made in Liverpool on 2 April 1849.57 That measurement is 
slightly less than the 28 foot 2 inch measurement for maximum beam for the 
Fanny & Jenny recorded on a copy of that vessel's CBR. 58 The CBR of the 
Fanny & Jenny also confirmed that the vessel was fitted with two side lever 
engines of the type that provided power for the wreck in question. 
Identification of the wreck as a paddle wheel steamer also eliminates the 
possibility of confusing the Fanny & Jenny with the other three Civil War 
vessels sunk near Masonboro Inlet. Each of those vessels, Columbia, Dec and 
Emily, was powered by one or more screw propellers. Columbia and Emily 
were single screw vessels and the Dec was a double screw sistership of the Hebe. 
56Pierce Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February, ORN, I, 9, pp. 473-474 and Pierce Crosby to S. P. Lee, 11 
February, ORN, I, 9, pp. 474-476. 
571ron Ships Survey, 2 April 1849, Liverpool, NMM, Lloyds Collection at Woolwich. 
58Certificate of British Registry, 13 May 1862, Scotia, BT108-76, PRO. 
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Exposed wreckage at the Fanny & Jenny site consists of the paddle wheel 
shaft, one hub, plummer block bearings and the paddle wheel shaft deck plate. 
The deck plate measured 17 feet 4 inches in width and supported four 
plummer block bearings. Each of the bearing caps and one of the rod caps had 
been removed. The paddle wheel shaft was constructed with two crank webs 
designed to accommodate a 56 inch stroke. One of the crank webs remained 
intact with the piston rod in place but the rod cap missing. The outboard half 
of the other crank web was missing. Between the two crank webs two 6 inch 
wide eccentrics were attached. 
A9 foot section of the shaft extends from the intact crank web to the 
exposed paddle wheel. The hub measured 4 feet in diameter and 3 feet in 
length. The iron hub was cast with rectangular depressions to facilitate 
attachment of the spokes. Approximately five feet from the hub, the remains 
of one of the spokes protruded from the bottom sediment. 
The remaining crank web was found 21 feet from the side of the deck 
plate where the paddle wheel shaft was missing. It was attached to the end of 
the paddle wheel shaft which protruded vertically from the bottom. No 
additional structure was exposed at the site. 
Ella Site 
Date of Loss 1 December 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 78° 00' 02" Latitude 33° 50' 57" 
The Ella Site lies in the Atlantic Ocean two miles east of the mouth of 
the Cape Fear River and one quarter mile offshore of the south shore of Bald 
Head Island (Figure 3). The exposed remains of the vessel consist of an 
extensive amount of hull structure, two boilers and machinery associated with 
the engine room. The surviving structure rests on a sand bottom in 14 to 19 
feet of water. Hull remains at the Ella Site consists of six distinct elements. 
Those include the bow, forward cargo hold, engineering space amidships, aft 
cargo hold, stern and fantail. The hull remains are oriented parallel to the 
shoreline with the bow to the west and the stern to the east. 
Historical sources verify that the ship was run ashore on the south side 
of Smith Island (now Baldhead Island). However, identification of the wreck as 
the remains of the Ella is based on local tradition. Evidence at the site and 
information from the historical record does not support identification of the 
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remains as those of the Denny-built Ella. Drawings and measurements of the 
fantail of the wreck do not correspond to the design and dimensions of the 
fantail recorded in the Ella plans from the Denny Collection of the National 
Maritime Museum in Greenwich. 59 Both the plans and the historical record 
establish that the Ella was equipped with two, 42 inch bore by 60 inch stroke 
oscillating cylinder engines that connected directly to the paddle wheel shaft. 60 
Documentation of the 42 foot long paddle wheel shaft at the Ella Site confirms 
that the vessel was equipped with a single oscillating cylinder engine of 50 inch 
bore and 74 inch stroke (Figure 17). 61 Also the remains of the boilers at the Ella 
Site do not match the design illustrated in the vessel's plans. 
While the wreck at the Ella Site does not appear to be the remains of the 
steamer Ella, no other identification can be made at present. It is apparent from 
material recovered from the wreck that the vessel dates from the period of the 
American Civil War and was carrying material such as Whitworth rifle 
projectiles, brass locks from New York and Crosse and Blackwell's spice from 
England. 62 Research has also shown that the vessel's machinery does not 
match that of the Antonica/Herald, Spunkie or Georgiana McCaw which were 
also lost off the Old Inlet entrance to the Cape Fear. 
When exposed by excavation in 1973, the bow section of the Ella 
measured 23 feet long and was almost completely covered by the bottom 
sediment. Excavation exposed the stem and much of the forward section is 
exposed and lists to starboard at an angle of approximately 75 degrees. The 
exposed section of the bow extends from the vicinity of the bulkhead forward of 
the forward cargo hold to the stem. The exposed portion extends more than 6 
feet into the water column at the point of separation from the forward cargo 
hold. Heavy fouling prevented highly accurate measurement but frames 
appeared to be on 18 inch centers. Deck beams appeared to be on 36 inch 
centers. A 24 inch main deck stringer plate remained intact inside the exposed 
section of the bow. 
59Plans of the Ella, William Denny and Company Collection, NMM, Greenwich. 
60Certificate of British Registry, 11 July 1864, Ella, BT108-243, PRO and I. S. Sampson to T. C. 
Dunn, 6 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, pp. 132-133. 
61Gordon P. Watts, 21 August 1973, Ella Site Survey notes on file NCDAH, Fort Fisher. 
62Gordon Watts and Leslie Bright, "Progress in Underwater Archaeology in North Carolina, 
1962-1972. " International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 1973, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 131-136. 
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Aft of the bow the hull comprising the forward cargo hold has collapsed 
to the turn of the bilge. That section of the wreck is almost entirely covered by 
sand but the area immediately aft of the bow contains the exposed remains of 
some of the upper hull and deck. Between that concentration of wreckage and 
the engineering space amidships sediment covers all evidence of articulated 
lower hull structure and only a few sections of hull plate were exposed. 
The forward extremity of the engine room was defined by the bulkhead 
at the aft end of the forward cargo hold. The remains of that bulkhead were 5 
feet forward of the forward boiler. The aft end of the engineering space is 
defined by another bulkhead. That bulkhead is 48 feet 6 inches aft of the one 
that defines the forward extent of the engineering space. Steam machinery at 
the site consists of the piston from a single oscillating cylinder engine that lies 
forward of the paddle wheel shaft. The engine consisted of a 50 inch diameter 
steam cylinder. Piston stroke, based on the paddle wheel shaft web cranks, was 
74 inches. 
The paddle wheel shaft is separated at the crank web and the port hub is 
missing. Reconstructed, the shaft originally measured 42 feet from hub to hub. 
The shaft has been dislodged from its support bearings and the piston rod is 
separated. Both bolts holding the piston rod cap have been removed as had the 
plummer block bearing caps. No evidence of an air pump or condenser was 
apparent in association with the piston. 
Five feet aft of the forward engine room bulkhead are the remains of the 
forward of the Ella's two boilers. The second boiler is mounted 5 feet forward 
of the aft engine room bulkhead. Each boiler is 10 feet 6 inches in length and 14 
feet in width. Both boilers are constructed with three furnaces and the forward 
face of the forward boiler and the aft face of the aft boiler is fitted with three fire 
box doors and three ash pits. The tops of both boilers have been destroyed 
exposing the horizontal fire tubes and a common uptake. The remains of a 
bulkhead between the boilers and the side of the hull of the ship suggest the 
presence of coal bunkers that run the entire length of the engineering space. 
Between the aft engineering space bulkhead and the remains of the 
stern, the hull has collapsed and the after cargo hold is almost entirely covered 
by sand. On the starboard side of the wreck the lower hull is exposed. That 
section was 51 feet in length and consisted of hull plating, frames on 18 inch 
centers and a double angle iron bilge stringer. On the port side the hull is also 
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broken down to a line just above the turn of the bilge. Below the turn of the 
bilge the remains of wood bilge ceiling survive intact. Much of the remains of 
the upper hull structure lie along the inshore side of the wreck. 
Aft of a break in the exposed hull structure on the port side, the remains 
of the stern and fantail are exposed. The forward extremity of that section of 
the hull contains the remains of the bulkhead that separated the after cargo 
hold from the stern. The 37 foot long section of the stern lists slightly to 
starboard. The interior of the stern section preserves the main deck stringers 
and deck beams and the remains of a water tank. The rudder remains attached 
to the sternpost. 
Aft of the aft end of the lower hull, the displaced fantail lies partially 
exposed on the bottom surface. That section of the wreck contains the deck 
structure, bitts, stanchions and the head of the rudder post along with the tiller 
bar. Below the fantail stringer plates, the transom plates contained 11 inch 
openings for three missing port lights. 
Stormy Petrel 
Date of Loss 7 December 1864 
Location of Wreck Longitude 77° 54' 25" Latitude 33° 57' 25" 
The wreck of the Stormy Petrel lies in the Atlantic Ocean one mile 
southeast of Fort Fisher and one mile offshore (Figure 3). The exposed remains 
of the vessel consist of a small amount of hull structure, part of one boiler and 
a concentration of machinery (Figure 18). The surviving structure rests on a 
sand bottom in 24 feet of water. There is not sufficient exposed structural 
remains to establish the orientation of the hull. However the machinery and 
one of the superheaters suggests that the wreck lies on a southeast/ northwest 
axis. 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Stormy 
Petrel is based on recovery of the ship's bell. 63 The name "Stormy Petrel" had 
been engraved on the bell. Although perhaps unnecessary, the vessel's 
location, dimensions and steam machinery support identification of the wreck 
as the Stormy Petrel. Historical sources confirm that the ship was run ashore 
63 Richard Lawrence, et. al., National Register of Historic Places Nomination for Cape Fear 
Civil War Shipwreck District, 1985. 
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on the outer extremity of Caroline Shoals off the mouth of New Inlet. 64 The 
location of the wreck one mile east of the historic location of New Inlet 
corresponds favorably with that general description of the area of loss. 
Exposed remains at the site are those of a steel paddle wheel steamer. 
Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to establish because of 
the almost complete deterioration of the structure, the exposed machinery 
confirmed that the vessel was fitted with two oscillating cylinder engines. The 
CBR of the Stormy Petrel confirmed that the vessel was fitted with two engines. 
Rare surviving plans of the Stormy Petrel also identify two superheaters that 
were fitted to a common boiler flue shared by the two forward and two aft 
boilers. 65 The remains of one of those superheaters was found on the site. 
The major exposed feature of the site is a concentration of steam 
machinery. That concentration is composed principally of sections of the 
paddle wheel shaft and the steam cylinders. The center section of the paddle 
wheel shaft consists of the eccentric and air pump bell crank and the bell cranks 
associated with both steam cylinders. The crank webs confirm that the stroke of 
the engines was 4 feet. That section of the shaft is supported by the piston rods. 
One of the cylinders remains intact and the cylinder head and upper walls of 
the other have been partially broken. The diameter of the cylinders measured 4 
feet. 
Outboard of the intact cylinder another section of the paddle wheel shaft 
with the other half of the steam cylinder crank web lies on the bottom. That 
section of shaft measures 8 feet and contains a4 foot diameter 3 foot wide 
paddle wheel hub. A plummer block with oil reservoir on top is still 
connected to the shaft immediately inside the paddle wheel hub. The aft side 
of the hub contains two attached but broken paddle wheel spokes. The 
starboard end of the paddle wheel shaft lies on the sand on the opposite side of 
the machinery. It has no hub or plummer block attached and measured 7 feet 3 
inches in length. 
In addition to the paddle wheel shaft. and steam cylinders the 
concentration of material comprising the major wreck site feature contains a 
small amount of hull structure. That includes the remains of stanchions, 
plummer block bearings, an eccentric ring and shaft and several fragments of 
64Diary of Colonel William Lamb, 7 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
65Plans of the Stormy Petrel, William Simons and Company Collection, University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow. 
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the deck structure that supported the paddle wheel shaft. Forward of the major 
concentration of material nothing was exposed on the bottom surface but 
several plates and the remains of what appeared to be a water tank. 
Aft of the major concentration of material a superheater that could still 
be attached to one of the boilers was identified. The superheater was 4 feet in 
diameter. The interior flue was 2 feet in diameter and the walls were 2 feet in 
diameter. Beyond the superheater two sections of hull were exposed. The 
largest was, 13 feet in length and contained the remains of six frames. The 
smallest was 12 feet 6 inches in length and appeared to be a section of main 
deck stringer plate. 
Nola 
Date of Loss 
Location of Wreck 
31 December 1864 
Longitude 64°54'46" Latitude 32°21'32" 
The wreck of the Nola lies in the Atlantic Ocean six miles northeast of 
Dockyard on Ireland Island, Somerset (Figure 4). The exposed remains of the 
vessel consist of an extensive amount of hull structure, the remains of two 
boilers and machinery associated with the engine room. The surviving 
structure rests on a sand bottom between coral formations in 16 to 28 feet of 
water. The hull of the Nola consists of five distinct elements. Those include 
the bow, forward cargo hold, engineering space amidships, aft cargo hold and 
stern (Figure 19). 
Conclusive identification of the wreck as the remains of the Nola is 
based on the vessel's location, dimensions and steam machinery. Historical 
sources confirm that the ship was run ashore attempting to enter Western Blue 
Cut during a gale. 66 The location of the wreck at Western Blue Cut corresponds 
with that description of the area of loss. 
Exposed remains at the site are those of a large iron paddle wheel 
steamer. Although the dimensions of the hull were impossible to precisely 
establish because of disarticulation of the structure, the overall length of the 
wreck corresponds with the 228 foot length of the Nola recorded on that 
vessel's CBR. 67 A 25 foot beam and 60 foot engine room measurement taken at 
66Bermuda Royal Gazette, 5 January 1864. 
67Certificate of British Registry, 31 November 1863, Nola, BT108-242, PRO 
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the wreck correspond closely with the 25 foot 2 inch beam and 59 foot 7 inch 
engine room dimensions recorded on the Nola' s CBR. The CBR of the Nola 
also confirmed that the vessel was fitted with two engines and two oscillating 
engines provided power for the wreck in question. 
The surviving remains of the Nola are almost entirely exposed on the 
seabed. While the paddle wheel shaft, pistons and portions of the cylinders 
have been removed by salvors, the collapsed hull structure represents almost 
80 per cent of the ship. The remains of the bow were found to consist of a 29 
foot 10 inch section extending from the stem aft to the immediate vicinity of a 
watertight bulkhead aft of the forecastle. The bow section lies on the starboard 
side supported by coral heads that border the sand channel containing the 
wreck. While exposed, wood decking on the bow has deteriorated iron deck 
beams, frames, hatch combings, hawse throats; and hull plating remain 
intact. 68 
Aft of the intact section of the bow, exposed fragments of the hull that 
compressed the forward cargo hold were found throughout the sand channel 
between the bow and forward boiler of the Nola. Iron beams from the deck 
were found to have collapsed over 76 foot 6 inches of the lower hull structure 
between the bow and forward boiler. Watertight bulkheads at the bow and 
forward coal bunker have also collapsed into the hull. Major fragments of the 
hull above the turn of the bilge were found to have collapsed away from the 
structure and lie atop coral on the starboard side and sand on the port side of 
the hull remains. As very little sediment has accumulated, the entire structure 
is accessible for investigation. 69 
Although the engineering space of the Nola has been damaged by 
salvage activity many important features of the vessel survive. Immediately 
forward of the engineering space a watertight bulkhead has collapsed 
concealing most of the forward coal bunker. The port side of the forward 
horizontal fire tube boiler of the Nola has been damaged by salvage activity, 
and the structure has collapsed revealing such interior features as the ash pits, 
fire boxes, fire tubes and steam collector pipes. From the forward coal bunker 
aft to a second bunker aft of the after boiler, the remains of the hull were found 
68 Gordon P. Watts, Jr., "Bermuda and the American Civil War: a reconnaissance investigation 
of archival and submerged cultural resources. " International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 
Vol. 17, No. 2,1988, pp. 159-171. 
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to survive below the turn of the bilge. The sides of the hull and paddle boxes 
have fallen away from the ship and lie on coral on the starboard side and sand 
on the port side of the hull. Aft of the engine room, a second horizontal fire 
tube boiler survives virtually, intact separating the remains of the after coal 
bunker from the engineering space amidships. Within the confines of the 
lower hull structure and between the two boilers, the surviving but extensively 
damaged remains of the Nola's two inverted oscillating steam cylinders and 
machinery lay amid coal from the bunkers. The top of each boiler formed a5 
foot 11 inch high, 7 foot 7 inch by 7 foot 4 inch steam chamber equipped with 
two blowoff valves. Smoke pipes 4 foot 4 and 1/2 inches in diameter provided 
an exhaust for combustion gasses. Both paddle wheels were found to have 
been heavily damaged by salvors' efforts to remove the shaft. The starboard 
wheel had collapsed into the hull structure between the boilers, while the 
remains of the port wheel lay outside the wreck amid fragments of the hull and 
deck structure. Each of the 20 foot diameter wheels was fitted with eccentric 
operated feathering buckets. 70 
Aft of the engineering space, the remains of a watertight bulkhead that 
isolated the after cargo hold and fragments of an iron deck that protected the 
engine room lay amid a concentration of coal from the after bunker. As 
historical records confirm, the after section of the ship separated as the vessel 
broke apart in heavy seas. The remains of the aft cargo hold lie 141 feet 
southwest of the amidships section of the Nola. Like the bow, the stern has 
separated from the amidships section of the hull. The after cargo hold 
watertight bulkhead remains virtually intact inside the stern structure. 71 
While most of the stern structure has collapsed away from the intact 
lower hull, the starboard side of the aft cargo hold has fallen into the hold. Aft 
of the cargo hold, the lower stern structure survives intact below the turn of 
the bilge and contains features such as a fresh water tank. Like the forward 
section of the wreck, the deck structure in the stern has collapsed into the hull. 
The distinctive elliptical fantail has separated from the lower hull and lies 
upright in the sand aft of the hull structure. 72 
70Ibid. 
71Ibid. 
721bid. 
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Implications of the Wreck Surveys 
Examination of eighteen wrecks in North Carolina and two additional 
sites in Bermuda generated some new insight into blockade running and the 
vessels that were employed in the trade. That research suggests that the hulls 
have a characteristic way of breaking up and deteriorating. The hulls of 
virtually every wreck were found to have highly similar characteristics. 
Forward of the watertight bulkhead at the forward end of the forward cargo 
hold the bow sections remained virtually intact although each one was found 
to list heavily to starboard or port. 
The forward cargo holds proved to be intact below the turn of the bilge 
and the sides of the hull and deck beams were scattered across and outside the 
hold. The engineering space, with the exception of the bow and stern, perhaps 
the most strongly constructed section of the hull, almost inevitably survived to 
a point above the turn of the bilge and contained the remains of the boilers and 
machinery. Because of their substantial construction, boilers were generally 
found in excellent condition unless an effort had been made to destroy them. 
Machinery, like the boilers, was of heavy construction and survives in a 
generally excellent state of preservation. Exceptions were almost always related 
to historically documented efforts to destroy the vessel or subsequent salvage 
activity. 
Like the hull structures associated with the forward cargo holds, that 
associated with the aft cargo holds was inevitably found to have collapsed to 
the turn of the bilge. The sides of the hull and deck beams were scattered across 
and outside the bottom of the hulls. Aft of the aft holds, the hulls were 
universally found to have broken at the location of the aft cargo hold 
bulkheads. The sterns at most of the wreck sites were well preserved and 
virtually intact below the fantail. In most cases the fantails were intact but had 
broken away from the hulls and lay close by on the sea bed. That pattern is 
surprisingly consistent throughout the vessels examined. 
Examination and documentation of the hull remains of blockade 
runners confirmed that vessel construction was highly regulated. Historical 
research revealed that construction requirements were spelled out by the 
insurance industry. Scantling dimensions and configuration within the hull 
were required to meet highly specific design criteria identified by the insurance 
underwriters. A comparison of the iron ship survey data for the steamers 
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Modern Greece, Peterhoff, Scotia, Douro, Don and Hebe confirmed the strict 
adherence to those requirements. An examination of contemporary records 
concerning the design and construction of iron and steel vessels also illustrates 
the uniform requirements for construction material. Iron and steel employed 
in building ships was industrially produced and standardization was the 
backbone of the industrial process. 
This research suggests that much of the material and construction data 
for iron steamers such as those employed to run the blockade can be found in 
historical sources. However, data concerning the actual configuration of each 
individual hull may only be preserved at the wreck site. Only a few plans for 
blockade runners are known to survive. Those consist of the Phantom, Ella 
and sister ship Annie, the Will of the Wisp and sistership Julia, the Dare and 
sistership Fergus, Stormy Petrel and sistership Mary Bowers and the Emily. 
Additional hull configuration information for the Dare, Colonel Lamb, 
Denbigh, Rosine and a few other blockade runners survives in their builders' 
models. With few exceptions, information on the configuration of blockade 
runner hull forms can only come from the structural remains of the vessels 
themselves. 
While those data comprise one of the most important attributes of a 
wreck site, the present condition of most hulls makes documentation and 
reconstruction a difficult, expensive and time consuming task. In considering 
the condition of the wrecks examined by the author, the most effective 
approach to recovery and reconstruction of those data would appear to be to 
focus recording and documentation on the bow and stern where lines are most 
complex and structural preservation the most complete. Additional 
documentation could consist of sections of the wreck taken at the watertight 
bulkheads and engine room. That level of recording should provide sufficient 
data to permit a reasonable reconstruction of the hull form. 
One of the most valuable assets of the wrecks of blockade runners is the 
steam machinery. Although patent data and contemporary engineering 
publications provide excellent documentation for the types of engines 
employed in blockade runners, machinery was often unique to the specific 
vessel. While the type of oscillating engines that were most commonly 
employed in the trade were all of a similar general configuration and function, 
each had its unique dimensions, configuration and associated assembly of air 
and water pumps, condensers and vibration dampers. Other types of 
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machinery like the compound engines aboard the Modern Greece an d 
Peterhoff and the horizontal direct acting engines of the Hebe, Dee and Vesta 
represent early configurations that merit additional, highly specific 
documentation. Both of those machinery types had an impact on the 
evolution of steam technology in the nineteenth century. 
Like steam machinery, marine boilers were produced in a variety of 
designs. The remains of blockade runners also preserve an important and 
varied collection of marine boilers. While most represent the return fire tube 
box type with a square steam collector like those of the Bendigo, Wild Dayrell 
and Ranger, others are more unique. The boilers of the Condor, for example, 
are perhaps the most unusual design and represent a "haystack" configuration 
developed by shipbuilder John Elder and employed in the Falcon, Flamingo, 
Condor and Ptarmigan. The boilers of the Hebe represent the box design 
without the steam collector and were constructed as a mirrored pair with a 
common flue. Those of the Stormy Petrel were designed as horizontal 
cylinders mounted in tandem and connected by a common flue. That type 
evolved into the high pressure "Scotch" boilers that became one of the most 
common designs of the late nineteenth century. Many of the boilers of 
blockade runners like those of the Peterhoff and Stormy Petrel were fitted with 
superheaters to dry and increase the temperature of the steam. 
Although not all of the thirty steam powered vessels lost on the-North 
Carolina coast have been located and identified, the remains of those that have 
been confirm that the assemblege represents one of the most comprehensive 
collections of mid-nineteenth century steamships extant. Historical and 
archaeological data establish that the wrecks include examples of every class of 
blockade runner employed in Anglo-Confederate commerce. The remains 
preserve a unique record of the steam technology employed to effectively 
circumvent Union efforts to close Confederate ports and isolate the South from 
sources of foreign supply. 
Chapter VI The Phantoms of Anglo-Confederate Commerce 
The remains of blockade runners lost on the North Carolina coast 
represent the entire spectrum of steam powered vessels employed in the trade. 
An examination of the surviving historical data associated with -those and 
other vessels of the classes employed in blockade running can provide 
additional insight into the demands of the trade and the technology that was 
adapted to meet those demands. 
Wrecks like the Modern Greece, Peterhoff and Douro are representatives 
of the class of oceanic steamers purchased or leased to deliver war materials 
and commercial cargoes direct from Europe to the South. They were employed 
prior to the development of the strategy of trans-shipping material through 
neutral ports in Nassau, Bermuda, Havana and Halifax. Those capacious and 
seaworthy oceanic steamers proved to be poor blockade runners. Once the 
option to ship goods through Nassau, Bermuda, Havana and Halifax permitted 
small fast vessels to be employed for the run through the blockade, the trans- 
oceanic steamers were relegated to carry cargos only as far as the islands. 
The steamers Kate and Elizabeth represent those readily available 
southern coastal steamers that were initially pressed into service and provided 
an effective response to tightening of the blockade during the summer of 1862. 
However, as steam vessels began to appear in large numbers on the blockade, 
Confederate agents and firms engaged in blockade running began to purchase 
faster more seaworthy vessels. Most of those had been designed and built for 
the British, and occasionally Great Lakes, public and mail transport services. 
Wrecks of vessels like the Scotia (Fanny & Jenny), Dundalk (Georgiana 
McCaw), Herald (Antonica), Havelock (General Bcaurcguard), Spunkie, Lynx 
and Arabian were all fast paddle wheel vessels engaged in public transportation 
and mail service before being purchased and adapted to run the blockade. 
As the fast steamers in the public and mail transport service disappeared 
and vessel prices increased dramatically, contracts for vessels under 
construction were purchased. The Pevensey was one of at least two paddle 
wheel vessels designed and constructed for the Australian river trade that were 
purchased for blockade running while under construction. The Emily was a 
single screw propeller being constructed for the Baltic trade before the contract 
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was purchased. Others, like the Confederate steamer Phantom, appear to have 
been modified versions of previously built vessels with acceptable design 
criteria. 
When the demands of blockade running called for specific design criteria 
and speed, vessels began to be built for the specific purpose of breaking the 
blockade. Those vessels combined the most appropriate available technology 
with hull design criteria specific to both the demands of the trade and the 
Atlantic coastal environment off southeastern North American. The Hebe, 
Venus, Bendigo, Ranger, Wild Dayrell, Dee, Ella, Stormy Petrel and Agnes' E. 
Fry were all built specifically to run the blockade. Of those Hebe and Dee 
represented a twin screw design. Contemporary technical literature suggests 
that their design had specific applications for blockade running. Surviving 
plans of the Ella, Stormy Petrel, Venus and other purpose-built blockade 
runners suggest that at least some aspects of hull design and construction were 
a response to specific environmental and economic considerations. 
The first steam blockade runners were vessels of convenience. Initially, 
the demands of the trade were tied to the necessities of trans-Atlantic shipping. 
Cargo capacity, range and seaworthiness were greater considerations than 
speed. As the success of the Bermuda and Fingal demonstrated, large trans- 
oceanic steamers could deliver cargos from Great Britain to the Confederacy. 
Ships like the Modern Greece, Peterhoff and Douro appeared to answer the 
immediate needs of the blockade runner. All three of those vessels represent 
auxiliary sail iron steamer designs developed in Great Britain. The Modern 
Greece and Peterhoff were larger and designed for more extended voyages and 
the Douro was built for the across channel trade with closer European ports. 
The Modern Greece was built at Stockton-on-Tees River by Richardson, 
Duck and Company in 1859. It was built for the Greek and Oriental Steamship 
Company for voyages to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. ' In 1861, Z. C. 
Pearson and Company purchased the vessel to support their Baltic trade. 2 The 
following year, Z. C. Pearson and Company contracted with Thomas R. Oswald 
1 Certificate of British Registry, 25 August 1859, Modern Greece, BT108-6, PRO and Iron Ships 
Survey No. 1945, Stockton, Modern Greece, 12 August 1859, NMM, Lloyds Collection at Woolwich. 
2 Modern Greece, Annual Survey, 15 October 1861, Hull, NMM Lloyds Collection at Woolwich. 
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and Company of Sunderland to build the Peterhoff for their Baltic commerce. 3 
When the American Civil War provided other opportunities, both ships were 
leased to carry cargo to Confederate ports. 
Surveys of the Modern Greece and the Peterhoff confirm the substantial 
nature of their design and construction. As a consequence of their heavy 
scantlings and plate, a considerable amount of the hull of both ships survive. 
Machinery and the percentage of hull space allocated to steam propulsion 
suggests that cargo capacity was a primary consideration and speed was less 
important than efficiency and seaworthiness. Both the Modern Greece and 
Peterhoff were designed and built with deep holds, 7.5 to 1 length to beam 
ratios. Only 15% of their hull length and 18% of their tonnage was devoted to 
steam machinery. That nominal percentage of length and tonnage devoted to 
propulsion and fuel confirms that speed was secondary to capacity and 
efficiency. 
The Modern Greece was 224 feet in length with a beam of 29 feet 3 inches 
and a depth of hold of 17 feet. The Peterhoff was 220 feet in length with a beam 
of 29 feet 3 inches and a depth of hold of 16 feet 11 inches. Engineering space in 
the Modern Greece was 32 feet five inches in length between bulkheads and 
that of the Peterhoff measured 31 feet. While the Peterhoff was equipped with 
a two cylinder compound engine that developed 90 horsepower, the Modern 
Greece contained a three cylinder engine that developed 120 horsepower. 
Evidence from the wreck site suggests that the engines of the Modern Greece 
could be an early double expansion compound engine design of the type 
patented by John Elder. Evidence from the wreck of the Peterhoff suggests that 
the engines of that vessel could be an early triple expansion compound design 
of the type also patented by Elder. The expansion engine configuration proved 
to be the most efficient type and during the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century became the standard in marine steam plants. Although steam was the 
principal means of propulsion, each of those ships was designed and rigged to 
be reasonably efficient under sail. Both ships carried a "good and sufficient" 
suit of sail for their bark rig. 4 
3 Certificate of British Registry, 20 December 1862, Peterhoff, BT108-9, PRO, and Iron Ships 
Survey No. 232, London, Peterhoff, 22 & 31 December 1862, NMM Lloyds Collection at Woolwich. 
4 Modern Greece, Annual Survey, 15 October 1861, Hull, NMM and Peterhoff, Annual Survey, 3 
June 1862, Hull, NMM Lloyds Collection at Woolwich. 
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Figure 20. Blockade Runner Ashore. 
Contemporary hull surveys indicate that both vessels were built to 
conform to the specifications or rules for iron vessels of 800 tons developed by 
British underwriters such as Lloyds, The Liverpool Registry and the Bureau 
Veritas. Those rules provided uniform specifications for the design and 
construction of merchant vessels to be insured by British firms. 5 Those 
specifications were based on more than four decades of industry experience 
gained in the design and construction of iron vessels. 
A contemporary painting titled "Blockade Runner Ashore" illustrates a 
vessel similar to the Modern Greece (Figure 20). The low waist and raised 
poop and forecastle deck correspond to the design details of the Modern Greece 
and the boiler funnel almost amidships corresponds with the location of that 
vessel's boiler. The bark rig in the painting agrees with the rig specified for the 
Modern Greece as do the configuration of the bow and figurehead. h The 
traditional paint scheme, black hull and white superstructure is almost 
5 Thearle, Samuel J. P., Naval Architecture: A Treatise on Laying off and Building Wood, Iron 
and Composit Ships, William Collins, Sons, & Company, London and Glasgow, 1876, pp. 267-268. 
6 Modern Greece, Annual Survey, 15 October 1861, Hull, NMM and Certificate of British Registry, 
25 August 1859, Modern Greece, BT108-6, PRO. 
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identical to that of the Peterhoff and suggests that the vessel was probably lost 
prior to the end of 1862 when white and gray shades were almost universally 
adopted.? 
The Passaic class monitor in the background could indicate that the 
vessel represents the Georgiana, another large steamer like the Modern Greece 
that ran aground off Charleston in March 1863. The Georgiana was a Clyde 
built vessel launched at the yard of J. G. Lawrie in Whiteinch on 1 December 
1862.8 Like the Modern Greece and Peterhoff, the Georgiana's hull was painted 
black and the superstructure amidships was white. The design of the hull was 
similar with a low waist and raised poop and forecastle-9 Regardless of the 
actual identity the illustration provides an excellent representation of the class 
of ocean-going steamers that were employed as the first blockade runners. 
Only a limited amount of the remains of the Douro are exposed but, the 
CBR and a survey of the hull provide considerable insight into the vessel's 
design and construction. The Douro was built at Paisley on the Cart River by 
Blackwood and Gordon in 1853. It was built for John Bibby, Sons and Company 
for voyages to the Oporto on the Douro River. 10 The Douro was 155 feet 8 
inches in length with a beam of 22 feet 3 inches and a depth of hold of 12 feet 5 
inches. Engineering space in the steamer was 30 feet 3 inches in length between 
bulkheads. 11 A two cylinder "geared steeple engine" that developed 90 
horsepower turned the Douro's patent propeller by means of a 2.5 to 1 gear 
drive. The Douro was designed and built with deep holds, 7 to 1 length to 
beam ratios and 14% of the hull length and 18% of their tonnage was devoted 
to steam machinery. 12 
Although steam was the principal means of propulsion, the ship was 
designed for three masts and rigged as a schooner to be reasonably efficient 
under sail. 13 The log book of the Douro, captured with the vessel on 9 March 
1863, provides excellent documentation of the combined use of sail and steam 
7 U. S. Consular Dispatch, London 12 December 1862, Peterhoff enclosure, RG 84, NA. 
8Dumbarton Herald, 4 December 1862 and Iron Ships Survey, S. S. Georgia na, 23 December 1862, 
NMM, Lloyds Collection, Woolwich. 
9U. S. Consular Dispatch, London 6 January 1863, Georgiana enclosure, RG 84, NA. 
10Douro, Iron Ships Survey, 8 September 1853, Paisley, NMM, Lloyds Collection, Woolwich. 
11Douro, Certificate of British Registry, Liverpool #413,10 September 1853, PRO, London. 
12 "Appraisement of the Steam Propeller Douro" by Charles H. Pierson, New York, 19 June 1863, 
RG 100, Regional Archives, New Jersey. 
13Certificate of British Registry, 10 August 1853, Douro, NA, RG-84 New York Prize Court 
Records Douro # 147. 
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by the Douro on the voyage across the Atlantic to the Bahamas and 
Wilmington. While steam was consistently used to get into and out of harbors, 
sail rather than steam was used as expeditiously as possible during the voyage. 
When weather permitted, the ship was brought up to the wind and the patent 
screw disconnected. If sailing conditions were favorable, steam was blown off 
and the boiler fires were banked. Once water in the boiler had cooled 
sufficiently, it was pumped out to lighten the ship. As necessary during the 
journey the boiler was refilled, the fires spread and fueled, the propeller 
reconnected and the voyage continued under steam. 14 
Upon reaching the coast of North Carolina the captain of the Douro 
began to gauge the ship's position carefully to time their arrival off 
Wilmington for the early hours of the morning on 21 February 1863. At 12: 15 
a. m. the ship passed three Union warships and came to anchor in three and a 
half fathoms of water near Fort Fisher. At daylight the anchor was raised and 
the Douro ran in for the New Inlet Bar under fire from the blockading fleet and 
the guns of Fort Fisher. Unfortunately, the vessel grounded inside the bar and 
much of the cargo had to be discharged into steamers from Wilmington before 
the ship could be refloated. 15 
The Modern Greece, Peterhoff, and Douro are representative of the class 
of oceanic steamers that were purchased or leased to deliver war materials and 
commercial cargoes direct from Europe to the South. In spite of the success of 
the Fingal and Bermuda, the strategy of shipping material direct from Europe 
on transoceanic steamers proved to be too risky. During the spring and 
summer of 1862, Union vessels captured the Bermuda, Settin, Cambria, 
Elizabeth, Patras, Tubal Cain, Columbia and Lodona. Like the Modern Greece, 
Peterhoff and Douro, the captured streamers were typical high cargo capacity, 
deep-draft steam vessels equipped with auxiliary sail and designed for efficiency 
and seaworthyness rather than speed. Clearly those design criteria were not 
sufficient to ensure success. 
As the Union blockade began to tighten during the summer of 1862, 
Confederate agents and firms such as Fraser, Trenholm and Company quickly 
recognized that the success of blockade running would depend on a different 
strategy, and faster steam ships. A critical shift in the strategy of blockade 
14Log Book of the Steam ship Douro #147, New York District Prize Court Records, Regional 
Archives, New York. 
151bid. 
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runners was made possible by the colonial interpretation and enforcement of 
British neutrality. At British Nassau, Bermuda and Halifax and in Spanish 
Havana, blind eyes permitted the trans-shipment of both civilian cargoes and 
war material. That permitted trans-oceanic sail and steam vessels to deliver 
goods to the islands with a high degree of immunity to capture by the United 
States Navy. From the islands small fast steamers could be employed to run 
goods into Confederate ports and bring cotton, tobacco and naval stores out 
through the blockade on the return. 
The initial solution to the shift in strategy was to obtain the most readily 
available small and fast steam vessels. John Fraser and Company of Charleston 
purchased both the Carolina (Kate) and the Atlantic (Elizabeth) in response to 
their initial needs. Both the Carolina and Atlantic were wood hull coastal 
steamers and each had been employed on the southeastern coast of the United 
States before the rebellion. Like the trans-oceanic steamers, they were vessels of 
convenience. Availability was as important as speed and cargo capacity. 
Although a few were constructed of iron in yards in New York or Philadelphia, 
most were the traditional wood hull steamers powered by a walking beam 
engines. Carolina and Atlantic were typical of that class of vessel. 
Carolina had been built by Samuel Sneden of Greenpoint, New York and 
launched in 1852.16 The 477-ton vessel was built of wood and measured 165 
feet in length, 29 feet 10 inches in beam and had a depth of hold of 10 feet 4 
inches. Constructed for the Florida Steam Packet Company, the Carolina was 
first home ported in Charleston, South Carolina. '? Under the command of 
Captain Louis M. Coxetter the Carolina was employed in the coastal trade 
between Charleston, Savannah and small towns along the northeast Florida 
coast. 18 
When the rebellion disrupted trade along the southern coast, the Florida 
Steam Packet Company was forced out of business. In December 1861, John 
Fraser and Company purchased the Carolina and changed the name of the 
16Lytle, William M., Merchant Steam Vessels of the United States, 1790-1868., Publication No. 
6, The Steamship Historical Society of America, Mystic, Connecticut, 1952, p. 26. 
17Orvin, Maxwell C., In South Carolina Waters, 1861-1865. Nelson's Southern Printing and 
Publishing Company, Charleston, S. C. pp. 35-36. 
1SMueller, Edward A., St. Johns River Steamboats, John A. Mueller, Jacksonville, Florida, 1986, 
p. 193. 
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vessel to Kate. 19 Under the command of Captain Thomas Lockwood, Kate 
began making regular voyages from Charleston, and occasional voyages from 
Wilmington and Savannah, to Nassau to support John Fraser and Company's 
Confederate contract. Kate proved to be one of the most successful of the John 
Fraser and Company vessels and ran successfully until sinking above 
Smithville in the Cape Fear River after hitting a snag or obstructions in the 
channel on 18 November 1862.20 
The Atlantic was built by the well known New York shipbuilder 
William Collyer and was also launched in 1852.21 The 623-ton vessel was built 
of wood and measured 216 feet 8 inches in length, 28 feet in beam and had a 
depth of hold of 9 feet 7 inches. 22 Steam machinery in the Atlantic consisted of 
a walking beam engine with a 40 inch cylinder diameter and a 10 foot stroke. 23 
Originally the Atlantic was constructed for the Portland Steam Packet Company 
of Portland, Maine. 24 While owned by that company, Atlantic was employed 
in Maine coastal transportation between Portland and Boston. Four years later, 
in September 1856, the vessel was sold to the newly formed Southern Steam 
Ship Company of New Orleans, Louisiana. That firm had been formed by New 
York financier Charles W. Morgan. The Atlantic, along with several other 
similar ships, was employed in transporting passengers and mail to Gulf coast 
ports between Mobile, Alabama and Galveston, Texas. 
When it was evident that southern states would attempt to leave the 
Union, Morgan sold the Southern Steam Ship Company to Israel N. Harris of 
New Orleans. Harris was not successful in breaking the association with 
Morgan until 1862 after he had been forced to sell the company's assets. 25 
Although some of the company's vessels were ordered confiscated for use by 
the Confederate War Department in January 1862, the Atlantic was determined 
19Nepveux, E. T. S., George Alfred Trenholm: The Company That Went to War 1861-1865., 
Comprint, Charleston, South Carolina, 1973, p. 39. 
20S. P. Lee to Gideon Welles, ORN, I, 8, p. 260 and North Carolina Standard, 26 November 1862. 
4 New York Times, 1852 and Lytle & Holdcamper, Merchant Steam Vessels of the United States, 
p. 13. 
211bid. 
22Atlantic, Enrollment Number 156, New Orleans, RG 41, NA. 
231bid. and John H. Morrison, History of American Steam Navigation, Stephen Daye Press, New 
York, 1958, p. 392. 
24Morrison, History of American Steam Navigation, p. 392. 
25Wise, Lifeline, p. 75. 
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to be unsuitable for gunboat service and released. 26 In February A. L.. Davis of 
Nashville, Tennessee bought the vessel. 27 After the U. S. Navy closed the 
Mississippi River below New Orleans, that vessel, and several others 
previously owned by the Southern Steam Ship Company, escaped to Havana 
through one of the passes at Brashear City, Louisiana. 28 Under the command 
of Captain John Smith the steamer delivered 1,086 bales of cotton at Havana on 
19 April 1862. 
Captain Smith continued to run the Atlantic between Havana and the 
Gulf of Mexico ports of New Orleans and Biloxi until September 1862. The 
following month, Davis sold the ship to John Fraser and Company and the 
Atlantic cleared for Charleston and, under the name Elizabeth. There the 
steamer replaced the Kate in trading through the blockade at Bermuda and 
Nassau under the command of Captain Thomas Lockwood. Elizabeth ran 
successfully until 24 September 1863 when the ship was run ashore and burned 
by Captain Lockwood at Lockwoods Folly Inlet. 
Both the Kate and Elizabeth are typical of the steamers of convenience 
employed as a response to running a tightening blockade. Availability was as 
much, if not more, a consideration in procurement than was design and 
function. They represented the last phase of wood ship construction and were 
equipped with steam machinery that was decades old when the Confederate 
States attempted to secede. Neither vessel was a fast steamer nor were they 
designed for the open ocean environment. Both vessels had been designed for 
coastal voyages. The only alterations required to make them effective blockade 
runners were removing some passenger accommodations to facilitate cargo 
and a coat of light colored paint to help make them difficult to see. The fact 
that both were highly successful was as much a factor of the ineffectiveness of 
the blockade as the ability of Captain Thomas Lockwood. His experience in the 
coastal trade prior to the rebellion gave him a command of the southern 
coastline that proved invaluable. 
26j. P. Benjamin to M. Lovell, 14 January 1862, ORN, II, I, p. 662, p. 667 and Report of Major- 
General Lovell, 16 January 1862, ORN, I, 17, pp. 159-160. 
27Aflantic, Temporary Enrolement No. 41, New Orleans, RG. 41, NA. 
28Wise, Lifeline, p. 75; C. J. Helm to W. M. Browne, 6 May 1862, ORN, II, 3, pp. 411-412 and U. S. 
Consul General's Report, ORN, I, 17, p. 91-92. 
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As the limited number of coastal steamers in the Confederacy were 
captured or destroyed and the price of southern cotton and European 
manufactured goods and war materials began to increase, firms trading 
through the blockade and Confederate agents began to look for faster steamers 
in Great Britain, Canada and even the United States. Wrecks of vessels like the 
Scotia (Fanny & Jenny), Herald (Antonica), Dundalk (Georgiana McCaw) and 
Havelock (General Beaureguard) were all fast paddle wheel vessels engaged in 
British public transportation and mail service before being purchased and 
adapted to run the blockade. The Arabian was engaged in public transportation 
service on Lake Ontario before being purchased and adapted to run the 
blockade. Like the coastal steamers of the southeastern United States, they were 
not designed for blockade running but, their speed, power and relatively 
shallow draft made them attractive and effective blockade runners. 
One of the first of those fast public transport steamers to be purchased in 
Great Britain to run the blockade was the Scotia. Scotia was a paddle wheel 
steamer built at London in 1847. The ship was built by M. and A. L. Wigram 
and Company at Blackwall for the Chester and Holyhead Railway Company. 
Wigram and Company built the Scotia 195 feet in length, 27 feet 6 inches in 
beam and 13 feet 5 inches in depth of hold. The engine room measured 56 feet 
2 inches in length and contained two steam engines produced by Maudslay and 
Company. 29 The Scotia was designed and built with deep holds, a conservative 
7 to 1 length to beam ratio and 29% of the hull length and 29% of their tonnage 
was devoted to steam machinery. 
The Scotia was a long low vessel with a raked stem and round fantail 
stern. The bow was fitted with a forecastle hood to minimize water on the 
foredeck during rough passages on the Irish Sea. Two raked funnels fore and 
aft of the paddle boxes were equipped with brass blow pipes and the base of the 
funnels were enclosed in a deck house amidships. A second small deck house 
was located aft of the main mast. Scotia was equipped with two light raked 
masts fitted for light schooner rigs. 30 
291ron Ships Survey, Scotia, 8 September 1853, Paisley, NMM Lloyds Collection, Certificate of 
British Registry, 13 May 1862, Scotia, BT 108-76, PRO and Certificate of British Registry, 26 June 
1863, Fanny & Jenny, BT 108-70 PRO. 
30Painting of the Scotia, Spurling Collection, St. Georges Historical Society, St. Georges, 
Bermuda. 
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The Scotia was one of four steamers, including Anglia, Cambria and 
Hibernia, that Chester and Holyhead Railway Company ran between Holyhead 
and Dublin. 31 It was operated between England and Ireland until December 
1861, when the, vessel was sold to J. Dorrington and W. B. Forwood of 
Liverpool. Dorrington and Forwood dispatched the Scotia to Nassau and on to 
Charleston, South Carolina early in the summer of 1862.32 During the summer 
and fall the vessel made several voyages through the blockade between 
Charleston and Nassau. On 24 October 1862, the Scotia was discovered heading 
for Bulls Bay and captured by the U. S. Bark Restless. 33 
The prize steamer was subsequently taken to New York and adjudicated. 
Being determined unacceptable for naval service, the Scotia was condemned 
and sold to Caleb Price and Henry Whitney of Boston. After at least one trip to 
Passamaquoddy, the renamed General Banks was taken to Halifax, N. S. After 
the cargo was transferred to the Will o' the Wisp, the steamer was sold to 
Benjamin Wier and Levi Hart. Under the new name of Fanny & Jenny, the 
ship departed for Bermuda on 26 July and arrived on 4 August 1863.34 During 
the fall and winter the Fanny & Jenny operated between Nassau and 
Wilmington. On 6 February 1864, the steamer left Nassau under the command 
of Captain L. M. Coxetter. After making land north of New Inlet on 9 February, 
Coxetter and pilot Joseph Burriss headed the ship south along the breakers for 
Fort Fisher. When the USS Florida fired on the speeding vessel the pilot 
panicked and ran the ship on shore before the captain could countermand his 
orders. The Fanny & Jenny was burned by boarding parties from the USS 
Florida before the "Whitworth flying battery" from Fort Fisher could drive the 
Union vessels away. On 16 February the remains of the steamer were sold at an 
auction for the benefit of the owners on Exchange Corner in Wilmington. 35 
311ron Ships Survey, Scotia, 8 September 1853, Paisley, NMM Lloyds Collection; Certificate of 
British Registry, 13 May 1862, Scotia, BT108-76, PRO and Certificate of British Registry, 26 June 
1863, Fanny & Jenny, BT108-70 PRO. 
32Certificate of British Registry, 13 May 1862, Scotia, BT108-76, PRO. 
33E. Conroy to Captain S. W. Gordon, 26 October 1862, ORN, I, 13, pp. 411-412 and S. F. Du Pont to 
G. Welles, 29 October 1862, ORN, I, 13, pp. 409-410. 
34Extracts Received by S. P. Lee, Liverpool Consular Dispatches, August 1863 and Bermuda 
Customs Records, In-bound 1862-1863,4 August 1863, BA. 
35Wilmington Daily Journal, 15 February 1864, Wilmington Daily journal, 16 February 1864., 
Wilmington Daily Journal, 17 February 1864, and Wilmington Daily Journal, 18 February 1864. 
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Herald, a fast Glasgow to Dublin steamer, was also purchased to run the 
blockade in March 1862. When the Herald was launched in the spring of 1851, 
it was celebrated as one of the most "magnificent" steamers to be built on the 
Clyde. John Reid and Company of Port-Glasgow built Herald for the Dublin 
and Glasgow Steam-Packet Company. The iron hull was 200 feet in length, 24 
feet 3 inches in beam and had a depth of hold of 13 feet 3 inches. The Herald 
was designed and built with an 8.3 to 1 length to beam ratio. Steam machinery 
occupied 32% of the hull length and approximately 36% of the tonnage. Herald 
was the first steamer fitted with a spacious on-deck saloon for the comfort of 
passengers and was considered to be the most luxuriously appointed passenger 
vessel in service on the Clyde. Like the Scotia, the Herald's bow was protected 
by a forecastle deck. 36 
In addition to having extraordinary accommodations for passengers, J. 
and G. Thomson of Clyde Bank Foundry fitted the vessel with two 300 
horsepower engines. They were a side lever design with 60-inch cylinders and 
60-inch stroke. The 23-foot diameter paddle wheels contained fourteen 
feathering floats each 8 feet 9 inches in width and 3 feet 6 inches in height. The 
eccentric that controlled the floats was located on the inner side of each paddle 
wheel. Two tubular boilers were mounted side-by-side in the hull and were 
connected by a common flue and a single stack aft of the paddle boxes. In test 
runs on the Clyde between Cloch Lighthouse and Cumbrae Head, a distance of 
sixteen and one quarter miles, the Herald made the trip in one hour and was 
celebrated as one of the fastest vessels on the river. 37 
Herald ran on the Dublin to Glasgow route until the fall of 1861, when 
the firm of Cunard Wilson and Company negotiated purchase of the steamer 
for Fraser, Trenholm and Company of Liverpool. 38 Fraser, Trenholm and 
Company purchased the vessel to run between Bermuda and the Confederate 
ports of Wilmington and Charleston with cargoes brought to Bermuda by the 
steamer Bermuda and their other sailing ships. 39 By mid-February the Herald 
36Glasgow Herald, 11 April 1851 and Glasgow Advertiser, 20 May 1851, Collingdale Newspaper 
Library, London. 
37Glasgow Herald, 11 April 1851 and Glasgow Advertiser, 20 May 1851, Collingdale Newspaper 
Library and U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 12 February 1862 with enclosed description of 
the steamer Herald. 
38U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 12 February 1862, RG-84, NA. 
39lbid., 12 and 14 February 1862. 
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had been delivered to Liverpool, loaded with extra coal and a cargo of "arms 
and Munitions of War. "40 - 
When the Herald stopped in Bermuda on 24 March 1862 for coal, the 
crew discovered that the vessel was destined for Charleston and refused to 
continue the voyage. Captain Tate acerbated matters, at the urging of U. S. 
Consul Allen, by going to see the Governor and retaining the Solicitor General. 
Captain Tate and the mutinous crew refused to be discharged of duties which, 
under the Merchant Shipping Act, were limited to a voyage to Bermuda and 
subsequent return to Great Britain. The matter took months to resolve and the 
Herald was not free to leave Bermuda until 11 June 1862. On that date Captain 
Coxetter cleared the vessel for Nassau and ran to Charleston. 41 
The Herald proved to be highly successful and ran between Nassau and 
Bermuda and Charleston until Fraser, Trenholm and Company sold the vessel 
to the Chicora Importing and Exporting Company of Charleston. Operating 
under the name Antonica, the vessel continued to make voyages from Nassau 
to Charleston and Wilmington until December 1863. On the night of 19 
December 1863, the Antonica was discovered and chased off Wilmington. The 
following morning at daylight the USS Fahkee found the Antonica aground 
on Frying Pan Shoals off Cape Fear. All accessible cargo was removed and 
efforts to pull the blockade runner off were abandoned after the iron hull began 
to break up in the surf. 42 
Chicora Importing and Exporting Company of Charleston also bought 
the steamer Havelock from the Dublin and Glasgow Steam-Packet Company. 
Like the Herald, Havelock was a fast Glasgow to Dublin steamer. When the 
Havelock was launched on 13 May 1858, the vessel was described in the 
Greenock Advertiser as a "splendid" steamer named in honor of General 
Havelock. The vessel was built by J. & G. Thomson and Company of Port- 
401bid. 
41Bourne Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, 24 March 1862, BA; 
Bourne Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, 8 April 1862, BA; 
Bourne Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, 9 April 1862, BA; 
Bourne Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, 4 June 1862, BA; Bourne 
Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, ND June 1862, BA; Bourne 
Letterbooks, J. T. Bourne to Messers. Fraser, Trenholm & Company, 14 June 1862, BA and St. Georges 
Customs Record Book, Outbound 1862,11 June 1862, BA. 
42S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 26 December 1863, ORN, I. 9, p. 362; E. F. Devens to S. P. Lee, 23 December 
1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 363; W. G. Saltonstall to S. P. Lee, 25 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 363-365; 
Statement of Captain W. F. Adair, 25 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 365-366 and Commander J. J. 
Almy to S. P. Lee, 21 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 366-367. 
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Glasgow. 43 The iron hull was 223 feet 3 inches in length, 26 feet 3 inches in 
beam and had a depth of hold of 14 feet 4 inches. 44 The Havelock was designed 
and built with an 8.6 to 1 length to beam ratio. Steam machinery occupied 33% 
of the hull length and 36% of the tonnage. 45 
J. and G. Thomson fitted the vessel with two 300 horsepower engines 
that, like those of the Herald, were a side lever design with 60-inch cylinders 
and 60-inch stroke. Eccentrics that controlled the improved feathering floats 
were located on the outside of each paddle wheel. Two furnace fire tube boilers 
were mounted back-to-back in the hull and were each connected by a common 
flue with two stacks aft of the paddle boxes. In test runs over the sixteen and a 
quarter mile distance between Cloch Lighthouse and Cumbrae head, Havelock 
made the trip in "half a-minute less than the hour. " The test was made in a 
gale and the steamer was "expected to realize great speed" on the Glasgow to 
Dublin run. 46 
Havelock was fitted with excellent passenger accommodations and was 
one of the most popular vessels running between Glasgow and Dublin. After 
more than four years on the Glasgow to Dublin route the Havelock was sold on 
8 November 1862 to the Chicora Importing and Exporting Company of 
Charleston. From Glasgow the Havelock sailed for Liverpool and took on a 
cargo and sufficient coal for the trans-Atlantic and departed for Nassau in 
January 1863.47 On 27 February the Liverpool Journal of Commerce reported 
the Havelock's safe arrival in Nassau. 48 By that time the Havelock had already 
made the first voyage through the blockade at Charleston. 49 There the name 
was changed to General Beaureguard and placed under the command of 
Captain Louis M. Coxetter. Until December 1863, the General Beaureguard ran 
between Nassau, and occasionally Bermuda, and the Confederate ports of 
43Greenock Advertiser, 18 May and 22 June 1858 and Greenock Telegraph, 7 July 1858, Collingdale 
Newspaper Library. 
44Certificate of British Register, 1 July 1858, Havelock, BT108-206, PRO. 
451bid. 
46Greenock Advertiser, 18 May and 22 June 1858 and Greenock Telegraph, 7 July 1858, Collingdale 
Newspaper Library. 
47Liverpool Consular Dispatch, 2 January 1863, RG-84, NA and U. S. Consular Dispatch, 
Liverpool, 6 January 1863, RG-41, NA. 
48Journal of Commerce, Liverpool, 27 February 1863. 
49Wise, Lifeline, p. 252. 
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Charleston, and after July, Wilmington. On the night of 11 December the 
General Beaureguard was run ashore near Flag Pond Battery north of Fort 
Fisher with a cargo of cotton. 50 
When launched in 1844, the steamer Dundalk was considered to be "one 
of the fastest seagoing vessels afloat. "51 Twenty years later the vessel's speed 
was still sufficient to attract the attention of Liverpool merchant M. G. 
Klingender. In April 1864, Klingender purchased the Dundalk. On 8 April 
1864, the U. S. Consul Francis Adams reported that his informant described the 
vessels as "a strong, powerful ship" and capable of being converted into an 
ironclad. 52 
Dundalk had been built for the Dundalk Steam Packet Company by 
Robert Napier of Glasgow. The steamer's 179 foot length, 26 foot 3 inch beam 
and 15 foot 6 inch depth of hold was calculated to be 562 tons. A 48 foot 3 inch 
engineering space amidships occupied 189 of those tons. The Dundalk was 
designed and built with an 6.9 to 1 length to beam ratio. Steam machinery 
occupied 27% of the hull length and 33% of the tonnage. 53 Two side lever 
engines of 270 horse power were supplied by three boilers with a common flue 
and single smoke pipe located aft of the paddle wheels. 54 The engines had 61 
inch diameter cylinders and operated on 66 inches of stroke. Paddle wheels 
were 24 feet 8 inches in diameter and contained 20 floats, each 104 inches long 
and 25 inches in width. 55 
The vessel was initially operated between Dundalk and Liverpool. The 
iron steamer was described as "a splendid and fast-sailing vessel, which will no 
doubt, attract many passengers. "56 As a safety feature the Dundalk was fitted 
with four watertight bulkheads that divided the steamer into five 
compartments. Since the collision of the iron steamer Vesta and the Arctic off 
Newfoundland in 1854, shipbuilders had recognized the advantage of 
50S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 16 December 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 354-355. 
51Liverpool Mercury, 1 March 1844, p. 71, col. 5. 
52U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 8 April 1864, RG-84, NA. 
53Certificate of British Registry, 12 April 1864, Georgiana McCaw, BT108-86, PRO. 
54Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 30 March 1864 and Glasgow Herald, 23 March 1857. p. 8, col. 2. 
55McOnie Engineers, Dimension Book, UGD 118,7/1 and Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 30 March 
1864. 
56Liverpool Mercury, 1 March 1844, p. 71., col. 5. 
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watertight compartments. 57 In addition to safety considerations, the Dundalk 
contained "tastefully fitted" cabins that left nothing "wanting. 1158 
After several years on the Dundalk and Liverpool line the Dundalk was 
sold to F. Mallard and moved to the east coast of Scotland. There it was ported 
in Leith until 12 April 1864, when the ship was purchased to run the blockade. 
After obtaining the ship, Klingender took the vessel to Liverpool, changed the 
name to Georgiana McCaw and loaded it with cargo and coal for the Atlantic 
crossing. Under the command of Captain G. Corbel the Georgiana McCaw 
cleared for Nassau and departed Liverpool on 15 April. 59 After stopping in 
Nassau the Georgiana McCaw cleared for Halifax and headed for Wilmington. 
At 3 a. m. on the morning of 2 June 1864, the crew of the USS Victoria 
discovered the Georgia na McCaw heading for Old Inlet and drove the blockade 
runner ashore on Long Island west of Fort Caswell. 60 
Not all of the passenger and mail service steamers purchased to run the 
blockade were built in Britain. Several were Canadian steamers built to 
provide service on the Great Lakes. One of those vessels was the steamer 
Arabian. The Arabian was built by the Niagara Harbor Company in Ontario, 
Canada in the spring and summer of 1851. After the vessel was launched on 2 
July 1851, the Niagara Chronicle reported that: 
As neither labor nor money has been spared in order that her 
hull, engine and machinery might be as strong and perfect as skill 
and material could make them, so also every needful cost has 
been incurred in order that the furniture and fittings may 
combine to render the 'Arabian' in every way worthy [of] the 
patronage of the travelling (sic) community. 61 
The Whig Standard also reported that the wood hull of the Arabian was built 
with an overall length of 182 feet, a beam of 26 feet 6 inches and a depth of hold 
of 11 feet 6 inches. On deck the vessel was fitted with a full length cabin with 
57Alexander C. Brown, Women and Children last: The loss of the Steamship "Arctic". G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, New York, 1961, pp. 183-184. 
58Liverpool Mercury, 1 March 1844, p. 71. col. 5. 
59U. S. Consul, Liverpool, 16 April 1864, RG-84, NA and U. S. Consul, Liverpool, 22 April 1864, 
RG-84, NA. 
60M. Haxtun to S. P. Lee, 5 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 114. 
6lKingstonWhig Standard, 7 May 1851, p. 2, Niagara Mail, 2 July 1851. 
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Figure 21. Steamer Arabian on Lake Ontario. 
state rooms on each side and a dining saloon in the center (Figure 21). In 
addition to 110 first class berths, the Arabian's passenger accommodations were 
decorated with stained glass windows. 62 
To ensure sufficient speed, Arabian was equipped with a low pressure 
300 horsepower walking beam engine. The engine, manufactured by Ridley 
and Company, turned a 13 1/2 inch diameter paddle-wheel shaft equipped with 
32 foot paddle wheels with fixed radial floats. Steam was provided by two 
boilers 23 feet in length and 9 feet nine inches across the face. The boilers 
shared a common flue and smoke pipe located forward of the paddle-wheel 
shaft and machinery. 63 Although not the fastest ship on Lake Ontario, Arabian 
was capable of a respectable 15 knots. 64 
Arabian was built for Andrew Heron and placed in service on the 
"Through Line" between Hamilton and Montreal. 65 When the "Through 
Line" failed to attract sufficient passengers the Arabian was removed from that 
62Kingston Whig Standard, 7 May 1851, p. 2. 
631bid. 
64Kingston Daily News, 29 May 1851. 
65Kingston Whig Standard, 7 May 1851, p. 2. 
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service and joined the "Royal Mail Line" between Toronto and Prescott in 1853. 
The following year that route was changed and the Arabian was shifted to run 
between Hamilton and Kingston. 66 In 1857, Arabian was withdrawn from the 
Royal Mail Line and put to work carrying excursion passengers. Between 1858 
and 1859, Arabian ran passengers and freight between Rochester and Cobourg 
and later on the Quebec to Shedic route. In 1859, the upper works of the 
Arabian were removed and the vessel was employed as a tow boat on the St. 
Lawrence until 1862 when one of the boilers exploded. 67 
After the boiler exploded in October 1862, the steamer was taken to 
Boston for repairs before going on to New York. There the vessel, registered to 
Robert Henry Sawyer and Ramon A. Menendez was apparently sold to Brett 
and Sons of New York. On 14 May, the Arabian cleared New York for Havana 
in ballast and steamed directly to Nassau. There the steamer was painted a "fog 
color" by a newly recruited crew and, after taking on a cargo of commercial and 
government freight, ran into Wilmington. 68 
On arriving in Wilmington the vessel was seized and the "Yankee" crew 
of the Arabian were placed under arrest. Clearing up the question of the crew's 
nationality and the ownership of the steamer required more than a month and 
it was not until early July that the Arabian was cleared by General Whiting at 
Wilmington. 69 After unloading the cargo, Arabian ran back and forth between 
Wilmington and Nassau until 15 September when the USS Howquah and USS 
Iron Age discovered the steamer running out of New Inlet. The Union vessels 
cut the Arabian off, forcing the steamer back toward Fort Fisher before it 
disappeared in the darkness. 70 Early the next morning the Arabian was 
discovered ashore on Caroline Shoals. While high seas prevented Union 
boarding parties from boarding the Arabian, they quickly destroyed the vessel's 
wood hull with gunfire. 71 
66British Whig, 18 May 1854. 
67Kingston Daily News, 5 April 1858,24 March 1859 and 21 October 1862. 
681bid., 21 October 1862, U. S. Consular Dispatch, Nassau, 15 May 1863, U. S. Consular Dispatch, 
Nassau, 27 June 1863 and U. S. Consular Dispatch, Nassau, 27 June 1863, RG-84, NA. 
69Brigader-General Jordan to Brigader-General Henry C. Whiting, 18 June 1863, Letter No. 
2/48/193. NA and H. C. Whiting to J. Seddon, 18 June 1863, Vessel Papers W-386, NA. 
70E. E. Stone to S. P. Lee, 16 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 202. 
71Wilmington Journal, I October 1863; E. E. Stone to S. P. Lee, 16 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 202 
and J. B. Breck to S. P. Lee and Log of the USS Niphon, 18 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 210-211. 
298 
Once the demand for fast steamers like the Scotia, Herald, Havelock, 
Dundalk and Arabian exceeded the availability of vessels already in service, 
Confederate agents and both southern and British entrepreneurs began to buy 
contracts for vessels under construction and negotiate contracts for the 
construction of new vessels. Initially, those vessels were designed for other 
purposes or were based on previously developed designs of the builder. 
Wrecks of the Phantom, Venus, Emily and Bendigo represent vessels 
purchased on the stocks or constructed from previously developed plans. Plans 
of the Confederate steamer Phantom constructed by William C. Miller and 
Sons for Fraser, Trenholm and Company suggest that the design was not 
specifically developed for blockade running. The Venus built by C. J. Mare for 
the China Mail Packet Company and the Bendigo, built as Milly, by William C. 
Miller were designed for use on Chinese rivers. Emily, built by Barclay, Curle 
and Company, was a traditional design developed for the channel trade that 
was purchased on the stocks by T. S. Begbie. The Pevensey constructed by James 
Ash and Company and the Nuffield constructed by Charles Lungley and 
Company were designed for service as Australian river steamers. The Agnes E. 
Fry was designed and constructed by Caird and Company for the mail and 
passenger service between Scotland and Ireland. In spite of the originally 
intended purpose, , each of those steamers met 
design criteria deemed 
appropriate for vessels running the blockade in 1863. 
William C. Miller and Sons built the Phantom 192 feet 11 inches in 
length, 22 feet in beam and 12 feet 3 inches in depth of hold. The engine room 
measured 42 feet 4 inches in length and contained two steam cylinders. 72 The 
Phantom was designed and built of steel with 8.7 to 1 length to beam ratios and 
22% of the hull length and 35% of the tonnage was devoted to the steam 
machinery. Machinery consisted of two 170 horsepower direct acting 45 inch 
diameter 36 inch stroke steam cylinders designed and produced by Fawcett, 
Preston and Company. 73 A three blade screw propeller approximately 6 feet in 
diameter pushed the hull. Because of the lightness of steel construction and 
the fact that the "engines are to be of greater power than is usually placed in 
72Certificate of British Registry, 21 May 1863, Phantom, BT108-81, PRO. 
73Fawcett, Preston & Company, Engine Book 1862, Maritime Museum, Liverpool. 
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vessels of her size", the ship was not expected to make less than seventeen 
knots. For cargo handling and auxiliary propulsion, Phantom was also 
equipped with two schooner-rigged masts. 74 
A plan of the hull of the Phantom was prepared by Gustav Hillman, a 
German naval architect who visited Liverpool at the time of construction 
(Figure 22). According to Hillman's plans the vessel had very fine lines and 
considerable deadrise. Like the clipper ship designs that Hillman was studying, 
the Phantom was built on an external keel that transformed into a gently rising 
forefoot and graceful sweeping stem. The sweeping counter stern supported a 
round fantail. 75 Although an apparently fast hull form, the Phantom's keel 
and deadrise were not desirable attributes for vessels running, and potentially 
grounding, in shoal water. 
The vessel was launched on 21 March 1863 and by 1 May was 
"approaching completion. "76 By 3 June cargo loaded and the vessel was entered 
at the Customs House. On 10 June, a crew for the Phantom was recruited at the 
Liverpool Sailor's Home. 77 Under the command of Captain Tessier, the 
Phantom cleared Liverpool and sailed for Nassau on 10 June 1863.78 Instead of 
making the voyage to Nassau, Captain Tessier took the Phantom to Bermuda. 
There the ship took on additional coal and cargo and ran into Wilmington 
under the command of Captain S. G. Porter. 79 Captain Porter took the 
Confederate steamer into Wilmington again in August but on 23 September 
1863, the vessel was chased ashore near Topsail Inlet. 80 
The remains of the steamer Venus represent another vessel that was 
designed and constructed for a purpose other than blockade running before 
being purchased by Crenshaw, Collie and Company and put into that service. 
Venus was designed by C. F. Heuwood for the China Mail Packet Company to 
74The Engineer, 27 March 1863, "Notes from the Northern and Eastern Counties" p. 185, U. S. 
Consular Dispatch 23 March 1863, Liverpool, RG 84, NA and U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 
25 March 1863, RG 84, NA. 
75Plan of Steel Steamship Built in Liverpool 1862, in the Gustav Hillman collection at the 
Mariners Museum, Newport News, Virginia. 
76U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 1 May 1863, RG 84, NA. 
77U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 10 June 1863, RG 84, NA and U. S. Consular Dispatch, 
Liverpool, 13 June 1863, RG 84, NA. 
78Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 21 June 1863 and Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 5 July 1863. 
79Extracts, Received by S. P. Lee, 5 July 1863, Major Smith Stansbury to Captain S. G. Porter, 16 
August 1863, Stansbury Letterbook, BA and Wise, Lifeline, p. 235. 
80J. J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 216-217. 
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operate on the Yangtze River. 81 C. J. Mare and Company was selected to 
construct the iron vessel at their Millwall shipyard. The Venus was 239 feet 5 
inches in length, 26 feet 1 inch in beam and had a depth of hold of 10 feet 8 
inches. The engine room measured 60 feet in length and contained two steam 
cylinders. 82 The Venus was designed and built of "best ship iron" with an 9.2 
to 1 length to beam ratios and 25% of the hull length and 31% of the tonnage 
was devoted to the steam machinery. Machinery consisted of two 240 horse 
power oscillating cylinders 45 inches in diameter and 48 inches in stroke and 
connected directly to the paddle wheel shaft. The Venus was reported by the 
captain in command at the time of her capture to have the "finest engines of 
any vessel in this trade. "83 
A cross section of the hull documented several design and construction 
features (Figure 11). The configuration of the hull amidships was virtually 
rectangular in section. Deadrise amidships is marginal and the floors were 
designed almost flat. No external keel was employed. Instead flat doubled 
plates were riveted to the floors. Bilges were tightly rounded and the hull 
above the turn of the bilge was absolutely vertical. An in/out plate pattern was 
employed with 9/16 inch strakes on the bottom, 1/2 inch strakes at the bilge 
and 3/8 inch strakes used in construction of the sides of the hull. With the 
exception of bulb iron beams supporting the deck, angle iron and plate was 
used exclusively to build the hull. 84 
Venus was launched on 15 March 1863. While the vessel was in the 
process of being completed, Alexander Collie and Company negotiated the 
purchase of the steamer from the owner Dadabbai Naoroji. By May 1863, the 
steamer had been completed and loaded with a cargo that included iron and 
machinery. On 2 May the vessel was cleared by customs and departed for 
Nassau. 85 After stopping in Falmouth to repair a damaged windlass, the 
Venus headed for Bermuda and arrived at St. Georges on 10 June 1863.86 At 
81Bowen, Mail and Passenger Steamers, p. 292 and U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 27 March 
1863, RG 84, NA. 
82Certificate of British Registry, 21 May 1862, Venus, BT108-10, PRO and Venus, Iron Ships 
Survey, 6 February and 4 March 1863, Millwall, NMM Lloyds Collection. 
83R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, I, I, 9, pp. 249-250. 
84Section Profile of the Venus, Iron Ships Survey Records, NMM, Woolwich. 
85U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 8 May 1863, RG 84, NA and Copy of the Bill of Entry for the 
Steamer Venus filed at the Custom House, London, 15 May 1863, RG 84, NA. 
86U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 8 May 1863, RG 84, NA and U. S. Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 
12 June 1863, RG 84, NA. 
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Bermuda the crew of the Venus was immediately engaged in painting the 
steamer white to make the ship more difficult to detect. The steamer's top 
masts and yards were taken down to reduce the profile (Figure 23a and 23b). 
After taking on coal and additional cargo the Venus cleared for Nassau on 13 
June 1863 and headed for Wilmington. 87 Under the command of Captain 
Ainsley Murray the Venus ran successfully until being forced ashore by the 
USS Nansemond north of Fort Fisher near Half Moon Battery on 21 October 
1863.88 
The screw steamer Emily was constructed by the Clydeholm firm of 
Barclay Curle Shipbuilding Company for London merchant Thomas S. 
Begbie. 89 That iron steamer was 181 feet in length, 22 feet 5 inches in beam and 
had a 12 foot 1 inch depth of hold. The Emily was designed and built of "best 
ship iron" with an 8.2 to 1 length to beam ratio. The engineering space was 35 
feet 1 inch in length and occupied 101 of the vessel's 355 tons. The engineering 
space required 19% of the hull length and 28% of the tonnage-90 Machinery 
consisted of two geared steeple engines producing a total of 80 horsepower. 91 
Upon completion Begbie brought the Emily to London under the 
command of Captain Leslie. At London Emily took on coal and cargo before 
clearing for Nassau and heading for Bermuda under the command of Captain 
Robert C. Halpin. 92 At Bermuda the ship received a coat of white paint and 
the crew took down both top masts and yards in preparation to run the 
blockade. Additional cargo belonging to the Albion Trading Company was 
loaded from several warehouses in St. Georges. 93 On 3 February, 1864, Captain 
Halpin cleared customs at St. Georges and sailed for Wilmington. 94 On the 
morning of 10 February 1864, the Emily was discovered ashore immediately 
north of Masonboro Island and was destroyed by the USS Florida. 95 
87Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 12 and 17 June 1863, RG 84, NA and Bermuda Customs, Outbound, 
St. Georges, 13 June 1863, BA. 
88R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, 21 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 249-250. 
89Dumbarton Herald, 12 November 1863. 
90Certificate of British Register, 19 December 1863, Emily, BT 108-10, PRO, London. 
91Dumbarton Herald, 12 November 1863. 
92U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 20 November 1863, RG 84, NA and Bermuda Customs Inbound, 
St. Georges, 19 January 1864, BA. 
93J. T. Bourne to S. I. Campbell & Company, 28 April 1864 and Bermuda Customs Outbound, St. 
Georges, 3 February 1864, BA. 
94Bermuda Customs Outbound, St. Georges, 3 February 1864, BA. 
951'. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 473-474. 
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i 
Figure 23a. Steamer Venus before taking down the masts and yards. 
Figure 23b. Steamer Venus after taking down the masts and yards. 
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The remains of the Bendigo lost at Lockwoods Folly Inlet represent 
another small river steamer design. That vessel was built at the shipyard of J. 
H. Mackern at Old Quay, Marsh End in Preston. 96 The hull was launched on 19 
February and christened Milly. A steam tug towed the vessel to Liverpool the 
following week to have the machinery and boilers installed. 97 At Fawcett, 
Preston and Company two, ninety horse power oscillating cylinder engines, 
paddlewheel shaft and wheels and two horizontal fire tube box boilers were 
installed in the hull. 98 The Bendigo's paddle wheels were equipped with 
feathering floats. 99 That work was not completed until July and the vessel was 
finally- registered as the Bendigo under the name of Matthew I. Wilson at 
Liverpool on 16 July. 10° 
The Bendigo was a small paddle wheel steamer only 162 feet 2 inches in 
length. The vessel's beam was 20 feet 2 inches and the depth of hold was 10 feet 
11 inches. The engine room measured 38 feet 6 inches in length. l01 Those 
dimensions gave the Bendigo a 8.1 to ,1 length to beam ratio. Steam machinery 
occupied 24% of the hull length and 31% of the tonnage. 
After taking on extra coal for the Atlantic passage, Bendigo cleared for 
Madeira and Bermuda on 25 July. Under the command of Captain Webber the 
little steamer made the voyage to St. Georges in twenty-five days. 102 There the 
ship was painted a light lead color and loaded with extra coal for the trip into 
Wilmington. On 2 September, Captain Webber cleared Bermuda Customs at 
St. Georges and departed for Nassau. 103 Between September 1863 and January 
1864, the Bendigo ran between Wilmington and St. Georges and Nassau. On 2 
January 1864, the steamer was discovered ashore at Lockwoods Folly Inlet. 104 
96Preston Pilot and County Advertiser, 21 February 1863, p. 2., and the Preston Chronicle and 
Lancashire Advertiser, 21 February 1863, p. 4. 
97Preston Pilot and County Advertiser, 21 February 1863, p. 2. 
98Fawcett, Preston & Company, Engine Book, 1863. 
99Gordon Watts, "Underwater Archaeological Reconnaissance and Historical Investigation of 
Shipwreck Sites in Lockwoods Folly Inlet, " 1986. 
1000ertificate of British Registry, 16 July 1862, Bendigo, BT108-81, PRO. 
101Ibid. 
102U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 17 and 25 July 1863, RG 84, NA and Customs Manifest, St. 
Georges, Bermuda, Inbound 1863,19 August 1863, Bermuda Archives. 
103Customs Manifest, St. Georges, Bermuda, Bendigo, Outbound 1863,2 September 1863, Bermuda 
Archives. 
104F. S. Wells to S. P. Lee, 13 January 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 400-401. 
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The Agnes E. Fry was designed and constructed as the Fox by Caird and 
Company in Greenock for the Burns mail and passenger service between 
Scotland and Ireland. 105 The vessel was one of a class of four steamers, 
including Wolf, Roe and Lynx, that were to maintain the Burns' service. Fox, 
second of the four, was launched on 26 March 1864.106 While the vessel was 
being fitted out by Caird, it was sold in June to James Cameron a London 
merchant representing Crenshaw and Company and the name was changed to 
Agnes E. Fry-107 
The Agnes E. Fry was built 236 feet 10 inches in length, 25 feet 2 inches in 
beam and had a 13 feet 6 inch depth of hold. The engine room measured 56 
feet 11 inches in length and contained two oscillating steam cylinder engines 
each having 58 inch diameter and 69 inch stroke. The engines were fitted with 
Cairds expansion gear. 108 The Agnes E. Fry was designed and built of iron with 
an 9.4 to 1 length to beam ratios and 24% of the hull length and 33% of the 
tonnage was devoted to the steam machinery. Machinery consisted of two 275 
horsepower direct acting steam cylinders also designed and produced by Caird 
and Company. Prior to her steam trials the "hansome fittings" and deck house 
installed to accommodate passengers on the run between Scotland and Ireland 
were stripped out to reduce the ships profile and increase cargo capacity. 109 
Although the accommodations of the Agnes E. Fry were removed to 
adapt the ship for blockade running, "a small Pilot House & wheel in platform 
or bridge" was left between the vessels two raked funnels. That structure 
enclosed the funnels and had an iron railing around the top. The funnels were 
fitted with pipes to blow off excess steam and there was no forecastle hood as 
the vessel's bow rode high out of the water. The figurehead of a fox was left in 
the ornamental molding on the stem. 110 
105The Engineer, 8 April 1864, p. 226. 
106Greenock Advertiser, 29 March 1864. 
107Certificate of British Registry, 27 July 1864, Fox, BT108-11, PRO and Certificate of British 
Registry, 2 August 1864, Agnes E. Fry, BT108-11, PRO and Greenock Advertiser, 23 June 1864. 
108Greenock Advertiser, 29 March 1864. 
1091bid., 23 June 1864. 
110U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 30 July 1864, RG-84, NA. 
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On 29 July the Agnes E. Fry departed the Tail-of-the-Bank below 
Greenock for Nassau. 111 Instead of going to Nassau, Captain Joseph Fry took 
the steamer to Bermuda where they arrived on 29 August 1864.112 Captain Fry 
took the Agnes E. Fry out almost immediately but was unable to run the 
blockade at Wilmington. 113 On 8 September, the Agnes E. Fry arrived in 
Nassau to take on coal. 114 On 22 September 1864, Captain Fry departed Nassau 
and again attempted to run the steamer through the blockade without success 
and returned to Bermuda. After taking on additional coal and waiting for the 
moon Captain Fry steamed out of St. Georges on 31 October. 115 This attempt to 
get into Wilmington proved successful and the Agnes E. Fry arrived at 
Smithville on the morning of 5 November. 116 On returning to Wilmington 
after carrying a cargo of cotton to Nassau in early December, the Agnes E. Fry 
was chased ashore on Long Island west of Fort Caswell and lost. 117 
Although quite different, Phantom, Venus, Emily, Bendigo and Agnes E. 
Fry represent vessels designed for a specific service but purchased while under 
construction or contract built for blockade running. In spite of the success of 
this third generation of vessels, their design criteria was not specific to the ever 
increasing demands of the trade. The Phantom, for example, proved to be a 
disappointment to Fraser, Trenholm and Company and was sold to the 
Confederate Government. Emily was incapable of sufficient speed to be 
effective in blockade running and was run ashore on the first voyage to 
Wilmington. The Venus, Bendigo and Agnes E. Fry were more successful. 
Their oscillating engine, shallow draft, flat bottom, low profile designs were 
characteristic of the purpose built blockade runners. 
As the blockade and elements took their toll, the demand for fast 
steamers to run the blockade began to seriously deplete the supply of British 
vessels in the public transportation and mail services. On 23 April, the 
Glasgow Advertiser reported that because of the need for fast steamers to 
111Greenock Advertiser, 5 August 1864. 
112Bermuda Customs, Outbound, St. Georges, Agnes E. Fry, 31 October 1864, BA. 
113New York Herald, 8 September 1864. 
114U. S. Consular Dispatch, Nassau, 24 September 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 477 and New York Herald, 
8 September 1864. 
115New York Herald, 1 October 1864 and Bermuda Customs, Outbound, St. Georges, Herald, 31 
October 1864, BA. 
116Diary of Colonel William Lamb, 5 November 1864, College of William and Mary. 
117W. H. C. Whiting to Flag-Officer Pinkney, 28 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 787 and Braxton 
Bragg to Flag-Officer Pinkney, 29 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 788. 
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111Greenock Advertiser, 5 August 1864. 
11213ermuda Customs, Outbound, St. Georges, Agnes E. Fry, 31 October 1864, BA. 
113New York Herald, 8 September 1864. 
114U. S. Consular Dispatch, Nassau, 24 September 1864, ORN, 1,10, p. 477 and New York Herald, 
8 September 1864. 
115NeW York Herald, 1 October 1864 and Bermuda Customs, Outbound, St. Georges, Herald, 31 
October 1864, BA. 
116Diary of Colonel William Lamb, 5 November 1864, College of William and Mary. 
117W. H. C. Whiting to Flag-Officer Pinkney, 28 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 787 and Braxton 
Bragg to Flag-Officer Pinkney, 29 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 788. 
307 
support blockade running: "there will scarce be a fast steamer left on the 
Clyde. "118 In his 8 May 1863, dispatch to Secretary of State William H. Seward, 
U. S. Consul at London Freeman H. Morse reported that: 
Nearly all the steamers fit for Confederate use and ready for 
service either for privateers, carrying cargo to the Mexican coast, or 
for running the blockade have been bought up sometimes to the 
serious inconvenience of the coast & continental trade. Very high 
prices have been paid for those lately purchased, some times about 
double their cost after running two or three years. Of course with 
such a demand for steamer navigation every building yard is fully 
occupied & there is a scarcity of workmen at high wages for this 
country. New boats are got into the water every few days &I hear 
from the Clyde that the Confederate agents are still actively 
inquiring for further purchases. 119 
Because successful blockade running required specific design criteria and more 
speed, vessels began to be designed and built for the specific purpose of breaking 
the blockade. Those vessels combined the most appropriate available 
technology with hull design criteria specific to both the demands of the trade 
and the Atlantic coastal environment off southeastern North America. The 
first vessel specifically designed and built to run the blockade included many of 
the technological advances that were considered to be advantageous. 
Shipbuilders on the Mersey, Clyde and Thames quickly developed 
designs for long, low freeboard vessels with sufficient power and speed to meet 
the needs of the Anglo-Confederate trade. Although not the only prerequisite 
for running the blockade, speed was recognized as a major consideration by 
1863. Contracts for purpose built blockade runners often included a guaranteed 
speed. Reports on trials of the machinery inevitably included "running the 
lights" or a test of the vessel's speed over a measured course. As the blockade 
tightened, the demand for speed increased. The following table provides an 
indication of the constant increase in speed associated with ships built to run 
the blockade. 
118Glasgow Advertiser, 23 April 1863. 
119U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 8 May 1863, RG 84, NA. 
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Vessel Launch Date Speed 
1862 
Coquette May 16 knots120 
Flora November 14.5 knots121 
1863 
Banshee January 16 knots122 
Kate February 12 knots123 
Columbia March 15 knots124 
Hebe April 14.45 mph125 
Anglia April 14 knots126 
Southerner June 12.5 knots127 
Aurora August 14.5 knots128 
Lucy October 19 knots129 
Gibraltar October 10.8 knots130 
Will o' the Wisp November 18 mph131 
Nola November 16 knots132 
Fergus November 20.5 mph133 
Greyhound December 14.5 mph134 
Iona II December 21 knots135 
1864 
Greyhound February 15.5 knots136 
Edith February 13.5 knots137 
Badger March 16 knots138 
120The Artizan, 1 June 1863, p. 142 and The Engineer, 18 December 1863. 
121The Artizan, 1 December 1862, p. 286 and The Engineer, 14 November 1862, p. 293. 
122The Artizan, 1 February 1863, p. 190. 
123The Artizan, 1 April 1863, p. 92. 
124The Artizan, 1 April 1863, p. 93. 
125The Artizan, 1 May 1863, p. 115. 
126The Artizan, 1 May 1863, p. 114. 
127The Artizan, 1 July 1863, p. 165. 
128The Artizan, 1 September 1863, p. 212. 
129The Engineer, 16 October 1863, p. 236. 
130The Artizan, 1 November 1863, p. 258. 
131The Engineer, 20 November 1863, p. 306. 
132Ibid. 
133The Engineer, 4 September 1863, p. 150. 
134The Engineer, 18 December 1863. 
135The Engineer, 3 July 1863, p. 14. 
136The Engineer, 1 January 1864, p. 14. 
137The Engineer, 4 March 1864, p. 141. 
138The Engineer, 25 March 1864, p. 194. 
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Atalanta March 14.138 knots139 
Little Hattie May 19 mph140 
Hope June 16.5 knots141 
Owl June 16 knots142 
Colonel Lamb September 19 mph143 
Georgia Bell 14 knots144 
Lelia 18 mph145 
1865 
Louise Ann Fanny January 173/4knots146 
The Hebe, Ranger, Vesta, Wild Dayrell, Dee, Ella, and Stormy Petrel were all 
vessels specifically designed around those criteria and purpose built to run the 
blockade. 
The first vessel designed and built as a blockade runner was the paddle 
steamer Banshee constructed in 1862 by Jones, Quiggin and Company of 
Liverpool. Banshee had been ordered by John T. Lawrence of the Anglo- 
Confederate Trading Company. 147 The vessel was unique in that it was 
constructed of steel and combined most of the technological advances in vessel 
design, construction and steam engineering that had been adopted for vessels 
successfully engaged in the trade. Although part of the vessel's scantlings were 
of iron, the majority of the hull was of steel produced by the Mersey Steel and 
Iron Works. 148 The vessel was 214 feet in length 20 feet in beam and had a 10 
foot depth of hold. 149 Those measurements gave the Banshee a 10.7 to 1 length 
to beam ratio. Steam machinery occupied 27% of the hull length and 36% of 
the tonnage. 
139The Artizan, 1 April 1864, p. 92. 
140The Artizan, 1 December 1864, p. 285. 
141The Engineer, 10 June 1864, p. 364. 
142The Engineer, 15 July 1864, p. 48. 
143The Artizan, 1 October 1864, p. 237. 
144The Artizan, 1 January 1865, p. 21. 
145The Artizan, 1 February 1865, p. 44. 
1461bid. 
147The Artizan, "A Merchant Steel Ship, " 1 January 1863, p. 19 and U. S. Consular Dispatch, 
Liverpool, 6 January 1863, RG 84, NA. 
148The Artizan, "A Merchant Steel Ship, " 1 January 1863, p. 19. 
149Certificate of British Registry, 10 August 1864, Banshee, BT108-243, PRO. 
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Banshee was fitted with four watertight bulkheads, and the engines 
consisted of two 52 inch diameter, 48 inch stroke oscillating steam cylinders 
that produced 120 horsepower. The vessel's return fire tube box boilers were 
vented through retractable smoke pipes. The hull was a low freeboard design 
with moderate size paddle wheels. Patented feathering floats were employed to 
increase efficiency and reduce noise. Short pole masts were used to reduce the 
vessel's profile. Banshee's bow was fitted with a forecastle hood and the only 
deck structure was a bridge between the two paddle boxes. At Nassau the hull 
was painted white to make the ship more difficult to see at night and in "thick" 
weather. 150 
The Banshee was too lightly plated and some of the hull plates buckled 
during the Atlantic crossing, nonetheless, the vessel was highly successful and 
the model was adopted by other firms and builders. The most unusual aspect 
of the Banshee was the fact that the hull was built almost entirely of steel. That 
vessel has been credited with being the first steel vessel to cross the Atlantic. 
However, a river steamer built by Richardson, Duck and Company of South 
Stockton preceded the Banshee's Atlantic crossing by three and a half years. 
That vessel, the Little Lucy, was 70 feet in length, 12 feet in beam and had a 
depth of hold of 6 feet 6 inches and was built of "Mersey Puddled Steel" 
plate. 151 
The first of the purpose built-blockade runners lost on the North 
Carolina coast was the steamer Ranger run ashore on Holdens Beach west of 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet on 11 January 1864. Ranger was built by Palmer's 
Shipbuilding Company in Jarrow-on-Tyne. The steamer was 232 feet 7 inches 
in length, 25 feet 3 inches in beam and had a 10 foot 8 inch depth of hold. The 
hull of the Ranger was flat in the floor with very minimal deadrise and the 
bilges were tightly rounded. 152 The engine room measured 47 feet 5 inches in 
length. 153 Those dimensions gave the Ranger a 9.3 to 1 length to beam ratio. 
Two oscillating cylinder engines provided the vessel with one hundred fifty 
horsepower. Feathering floats were used on the paddle wheels to increase 
efficiency and reduce noise. Steam machinery occupied 20% of the hull length 
and 26% of the tonnage. 
150Wise, Lifeline, pp. 112-113 and 289-290. 
151Stockton and Hartlepool Mercury, 3 September 1859. 
152Notes on reconnaissance survey of Ranger in the collection of G. P. Watts, 1984. 
153Certificate of British Registry, 6 November 1863, Ranger, BT108-81, PRO. 
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The Ranger was launched on 12 October 1863 and was registered in 
Jarrow on 6 November 1863. The owner was listed as James H. Wilson, a 
Liverpool merchant. 154 Rather than going to Liverpool, Ranger was taken to 
Plymouth by Captain John Thomas Holmes. There the vessel took on coal and 
departed for Bermuda in ballast. 155 Under Captain Holmes' command Ranger 
made the Atlantic crossing to Bermuda in less than a month arriving at St. 
Georges around 5 December 1863.156 At St. Georges, the vessel was painted a 
light lead color, and loaded with cargo on account of the Confederate 
Government. After clearing Bermuda Customs at St. Georges the vessel 
departed for Nassau on 17 December. 
By 24 December, Ranger was back in Bermuda having run almost into 
Wilmington before having trouble with the steam machinery. 157 After 
making the necessary repairs and taking on coal the Ranger departed for 
Wilmington during the first week of January 1864 under the command of 
Lieutenant George Gift, CSN. 158 After approaching the coast near Cape Fear on 
9 January, Gift tried to establish his position using the Frying Pan Shoals 
lightship. When he found that the light had been extinguished, 'Gift headed 
the Ranger inshore and anchored east of Little River during the day on 10 
January. After establishing his position and putting passengers ashore, Gift 
headed east along the beach toward Old Inlet a half hour after midnight. Eight 
miles west of Old Inlet the crew of the Ranger found the USS Minnesota in 
their path. The pilot panicked and ran the steamer ashore in the breakers 
approximately one mile west of Lockwoods Folly Inlet. According to Gift's 
official explanation "a couple of turns of a wheel in the hands of a timid man 
lost a fine ship and a valuable cargo. "159 
154Ibid., and [The History of] Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company, Limited, Jarrow and 
Hebburn, England, 1924 published for the British Empire Exhibition 1924. 
155Bermuda Customs Manifest, In-bound St. Georges, Ranger, nd after 5 December 1863, BA. 
1561bid. 
157Bermuda Customs Manifest, Out-bound St. Georges, nd after 5 December 1863, Ranger, BA; John 
T. Bourne to M. G. Klingender, 24 December 1863 and John T. Bourne to S. I. Campbell, 24 December 
1863, Bourne Letter Book, 1863-1865, BA. 
158George Gift to Ellen A. Shackleford , 27 January 1864, Gift Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina. 
159George Gift, 27 January 1864, Sprunt, Derelicts, pp. 97-102. 
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The Wild Dayrell, lost in Rich Inlet, represents another paddle wheel 
steamer designed and built to run the blockade. That vessel was built by the 
firm of Jones, Quiggin and Company in Liverpool and was an identical 
sistership of the Lucy. Both the Wild Dayrell and the Lucy were modeled after 
Banshee but were constructed of iron. 
Wild Dayrell was built 215 feet in length, 20 feet in beam and had a 10 
foot 3 inch depth of hold. The engine room measured 50 feet 8 inches in 
length. 160 Those dimensions gave the Wild Dayrell a 10.7 to 1 length to beam 
ratio. Steam machinery occupied 24% of the hull length and 35% of the 
tonnage. Two oscillating cylinder engines provided the vessel with one 
hundred forty horsepower. Oscillating steam cylinder engines in the vessel 
were built by Fawcett, Preston and Company in Liverpool and measured 52 
inches in diameter and had a stroke of 48 inches. 161 The Wild Dayrell was also 
equipped with feathering paddle wheel floats and a forecastle hood. Two raked 
pole masts and two raked retractable funnels were all that protruded above the 
level of the steamer's paddle boxes. 
The Wild Dayrell was launched on 17 September 1863.162 Although the 
steam trials of the Wild Dayrell were not reported in the press, the steel plated 
sistership Lucy proved to be capable of 15 1/2 knots against a strong wind and 
tide during her trials in October 1863.163 By 12 November the vessel's 
registered owners Edward Lawrence and Company had entered the vessel at 
Liverpool Customs to load for Nassau. Once loaded, the Wild Dayrell cleared 
for sea on 14 November. 164 In December the steamer made Nassau and, after 
being painted a lead color, took on a cargo for Wilmington. After two 
successful round trips the Wild Dayrell was run ashore approximately twenty 
miles north of Fort Fisher on 1 February 1864.165 
One of the most distinctive of the paddle wheel steamers designed and 
built to run the blockade was the Condor. The Condor was one of a class of 
four identical vessels, that included the Falcon, Flamingo and Ptarmigan, built 
by Randolph, Elder and Company at their new yard at Govan on the Clyde 
160Certificate of British Registry, 6 November 1863, Ranger, BT108-81, PRO. 
161Fawcett, Preston and Company, Engine Book, 1863 and Specifications of Iron Paddle Steamers, 
"Lucy" & "Wild Dayrell, " Jones, Quiggin and Company, Maritime Museum, Liverpool. 
162U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 18 September 1863, RG 84, NA. 
163Liverpool Daily Post, 13 October 1863. 
164U. S. Consular Dispatch, Liverpool, 13 November 1863, RG 84, NA. 
165F. A. Roe to S. P. Lee, 3 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 438-439. 
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River. 166 The steamers were built for Alexander Collie and Company. The 
Condor and others of the class were 221 feet in length, 28 feet 3 inches in beam 
and had a9 foot 10 inch depth of hold. The engine room measured 59 feet 7 
inches in length. 167 Those dimensions gave the Condor a 7.9 to 1 length to 
beam ratio. Steam machinery occupied 27% of the hull length and 36% of the 
tonnage. The vessel's oscillating steam cylinder engines were also built by 
Randolph, Elder and Company and measured 52 inches in diameter, had a 
stroke of 48 inches and produced 180 horsepower. The boilers were a vertical 
fire tube design identified as "Haystack Boilers" because of their similarity to a 
hay stack in shape. Two boilers supplied steam during normal operations and 
the third was fired up when maximum speed was necessary. 168 
Falcon, the first of the four to be completed, was launched on 15 June 
1864.169 Reports from M. S. Underwood, the U. S. Consul in Glasgow, indicated 
that Falcon and the other vessels of that class were "built for speed to the 
sacrifice of almost every other consideration. "170 Although their speed was 
calculated to be "24 statute miles per hour" the Falcon only achieved 21 1/2 
statute miles per hour during trials of the machinery. 171 
The Condor and her sisterships were distinctive in appearance because 
they were fitted with three boilers and had three raked funnels forward of the 
paddle wheels. None of the funnels were fitted with pipes to blow off excess 
steam as the noise associated with that operation attracted undesirable 
attention in the proximity of the blockade. Instead the vessels were equipped to 
blow off excess steam underwater. 172 Each vessel in the class was also equipped 
with feathering floats and a forecastle hood. 
The shallow depth of hold of the Falcon class vessels made it necessary 
to construct a small engine house and boiler hoods on the deck. 
Accommodations for the vessel's officers were located in an enclosed poop and 
those of the crew were forward below a covered forecastle or "turtle back. "173 
The "turtle back" or "hooded forecastle" was designed to throw water off the 
166Clyde Built Ship Card File, Mitchell Library, Glasgow. 
167Certificate of British Registry, 8 August 1864, Condor, BT108-243, PRO. 
168U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 8 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
169Clyde Built Ship Card File, Mitchell Library, Glasgow. 
170U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 18 June 1864, RG 84, NA. 
171 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 27 May and 18 June 1864, RG 84, NA. 
172 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 27 May 1864, RG 84, NA. 
173 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 27 May 1864 and 8 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
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forward deck and help the bow punch through seas in rough weather. Condor 
also had two short pole masts to carry fore and aft sails for stability, facilitate 
cargo handling, and provide stations for lookouts. 174 A low deck house 
enclosed the funnels to protect the boilers and extended aft of the paddle 
wheels to the main mast to provide passenger accommodations. 175 
On 10 August 1864, the Condor departed Glasgow with a cargo of military 
supplies and extra coal. 176 From Glasgow the Condor steamed to Cork, Ireland. 
There unidentified Confederate agents took the train to Limerick where a 
supply of military uniforms had been procured for shipment aboard the 
steamer-177 From Ireland the Condor steamed to Bermuda arriving on 1 
September 1864.178 From Bermuda the Condor went to Halifax, Nova Scotia 
for coal and additional cargo. On 24 September, when the dark of the moon 
made it safe to attempt to run the blockade the vessel departed for Wilmington 
under the command of Captain William N. W. Hewett formally commander 
of the British warship Rinaldo. 179 On the morning of 1 October 1864, the 
Condor was driven ashore on Caroline Shoals at the entrance to New Inlet by 
the USS Niphon. 180 
The steamer Ella was one of two identical vessels constructed by William 
Denny and Sons at Dumbarton. 181 The ship was built for the Importing and 
Exporting Company of South Carolina but, the registered owner was James 
Carlin of Carrickfergus. The Ella, and the other vessel of the class Annic, were 
each built 226 feet 1 inch in length, 28 feet 3 inches in beam and had a 13 foot 6 
inch depth of hold (Figure 24). The engine room measured 64 feet 3 inches in 
length. 182 Those dimensions gave the Ella an 8 to 1 length to beam ratio. 
Steam machinery occupied 28% of the hull length and 36% of the tonnage. The 
vessel's oscillating steam cylinder engines were built by Robert Napier and 
Sons at the Lancefield Foundry in Glasgow and measured 42 inches in 
174 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 8 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
175Flamingo Painting, Spurling Collection, St. Georges Historical Society, St. Georges, Bermuda. 
176 Glasgow Herald, 11 August 1864. 
177 Glasgow Herald, 18 August 1864 and U. S. Consular Dispatch, Cork, ND (Received, 7 
September 1864) RG 84, NA. 
178Bermuda Customs, Inbound, St. Georges, Condor, 1 September 1864. 
179 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Halifax, 7,18,21 and 26 September, 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 438,468, 
476 and 484. 
180 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 7 October 1864, ORN, I, 10, p. 531. 
181 The Artizan, "Steam Shipping" 1 July 1864, p. 165. 
182Certificate of British Registry, 11 July 1864, Ella, BT108-243 PRO. 
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diameter, had a stroke of 60 inches and produced 200 horsepower. The boilers 
were a horizontal fire tube design equipped with superheaters to improve 
efficiency. The paddle wheels of the Ella were fitted with feathering floats to 
improve efficiency and speed. 183 
The Ella was designed with a long low hull to reduce the ships visible 
profile. That profile was only interrupted by the paddle boxes and a low deck 
house. The deck house arrangement included a pilot house forward and 
accommodations for some the officers and passengers that were built around 
the superheaters that extended well above the level of the deck. The Ella's low 
profile design produced a limited depth of hold that made it necessary to 
construct a small engine hatch and boiler house on the deck for the 
superheaters. Additional accommodations for the vessel's officers were located 
in the stern and those of the crew were forward in the forecastle. The steamer 
was not fitted with a forecastle hood or turtle back. Ella was equipped with two 
short masts to carry fore and aft sails for stability and a yard on the foremast for 
a square sail to enhance speed when conditions permitted. Ella's masts were 
also equipped to facilitate cargo handling, and provide stations for lookouts. 
The hull was virtually flat amidships with no deadrise and no external keel. 
The absence of a keel was intended to make the vessel easier to work off should 
the ship be intentionally or inadvertently run aground. The forefoot of the Ella 
was cut away to reduce the impact of grounding. 184 
Already painted white, the Ella completed her trials and departed from 
Greenock on 16 July. 185 On 17 July the steamer was at Cork taking on coal for 
the Atlantic voyage. 186 From Cork the Ella sailed directly to Bermuda and 
cleared customs at St. Georges on 2 August 1864.187 One week later, Ella cleared 
customs at Hamilton and sailed for Wilmington on 9 August 1864.188 The Ella 
continued to run into Wilmington until being driven ashore off Smith Island 
on 3 December 1864.189 
183Plans of the Ella, Denny Collection, NMM, Greenwich. 
1841bid. 
185 Greenock Advertiser, 27 December 1864 and Glasgow Herald, 19 July 1864. 
186 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Cork, 25 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
187Bermuda Customs, St. Georges, In-bound, Ella, 2 August 1864, BA. 
188 Bermuda Customs, Hamilton, Out-bound, 9 August 1864, Ella, BA. 
189G. W. Young to D. D. Porter, 6 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 131 and I. S. Sampson to T. C. 
Dunn, 6 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, pp. 132-133. 
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Stormy Petrel was another purpose built blockade runner from Glasgow 
that was chased ashore on the outer extremity of Caroline Shoals off New Inlet. 
That vessel was built by the firm of William Simons and Company at their 
London Works in Renfrew. The ship was built for the Anglo-Confederate 
Trading Company but, the registered owner was John Lawrence of Liverpool. 
The Stormy Petrel, and another vessel of the class Mary Bowers, were each built 
222 feet 5 inches in length, 25 feet 2 inches in beam and had a 10 foot 3 inch 
depth of hold. The engine room measured 49 feet 8 inches in length. 190 Those 
dimensions gave the Stormy Petrel, an 8.8 to 1 length to beam ratio. Steam 
machinery occupied 22% of the hull length and 36% of the tonnage. The 
vessel's oscillating steam cylinder engines were also built by William Simons 
and Company and produced 180 horsepower. 191 The boilers were a cylindrical 
horizontal fire tube design equipped with superheaters to improve efficiency. 
The paddle wheels of the Stormy Petrel were fitted with feathering floats to 
improve efficiency and speed. 192 
Like most of the vessels built to run the blockade, the Stormy Petrel was 
designed with a long low profile that produced a limited depth of hold (Figure 
25). That profile was only interrupted by the paddle boxes and a bridge between 
them and two small deck houses. The shallow depth of hold of the Stormy 
Petrel made it necessary to construct a small engine hatch and boiler house on 
the deck for the superheaters. Accommodations for the vessel's officers were 
located in the stern and those of the crew were forward below a forecastle hood 
or turtle back. Stormy Petrel also had two shore masts to carry fore and aft sails 
for stability, facilitate cargo handling, and provide stations for lookouts. The 
hull was almost flat amidships with only marginal deadrise and no exterior 
keel to complicate grounding. The forefoot of the Stormy Petrel was also cut 
away to reduce the impact of grounding. 193 
The Stormy Petrel was launched on 29 July 1864 and the engines were 
immediately installed at the William Simons and Company yard. 194 On 11 
August, the steamer underwent trials of the steam machinery near the Tail-of- 
190Certificate of British Registry, 11 July 1864, Ella, BT108-243 PRO. 
191 The Engineer, 12 August 1864, p. 112., and Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 8 August 1864. 
192Profile and Plans of the Stormy Petrel, University of Glasgow Archive, Glasgow. 
193 Ibid. 
194 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 30 July 1864, RG 84, NA. 
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the-Bank on the Clyde below Greenock. 195 By the third week of September the 
Stormy Petrel had completed the voyage to Bermuda and on 24 September, the 
ship cleared customs in Hamilton and headed for Wilmington. 196 On the 
second attempt to break the blockade the steamer's boiler exploded and the 
vessel was forced back into St. Georges on 2 November 1864.197 After repairs 
were completed the Stormy Petrel cleared St. Georges and ran for Wilmington 
a second time but was unable to break the blockade and headed for Nassau. 198 
There the vessel took on additional coal and departed for Wilmington a third 
time on 3 December. On the morning of 7 December, the ship ran aground on 
the outer edge of Caroline Shoals off New Inlet and was destroyed. 199 
Although paddle wheel steamers were the most prevalent design for 
vessels specifically built for running the blockade, a limited number of twin 
screw steamers were also produced and put into service. The twin screw 
concept had been in use in the United States for almost two decades and was 
patented in England almost a decade prior to Flora by Richard Roberts. 
However, the idea was not effectively put into practice in iron vessels until the 
Dudgeons construction of a twin screw vessel in 1857.200 
The first of the Dudgeon blockade runners was the Flora produced by 
John and William Dudgeon, owners of the Sun Iron Works in London for 
Alexander Collie and Company. Flora was 161 feet four inches in length, 22 
feet 6 inches in beam and had a depth of hold of 12 feet 5 inches. A two 
cylinder steam engine, each 26 inches in diameter with a 21 inch stroke, was 
fitted to drive each shaft. The engine room measured 41 feet 5 inches in 
length. 201 Those dimensions gave the Flora an 7.1 to 1 length to beam ratio. 
Steam machinery occupied 26% of the hull length and 38% of the tonnage. At 
the time the vessel's trials press observers recorded a draft of 5 feet 5 inches 
forward and 7 feet aft. 202 
195 Greenock Advertiser, 11 August 1864. 
196Bermuda Customs, Hamilton Outbound, 1864, Stormy Petrel, BA. 
197 Consular Dispatch, Bermuda, 24 October 1864, Consular Dispatch, Nassau, 1 November 1864 
and Bermuda Customs, St. Georges In-bound, 2 November 1864, Stormy Petrel, BA. 
198Greenock Advertiser, 21 and 29 November and 10 December 1864. 
199Diary of Colonel William Lamb, 7 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
200Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, Richard Roberts Obituary, Vol. 4,1864, p. 
xxvi. 
201Certificate of British Registry, 22 November 1862, Flora, BT 108/09, PRO and London Times, 
ND, included in U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863. 
202The Artizan, 1 December 1862, p. 286. 
320 
The vessel's horizontal direct acting double cylinder engines were also 
built by Sun Iron Works and produced 120 horsepower. 203 The boilers were a 
horizontal fire tube design positioned athwart ship and equipped with a 
common flue. The three blade propellers were 7 feet in diameter and had 14 
feet 6 inches of pitch to improve efficiency and speed. 204 
Flora was highly successful although the steamers speed was only 14 
knots. 205 After nine months of running between Nassau and Charleston or 
Wilmington for Alexander Collie and Company the ship was sold to the 
Consolidated Steamship Company and the, next month to the Confederate 
Government for use as a transport on-the Cape Fear. 206 The Flora was operated 
on the Cape Fear until being scuttled on 16 January 1865.207 
A second Dudgeon double screw, Kate, was constructed for Edward J. 
Lomnitz a Manchester merchant representing Beech and Root and 
Company. 208 Kate was 176 feet 8 inches in length, 22 feet 6 inches in beam and 
had a depth of hold of 12 feet 4 inches. The engine room measured 39 feet 3 
inches in length. 209 Those dimensions gave the Kate, an 8 to 1 length to beam 
ratio. Steam machinery occupied 22% of the hull length and 24% of the 
tonnage and produced a draft of 5 feet 4 inches forward and 7 feet 2 inches aft at 
the time the vessel's trials. 210 ý The vessel's horizontal direct acting double 
cylinder engines were also built by Sun Iron Works and produced 120 
horsepower. Each cylinder was 21 inches in diameter and pistons operated on a 
26 inch stroke. The boilers were a horizontal fire tube design positioned 
athwartships and equipped with a common flue. The three blade propellers 
were 7 feet 6 inches in diameter and had 14 feet 6 inches of pitch to improve 
efficiency and speed. 211 
203 The Artizan, 1 May 1862 and 1 December 1862 and The Engineer, 14 November 1862, p. 293. 
204The Artizan, 1 December 1862 and The Engineer, 14 November 1862, p. 293. 
205The Artizan, 1 December 1862, London and The Engineer, 14 November 1862, p. 293. 
206 Wise, Lifeline, pp. 299-300. 
207Wise, Lifeline, pp. 299-300. 
208 Wise, Lifeline, p. 307. 
209Certificate of British Registry, 31 March 1863, Kate, BT 108/10, PRO. 
210 The Engineer, 6 March 1863, p. 139. 
21111lustrated London News, "Dudgeon's New Double-screw Steam-ship Flora" 29 November 
1862, p. 587 and The Artizan, 1 April 1863, pp. 92-93 and The Engineer, 6 March 1863, p. 139. 
Dimension of the Kate's machinery were reported as having 26 inch cylinders and 26 inches of 
stroke and those of the Hebe were reported as having 26 inch cylinders and 26 inches of stroke. 
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Kate, even more than Flora, attracted considerable attention during her 
machinery trials. The majority of that attention was directed to the function of 
the twin-screw system of propulsion. In addition to recording a 12 knot speed 
under both screws and boilers, the vessel was capable of 8 knots under one 
screw and boiler. A major preoccupation was the maneuverability of the ship 
and most of the trials involved testing the steerage and turning the vessel with 
the screws. All of the tests proved quite satisfactory and the much improved 
control over the vessel provided by the twin screw arrangement was not lost 
on the owners or a special agent of the Admiralty. 212 Kate was also impressive 
because of the speed attained from a modest power to displacement ratio of . 25 
horsepower to a ton of displacement. 213 
The double screw vessels built by the Dudgeon brothers were also 
distinctive because of their hull configuration. Contemporary descriptions of 
the Kate reveal that the vessel was "perfectly flat in her floor at the amidships 
section, and without keel" and had "tolerably square bilges". 214 Two masts 
were designed for small fore and aft schooner rigs and were "constructed to 
lower by a joint near the deck" and telescopic funnels were also designed to be 
lowered to reduce the Kate's visible profile. 215 
Unlike Flora, Kate proved to be less successful as a blockader runner. 
After clearing London Customs in late March, the steamer ran out to 
Nassau. 216 After several successful trips through the blockade at Charleston 
and Wilmington, Kate was chased aground on the east side of Smith Island on 
12 July 1863.217 In spite of Union efforts to destroy the stranded steamer, 
Confederate salvors refloated the vessel and were in the process of towing the 
hull to New Inlet when they were discovered and the was vessel captured by 
the USS Iroquois, Mount Vernon, and James Adgcr. 218 
212 The Artizan, 1 April 1863, pp. 92-93 and The Engineer, 6 March 1863, p. 139. 
213London Times, ND, included in Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863. 
214 London Times, ND, included in Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863 and The Artizan, 1 
April 1863, pp. 92-93. 
215London Times, ND, included in Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863 and The Artizan, 1 
April 1863, pp. 92-93. 
216U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 27 March 1863. 
217 A. L. Case to S. P. Lee, 13 July 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 120-121. 
2185. P. Lee to G. Welles, 6 August 1863, ORN, I, 9, p. 142. 
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The first of the new twin screw steamers to be lost on the North Carolina 
coast was the Hebe. That Dudgeon double screw was constructed for Collie, 
Crenshaw and Company. Like Kate, Hebe, was 176 feet 8 inches in length, 22 
feet 6 inches in beam and had a depth of hold of 12 feet 4 inches. The engine 
room measured 39 feet 3 inches in length. 219 Those dimensions gave the Hebe, 
an 8 to 1 length to beam ratio. Steam machinery occupied 22% of the hull 
length and 24% of the tonnage and produced a draft of 5 feet forward and 9 feet 
aft at the time the vessel's trials. 220 
The vessel's horizontal direct acting double cylinder engines were also 
built by the Dudgeons and produced 120 horsepower. Each cylinder was 21 
inches in diameter with a 26 inch stroke was fitted to drive each shaft. 221 The 
boilers were a horizontal fire tube design positioned athwartships and equipped 
with a common flue. The three-blade propellers were 7 feet 6 inches in 
diameter and had 15 feet of pitch 222 
Trial of the Hebe attracted even more attention than the Flora and Kate. 
Aboard during the tests were a variety of scientific and government 
representatives and "gentlemen connected with the commercial marine. " 
Those in attendance included; Sir J. D. Elphinstone, M. P., Admiral Sir Edward 
Belcher, C. B., Sir J. Lawrence, Captains Jones and Howes and Commander T. E. 
Symonds of the Royal Navy, and several officers in the service of Imperial 
Austria. The majority of their attention was directed to the twin-screw system 
of propulsion, and most of trials involved testing the maneuverability of the 
ship using the screws. As was previously the case, all of the tests proved quite 
satisfactory. 223 Hebe attained a 12 knot speed under both screws and boilers 
with the same modest power to displacement ratio as the Kate. 224 
Like the previous double screw vessels built by the Dudgeon brothers, 
Hebe also had a distinctive hull configuration. Like the Kate, Hcbc was 
"perfectly flat in her floor at the amidships section, and without keel" and had 
219 Certificate of British Registry, 7 May 1863, Hebe, BT 108/10, PRO. 
220The Engineer, 1 May 1863, p. 252. 
221London Times, ND, included in Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863 and The Artizan, 1 
May 1863, p. 115. 
222The Engineer, 1 May 1863, p. 252. 
223 Ibid., and The Artizan, 1 May 1863, p. 115. 
224The Engineer, 1 May 1863, p. 252 and The Artizan, 1 May 1863, p. 115. 
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"tolerably square bilges". 225 Two pole masts were designed for small fore and 
aft schooner rigs and were "constructed to lower by a joint near the deck" and 
the vessel's telescopic funnel was also designed to be retracted to reduce the 
ship's visible profile. 226 A low deckhouse extended aft from the foremast to 
the stern just forward of the ships wheel and enclosed the funnel. Hebe's bow 
was designed along the lines of a clipper with a bowsprit and decorated 
trailboards. 227 
As a blockader runner the Hebe had only limited success. After clearing 
London Customs on 13 May, the steamer ran out to Nassau. 228 There the 
steamer waited for the dark of the moon and ran into Wilmington on 10 July 
1863.229 After successfully running back out through the blockade Hebe 
delivered a cargo of cotton and headed back to Wilmington in mid-August. On 
18 August, Hebe was discovered and chased aground north of Fort Fisher by the 
USS Niphon and USS Shokokon. 230 
Early in 1864, another Dudgeon twin-screw vessel was lost on the North 
Carolina coast not far from the wreck of the Hebe. That vessel was the Dec. 
Dee was built as the Aurora for Collie, Crenshaw and Company. That name 
was changed to Dec before the ship was delivered to her owners in- August 
1863. Dee was 175 feet 5 inches in length, 23 feet 6 inches in beam and had a 
depth of hold of 12 feet 5 inches. The engine room measured 37 feet 8 inches in 
length. 231 Those dimensions gave the Dec, a 7.6 to 1 length to beam ratio. 
Steam machinery occupied 21% of the hull length and 33% of the tonnage and 
produced a draft of 5 feet 3 inches forward and 7 feet 3 inches aft at the time the 
vessel's trials. 232 Slight differences in the specifications and capacities of the 
Dee were a result of refinements to the hull which produced "much finer lines 
fore and aft than were possessed by either predecessors. "233 
225 London Times, ND, included in Consular Dispatch, London, 10 April 1863 and Tile Artizan, 1 
April 1863, pp. 92-93. 
226 U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 24 April 1863,8 May 1863 and 13 May 1863, RG-84, NA. 
227U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 13 May 1863, RG-84, NA. 
2281bid. 
229 Wise, Lifeline, p. 234. 
230N. B. Harrison to S. P. Lee, 18 August 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 158. 
231 Certificate of British Registry, 2 September 1863, Dee, BT 108/10, PRO and Consular 
Dispatch, London, 4 September 1863. 
232 Army and Navy Gazette, 29 August 1863 and The Artizan, 1 September 1863. 
233Army and Navy Gazette, 29 August 1863. 
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The vessel's horizontal direct acting double cylinder, engines were also 
built by the Dudgeons and produced 120 horsepower. Each cylinder was 26 
inches in diameter with a 21 inch stroke and was fitted to drive an individual 
shaft. 234 The boilers were a horizontal fire tube design positioned athwartships 
and equipped with a common flue. The three blade propellers were 7 feet in 
diameter and had 14 feet 6 inches of pitch. 235 
Trial of the Dec attracted considerable attention even though the twin- 
screw propulsion system was no longer as novel as it had been when the Flora 
and Kate were put into service. Aboard during the Dee's trials were one of the 
owners Captain William G. Crenshaw, Vice-Admiral Sir George Sartorius, 
Commander T. E. Symonds of the Royal Navy, and "other gentlemen whose 
names are well known in the naval, scientific, and literary world. "236 As was 
previously the case, the majority of their attention was directed to the twin- 
screw system of propulsion and much of trials involved the ship's 
maneuverability using the screws. All of the tests proved satisfactory and the 
Dee attained a 15 knot speed under both screws with boilers up to normal 
capacity and burning patent fuel. 237 
The Dee was almost identical to the other Dudgeon vessels (Figure 26). 
The hull was fitted with a clipper bow that included a bowsprit and decorated 
trailboards. Two deck structures, one forward of the engineering space and one 
aft, provided accommodations for the officers and passengers. Two pole masts 
were designed for small fore and aft schooner, rigs and were located 
immediately forward of the deck structures. Apparently unlike the previous 
vessels neither the masts nor the funnel were designed to be lowered to reduce 
the ship's visible profile. 238 Also, the Dec appears to have been fitted with 
some means of blowing off steam underwater as the discharge pipes apparent 
in representations of the Flora, Kate and Hebe are not included on the funnel 
in the representation of the Dec. 239 Kate was subsequently equipped with a 
234The Artizan, "Marine Engineer from 1851 to the Present Time", 1 May 1865, p. 106 and Army 
and Navy Gazette, 29 August 1863. 
235 Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, "Record of Performance and Experiences 
with Twin-Screw Steamers Built By J. & W. Dudgeon" VI, p. 209, London, 1865 and Army and 
Navy Gazette, 29 August 1863. 
236 Army and Navy Gazette, 29 August 1863. 
237U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 4 September 1863, RG-84, NA. 
2381bid. 
239 Illustrated London News, December 1862; U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 13 May 1863 and 
U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 4 September 1863. 
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Figure 26. Photograph of the Dudgeon Steamer Dee. 
"steam pipe on to the boiler leading to the donkey suction pipe to blow steam 
through the bottom" and some similar form of arrangement may have been 
built into the Dee. 240 
Early in September 1863, the Dee left the West India Dock in London and 
headed for Nassau with a combined civilian and military cargo. 24' Rather than 
going to Nassau the Dee headed for Bermuda and arrived in St. Georges on 28 
September 1863.242 After taking on coal and loading additional cargo the Dee 
cleared for Nassau. On 3 November under the command of Captain G. H. Bier 
the Dee headed for Wilmington. 243 Between November 1863 and February 
1864, when the Dee was lost near Masonboro Inlet, the vessel ran successfully 
between Wilmington and both Bermuda and Nassau. 244 
Demands of blockade running required a combination of speed, shallow 
draft and low profile to provide some assurance of success by the summer of 
1864. Addressing those requirements produced a distinctive vessel that was 
240Unknown to M. Dudgeon, 30 June 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 123. 
241 U. S. Consular Dispatch, London, 11 and 19 September 1963, RG-84, NA. 
242 Bermuda Customs, St. Georges In-bound, 28 September 1863, Dee, BA. 
243 Bermuda Customs, St. Georges Out-bound, 2 November 1863 and Private Log of J. 'I'. Gordon, 
Cornubia, 3 November 1863, ORN, 1,9, p. 278. 
244 W. F. Spicer to B. F. Sands, 6 February 1864, ORN, 1,9, pp. 44-45. 
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considered characteristic of the clandestine trade. That ship was approximately 
225 feet in length, 25 feet in beam and had a draft of 7 to 9 feet. The hull was a 
low profile design with a sharp bow and stern to achieve speed and a flat floor 
amidships without a keel to facilitate "taking the ground" and "working off. " 
To comply with underwriter's requirements the hulls were equipped with four 
or five watertight bulkheads. The bow was reinforced and covered by a 
forecastle hood or turtleback to take the Atlantic seas and minimize water on 
the foredeck in heavy weather. A fantail stern was usually equipped with one 
of two wheels for steering. To make it more difficult to see at night and in 
heavy weather vessels running the blockade were almost universally painted 
white or a lead color. 
Amidships the shear was broken by a paddle box with cabins, water 
closets or storage facilities fore and aft of each wheel. The majority of 
purpose-built blockade runners were equipped with two boilers. One was 
located forward of the paddle box and a second was located aft of the box. 
Raked funnels to carry smoke aloft were frequently designed to be retractable 
to lower their profile. Raked pole masts were positioned to facilitate cargo 
handling and carry light fore and aft gaff rigged sails. I 
Machinery in the arch-typical purpose-built blockade runner generally 
consisted of two oscillating steam cylinders. Spent steam was pumped into a 
condenser to recapture the water and return it to the boilers. Boilers were 
frequently fitted with super heaters like those of the Stormy Petrel to produce 
hotter, dryer steam. Many blockade runners were equipped to blow off excess 
steam underwater to prevent the noise giving away the ship's position. To 
improve both speed and efficiency, paddle wheels were generally fitted with 
patent feathering floats, some like those of the Condor were constructed of iron 
or steel. 
Although it has frequently been suggested that the technology employed 
by blockade runners was specifically developed to satisfy the needs of the trade, 
that does not appear to be the case. Hull designs were adaptations of those that 
had proven effective on the Mersey, Clyde and Thames and the Irish Sea, 
English Channel and North Sea. The forecastle hood or turtleback was 
developed for steamers on the Irish and North Sea. Oscillating steam engines, 
the most popular type employed in purpose built blockade runners, had been 
patented years before the necessity for running the blockade. The feathering 
buckets employed on paddle wheels had been in use for more than two 
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Figure 27. Photograph of Blockade Runners at Nassau. 
decades. Retractable funnels had been designed to permit vessels to pass under 
bridges on rivers like the Thames. Fire tube boilers were not new and 
superheaters had been developed to produce hotter and dryer steam prior to 
the American Civil War. In the final analysis, blockade runners simply 
employed the most appropriate extant technology in their efforts to evade the 
United States Navy (Figure 27). Under the command of the right captain and 
crew that approach produced surprising success. 
Chapter VII The Cargos 
Anglo-Confederate steamers carried a variety of essential cargos through 
the Union blockade. War materials from Europe helped make it possible for 
the Confederacy to maintain armies in the field after resources available in the 
South had been depleted. Much of the material shipped through the blockade 
consisted of ordnance, munitions and other war materials. Cargos also 
included a wide variety of non-essential manufactured goods for civilian 
markets. Because the blockade was never effective enough to seriously 
threaten Anglo-Confederate trade it was not until late in the rebellion that the 
Confederate Government attempted to exert control over vessels running into 
ports in the South. 
Trafficking in ordnance, munitions and military goods was prohibited by 
Queen Victoria's Proclamation of Neutrality and blockade runners carried on a 
clandestine trade. Historical sources reflect both the nature and extent to which 
those engaged in Anglo-Confederate commerce went to disguise their activities 
as legitimate commerce and the extent to which British authorities ignored or 
facilitated that trade. A rich collection of artifacts recovered from the remains 
of the Z. C. Pearson and Company steamer Modern Greece, suggested that 
shipwrecks would be the most important source of information on the nature 
of cargos shipped through the blockade. 1 Examination of the remains of 
blockade runners that have been located, identified and to some degree 
investigated during the thirty years since the Modern Greece was salvaged has 
demonstrated that, at least in North Carolina, wrecks may not be the most 
comprehensive source of cargo specific data. Most were effectively salvaged by 
enterprising Confederates or Union boarding parties. Archival research 
associated with wrecked and captured vessels revealed that untapped sources of 
historical data preserve surprising insight into the trade. 
Work on the Modern Greece produced little information about the 
nature of surviving vessel remains but, produced the most comprehensive 
collection of material recovered from a blockade runner. Documentation of 
that important collection afforded the first insight into the specific nature of the 
1 Bright, et. al., Modern Greece, 1977. 
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material shipped through the blockade. The amount of material recovered 
from the Modern Greece suggested that other wrecks would also contain 
extensive cargo inventories. 
Unfortunately, subsequent examination of additional wrecks indicates 
that may well not be the case. Of the remaining seventeen shipwrecks that 
have been examined, none have been found to contain the amount of cargo 
preserved on the Modern Greece. In fact, evidence from those sites suggests 
that the amount of cargo surviving in association with the hull remains could 
be marginal by comparison. Although several of the wrecks were found to be 
heavily covered by sand, the remains of the Ranger, Ella, Condor, Stormy 
Petrel, Lynx, Hebe, Wild Dayrell and Phantom were exposed enough to 
determine that only limited amounts of cargo remain at the wreck site. 
Both the geographical distribution of the wrecks of blockade runners and 
additional historical research supports the theory that the Modern Greece could 
be an exception to the rule. The spatial distribution of the wrecks suggests that 
where possible, the vessels were run aground under the protection of 
Confederate batteries. That permitted the wreck to be protected by artillery 
while army units, black laborers and the ship's officers and crew attempted to 
recover the cargo. Both the archaeological and historical record confirm that 
Confederate salvage activity was highly successful. Historical and 
archaeological research associated with the Ranger, Ella, Condor, Stormy Petrel, 
Lynx, Hebe, Wild Dayrell and Phantom illustrate that effectiveness. Although 
little evidence of associated cargo was found on eight of the other identified 
blockade runners, it is possible that the heavily sanded sites and those yet to be 
located and identified could contain concentrations of material similar to that 
found on the Modern Greece. 
In spite of the Proclamation of Neutrality issued by Queen Victoria, 
Britons generally adopted a neutrality of convenience. While Foreign Minister 
Lord John Russell took measures to ensure that Britain would recognize the 
Union blockade, he adopted the unofficial position that the blockade would be 
ineffective and British merchants could continue to maintain trade with the 
Confederacy as long as it was discrete and did not provoke a confrontation with 
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the United States. 2 In a letter to Russell touching on the situation, Lord 
Palmerston wrote: 
As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on 
as we have [and] to keep quite clear of the conflict between North 
and South.... I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would 
not justify such a proceeding, [combined French and British 
intervention in America] unless, indeed, the distress created by 
that want was far more serious than it is likely to be. The 
probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from 
America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from 
other quarters. 3 
Responding to an inquiry from United States Secretary of State Seward 
concerning the exportation of war materials to the Confederacy, Minister 
Charles Adams pointed out that British merchants were not restrained by 
either parliamentary law or crown regulations. By early 1862, British officials 
had made it clear that the trade developing at Nassau and Bermuda would not 
be constrained as long as customs and port regulations were not violated. In a 
letter to John B. Lafitte at Nassau, John T. Bourne wrote "You will see in our 
Gazette the proclamation prohibiting the exporting of Arms etc., but carefully 
read it and you will see that its simply notifying that such a law has received 
sanction [but will not be] acted on without England is at war with some 
power-114 
Despite the publication of the Queen's proclamation in the 3 July 1861, 
Royal Gazette by the Colonial Secretary and the passage of an act prohibiting the 
importation of arms by the Bermuda Legislature in August 1862, Bermuda 
officials turned a blind eye to Anglo-Confederate trade. So obvious was their 
attitude that Bourne wrote A. 
I. M. Gilbert, Assistant-Receiver General at St. 
Georges on 4 January 1862 to blatantly complain that United States intentions 
to develop a coal depot in Bermuda was "highly prejudicial to the Mercantile 
interest of this Colony. "5 On 15 November 1861, Bermuda Governor H. St. 
2 Lord Russell to Lord Lyons, 16 August 1861, Lyons Papers, PRO. 
3 Adams, Ephraim D., Great Britain and the American Civil War, 2 Vols., Vol. 1, Peter Smith, 
Gloucester, 1957, pp. 199-200, Palmerston to Russell, 18 October 1861, Lyons Papers, PRO. 
4John T. Bourne to John B. Lafitte, 1 January 1862, Vandiver, Confederate Blockade Running 
Through Bermuda, p. 34. 
5J. T. Bourne to A. I. M. Gilbert, Assistant-Receiver General at St. Georges, 4 January 1862, 
Vandiver, Confederate Blockade Running, Through Bermuda, p. 9. 
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George Ord received a circular from the Foreign Office that clarified proper 
treatment of Confederate merchant vessels. The opinion had been formulated 
by the "law Offices of the Crown" and specified that "no Foreign Consul has 
any power or jurisdiction to seize any vessel (under whatever Flag) within 
British Territorial Waters, and that the British Authorities ought not to take 
any steps adverse to Merchant vessels of the Confederate States, or to interfere 
with their free resort to British Ports. "6 
That circular went on to state that "supplies even of articles clearly 
'Contraband of War' (such as Arms or ammunition) to the vessels of either 
party, the Colonial Authorities are not at liberty to interfere unless anything 
should be done in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act which prohibits the 
"equipping, furnishing, fitting out, and arming of ships or vessels for the 
service of Foreign belligerent powers.... "7 Clearly that position provided 
colonial merchants with considerable latitude to support and engage in Anglo- 
Confederate trade. 
One of the best sources of information on the nature and scope of Anglo- 
Confederate trade are the Bermuda Customs records. They provide insight into 
the vessels and cargos that were cleared through the Bermuda ports of St. 
Georges and Hamilton. Unfortunately, because of the clandestine nature of the 
trade those records are not entirely accurate or comprehensive. Most of the 
inbound manifests reflect a conscious effort to ensure that contraband was not 
specifically identified. Cargos from Confederate ports, on the other hand, 
appear to have been less sensitive to public scrutiny and throughout the 
rebellion were listed more accurately in Bermuda Customs records. 
The first steamer to clear Bermuda Customs with a cargo from the 
Confederacy was the Economist which brought out "837 Bales Cotton" and "405 
Bbls Rosin" and stopped in Bermuda enroute to Liverpool. 8 When the 
Southwick arrived on 2 May 1862 and the Gladiator cleared on 8 May 1862 their 
cargos from Charleston were listed in detail. The Southwick carried: 
629 Bales Cotton 
702 Bbls Turpentine 
72 Tons 15 Cwt. Logwood 
6Bermuda Circular, Foreign Office, 15 November 1861, Governor's Papers, BA. 
7 Ibid. 
8Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Economist 19 April 1862, BA, and Bermuda Customs, 
Out-bound St. Georges, Economist 6 March 1862, BA. 
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20 Pieces Ebony 
65 -Do- Satin Wood 9 
The Gladiator had on board: 
932 Bales Cotton 
100 Bbls Rosin 
2 BbIs Oil 
3 -Do- Ale 
8 -Do- Bread 
3 Kegs Paint 
75 Packages Tobacco 
1 Sugar 
1 Butterl0 
Cotton, tobacco and to a lesser degree the rosin carried on the Southwick and 
Gladiator were typical of the cargos brought out of Confederate ports. 
The Confederate steamer Cornubia consistently brought out cotton, 
tobacco, turpentine and occasionally rosin. The following table of the 
Cornubia's cargos entered at St. Georges effectively illustrates the nature of 
material taken out of the Confederacy. 
Cornubia 
Date 
19/1/63 
19/2/63 
23/3/63 
27/7/63 
8/9/63 
17/10/63 
Cotton 
304 bales 
324 bales 
314 bales 
268 bales 
384 bales 
364 bales 
Tobacco 
30 boxes 
26 boxes 
27 cases 
104.5 tierces 
5 boxes 
Turpentine 
1 barrel 
2 casks 
2 casks 
19 barrels 
5 barrels 
Rosin 
9 barrels 
When the North Carolina owned steamer A. D. Vance was captured 
running out of Wilmington on 
10 September 1864, the vessel was carrying 391 
bales of cotton, 3301 pounds of 
loose cotton, 10 barrels of spirit turpentine, 64 
yellow pine planks, 2 manilla 
hawsers and 1 hemp hawser as cargo. " The 
913ermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Southwick, 2 May 1862, BA. 
10 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Gladiator 8 May 1862, BA. 
11 Cargo of A. D. Vance, New York District 
Court Records, 181-13, NA, Bayonne New Jersey 
Regional Center. 
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following table of the A. D. Vance's cargos entered at St. Georges illustrates the 
nature of material that vessel took out of the Confederacy. I 
A. D. Vance 
Date Cotton Tobacco Turpentine Rosin 
27/7/63 500 bales 10 barrels 
26/9/63 530 bales 35 barrels 
12/2/64 670 bales 1 box 9 barrels 
19/3/64 1 bag 2 boxes 
The steamer Annie, owned and operated jointly by the State of North Carolina 
and Alexander Collie and Company, was captured on 1 November 1864 with a 
cargo consisting of 225 bales of cotton, 168 tierces of tobacco, 92 boxes of tobacco 
and 8 barrels of spirit turpentine. 12 The other vessel owned jointly by North 
Carolina and Alexander Collie was the steamer Hansa. On two documented 
trips through the blockade that vessel brought out a total of 945 bales of cotton, 
77 tierces of tobacco, 7 half tierces of tobacco and 8 barrels of spirit turpentine. 13 
The Mary Celestia owned by Colonel William Crenshaw and Company cleared 
at St. Georges three times before being lost on the reefs south of Sinky Bay, 
Bermuda in September 1864. On those three voyages the Mary Cclcstia brought 
in a total of 1,877 bales of cotton and 4 barrels of spirit turpentine. 14 
At Wilmington, cotton was by far the most important export. In a2 
September 1863 message to John Slidell, Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. 
Benjamin reported that cotton exports at Wilmington, North Carolina 
amounted to $3,240,000 dollars per year. That amount was more than four and 
a half times the foreign commerce of the entire state in 1858.15 In April and 
May 1863, fifteen thousand bales of cotton were exported from Charleston and 
Wilmington. 16 
12 Cargo of Annie, New York District Court 
Records, 184 -3, NA, Bayonne New Jersey Regional 
Center. 
13 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Hansa, 7 September 1863, BA and Bermuda Customs, 
In-bound, St. Georges, Hansa, 16 February 1864, BA. 
1413ermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Mary Celestia 9 July 1863,4 July 1864 and 29 July 1864 
September 1863, BA. 
15 J. P. Benjamin to John Slidell, 2 September 1863, in James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers 
of the Confederacy, 2 vols., 
Vol. 2, United States Publishing Company, Nashville, Tennessee, 
1905, pp. 550-551. 
161bid. 
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During the month of July 1863 vessels brought more than 2,174 bales of 
cotton from Wilmington alone. The Gladiator carried 1130 bales, the Cornubia 
carried 236 bales, the A. D. Vance carried 500 bales, the Banshee brought out 44 
bales having had to throw most of the cargo overboard to escape a chase and 
the Eugenie brought out 264 1/2 bales. 17 During 1863, at least 14,170 bales of 
cotton were brought out through the blockade at Wilmington by steamers. 18 
The following year that number increased to 36,625 bales in spite of the 
increased number of Union vessels committed to closing the Cape Fear to 
Anglo-Confederate trade. 19 That amount of cotton was 20% more than was 
exported from Wilmington in 1860.20 
In addition to cotton, Anglo-Confederate steamers brought tobacco and 
naval stores through the blockade to finance Confederate acquisitions. Because 
tobacco was shipped in tierces, boxes, caddies, packages and hogsheads it is 
difficult to calculate the amount shipped through Bermuda. In 1862, the 
Gladiator brought 75 packages of tobacco into St. Georges. The following year 
steamer cargos at St. Georges included 495 boxes, 382 tierces, 179 packages and 27 
cases of tobacco. In 1864, the amount of tobacco coming to Bermuda from 
Wilmington increased by a factor of almost ten. At St. Georges 4,787 boxes, 
1,013 tierces, 477 drums, 62 packages, 62 caddies, 85 keys and 27 cases, 20 
hogsheads and 402 pounds of tobacco were recorded by Bermuda Customs. 21 
Prior to the rebellion, naval stores had been one of the most important 
export commodities at Wilmington. The 1860 Kelley's Wilmington Directory 
claimed that the city was the largest naval stores market in the world. 22 During 
the 1860-1861 season for naval stores, 37,000 barrels of crude turpentine, 42,000 
barrels of spirits of turpentine, 140,000 barrels of rosin and 35,000 barrels of tar 
were exported. 23 During the blockade exports of naval stores fell off 
dramatically. Steamers only rarely carried rosin and only 644 barrels and 56 
17Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Gladiator 21 July 1863, Cornubia 27 July 1863, A. D. 
Vance 27 July 1863, Banshee 27 July 1863 and Eugenic 27 July 1863, BA. 
18 Inventory of Bermuda Customs Records, In-bound, St. Georges, 1863 BA. 
19 Inventory of Bermuda Customs Records, In-bound, St. Georges, 1864, BA. 
20 Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Agriculture of the United States In 1860; Compiled from the Original 
Returns of the Eighth Census Under the Direction of the Secretary of Interior. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1864. p. 109. 
21 Inventory of Bermuda Customs Records, In-bound, St. Georges, 1862,1863 and 1864, BA. 
22 Kelley's Wilmington Directory, Wilmington, North Carolina, 1860-1861, p. 13. 
23 Richard E. Wood, "Port Town at War: Wilmington, North Carolina 1860-1865. " Unpublished 
Ph. D. Dissertation, Florida State University, 1976, p. 3. 
335 
casks of turpentine were brought out to Bermuda in 1863. The following year 
that amount dropped to only 73 barrels. 24 That volume suggests that a few 
captains carried a limited amount of turpentine to soak cotton for burning in 
the boilers in the event of a close chase. That practice was apparently employed 
on more than one occasion. 25 
While the cargos of blockade runners inbound from Wilmington were 
carefully listed at St. Georges, Bermuda Customs agents exercised discretion in 
entering and clearing Anglo-Confederate vessels with cargos shipped from 
Europe throughout the war. In 1862, that discretion must have been of 
considerable importance as steamers arriving from Great Britain were 
consistently entered with cargos of "General Merchandize". The Economist, 
the first steam blockade runner to arrive in Bermuda, was entered at St. 
Georges on 28 February 1862 with a cargo listed as "General Merchandize". The 
captain listed the vessel's destination as Melbourne. 26 The Southwick, 
Bermuda and Herald entered at St. Georges in March 1862. While the 
Southwick was entered with "General Merchandize", the entire cargo of 
Bermuda was listed in meticulous detail. The Herald was entered with 94 cases 
of "Stationary & Printing Materials. "27 
By the fall of 1862, Bermuda Customs agents at St. Georges began to relax 
their efforts at discretion. When the Fraser, Trenholm and Company steamer 
Minho cleared for Halifax on 26 September, the inventory included not only 
"General Merchandize" and "Hardware" but a surprisingly detailed list of 
material that included: 
48 Hhds: Brandy 
211/2 Casks Do: 
63 Cases-Do 
10 Casks Wine 
673 Cases Wine 
6 -1/4 Gs Whiskey 
14 Hhds Spirits 
8 Cases Apothey Ware 
1 Do Marine Glasses 
1 Do Cutlery, 7 Cases Quinine 
2 Bales Mdze 
641 Cases Genl Mdze 
441 Cases Hardware 
31 Boxes Candles 
5 Cases Drugs 
3 Parcels Thread 
8 Packages Mdze (Boots) 
12 Chest Tea "Ex Merrimac" 
1 Case Stationery 
12 Cases Mustard & Starch 
37 Bbls Ale & Porter 
6 Do Crushed Sugar 
1 Box Sardines 
4 Cases Mdze: (Meats) 
14 Kegs Gunpowder 
2 Cases Maize 
24 Inventory of Bermuda Customs Records, In-bound, St. Georges, 1863 and 1864. 
25 Thomas E. Taylor, Running the Blockade. London: J. Murray, 1897, p. 80. 
26 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Economist, 28 February 1862, BA. 
27Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Herald, 25 October 1862, BA. 
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83 Do Mdze 5 Cases Tea 
4 Do, Do 1 Do Screws 
176 Packages General Mdze 8 Cases Tin 
500 Bags Salt 2 Do Shoes 
12 Sacks Do 
7 Rolls Lead 
3 Bags Pepper 
10 Do. Coffee 
25 Sheets Iron 
3 Cases Cream28 
Another Fraser, Trenholm and Company vessel, Herald, cleared for St. 
Johns, New Brunswick on 25 October and St. Georges Customs recorded: 
30 Cases Quinine 
201 Cases Hardware 
101 Cases General Mdze: 
64 Bbls: Combustible do- 
167 Boxes -Do: - -Do- 
500 Bags Salt Petre 
500 Bbls: Gunpowder 
3 Cases Merchandize 
4 Casks Brandy 
1 Hhd: Sherry Wine 
1 Case Merchandize 
25 Hams & 25 Cheese 
12 Cases Brandy 
52 Bundles Oakum 
42 Cases & Trunks Consistg 
Boots, Shoes Flannels & 
General Merchandize29 
That general combination of unidentified "General Merchandize, " "Hardware" 
and "Combustible Merchandize" and more specifically identified goods such as 
consumables, wines and liquors, 
bulk metals and chemicals, gunpowder and 
ammunition characterize the outward 
Bermuda Customs cargo manifests for 
the remainder of the period of blockade running. The extent to which customs 
agents went to disguise cargos 
that were clearly in violation of British 
neutrality is readily apparent when 
the documents associated with blockade 
runners are compared with vessels 
that continued to serve Bermuda's 
traditional commerce with New York and 
Halifax. Manifests of vessels like the 
28 Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, 
Minho, 26 September 1862, BA. 
29Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Herald 25 October 1862, BA. 
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Princess Royal, Hound, Merlin, Alpha, Delta, Harkaway and Oleander were 
meticulously recorded for each voyage 30 
The first steamer to clear at Bermuda was the iron screw Fingal 
dispatched by Confederate agents Bulloch and Anderson. At St. Georges on 4 
November 1861, the Fingal was listed as having a "General Cargo of 
Merchandise. "31 The Fingal cleared Bermuda Customs at St. Georges with 
nothing more that the statement that "Inward Cargo Outwards. "32 William 
Cook, United States Consul in Glasgow, had been instructed by Minister 
Charles Adams to investigate the Fingal and his reports confirmed that the 
steamer was actually carrying "about 300 or 400 Bales which may contain Army 
uniforms and clothing, about 300 cases of rifles and 150 cases of pistols, some 
cannon (3 or more), and gunpowder. "33 Cook subsequently forwarded a copy of 
the 12 October 1861 Clyde Bill of Entry which contained a declaration of the 
Fingal's cargo. That included: 
Fingal (ss) of Glasgow, Anderson, Honduras, 325 (30 men) 
-C S Caird 
with 410 bxs, 73 bis, 236 cks, 1091 cs, 1 trk-11,340 rifles £42,660,60 
pistols £210,24,100 lbs gunpowder £805,409,000 cartridges £1195, 
550,000 percussion caps £162, apparel £600, apothecaries' wares 
£80,500 sabres £350, wrot leather £200,4 pcs ordnance (12 1/2 ts) 
£300,1 1/2 is lead shot £35,7 is shells £929,230 swords £230,9982 
yds blankets £124034 
The screw steamer Economist, that cleared at St. Georges on 27 February 
1862, and the screw steamer Southwick, that cleared at St. Georges on 22 March 
1862, were both listed as carrying nondescript cargos of "General Merchandze" a 
term that would be used extensively by Bermuda Customs agents to describe 
Anglo-Confederate goods of every description for the duration of the 
blockade. 35 Although cargos like that carried on 24 March 1862, by the paddle 
steamer Herald were identified as cases of "Stationary and Printing Materials" 
30 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, 1862,1863 and 1864, BA. 
31 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Fingal, 4 November 1861, BA. 
32 Ibid. 
33 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 8 October 1861, RG 84, NA. 
34 Clyde Bill of Entry and Shipping List, 12 October 1861, Vol. XX, No. 123, Glasgow included 
with U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 18 October 1861, RG 84, NA. 
35 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, 27 February and 22 March 1862, BA and Bermuda 
Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, 6 and 24 March 1862, BA. 
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most descriptions were limited to "Cases Merchandize" or "Mdze & Hardware" 
and "Cases Mdze Combustible Nature. "36 Exceptions were "Gunpowder" and 
"ammunition" which 'may have been documented due to the necessity for 
special handling and storage 37 
When the steamer Peterhoff arrived from Hull on 2 August 1862, the 
vessel was entered with "General Mdze" but the declaration revealed that the 
cargo consisted of "Wines, Brandies & Manufact Goods". 38 The Gladiator 
arrived from Liverpool on 22 August with a cargo of "1468 Cases Genel 
Manufact Mdze & Hardware, 1021 Bags Saltpetre, 1085 Cases Mdze Combustible 
Nature, 1066 Bbls Gun Powder. "39 "General Mdze & 1200 Bbls Gunpowder" 
was the cargo listed for the steamer Merrimac that followed Gladiator on 5 
September 1862.40 The Anglia was reported to have been loaded "a large 
quantity of arms" in London but, entered at St. Georges with "General 
Merchandize" and cleared for Nassau in "Ballast. "41 The Confederate steamer 
Cornubia also entered at St. Georges on 3 December 1862 in ballast in spite of 
the fact that the U. S. Consul at Glasgow reported that the vessel was "loaded 
with goods contraband of war and supplies for persons in insurrection against 
the government of the United States. "42 On clearing Bermuda Customs those 
same vessels were also listed as carrying "Inward Cargo Outwards" as was the 
case with the steamer Fingal or "General Merchandize" like the Economist. 43 
The clandestine nature of blockade running and the lengths to which 
Confederate agents and British merchants went to avoid any suggestion that 
their activities violated British law contributed significantly to the fact that 
historical documentation cannot support the development of a detailed picture 
of the trade. Material salvaged from the remains of the Modern Greece 
provided considerable archaeological insight into the issue and suggested that 
36 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Herald 24 March, Phoebe 28 July and Gladiator 23 
August 1862, BA. 
37 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Phoebe 28 July and Gladiator 23 August 1862, BA. 
38 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Peterhoff 2 August 1862, BA. 
39 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Gladiator 22 August 1862, BA. 
40 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Merrimac 5 September 1862, BA. 
41 Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Anglia 21 July 1862, BA and Bermuda Customs, In- 
bound St. Georges, Anglia 8 August 1862, BA. 
42 U. S. Consular Dispatch, Glasgow, 1 September 1862, RG 84, NA. 
43 Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Fingal 4 November 1861, BA and Bermuda Customs, 
Out-bound, St. Georges, Economist 6 March 1861, BA. 
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investigation of additional shipwrecks could generate data unavailable in the 
historical record. 
More than ten thousand artifacts were recovered from the wreck of the 
Modern Greece following rediscovery of the wreck in 1962.44 That collection 
was published by the North Carolina Division of Archives and History in 
1977.45 For the purpose of that publication the collection was divided into 
ship's equipment and fittings, firearms and ordnance, bulk materials, surgical 
instruments, tools and implements, edged weapons and pocket knives, 
housewares, hardware, containers and miscellaneous material. Firearms and 
ordnance recovered from the Modern Greece consisted almost entirely of 
Whitworth projectiles and Enfield rifles and accoutrements. The Whitworth 
projectiles were of two varieties. Of a total of 85 that were recovered, 75 proved 
to be solid bolts and 10 were found to be explosive shells. Both the shells and 
bolts were originally packed 10 to a case. One of the 12-pounder Whitworth 
rifles salvaged from the Modern Greece remains in the collections of the 
Washington Navy Yard Museum in Washington, D. C. 46 
In addition to the Whitworth projectiles, material from the Modern 
Greece included the remains of 215 Enfield 1853 pattern rifled muskets. With 
the exception of three contract rifles that were produced by Ward and Sons of 
Birmingham, the entire collection appears to have been produced by either the 
Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield or the London Armory Company of 
Bermondsey. 47 The collection of Enfields includes both the three band rifle- 
muskets and the two band short rifles. The rifles were packaged in cases of 24 
with shipping plugs, nipple protectors, bayonets, leather slings and a bullet 
mold. Two types of bayonets were included; 93 triangular socket bayonets for 
the rifled muskets and 104 saber bayonets for use with the short rifles. A total 
of fifteen clusters of percussion caps and several hundred . 577 caliber rifle 
projectiles with boxwood base plugs were also recovered. 48 
Bulk cargo included ingots of both lead and tin. The lead ingots 
averaged 142.5 pounds in weight and ranged in from as little as 127.5 pounds to 
as much as 158 pounds. With one exception, each of the lead ingots was 
44 Watts and Bright, IJNA, 1973. 
45Bright, et-al., NCDAH, 1977. 
46 Ibid., pp. 49 and 58. 
47Bailey, D. W. British Military Longarms 1715-1865. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1971. 
48 Bright, et. al., NCDAH, pp. 54-57. 
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stamped: "Bagillt Works" and "Newton Keats & Co. " at "Liverpool. "49 The 
exception was stamped: "Bagillt Works" and "Newton Lyon & Co. " at 
"Liverpool. "50 Each of the bars was stamped with a number and some were 
additionally stamped with a letter or combination of letters. 51 
A total of 43 ingots of tin were also recovered from the Modern Greece. 
The tin ingots averaged 58.85 pounds in weight and ranged in from as little as 
51.5 pounds to as much as 74 pounds. Each of the tin ingots was marked "T 
BOLITHO & SONS PENZANCE" on one end and contained the representation 
of a sheep with a banner over the name "CHYANDOUR" on the other end. 
Three different types of banners were identified among the 43 ingots. Two are 
suggestive of the English cross of St. George and the other the banner of 
Scotland. 52 
Bulk material also included seventeen cases of tinned steel sheets. Each 
case held 125 sheets, each . 026" thick and 11 inches by 16 inches in width and 
length. A single spool of wire was recovered from the Modern Greece. That 
spool was 18 inches in diameter and 36 inches in length. The spool had a core 
of copper wire that was covered by steel wire. The copper wire was . 125 inches 
in diameter and the steel was . 055 inches in diameter. 53 Two kegs were found 
to contain approximately 200 pounds of horseshoe nails in three sizes. 54 
Six surgeons medical field kits were included in the collection. The kits 
were shipped in rectangular mahogany boxes that were fitted with brass 
hardware. The kits included a variety of instruments including tongue 
depressors, surgical knives with wood and gutta-percha handles, probes, bone 
saws, scalpels, scarifiers and a tourniquet press both marked "W. & H. 
Hutchinson, Sheffield. "55 
Tools and implements carried by the Modern Greece included a dozen 
axes, 38 flat metal drill bits, 14 ratchet drills, 9 hammer heads, 11 cold chisels 
and approximately 1,600 wood chisels of three basic types. Three maker's 
marks associated with the chisels included "Wright Holdsworth & Co., " "C. 
Henry Sheffield" and "John K. Turner Sheffield. " A keg of files was estimated 
49 Ibid., pp. 59-63. 
50 Ibid., p. 59. 
51 Ibid., pp. 59-63. 
52 Ibid., pp. 64-69. 
53 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
541bid., p. 152. 
55lbid., pp. 73-83. 
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to contain approximately 1,000 triangular, flat and half round types. In addition 
35 packages were estimated to contain another 1,150 files and 156 were found 
loose. Approximately 746 wood gouges ranging from 1/8 to 1" were clustered 
in sets of a dozen. 56 
Each of 134 hoes in the collection were found to have been stamped 
"Yates & Co., Aston Manor. " Another collection of 50 hand saw blades and one 
consisting of 91 picks had no identifying makers marks. Three wood handles 
accompanied the saw blades. The picks were of two types. One type had two 
pick ends and the other was equipped with a pick and mattock combination. 57 
No handles accompanied the hoes or mattocks. A dozen axes and 13 hatchets 
were also shipped without handles. 58 Although probably not part of the cargo, 
the Modern Greece also carried a set of dies with handles and a set of taps, a 
carpenter's marking gauge, awl and rasp handles, a screw driver and several 
adjustable wrenches-59 
The cargo of the Modern Greece included both side and pocket knives. 
The side knives included 107 complete knives, 84 blade fragments and 94 
handle fragments. The collection included a wide range of blade and handle 
types. Blades included several clip point and spear point designs and handles 
included a wide variety of stag, wood, cast German silver and combination cast 
German silver and mother of pearl. No manufacturers marks were found on 
the side knives. Styles suggest that some of the side knives could have been 
made by George Worstenholm & Son at Sheffield and some of the German 
silver handles could be attributable to John Biggin also of Sheffield. 60 A variety 
of sheath hardware was found in association with the knives. 61 
A total of twelve types of pocket knives were found on the Modern 
Greece. The knives were packaged in lots of six or twelve and were wrapped in 
paper for shipping. Some were fitted with one blade, others with two. Handle 
material included gutta-percha, wood and stag. Only one manufacturer's mark, 
"J. K. Turner & Co. Sheffield, " was found on the side knives. 62 
56 Ibid., pp. 83-95. 
571bid., pp. 99-103. 
58 Ibid., pp. 83 and 99. 
59 Ibid., pp. 102-108. 
60 Richard Washer, The Sheffield Bowie & Pocket-knife Makers 1825-1925, Zeros Printers, 
Nottingham, 1974 and Bright, et. al., NCDAH, 1977, pp. 110-120. 
611bid., pp. 128-132. 
62 Ibid., pp. 122-127. 
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A variety of domestic or household items included 86 flat irons 
produced by "Tho. Green" and "W. LEES & SONS" that weighed from 4 to 5.5 
pounds. Four large cooking forks and approximately 1,000 table forks, some 
with ebony handles and some entirely of metal were packed in conjunction 
with table knives. The table knives were fitted with ebony and gutta-percha 
handles. Maker's marks were limited but include "John K. Turner Sheffield" 
and "C. WALTERS & CO. GLOBE WORKS SHEFFIELD. " Spoons included 11 
serving, 72 table and 65 teaspoons. Approximately 200 pair of scissors of four 
designs were present in the cargo. 63 
Material recovered from the Modern Greece suggested that continued 
investigation of blockade runners could produce additional information 
concerning the specific nature of cargos run through the blockade. One of the 
objectives of blockade runner related research has been to identify another 
wreck with an undisturbed cargo. During the past thirty years, the remains of 
eighteen blockade runners have been located, identified and to some degree 
investigated. Those vessels include the Modern Greece and Kate lost in 1862, 
the Hebe, Phantom, Arabian, Elizabeth, Douro, Venus and Beaureguard lost in 
1863 and the Bendigo, Ranger, Wild Dayrell, Dec, Fanny & Jenny, Lynx, Ella, 
Stormy Petrel and Agnes E. Fry lost in 1864. 
Of those wrecks the Kate, Douro (1), Arabian, Beaureguard and Lynx, 
were lost running out with cargos consisting of cotton and naval stores. The 
remaining vessels, Hebe, Phantom, Elizabeth, Douro (2), Venus, Bendigo, 
Ranger, Wild Dayrell, Dee, Fanny & Jenny, Ella, Stormy Petrel and Agnes E. Fry 
were lost running in with cargos from Europe. Examination of those wrecks 
and the historical record associated with them confirmed that they were 
effectively salvaged or the cargos destroyed. 
The Hebe and Venus were run ashore under the guns of Half Moon 
Battery. A company from Fort Fisher was engaged in salvaging cargo from the 
Hebe when they were attacked by six Union vessels and a landing party that 
captured one of the Whitworth rifles from the Modern Greece. 64 Acting 
Ensign E. H. Dewey boarded the Hebe with a party from the USS Niphon and 
reported that the cargo consisted of "coffee, drugs and medicines, clothing, and 
63 Ibid., pp. 133-148. 
64 Governor Z. B. Vance Papers, P. C. 15.3, pp. 229-230, NCDAH and J. B. Breck to A. L. Case, 18 
August 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 166-167. 
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a few bales of silk. "65 Examination of the wreck confirmed that the hull had 
collapsed to the turn of the bilge and nothing was exposed in the cargo holds. 66 
A boarding party form the USS Nansemond reported that the cargo of the 
Venus consisted of "lead, drugs, dry goods, bacon, and coffee. "67 As the Venus 
was also under the guns of Half Moon Battery, Confederate soldiers from Fort 
Fisher were able to salvage portions of the cargo that survived the fire set by the 
Nansemond's boarding party and a considerable amount of material from the 
vessel itself. Because the Venus cleared at Nassau for the run through the 
blockade no final cargo manifest has survived. An advertisement placed in the 
16 December 1863 Wilmington Journal by Wreck Master J. A. Sanders 
announced the auction of material from the Venus. Salvaged material 
included "ANCHORS, CHAINS, RIGGING, ROPE, BAR & SHEET IRON, 
BRASS AND COPPER, FILES, PARTS OF THE ENGINES, STOVES, 
FURNITURE, AND ONE LARGE SAIL. 1168 
The Phantom and Wild Dayrell were run ashore well north of the 
protection of any permanent Confederate battery. "Flying" Whitworth batteries 
from Fort Fisher were quickly moved into position to provide sufficient 
protection for salvage operations. When the Wild Dayrell went aground in 
Rich Inlet on 1 February 1864, the crew threw overboard as many packages of 
merchandise, shoes, blankets and provisions as possible and set the ship on fire 
before being discovered and chased away by the USS Sassacus. Most of what 
they were able to throw overboard floated to the beach and was recovered. 69 
Because the wreck was above Masonboro Inlet Confederate forces could not 
protect the steamer by bringing artillery up the beach to drive Union vessels 
away from the wreck. However, by the time the USS Florida returned to the 
wreck on 5 February a battery of rifled Whitworth cannon opened fire from the 
mainland hitting the vessel wounding one member of the crew. 70 Goods 
thrown overboard, although frequently damaged, were reported to the 
65 E. H. Dewey to J. B. Breck, 18 August 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 167-168. 
66 Watts, Hebe survey notes 10 July 1988, on file with author. 
67 R. H. Lamson to S. P. Lee, 21 October 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 249-250. 
68 Wilmington Journal, 16 December 1863, p. 3, col. 4. 
69 F. A. Roe to S. P. Lee, ORN, I, 9, pp. 438-439. 
70 P. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 5 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 460-461. 
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Wilmington Wreck Master and sold for the benefit of the owners and 
salvors. 71 Because the Wild Dayrcll cleared at Nassau for the final voyage no 
list of the cargo has survived. 
Although Commander John J. Almy informed S. P. Lee that "we shall 
try to make everything a total wreck.... the rebels shall not have a remnant of 
her" material was also recovered from the Phantom. 72 On 29 September, the 
USS Niphon shelled the wreck of the Phantom for an hour and a half firing 76 
rounds and hitting the target 20 times. 73 The impact was apparently marginal 
as most of the cargo was apparently saved. On 30 September Major-General W. 
H. C. Whiting reported to Chief of Ordnance Colonel Gorgas that: 
Captain Porter has, with great gallantry and much personal 
exposure, directed successfully the troops and his crew in saving 
the cargo, under a daily and heavy fire, and in this he deserves in 
every way the consideration and commendation of the 
Department. 
The loss of the vessel is what may happen to any 
commander. The course he has pursued since belongs to himself, 
and I hope that he will be continued in service for the good of our 
cause. 
Backed by our brave soldiers, I think that the saving of the 
cargo of the Phantom is due to the personal skill and gallantry of 
Captain Porter. 74 
In his report to the War Department on 15 November 1863, Secretary of 
War James Seddon reported that importation by the steamers Columbia, R. E. 
Lee, Merrimac, Eugenic, and Phantom between 30 September 1862 and 30 
September 1863 included: 113,504 small arms, large quantities of saltpeter, lead, 
cartridges, percussion-caps, flannel and paper for cartridges, leather, hardware 
and three 8-inch rifled and 12 
3/4 inch rifled Blakeley guns. At least two of 
those Blakeley rifles, some of the leather goods, powder and some quantity of 
Austrian rifles were recovered from the Phantom. 75 Phantom's manifest for 
the final voyage from St. Georges included: 
71Wilmington Daily Journal, 19 November 1863, p. 3, col. 4. 
72 J. J. Almy to S. P. Lee, 23 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 216-217 and Richmond Whig, 29 
September 1863. 
73 Abstract log of the USS Niphon, 29 September 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 221-222. 
74 W. H. C. Whiting to J. Gorgas, 30 September 1863, ORA, I, 29, p. 763. 
75 Report of the Secretary of War, 15 November 1863, ORA, IV, I, pp. 955-956 and Bermuda and 
Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Phantom, 19 September 1863, BA. 
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200 Pigs Lead 
2 Blakeley Guns 
50 Cases Leather 
50 Cases Austrian Rifles 
135 Barrels Pork 
150 Casks Gunpowder 
1 Case Merchandize76 
Cargos from the wrecks of the steamers Dee and Fanny & Jenny were 
also at least partially salvaged. After the Dee was discovered on 6 February 
1864, a boarding party from the USS Niphon threw over 170 pigs of lead. The 
remainder of the cargo, bacon and spirits, were burned and the vessel was 
"completely destroyed" when the boarding party abandoned ship. 77 After 
Union vessels abandoned their efforts to destroy the Dec, Confederate salvors 
recovered most of the remaining lead. Four days later the Fanny & Jenny was 
driven ashore north of Masonboro Inlet immediately south of the Dee. 78 
Efforts to get the Fanny & Jenny off proved impossible because the remarkably 
accurate fire from a Whitworth battery drove the USS Florida away from the 
wreck. 79 On 15 February 1864, the "HULL, MACHINERY, BOATS and all 
appurtenances belonging to the Steam Ship Fanny and Jenny as she now lies 
stranded near Wrightsville Sound" were advertised for auction the following 
day by Wilkes Morris at Wilmington. 80 According to Commander Crosby of 
the USS Florida, the Fanny & Jenny was carrying a cargo of coal and "small 
articles of merchandise. "81 Because the Fanny & Jenny's last voyage originated 
at Nassau no historical evidence of the cargo survives. 
At Lockwoods Folly Inlet the steamers Elizabeth and Bendigo, were both 
salvaged. The Elizabeth was run ashore and unloaded before Captain Thomas 
Lockwood set the vessel on fire on the morning of 24 September. 82 On 3 
October the hull and machinery of the Elizabeth were advertised for auction. 
The Wilmington Daily journal advertisement indicated that the engines were 
7613ermuda Customs, Out-bound St. Georges, Phantom, 19 September 1863, BA. 
77 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 7 February 1864, ONR, I, 9, p. 467. 
78 P. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, 1,9, pp. 473-474. 
79 P. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, 1,9, pp. 473-474 and Keeler, Aboard the USS 
Florida, pp. 149-154. 
80 Wilmington Daily Journal, 15 February 1864, p. 3, col. 3. 
81 P. Crosby to S. P. Lee, 10 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 473-474 
82 Notes on Information from Prisoners taken from the Douro by Lt. Lamson, USS Nansemond, 12 
October 1963, ORN, 1,9, p. 234. 
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in good order and the coppered hull contained valuable material for salvage. 83 
When the Bendigo was found by the USS Fahkee on the morning of 3 January 
1864 there was "no cargo or freight of any description on board. "84 Because the 
Elizabeth and Bendigo cleared from Nassau no customs records are available to 
shed light on the cargo. 
The Ranger ran aground off Holdens Beach early on the morning of 11 
January and was scuttled and burned to prevent Union vessels from salvaging 
the cargo or getting the steamer afloat. At night and in "thick weather" rifles 
and tools on the Ranger were salvaged by Confederates that commanded the 
Holdens Beach shoreline. 85 Ranger's outbound cargo listed at St Georges, 
Bermuda consisted of: 
200 Sacks Saltpeter 16 Bbls Salt 
200 Cases Rifles 50 Cads Tea 
202 Coils Rope 30 half Chests 
5 Bls Bagging 1 Case Quinine 
1900 1 Case Borax 
50" 208 Oil 
106 " Rope 3 Cases Hand Cards 
25 Cases Enger Instrmts 3" of 
3" Sheet Copper 2" it 
50 Pigs Lead 1 to to 
50 Bbls Copperas 2" 
14 " Salt 2" 
20 Kegs Soda 1 to of 
60 Bbls loaf Sugar 1 It "86 
In December 1864, the steamers Ella and Agnes C. Fry were chased 
aground attempting to enter Old Inlet and Confederate artillery frustrated 
Union efforts to destroy both vessels. 87 The Ella, aground on Marshall Shoal, 
was under the guns of both Fort Caswell and Fort Holmes. The Agnes E. Fry 
was chased ashore on Oak Island near the remains of the Georgiana McCaw. 
The Ella was salvaged by Confederates from Fort Holmes on Smith Island and 
the Agnes E. Fry was salvaged by the garrison at Fort Caswell. 88 Material 
83 Wilmington Daily Journal, 3 October 1863, p. 3, col. 3. 
84 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 10 January 1864, ORN, 1,9, pp. 385-386. 
85 W. G. Saltonstall to S. P. Lee, 2 February 1864, ORN, I, 9, pp. 436-437. 
86Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Ranger, 2 December 1863, BA. 
87 T. C. Dunn to G. W. Young, 3 December 1863, ORN, I, 11, p. 127. 
88B. Bragg to R. F. Pinkney, 29 December 1864, ORN, I, 11, p. 788. 
347 
salvaged from the Ella was auctioned by the Wilmington Port Warden for the 
benefit of the owners and salvors on 5 January 1865. The auctioned cargo 
included: 
530 pieces dark, fancy and mourning Prints 
86 bleached Shirtings 
161 dozen Half Hose--assorted, 
20 pieces black Alpaca, 
20 " Alpaca--assorted colors 
12 " Alpaca Lustre, 
13 " Maroon Stripes 
20 dozen Linen Cambric Handkerchiefs, 
110 pieces Paper Cambric--assorted colors, 
6" black Broad Cloth, 
16 " Grey Cloth, 
6" Tweeds, 
48 rolls Ribbon, 
19 black Lace Mantillas, 
200 dozen Coats' Spool Cotton, 
50 gross Agate Buttons, 
130 packs Pins, 
39 dozen Dressing Combs, 
8" Merino Drawers, 
150 lbs. Flax Thread, B&W 
20 Letter Copying Books, 
74 dozen Fr Waxed Calf Skins, 
56 " Goat Skins 
20 " Chamois Skins 
20 sides extra Sole Leather. 
30 boxes Adamantine Candles 
27 " Brown Soap 
33 " Brown Windsor Soap 
7 chests Tea 
5 bags Coffee 
10 bags Pepper 
7 cases White Wine Vinegar, 1 dozen each 
1 case Cheese 
2,000 lbs. Cotton Card Wire 
AND 
Immediately thereafter, the following sound goods, re- 
ceived by recent arrivals: 
3 cases Black Flax Thread, 1,600 lbs. 
5" Clark's Spool Cotton, 2000 dozen 
1" Agate Buttons 85 gt gross 
2" White Bone Buttons, 90 gt gross 
7" Military Buttons 
2500 pairs heavy Brogans 
5 cases Head Stalls, Girths and Buckles 
10 bales Twine 
3 cases Cotton Cards 
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Because the Ella and Agnes E. Fry cleared from Nassau no customs records are 
available to shed more specific light on their cargos. 
When the Stormy Petrel went ashore in December 1864, it was on the 
south breaker on Caroline Shoals. The wreck was within the limits of Fort 
Fisher's protection but was also within range of the Union blockaders. 
Although they could not destroy the Stormy Petrel, they shelled the steamer 
until they were driven away by the fort's artillery. The following day Power, 
Low and Company sent down 50 blacks to assist the garrison in recovering the 
Stormy Petrel's cargo. 89 Unfortunately a northeast gale prevented salvaging 
material from the wreck and the steamer was beaten to pieces in heavy surf. 
The cargo of the Stormy Petrel was recorded as "647 Packages Merchandise" at 
Hamilton, Bermuda on 24 September 1864 and 498 Packages Merchandize" at 
St. Georges on 2 November 1864.90 Although most of the freight aboard the 
steamer was destroyed, Colonel Lamb dispatched two boats to recover cloth 
from the wreck on 14 December. They returned filled with material for the 
garrison. The Stormy Petrel would be the last blockade runner to go aground 
under the protection of Fort Fisher. 91 
Both the archaeological and historical evidence confirms that the cargos 
of most blockade runners were either destroyed or extensively salvaged. For 
those vessels that made their final voyage from Nassau there is little if any 
historical documentation of the cargos. Virtually all of the Nassau Customs 
records were destroyed by devastating hurricanes early in the twentieth 
century. The Bermuda Customs records provide some insight into the exact 
nature of material being shipped through the blockade. However, in most of 
the records efforts to disguise outbound Anglo-Confederate commerce that 
might violate British Neutrality are apparent. 
One of the most detailed exceptions in the St. Georges Customs records 
was the steamer Bermuda which entered on 22 March 1862.92 The cargo of that 
vessel was documented in detail. According to the declaration, the Bermuda 
carried: 
89 Colonel William Lamb Diary, 8 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
90 Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, Hamilton, Stormy Petrel, 24 September 1864, BA and Bermuda 
Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Stormy Petrel 2 November 1864, BA. 
91 Colonel Lamb's Diary, 7,8,9 and 14 December 1864, College of William and Mary. 
92 Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Bermuda, 22 March 1862, BA. 
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1 Case Leather 1 Case Shoes 
1 Case Haberdashery 2 Casks Porcelain 
1 Case Leather 1 Case --Do---- 
1 Case Haberdashery 1 Case Perfumery 
3 Bales Web 5 Boxes cards 
1 Bale Thread 1 Case Teasels 
5 Casks Saddelery 2 Casks Bichrome 
2 Case Leather 8 Bales Woollens 
1 Case Hosiery 1 Truss Wool Braid 
1 case Hosiery 7 Bales Woollens 
5 Case Millenery 1 Case Needles 
7 Case Print Materials 1 Case Pencils &c 
6 Case Stationary 24 Casks Hardware 
5 Casks Stationary 2 Cases Haberdashery 
2 Casks Stationary 3 Cases Haberdashery 
1 Cask Stationary 1 Cases Haberdashery 
1 Bale Woollens 2" Hardware 
1 Case -Ditto- 100 Bundles Shoes 
4 Bales -Ditto- 11 Cases Paper 
12 Casks Cottons 14 " Soap 
2 Bales Woollens 3 Bales Woollens 
6 Cases Small Wares &c 5 Cases Shot 
3 Bales Woollens 1 Case Stationary 
1 Case -Do---- 14 Cases Surgical Instruments 
7 Ditto Cotton Thread &c 7 Casks -Do- 
1 Ditto Hosiery &c 1 Case Haberdashery 
2 Bales Woollens 7 Hhds Drugs 
1 Bale Paste Boards 1 Tierce 
1 Case Small Wares 12 Casks " 
9 Casks Drugs 27 Cases 
30 Bags Cutch 1 Cask 
6 Casks (In transit) 26 Cask or Cases Drugs 
6 -"- Hardware 4 Bales Woollens 
2 Bales Sheeting 5 Cases Cottons 
1 Cask Kidd Gloves 2 Cases Cotton Thread 
10 Case Shirting 15 Bales Cottons 
1 Bale Cottons 
1 Case Woollens 
2 Cases Woollens 
5 -Do- Cottons 
10 -Do- Cotton Thread 
13 " Cottons 
8" Woollens 
53 " Cotton 
3" Hardwars Buttons &c 
15 " flaxes 
1 Linen Thread 
2 Bales Woolens 
5 it it 
1 Case Print Materials 
1 Package do 
2 Case do 
19 Cases do 
26 --"-- Paper 
1 ---"- Ink 
1 ---"-- Machinery 
9 ---"-- Print Materials 
14 Ingots Block Tin 
16 Cases Hosiery 
12 " Print Materials 
250 Cases Shell 
2 Cases Copper Tube 
Fuses 
1 Cannon (loose) 
100 Cases Shell 
120 - "-- Do- 
18 -"-- Do 
41 --"-- Do 
1 Case Fuses 
1" Howitzer 
1" Blankets 4 Cases Pistols 2 Cases}Gun Carriage 
350 
2" 208 Coils Manilla Rope 4 Loose Pieces} 
16 Boxes Linen Thread 240 Cases Boots 3 Cases}Reply 
5 Loose Pieces}Machine 
70 Bales Woollens 12 " Leggings 
2 -Do- Blankets 64 Bales Hides 1 Cannon (Loose) 
38 " 1723 Sides Leather 1 If 
1" Woollens 250 it " 7 Field Carriages 
20 " Blankets 1200 Boxes Glass {2 Timbers 
1 Truss Samples 2 Bundles **** 
6 Cases Miltary Caps 10 Chest Tea 
5 Drums *** Cable 20 Boxes -Do- 2 Cases Cannon 
1 Box join Tools 6 Half Chests -Do- 2" to 
1 Bale Woollens 25 Boxes -Do- 14 " Swords 
4 Cases Shoe Thread 4 Half Chests 3" -Do- 
1 Cask Hardware 94 Bags Coffee 47 " -Do- 
6 Cases Guns 122 -Do- -Do- 70 Bbls Cartridges 
3 Cases Hardware 32 -Do- -Do- 
2 Casks " 67 -Do- -Do 300 Bbls Gun Powder 
1 Case 25 -Do- -Do- 76 Half Bbls 
3 Casks 712 Bags Saltpetre 177 Gr it 
4 Cases Steel 3 Barrels Bar Tin 170 " 
1 Case Hardware 5" Ingots " 2 Half Bbls 
24 Bundles *** 128 Ingots to 
3 *** Misc Cloth 35 Pigs Lead 
2 Bales Basils 8 Bundles Iron 6 Gr: 
1 Roll Misc Cloth 35 " Sheet " 47Cases Merchandize 
1 Cask Hardware 200 Boxes Tin plates 5 Bales 
1 Box Do 100 Do *** plates 1 Case " 
2" Cotton Thread 10 Bundles Iron Misc 
2 Trusses Haberdashery 3 Cases Cannon 1 Box 
14 Hhds Hose Piping 1 Do 
10 Bales Canvas 1" Carriage 7 Cases 
2 Coils Rope 60 " Shell 
4 Coiled Hawsers 20 " Do93 
The Bermuda was captured on the voyage from Bermuda to Wilmington. 
After the vessel was turned over to the New York Prize Court, the cargo was 
inventoried and a very detailed record prepared for the court and auction. That 
inventory provided considerable insight into the contents of each of the kegs, 
casks, boxes and containers in the Bermuda Customs declaration. 
The New York Prize court inventory identified the tea on the Bermuda 
Customs declaration as Chinese "Oolong, " "Hyson, " "Hyson Oolong, " and 
"Canton Finest Gunpowder" teas. Bales of woolens listed in the Bermuda 
Customs inventory were identified as "White Blankets" of varying weights 
93Bermuda Customs, In-bound, St. Georges, Bermuda, 4 November 1863, BA. 
351 
from 4.5 to 6.5 ounces and dimensions such as 72 by 77 inches. Another case 
contained lots of 2 to 60 dozen grey, white and black ladies and brown, black 
and white mens stockings. Several casks of "Merchandize" contained 242 axes 
and 20 dozen 6 inch Planters Hoes and 20 11/12 dozen 5 1/2 inch Planters Hoes. 
Another case was broken down into dozens of ladies, gentlemens and girls 
gloves of various sizes and colors. A case of stationary was broken down into 
80 reams of blue and white, plain and slick letter paper. 94 
One cask of hardware was inventoried and contained: 
240 doz. Table Cutlery 
120 doz. Table Cutlery 
8 doz. Sheep Shears 
8 doz. Sheep Shears 
6 doz. Razors 
6 doz. Razors 
14 doz. Razors 
6 doz. Beauregard Knives 
6 doz. Davis Knives 
6 doz. Davis Knives 
6 doz. Beauregard Knives 
12 doz. Bull's Run Knives 
12 doz. Bull's Run Knives 
11 1/2 doz. Bull's Run Knives 
Knives listed as Beauregard Knives, Davis Knives and Bull's Run Knives were 
likely side knives manufactured in the "Bowie" style with acid etched blades 
honoring Confederate General P. G. T. Beaureguard, President Jefferson Davis 
and commemorating the Confederate victory at the battle of Bull Run in 
northern Virginia in 1862.95 The cargo of the Modern Greece contained a 
shipment of side knives produced a decade before the Civil War to 
commemorate the California Gold Rush. 
The contents of another case, one of six identified as "In Transit" in the 
Bermuda Customs manifest contained several hundred "Line Officers Swords" 
and scabbards, dozens of pairs of "Gilt Epaulets, " "Gilt Embd Bugles, " "Gold 
Embd Sabers" and "Crimson Silk Sashes. " Another cask listed as drugs in 
Bermuda was broken down into "4 Jars Ginger, 2 Jars Blue Pills, 2 Jars Hemlock 
extract, 1 Jar Jalap Extract" and two packages one containing 31 bottles of 
94Inventory of the Cargo of the Steamer Bermuda, New York Prize Court Records, RG 21, NA, 
Bayonne, New Jersey. 
951bid. 
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Morphine and the other containing 46 bottles. A second cask included in the 
lot contained "4 Jars powdered Rhubarb, 4 Jars Mercurial Ointment, 8 Cans 
Spice Root, 2 bottles Citreate Quinine, and 1 bottle Bismuth sub. carb. " Ten 
cases shipped on the Bermuda contained packages of Brown Windsor soap. 96 
A lot of twelve cases contained from 40 to 56 reams of "Bank Note" 
paper water lined C. S. A. and produced by the firm of Wiggins Teak and 
Company. Another lot included ink for bank notes and several contained the 
tools and supplies for engravers. Other cases contained "26 gross Tooth 
Brushes, " 252 cane and bone umbrellas, an assortment of buttons of bone, 
wood, pearl, agate and metal, military gilt buttons with the Palmetto insignia of 
South Carolina, packages of "Taylor London pins, " neck ties and "Cotton 
Velvet Ribbons. "97 
The Robert E. Lee, a Confederate government owned vessel, cleared St. 
Georges on 4 November 1863 with a cargo listed as: 
145 Cases Arms 
29 Bbls Pork 
1 Box Bacon 
90 Sacks Saltpetre 
28 Pigs Lead 
160 Sacks Saltpetre 
372 Pigs Lead 
8 Packages Mdze 
1 Case Wire Rope 
1 puncheon Rum98 
After the Robert E. Lee was captured on 9 November 1963, the United 
States District Court of Massachusetts provided a much more comprehensive 
inventory that included: 
13 Pig Lead 
251 Bags Saltpetre 
22 Barrels Salt-Beef 
39 of " Pork 
1 Coil Wire Rope 25 ft 
150 Cases Austrian Muskets 
30 Bales Blankets 
3 Bales Army Blankets 
52 Cases Boots & Shoes 
1 Case Dry Goods & Clothing 
2 Sextants 
2 Quadrants 
2 Chronometers 
1 Writing Desk 
1 Electrical Machine 
2 Spy Glasses 
1 Patent Log 
1 Lot Knives Forks 
4 Compasses 
1 Lot Signal flags 
96 Ibid. 
971bid. 
98 Bermuda Customs, Out-bound, St. Georges, Robert E. Lee, 22 March 1862, BA. 
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1 Case Clothing 1" Starch 
1 Bale Dry Goods 1" Indigo 
26 Large Cases Blankets 1" Newspapers 
25 Large Cases Boots & Shoes 1 Drugs & Medicines 
Stores & Sundries 1" Sewing Twine 
1 Lot Dry Goods including pieces 1" Blue Signal lights 
of cotton-woolen & linen 
also flannel & prints 1 Engineers Instrument 
1 Trunk fancy Goods-Button 1 Lot Tea 
spool cotton *** & needles 
2 Boxes Stationary 1" Bedding 
1 Trunk Stationary 1" Charts 
1 Box Pocket Knives & 1" Hoop Skirts 
Hardware 
1" Childrens Books 1" Clothing 
1 Lot Leather 1" Pickles & Preserves 
1 Empty Trunk 1" Spices 
1 Trunk containing pieces silk 1" Preserved Meats 
linen & Alpaca goods 
1 Lot Carpeting & wool 1 Case Boots & Shoes 
1 Lot Tin Ware 1 Basket do do 
1" Crockery & Glassware 1 Case do do 
4 Boxes Vermicelli 1 Bag Almonds 
2 Boxes Medicine Chest 1 Tool Chest & Tools 
2 Aherord Barometers, 1 Broken 2 Boxes Preserved Lobsters 
1 Time Piece 1" Smoked Salmon`s 
1 Artificial Horizon 
On 21 November 1863, the steel steamer Banshee was captured heading 
for Wilmington by the USS Montgomery. Banshee was owned by the Anglo- 
Confederate Trading Company and had a cargo consisting almost entirely of 
civilian goods. While no customs declaration survives from Nassau, the New 
York Prize Court inventory provides a highly detailed record. The inventory 
prepared for the N. Y. Prize Court included: 
1 Bale Bleached Shirting 
1 Case Mozambiques Shirting 
1" Chino Alpaca 
1 Bale Bremen Cassmeres 
1 Bale Tweeds 
9 Cases Grey Twilled Flannel 
4 Bales 
1 Bale White *** Flannel 
1 Bale Red Flannel 
1 Bale Long Cloth Flannel 
1 Pkg linen Diaper 
1" *** Hydrag 
1" Quinine 
5 Kegs Bi Carb Soda 
2 Cases **** 
1 Case ass. Screws 
1 Cask ass. Files 
1" Boston 
1 .. ".. 
1" Second Cut Files 
1" Files 
99Inventory of the Cargo of the Steamer Robert E. Lee, New York Prize Court Records, RG 21, NA, 
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1 Case Sundries 3 to Garden Hose 
1 if 1 Case Matches 
1 of 10 Bales Gunning Cloth 
1 " 100 Coils Logging Rope 
1 to 2 Bales Twine 
1 it 3 Cases Letter Paper 
1 of it 1 It it 
1 Trunk to 1 to it 
1 Case 11 1 it If Books 
2 to Buttons 297 Bags Rio Coffee 
1 of 14 Bags Coffee 
1 " 1 Box " 
1 " Congress Gaitors 1 Bag Pepper 
1 to 2 BbIs *** Sugar 
1 It 1" Brown " 
1 to 1 Case Sundries 
1 to if 1 It 
1 " "12Pkg 
1 It 11 1 Box Cheese 
1 " Neopolitan Shoes 100 " Bacon 
1 " Gaiters 100 Bbls Whiskey 
1 " Neopolitan 1 Case Brandy 
1 " Congress Gaitors 2 "Blankenheizm Gin 
13 Cases misses Brogans 3 Bbls Ale 
6 " Men's it 2 Bbls Port** 
15 " 1 Pkg ass. Postman Packig 
Books 
6 " 1 Case Sundries 
6 to **** Boots 1 of 
1 " Balmoral Shoes 13 Kegs Soda 
2 to Congress Gaiters 40 " Salt Peter100 
1 to *** Hats 
1 of to it 
An examination of the auction records associated with the cargo of the 
Banshee provides unique insight into the exact nature of many of the 
unidentified containers listed in the prize court inventory. Each container was 
opened, inventoried and the contents published in the auction catalog along 
with the name of the consignee where that was available. Containers were 
marked for such individuals as North Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance, 
South Carolina merchant and shipowner James E. Adger, Confederate Secretary 
of the Treasury Christopher G. Memminger and blockade runner Captain 
Jonathon Steele. 
1001bid. 
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A case shipped to Governor Vance included the following articles: 
1 ps blk Barege 72 in 11 yds 
1 ps do 25 in 16 yds 
4 ps white and blk printed Lawns 48 yds 
3 ps mourning Prints 35 yds 
1 ps mourning Ginghams 10 yds 
1 ps dark Print 20 yds 
4 ps light Prints 8 yds 
2 ps white Cambric 36 in 10 yds 
10 yds blk Cambric 
1 yd blk Crape 
1 doz blk cotton Hose 
3 pr spun silk Hose 
3 Hoop Skirts 
1 blk moire antique Parasol 
2 boxes Sundries 
6 pr ladies lasting side L Gaiters 
6 pr do Slippers 
6 pr childrens Shoes and Gaiters101 
James E. Adger, Charleston merchant and ship owner, was to have 
received a large case that contained a variety of expensive material, clothes, 
medicine and other articles. Adger's case contained: 
1 ps Long Cloth 
1 ps grey Tweeds 
2 ps white Flannel 
1 ps Angola do 
1 ps Canton do 
1 ps dbl twilled do 
1 ps red do 
4 ps mixed do 
2 ps purple Prints 
2 ps Irish Linen 
1 ps Birds Eys Diaper 
1 fancy Dentin Dress 
8 yds brown Linen 
6 yds Hair Card Prints 
10 yds Frence Marine 
5 yds paper Cambric 
21 yds brown Holland 
40 yds Mohair Lastre 
41 112 yds 
101/2yds 
211/2yds 
8 yds 
68 yds 
10 yds 
40 yds 
28 yds 
32 yds 
55 yds 
10 yds 
7 cotton Handkerchiefs 
1 doz ladies cotton Handkerchiefs 
7 doz ladies linen Handkerchiefs 
16 doz Brooks Spool Cotton 
3 lbs Linen Thread 
2 doz white cotton Tapes 
1 doz worsted Stay Lacets 
l lb Pins 
4 gro agate Buttons 
1 gro blk bone suspender Buttons 
1 doz fine horn Combs 
10 Tooth Brushes 
1 doz fey Soap 
18 pr asstd ladies misses & boys Shoes 
3 pr calf Boot Legs complete 
6 pr do Fronts for footing 
25 lbs Sole Leather 
3 Calf Skins 
1 1/2 lbs Shoe Thread 
1 piece silk Gore for gaiters 8 yds 
4 leather Belts 
2 felt Hats 
6 cotton Under Shirts 
4 doz ladies white Cotton Hose 
1 doz mens do 
1 doz misses brown do 
101Catalog of Cargo of Prize Steamer "BANSHEE, " filed with New York Prize Court Records, 
RG 21, NA, Bayonne, New Jersey. 
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3-12 doz boys mixed do 
4-12 doz misses cotton Hose 
12-12 doz cotton bk Hose 
5-12 doz childrns wht cotton Socks 
3 Angola Saxon Shirts 
4 spun silk Shirts 
2 Shetland Shirts 
2 cotton Umbrellas 
1 lb green & black Tea 
1 oz Pellateers Quinine 
2 small bottles calcined Magnesia 
1 bottle Oxmel Scilla 8 oz 
1 small Argent Nit 
4 oz best root Rhubarb 
16 oz bottle Laudenum 
18 oz bottle Paregaree 
2 lbs Ep's Salts10 
Confederate Secretary of the Treasury Christopher G. Memminger's 
material consisted of a box containing 140 pounds of coffee from Santo 
Domingo, a 185 pound barrel of crushed sugar and a case of 7 bottles of brandy. 
Captain Jonathon Steele's modest shipment included: 
1 ps brown Shirtings 35 in 36 yds 
1 ps blea long Cloth 35 in 43 1/2 yds 
1 ps blk Bombazine 5 qrs 10 yds 
1 soft Hat 
6 hair Brushes 
21/4_lb bottles calcined Magnesia 
1 lb Cloves 
2 lb Mace 
1/2 box Raisins103 
By the fall of 1863, Confederate officials were considering regulation of 
blockade running. Loans based on cotton warrants had to be heavily 
discounted to be attractive as cotton was to be delivered at Confederate ports 
and had to be run through the blockade at the owners risk. 104 In October C. J. 
McRae suggested a plan for restructuring Confederate credit and purchasing in 
Europe. McRea's plan called for five dramatic steps: 
First. To revoke or annul all contracts in Europe, in which 
profits or commissions are allowed, whether they be with agents, 
contractors, or partners. 
Second. That there should be one contracting or purchasing 
officer each for the War and Navy Departments in Europe.... 
1021bid. 
1031bid. 
104 J. M. Mason to J. P. Benjamin, 5 Sept 1863, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, pp. 560-562. 
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Third. That there should be one general agent for Europe, who 
should have the entire control of the credit of the Government 
abroad, with large discretionary powers.... 
Fourth. That the government should take the exports and 
imports into its own hands, and no cotton, tobacco or naval stores 
should be allowed to leave the country except on Government 
account or for account of holders of produce bonds.... 
Fifth. To purchase or take possession of all of the cotton and 
tobacco in the country at a price to be fixed by act of Congress. 105 
Even before McRae's proposal arrived in Richmond, Confederate 
officials Davis, Seddon, Benjamin, Memminger and Mallory initiated plans to 
put a similar plan proposed by John Slidell into effect. 106 McRae was appointed 
to conduct Confederate business in Europe and the decision was made to export 
cotton to finance Anglo-Confederate trade. The success of the Ordnance 
Bureau, War Department and Navy Department in running munitions and 
war material through the blockade provided an example for Confederate 
control of the trade. McRae pointed out in his 7 October letter to Memminger 
"that the Government can successfully run the blockade is conclusively proven 
by the experiment of Maj. Caleb Huse, of the Ordnance Department, who put 
on four boats between Wilmington and Bermuda in February and march last 
with funds obtained mainly on the credit of cotton the boats were to bring out, 
which boats made twenty-two successful trips by the 1st of August and without 
a single loss. "107 
In his 26 November 1863 report to President Davis, Secretary of War 
Seddon confirmed the success of government blockade running. According to 
Seddon: 
The steamers owned by the Department, four in number, were for 
a long time run between Wilmington and the islands with signal 
success and almost the regularity of packets. The profits by the 
outward and the saving by the inward trips to the Department 
were very great, as at each trip, according to the current rates, the 
105 McRae to Memminger, 7 October 1863, p. 983, ORA, IV, 2,126 and Pickett Papers, Slidell to 
Benjamin, No. 37,12 June 1863, NA. 
106 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 37,12 June 1863. 
107McRae to Memminger, 7 October 1863, ORA, IV, 126, pp. 983-985. 
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value of the vessel was fully reimbursed. It is a moderate 
calculation to estimate the gain thus effected for the Department 
as upward of twenty millions of dollars in currency. 108 
Mason had suggested that the Confederate Government fit out a fleet of 
"fast steamers, for bringing out cotton on Government account" in a6 August 
1863 communication to Judah P. Benjamin. 109 Mason felt that as soon as 
cotton could be' delivered to Nassau or Bermuda it could be delivered to Great 
Britain or Europe without additional war related risks. 110 Henry Hotze 
publisher of the Confederate newspaper Index, also recommended that the 
Confederacy adopt a "monopoly on blockade running" and control the 
importation of nonessential goods. 111 
The elements of McRae's plan were adopted and submitted to Jefferson 
Davis and his cabinet in January 1864 and "A bill to impose regulations upon 
the foreign commerce of the Confederate States to provide for the public 
defense" was introduced in the Confederate Congress that same month. The 
bill was passed by the House of Representatives and Senate before the end of 
January and was signed by Jefferson Davis on 6 February 1864.112 That bill 
provided Davis with authority to regulate all of the Confederacy's foreign 
commerce. 113 The legislation spelled out the punishments for violation of the 
act and designated the Confederate agents and courts that would enforce and 
resolve litigation associated with the act. President Davis was given specific 
control over the exportation of cotton, tobacco, military and naval stores, sugar 
molasses and rice. 114 
"An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Luxuries, or of Articles Not 
Necessaries or of Common Use" was also passed on 6 February. ' That act 
specifically prohibited the importation of: 
108 Seddon to Davis, 26 November 1863, ORA, IV, 2, pp. 990-1018. 
109 Mason to Benjamin, No. 43,6 August 1863. 
110 Mason to Benjamin, No. 45,5 September 1863. 
111 Hotze to Benjamin, No. 30,3 October 1863 and Hotze to Benjamin, No. 34,26 December 1863. 
112 Acts and Resolutions of the Confederate States of America, mss. Library of Congress and 
"Statutes at Large of the Confederate States, " 1861-1864, Richmond, 1864, XXIV, p. 81. 
113 A Bill to impose regulations upon the foreign commerce of the Confederate States to provide 
for the public defense, ORA, IV, 3, pp. 80-82. 
114 Ibid. 
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Beer, ale and porter; muffs and tippets, and all other manufactures 
of fur, or of which fur shall be a component part, except caps and 
hats; carpets, carpetings, hearth rugs, bedsides, and other portions 
of carpeting, of any kind or description; carriages and parts of 
carriages; cider and other beverages not containing alcohol; clocks 
and parts of clocks; cotton insertings, cotton trimmings, or laces of 
thread and other material; coral, manufactured; dolls and toys of 
all kinds; fire-crackers, sky-rockets, Roman candles, and all similar 
articles used in pyrotechnics; furniture, cabinet and house-hold; 
glass, colored, stained or painted; India matting of all sorts; jet and 
manufactures of jet, and imitations thereof; jewelry or imitations 
thereof; manufactures and articles of marble, and marble paving 
tiles, slabs or, blocks, and all other marble; matting, China, or other 
floor matting and mats made of flage, jute, or grass; paper 
hangings, paper for walls, and paper for screens or fire boards; 
paving and roofing tiles, and bricks, and roofing slates, and fire 
bricks; thread lastings and serge; velvets of all kinds. 
Additional materials placed on the list of contraband included: 
Angora, Tibet, and other goats' hair or mohair, unmanufactured; 
bananas, cocoa nuts, plantains and oranges; cabinets of coins, 
medals, gems, and collections of antiques; diamonds, mosaics, 
gems, pearls, rubies, and other precious stones, and imitations 
thereof, set in gold or silver or other metal; engravings, bound or 
unbound; rattans and reeds; paintings and statuary; leaf and 
unmanufactured tobacco and cigars; or the following 
articles.... Diamonds, cameos, mosaics, pearls, gems, rubies, and 
other precious stones, and imitations thereof when not set. 115 
On 5 March 1864, C. G. Memminger, James A. Seddon and Jefferson 
Davis approved regulations that put the Foreign Commerce Act into effect. 116 
The regulations required vessel owners to declare their cargos and consent to 
providing the Confederacy one half of the vessel's tonnage for military 
necessities. Each vessel was to be bonded and the Confederate Government 
was to pay vessel owners for their portion of the cargo space at rates established 
by the government and paid in coin or sterling for outward cargos and in 
cotton for inward cargos. The regulations also required disclosure and 
approval of the vessel's officers and crew and of all passengers. Exemptions 
115Wilmington Daily Journal, 11 May 1864, p. 4, col. 2. 
116Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, pp. 417-420. 
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were made for vessels owned or operated by Confederate and state agencies and 
for vessels entering the Confederacy to take out cotton obligated by Confederate 
bonds, warrants and loans. 117 
I The passage of legislation and promulgation of regulations designed to 
control blockade running stimulated an immediate response from the Anglo- 
Confederate trading community. James Randall, a Wilmington based clerk for 
one of the companies engaged in blockade running wrote on 10 March 1864 
that: 
The blockade runners swear that they will not bring in a single 
cargo under the present arrangement viz one-half the cargo. It is 
unjust and extortionate. If the Govt. does not prove successful 
in running its own steamers it will suffer rather than gain by 
such a regulation. 118 
North Carolina Governor Z. B. Vance complained that due to the Confederate 
regulations "Wilmington is more effectively blockaded from within than 
without. "119 One member of the crew of the Confederate steamer Coquette 
wrote the Wilmington Daily Journal to complain of the situation created by the 
newly imposed regulations. That unidentified individual wrote: 
Some of us are in "the trade" not for the purpose of making 
money, seeing we receive only our regular pay as Government 
officers, and carry nothing except for Government, which 
unfortunately has made us no allowance for propitiating the 
municipals; and after struggling through the usual difficulties of 
intricate navigation, in dark nights, hard work, and anxious 
vigilance to escape Yankee cruisers, we get into a Confederate port 
to find, instead of welcome and aid, numerous annoyances, 
questioning our veracity and loyalty to our native country, and 
restrictions that almost prevent success in the undertaking. 120 
1171bid. 
118 J. Randall to K. Hammond, 10 March 1864, James Randall Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina. 
119 Wilmington Daily Journal, 27 May 1864, p. 2, col. 2. 
120 Wilmington Daily Journal, 21 June 1864, p. 2, col. 2. 
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In returning a bill designed to amend the 6 February 1864 Act to the House of 
Representatives, President Davis pointed out that he had remained steadfast in 
his belief in the necessity to control blockade running. He was satisfied that 
complaints and threats to withdraw vessels from blockade running were only 
an effort to test the government's resolve. The results: 
.... proved the correctness of the view, 
for, after various attempts to 
obtain increased advantages, the vessels resumed their voyages. 
Their number has been largely increased, the ability to export 
produce and import supplies on Government account has been 
developed to a greater extent than had been anticipated, and the 
credit of the Government has been so improved in foreign 
markets that the quotations for its loan have rapidly advanced. 121 
That opinion was confirmed by Secretary of War Seddon on 10 December 
1864. Seddon wrote President Davis that he felt "the regulations have been 
beneficial to the Confederate States Government in furnishing the means 
abroad to purchase supplies and munitions of war and the tonnage required to 
transport them to our ports. "122 Seddon also agreed that the number of vessels 
engaged in blockade running had increased steadily since the regulations were 
promulgated. 123 
The impact of Confederate regulations can be seen in the nature of the 
cargos of vessels captured after March 1864. One of the first was the steamer 
Caledonia. Caledonia cleared Bermuda Customs at St. Georges with a nominal 
cargo consisting of: 
47 Boxes Bacon 
28 Casks Bacon 
36 Cases Leather Goods 
3 Cases Medical Stores 
1 Keg Horse Shoe Nails 
1 Case Merchandize124 
121J. Davis to the House of Representatives, 10 June 1864, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, pp. 466-470. 
122Seddon to Davis, 10 December 1864, ORA, IV, 3, pp. 928-930. 
1231bid. 
124 Bermuda Customs, Outward, St. Georges, 11 April and 25 May 1864, BA. 
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The Boston Prize Court inventory confirms that the cargo was small and 
suggests that perhaps the 36 cases of leather goods were "Infantry Equipment. " 
According to the Prize Court inventory and the report of Commander Pierce 
Crosby approximately half of the bacon and most of the leather goods were 
thrown overboard during the chase. 125 
The steamer Thistle was captured on 4 June 1864 by the USS Fort Jackson 
off Beaufort. During a 70 mile chase the crew of the blockade runner threw 
almost all of the cargo overboard. 126 At St. Georges the Thistle entered a cargo 
consisting of: 
335 Pkgs: Machinery 
101 Cases Mdze. 
29 Coils Rope 
29 Bbls: Ink 
78 Pkgs: Machinery 
25 do - do 
3 Cases Mdze 
1 Case Mdze 
10 Bbls Copperass 
1 Case Mdse127 
When the Thistle was captured, B. F. Sands reported that the only part of the 
cargo left onboard was a cotton press. The Boston Prize Court inventory did 
not include the cotton press but 
listed the following as cargo: 
21 Coils Manilla Rope 
Lot Gas Pipes 
Lot Steel 
Lot Plate Iron 
Lot Bar Iron 
82 Cases Muskets 
1 Case Carbine 
4 Casks Oil 
Lot Carriage Springs 
of Axles 
1 Wood Jointing Machine 
1 Surfacing 
1 Circular Sawing 
1 Scoll 
1 Wood Boring 
1""& Mortising 
1" Wine 
18 Cases Brandy 
1" Wire Cloth 
1" Machine Cards 
1 Box Files 
1 Case Wrenches 
1 to Carriage Trimmings 
95 *** Bolts 
2646 " Screws 
591 pr. Hinges 
157 lbs. Copper Rivets 
35 " Brass Eyelets 
1 Case Mustard 
2"&3 Cans Camphor 
6 Bags &1 Bbl. Coffee 
6 Cases Blacking 
125 Inventory of property on the steamer Caledonia, 
8 July 1864, U. S. Prize Court Records Boston, 
NA, Waltham, Massachusetts and P. Crosby to 
S. P. Lee, 30 May 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp 106-107. 
126 B. F. Sands to S. P. Lee, 5 June 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 
120-121. 
127Bermuda Customs, Outward, St. Georges, Thistle, 31 May 1864, BA. 
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1 Moulding 9" Soap Powder 
Lot wood working 8 Bbls. Beef & Pork 
1 Cask Rum 11 "Copperas 
2 Cases Champagne Lot Crockery & Glass128 
The Little Ada owed by the Importing and Exporting Company of 
Georgia was captured by the USS Gettysburg on 9 July 1864.129 Unlike the 
Caledonia and Thistle, Little Ada's cargo was not thrown overboard prior to 
capture. The Boston Prize Court inventory included the following as cargo: 
125 Pigs Lead 
249 Kegs Soda 
12 Bales Hops 
1 Cask Hoes 
42 Barrels Epsom Salts 
1 Barrel Alum 
1 Case Do 
1 Barrel Coffee 
2 Bags Do 
2 Barrels Sugar 
1 Barrel Beef 
5 Kegs Beef and Pork 
6 Casks Liquor 
1 Case Printers Ink 
5 Cases Shirts, Hoseiry, Neck ties 
3 Boxes Soap 
5 Boxes Gin 
2 Boxes Liquor 
1 Box Cotton Cards 
1 Case Testaments 
1 Box Drugs & Medicines 
1" Dry Goods & Shoes 
1" of & Soap 
1" Sardines, Soap & Provisions 
1 Box Ham & provisions 
1 Box Champagne 
1" Sweet oil & ***130 
128 Inventory of property on the steamer 77iistle, 11 
July 1864, U. S. Prize Court Records Boston, 
NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
129 S. P. Lee to G. Welles, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1,10, pp. 245-246 and W. M. Gloin, 31 July 1864, 
ORN, I, 10, p. 246. 
130 Inventory of property on the steamer Little 
Ada, 25 July 1864, U. S. Prize Court Records 
Boston, NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
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Some of the material from the Little Ada included in the United States 
Marshal's Sale was clearly in violation of Confederate import regulations. That 
material consisted of a case of ladies' white cotton hose, a case of fancy ties, and 
three cases of fancy shirts. 131 
In July 1864, the steamers Rouen and Boston were also captured. The 
Rouen was owned by W. Patrick Campbell of St. Georges, Bermuda and cleared 
that port with a cargo consisting of the following material: 
100 Cases Tea 
100 Cases Hoop Iron 
1 Case Mdze 
1 Bals Mdze 
100 Sacks Saltpetre 
31 Cases Shoes 
1 Bale Blankets 
2 Casks Sugar 
3 Casks Whiskey 
8 Cases Brandy 
5 Casks Wire 
2 Cases Leather132 
During a four hour chase by the USS Keystone State, most of the cargo was 
thrown overboard. 133 When the cargo was listed for sale by the U. S. Marshal 
in Boston it was apparent that most of the tea and saltpetre had been thrown 
overboard. The U. S. Marshal's Sale Catalog listed the following material from 
the ship's cargo: 134 
117 White Blankets 
2 Cases and Contents 
1 Case and Contents 
1 Case 21 pr. ass'd Shoes 
2 do 62 do do 
4 do 400 do Brogans 
5 do 500 do do 
5 do 500 do do 
20 do 901/2 doz. Calf-skins 
1 Lot hoop Iron 
1 Box Soap 
1 do Castor Oil 
131 U. S. Marshal's Sale Catalog, Steamer Little Ada, 24 August 1864, included in U. S. Prize 
Court Records Boston, NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
132$ermuda Customs, Outward, St. Georges, Rouen, 28 June 1864, BA. 
133 p. Crosby to G. Welles, 2 July 1864, ORN, I, 10, pp. 223-224. 
134U. S. Marshal's Sale Catalog, Steamer Rouen, 24 August 1864, included in U. S. Prize Court 
Records Boston, NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
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3doGin 
1 do Brandy 
7 do Wine 
5 do Champagne 
1 do Wine 
1 do Sauces 
1 do Machine cards 
2 Casks Loaf Sugar 
Lot P. Meats 
1 Cask Spirits Terpentine135 
Other material on the sale inventory included the ship's stores, equipment, 
navigation instruments, charts and supplies. 
The cargo of the steamer Boston, owned by Francis W. J. Gurst, was listed 
at St. Georges as: 136 
24 Bbls Copperas 
465 Sacks Salt 
180 Boxes Soap 
The U. S. Marshal's Sale inventory for the Boston included: 
445 Bags Salt 
24 Barrels of Copperas 
179 Boxes Soap137 
Other material on the auction inventory included the ship's stores, equipment, 
navigation instruments, charts and supplies. 138 
One of the last blockade runners to be captured was the steamer Stag. 
The Stag was owned by Fraser, Trenholm and Company and was one of several 
vessels purchased from Jones, Quiggin and Company for the Confederate States 
Government. When the vessel cleared at Bermuda on 26 January 1865, the St. 
1351Nd. 
136Bermuda Customs, Outward, St. Georges, Rouen, 2 July 1864, BA. 
137U. S. Marshal's Sale Catalog, Steamer Boston, 24 August 1864, included in U. S. Prize Court 
Records Boston, NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
138U. S. Marshal's Sale Catalog, Steamer Boston, 24 August 1864, included in U. S. Prize Court 
Records Boston, NA, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
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Georges Customs declaration specified only "123 Pkgs Mdze reported in ward 
Entry of 13 January 1865 & Not take out of said Vessel here. "139 The Boston U. 
S. Marshal's Sale inventory included: 
10 Pieces Red Marine Cloths 
5" Black *** " 
5" White ** " 
10 Pieces Red do do 
5 Pieces Blue do do 
5 Pieces White do do 
9 Pieces Red Do Do 
5 Pieces White 
5 Pieces Blue 
6 Pieces Red Cloth 
4 Pieces Blue 
4 Pieces White 
9 Pieces Red *** Cloth 
4 Pieces Blue 
5 Pieces White 
Ten Bales Army Cloth 
Ten Bales " to 
Ten Bales " to 
Ten Bales " to 
Ten Bales " of 
Nine Bales " to 
120 Bales Black Thread 
120 Bdls White * Brown Do. 
130 Bdls Black Do. 
49 Bdls White Linen Sailor Shirts 
28 1/2 Bdls White Linen Sailor Pants 
Fourteen Bales Army Blankets 
Five Hhds Russet Shoes 
Thirteen Cases Containing 
Wood Strips for Shoe Pegs 
Five Cases Containing 
4 Sewing Machines & Features for the 
Manufacturing of Shoes and Harnesses 
2 Large Eylet Machines for the Manufacturing 
of Shoes Harnesses 
10 Packages of 10 Boxes Ea. French Eylets 
6 Cases Containing Cotton Machinery 
1 Large Cases Containing Cotton Machinery 
15 Bdls. French Laces 
Three Boxes Honey Soap 
One Box Containing 
Sunday School Books 
One Box Containing 
6 Bottles Cordials 
12 lbs Adams Candles 
10 " Currants 
12 " Starch 
2 lbs Filberts 
2 lbs Indigo 
3 lbs Candied Lemon Peel 
1/2 Box Raisins 
1 Paper Black Lead 
1 Scrubbing Brush 
1 Shoe Brush 
6 Bottles Currant Jam 
4 Small Boxes Potted Tongues 
Two Half Boxes Raisins 
2 Paper's Starch, 14 lbs 
1 Small Box do, 5 
49 Boxes Sardines 
1 Bottle Ground Pepper 
50 lbs Cracked Sugar 
3" Almonds 
6 Pt Bottles Cologne 
1 Iron Saucepan 
15 Mens Soft Hats 
2 Dozen Suspenders 
6 lbs Gross Bone Buttons 
42 Mens Soft Hats 
51 /2 Dozen Suspenders 
3 1/2 Gross Small Gilt Army Buttons 
5 Pieces Fancy Tweeds 
5 Pieces Fancy Cassimeres 
91 Dozen Fine Buffalo Combs 
63 " Dressing 
24 
14 
".. .. 24 
3 Gross Gilt Army Buttons 
110 Doz Children & Misses Hair *** Asst. 
Col. 
30 Cases Enfield Rifles 
20 in Each: Total: 600 
34 Pigs Lead 
Estimated Weight 125 lb ea. Total: 4250 lbs. 
One Truss White **** Sugar 
Ones Truss White **** Sugar 
One Keg Pickled Tongues 
One Hundred & Thirty Bags St. Petre 
139 Bermuda Customs, Outward, St. Georges, Deer, 26 January 1865, BA. 
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12 Small Rds English Cheese Estimated Weight 150 lb Ea. 19,500 lbs. 
60 lbs Hulls Sons Soap One Hundred & Fifty Tons 
5 lbs Almonds (More or less) Cardiff Coa1140 
While extensive information on the nature of cargos does not appear to 
be preserved in the archaeological record associated with sunken blockade 
runners, untapped historical sources can supply new information concerning 
the specifics of that clandestine trade. Information preserved in the 
archaeological, historical and Prize Court records also suggest that the cargos 
quickly became the most important financial consideration. The distribution of 
wrecked blockade runners suggest that, as the war progressed, running the 
vessel ashore under Confederate guns where the cargo could be unloaded was 
considered a viable option. The clustering of wrecks at Masonboro Inlet, 
Carolina Beach Inlet, off Flag Pond Battery, off Oak Island Battery and at 
Lockwoods Folly Inlet suggests that the presence of Confederate troops and 
artillery was a serious attraction. Confederates proved to be very adapt at 
salvaging material from the remains of wrecked blockade runners and a 
salvaged cargo could easily pay for the cost of the vessel and its cargo. 
An examination of the values of cargos auctioned by the United States 
Prize Court at Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Key West supports the 
theory that by 1863, the cargo had become so much more valuable than the 
vessel that the vessel could be considered expendable. One round trip would 
more than pay for the entire expense of a blockade running joint venture. All 
additional trips through the blockade generated excessive profits. 
Examination of an inventory of vessels adjudicated by the United States 
Prize Courts provides additional evidence that the value of the cargos 
frequently exceeded the cost of the vessel. The following table provides an 
indication of the gross proceeds realized from the auction of blockade runners 
and their cargos. The value of the vessel has been determined by the amount 
received at auction or paid by the United States Navy. 141 
140Cargo of the Steamer Stag, New York Prize Court Inventory, Prize Court Records, RG 84, NA, 
Bayonne, New Jersey. 
141 "Purchased Vessels" inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. Navy Department, RG 45, 
Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
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Vessel Date Captured Adjudicated Vessel Cargo 
Amount Amount Amount 
1862 
Settin 24 May 1862 226,393.10 50,000.00 176,393.10 
Cambria 26 May 1862 191,424.54 72,579.44 118,845.10 
Patras 27 May 1862 90,188.89 31,401.25 58,787.64 
Lodona 4 August 1862 246,651.32 80,000.00 166,651.32 
Memphis 31 July 1862 543,495.15 103,000.00 440,495.15 
Banshee 21 November 1862 111,216.65 72,500.00 38,716.65 
1863 
Antona 6 January 1863 126,390.65 55,130.00 71,260.65 
Princess 
Royal 29 January 1863 359,535.33 112,000.00 247,535.33 
Granite City 22 March 1863 68,829.81 55,000.00 13,829.81 
Aries 28 March 1863 147,008.46 100,000.00 47,008.46 
Gertrude 16 April 1863 88,987.60 45,000.00 43,987.60 
Bermuda 27 April 1863 447,015.40 120,000.00 327,015.40 
Eugenie 6 May 1863 24,239.67 20,000.00 4,239.67 
Cherokee 8 May 1863 151,507.02 75,000 76,507.02 
Calypso 11 June 1863 80,265.03 48,500.00 31,765.03 
Neptune 14 June 1863 40,820.58 40,000.00 820.58 
Annie Childs 21 June 1863 106,008.11 65,000.00 41,008.11 
Britannia 25June1863 173,670.55 52,000.00 121,670.55 
Merrimac 24 July 1863 202,741.16 65,000.00 137,741.16 
Columbia 3 August 1863 151,523.20 66,000.00 85,523.20 
Margaret & 
Jessie 5 November 1863 170,708.34 90,000.00 80,708.34 
Robert E. Lee 9 November 1863 122,331.11 73,000.00 $49,331.11 
1864 
Greyhound 10 May 1864 497,858.55 40,610.00 457,248.55 
Tristram 
Shandy 15 May 1864 418,873.81 58,000.00 360,873.81 
Donegal 6 June 1864 140,000.00 89,000.00 51,000.00 
Lilian 24 August 1864 327,507.35 140,000.00 187,507.35 
A. D. Vance 10 September 1864 288,286.49 120,000.00 168,286.49 
Lady Sterling 28 October 1864 509,354.64 135,000.00 374,354.64 
The relative value of the inbound and outbound cargos was well 
established by the summer of 1862. The vessels of Z. C. Pearson provided a 
clear indication of the financial relationship between the vessel and its cargo. 
Ships like the Settin, Patras, Lodona and Peterhoff were clearly valued at less 
than half the cargo each carried, The Lodona was sold to the Navy for 
$80,000.00 while the cargo brought $166,651.32 at auction. While the Patras was 
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sold to the U. S. Navy for $31,401.25 the cargo brought $58,787.64.142 The cargo 
of the steamer Settin was sold for $176,393.10 and the vessel was purchased for 
$50,000.00 by the Navy. The screw steamer Columbia, owned by Thomas S. 
Begbie was captured by the Santiago de Cuba on 3 August 1862 with almost all 
of her cargo intact. At auction in Key West the cargo sold for $85,523.20 while 
the vessel was purchased by the Navy Department for $66,000.00.143 The 
implications must have been clear. Rather than risk capture and total loss, the 
vessel could be run ashore and the cargo discharged and sold. Even at auction 
damaged goods could be sold and sufficient revenues generated to cover the 
cost of the enterprise. Successful salvage of the Pearson steamer Modern 
Greece effectively illustrated that point. Under the direction of Colonel 
Leventhorp a "large quantity of arms" were reported salvaged and Colonel 
Leventhorp reported that with good weather he could save the remaining 
cargo and possibly the vessel itself. The Wilmington Daily Journal confirmed 
that Colonel Leventhorp was successful in recovering virtually all of the 
cargo-144 The following advertisement announced the sale of material from 
the wreck: 
AUCTION SALE 
BY WILKES MORRIS, AUCTIONEER, 
CARGO SALE AT AUCTION BY THE 
PACKAGE. 
Per Steamship "Modern Greece" direct from London 
ON TUESDAY NEXT, 8th inst., at 11 o'clock, A. M., 
I will sell at No. 2, Granite Row, 
THE ENTIRE CARGO (900 TONS) OF STEAMSHIP 
MODERN GREECE 
Reserving such articles as may be required by the Government, 
This is one of the most valuable Cargos ever imported into the Southern Confederacy, and consists 
of 
CASES DRY GOODS; 
CASKS HARDWARE; 
CASES BOOTS AND SHOES; 
BALES BLANKETS; 
CASES READY-MADE CLOTHING; 
142 Prizes adjudicated from the commencement of the rebellion, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 1864, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., pp. 733-750. 
143 Prizes adjudicated from the commencement of the rebellion, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 1864, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., pp. 733-750 and "Purchased Vessels" 
inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. Navy Department, RG 45, Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
144 Wilmington Daily Journal, 28 June 1862, p. 2, col. 2. 
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CASES UNDER SHIRTS; 
BALES SHIRTS; 
CASES FELT HATS; 
BAGS PEPPER; 
BAGS PIMENTO; 
KEGS BI-CARB. SODA; 
KEGS SODA ASH; 
CASES MUSTARD; 
DRUGS AND MEDICINES; 
BLACK LEAD; 
GUNNY BAGS; 
SACKS SALT; 
QR. CASKS RED WINE; 
QR. CASKS WHITE WINE; 
HHDS. CHOICE SCOTCH WHISKEY; 
CASES SAUTERINE; 
CASES CLARET; 
CASES MARASCHINO; 
CASES RED SPARKLING BURGUNDY; 
With various other articles. 
Damaged portion of cargo will be sold first. 
Catalogues will be furnished as soon as quantity landed in order can be assertained. 145 
Additional material from the Modern Greece was listed in the following 
29 July advertisement: 
BY WILKES MORRIS, AUCTIONEER, 
CLOSING SALES OF WINES, LIQUOR, & c., 
Fx "MODERN GREECE" 
ON MONDAY, AUGUST 4th, I will sell at my office, No. 2 Granite Row, all the wines and 
Liquors saved from the steamship 'Modern Greece" viz: 
40 CASKS OLD SCOTCH WHISKEY 
20 CASKS PALE COGNAC BRANDY (very old) 
20 CASKS DARK COGNAC BRANDY (very old) 
30 CASKS PURE PORT WINE 
100 CASES SCOTCH WHISKEY 
100 CASES CHAMPAIGNE 
20 CASES COGNAC BRANDY 
5 CASES SPARKLING BURGUNDY 
5 CASES MARACHINO 
7 CASKS BALL AND LUMP BLACK LEAD 
8 CASES MAGNESIA 
5 CASKS EPSOM SALTS 
20 KEGS BI. CARB SODA 
400 LBS. CANISTER POWDER 
With sundry other articles from the wreck. 
146 
145 Wilmington Daily Journal, 1 July 1862, p. 2, col. 5. 
146Wilmington Daily Journal, 29 July 1862, p. 3, col. 3. 
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Wilkes also advertised the auction of the Modern Greece for the Port 
Warden. That auction was to take place on 30 July on the beach near Fort 
Fisher. A steamer was chartered to take prospective bidders to examine the 
wreck and attend the auction. Material for sale included the "hull, spars, 
rigging, anchors and chains" but was sold on an as is-where is basis. 147 
When the steamer Memphis was captured on 31 July 1862, the outbound 
cargo was almost entirely cotton. At auction in New York. it sold for a 
staggering $440,495.15.148 The Memphis was purchased from the Prize Court by 
the U. S. Navy for an additional $103,000.00.149 In the case of vessels outbound, 
a single cargo was as much as four times the value of the vessel. The steamers 
Princess Royal, captured on 29 January 1863, and the Bermuda, captured on 27 
April 1863, provided additional evidence that the vessel was a nominal 
expense of the blockade running enterprise. The cargo of the Princess Royal 
sold for $247,535.33 and the cargo of Bermuda sold for 327,015.40.150 The 
Princess Royal and Bermuda were both sold to the U. S. Navy for $112,000.00 
and $120,000.00 respectively. 151 
Although smaller, faster vessels were employed in blockade running 
after the fall of 1862, the fiscal relationship between vessel and cargo only 
changed when blockade running captains initiated the practice of throwing 
cargo overboard to lighten the ship and prevent its capture. The steamer 
Gertrude was captured by the USS Vanderbilt on 16 April 1863. Before being 
captured, the crew of the Gertrude was able to throw over a substancial portion 
of the cargo. In spite of the undetermined amount of lost cargo, material from 
the Gertrude sold for $43,987.60, only $1,012.40 less than the established value of 
the vessel. The steamer Calypso; captured by the USS Florida on 11 June 1863, 
1471bid. 
148 Prizes adjudicated from the commencement of the rebellion, Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 1864, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., pp. 733-750. 
149 "Purchased Vessels" inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. Navy Department, RG 45, 
Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
150 "The Steamer Bermuda & Cargo" report of the Clerk on balence in Registry after deducting 
costs, 4 April 1866, Philadelphia Prize Court Records, NA, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and 
Prizes adjudicated from the commencement of the rebellion, "Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, " 1864, pp. 733-750. 
151 "Purchased Vessels" inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. Navy Department, RG 45, 
Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
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was found to have thrown overboard an undetermined amount of cargo. 152 In 
spite of that, the remaining cargo sold at auction for $31,765.03 and the vessel 
sold to the Navy Department for $48,500.00.153 
During November 1863, a number of blockade runners were captured. 
They included the Margaret & Jessie captured on 5 November 1863 by the USS 
Nansemond and USAT Fulton; the Cornubia, captured on 8 November by the 
USS James Adger; and Robert E. Lee was captured the following day by that 
same vessel. The steel paddle steamer Banshee was captured on 21 November 
by the USS Grand Gulf and USAT Fulton. All of those blockade runners had 
thrown cargo overboard prior to capture. At auction the cargo of the Margaret 
& Jessie sold for $80,708.34 while the vessel sold to the Navy Department for 
$90,000.00. Cornubia sold to the Navy for $99,000.00 and the remaining cargo 
brought $103,765.23. Robert E. Lee was sold to the Navy Department of 
$73,000.00 and the cargo brought $49,331.11 while the Banshee and cargo 
brought a total of $111,216.65. The vessel brought $72,500.00 from the Navy 
Department and the cargo was sold for $38,716.65.154 
The trend for inbound vessels continued in 1864 and the outbound 
example set by the Memphis in 1862 was consistently repeated. The cotton from 
the Merrimac captured on 24 July 1863 was sold for $137,741.16 while the vessel 
brought only $65,000.00 from the Navy Department. The Tristram Shandy was 
captured on 15 May 1864 with a cargo of cotton that sold for $360,873.81. The 
vessel sold to the Navy for only $58,000.00. On 28 October 1864, the Lady 
Sterling was captured by the USS Calypso and Eolus. The vessel was purchased 
by the Navy Department from the New York Prize Court for $135,000.00 and the 
cargo of cotton and naval stores was auctioned for $374,354.64.155 
Investigation of the remains of Civil War blockade runners suggests that 
only a limited amount of cargo survives in association with the wrecks of 
blockade runners. However, previously untapped historical sources like the 
Prize Court proceedings provide a highly detailed, and sometimes personal, 
record of the nature and scope of material being shipped through the blockade. 
152 J. p, Bankhead to S. P. Lee, 11 June 1863, ORN, I, 9, pp. 73-74. 
153 "purchased Vessels" inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. Navy Department, RG 45, 
Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
154 Prizes adjudicated from the commencement of the rebellion, "Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy", 1864, pp. 733-750 and "Purchased Vessels" inventory of vessels purchased by the U. S. 
Navy Department, RG 45, Box 124, AY 1860-1870, NA. 
155 Ibid. 
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The example provided by this research suggests that additional examination of 
those records could shed important new light on the material carried by Anglo- 
Confederate blockade runners. 
Chapter VIII Conclusions 
Although local geographical, military and political considerations made 
each Confederate port unique, Wilmington, North Carolina provided an 
excellent opportunity for an archaeological and historical case study of Anglo- 
Confederate commerce. By the summer of 1863, the port of Wilmington 
became the most active center for blockade running in the Confederacy. 
Because of the nature and intensity of that activity, the historical and 
archaeological record associated with blockade running at Wilmington can be 
used as a model for defining the nature and scope of Anglo-Confederate 
commerce. 
Some of the most important considerations in defining the nature and 
scope of Confederate blockade running were the limitations and constraints 
under which the United States Navy attempted to establish and maintain the 
blockade. One of the most important considerations was the failure of United 
States foreign policy. In spite of pressure from the United States, Great Britain 
recognized the belligerent status of the Confederacy. Queen Victoria's 
Proclamation of Neutrality and relaxed enforcement of regulations on Anglo- 
Confederate trade became the cornerstone of blockade running. The 
unrelenting U. S. diplomatic campaign to cut off the Confederacy from British 
merchants and manufacturers was largely unsuccessful. The persistence and 
initiative of Minister Charles F. Adams and the intelligence network that was 
developed around the United States Consular Service in Great Britain was 
undoubtably responsible for the objectives that were achieved. Without their 
efforts Confederate agents would, no doubt, have had a virtually free reign to 
operate in Britain and Europe. 
When Lincoln declared a blockade of the Confederacy, the United States 
Navy was in a state of disarray. The number of vessels available for 
establishing a blockade was totally inadequate due to years of Congressional 
neglect and a primarily isolationist national defense policy that provided 
nominal support for the construction of coastal fortifications and little for the 
construction and maintenance of naval vessels. None of those available 
vessels were appropriate for the task of establishing and maintaining a blockade 
that would be effective against fast steamers. 
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The most important factor in the initial success of the U. S. Navy was the 
fact that the Confederacy placed an embargo on cotton and made no concerted 
effort to break the blockade. In fact, any early success of the Union blockade 
must be weighed in light of the Confederate policy on the exportation of cotton 
and, to a lesser degree, naval stores. The success of Confederate and state 
owned or operated blockade runners strongly suggests that had the Confederate 
Government initially, adopted a plan for controlling or conducting blockade 
running, their program of foreign finance and economic assistance might have 
been considerably more successful and the home -economy less subject to 
inflation. 
In addition, many of the veteran officers in the U. S. Navy tendered their 
resignations to offer their services to newly formed state and Confederate Navy 
organizations. That left the United States Navy with serious personnel 
problems and lingering questions about the loyalty of many of those who chose 
to remain in that service. Distrust created an atmosphere of suspicion that was 
not overcome for years. Thus, the Navy Department was forced to build its 
fighting potential around a small corps of loyal officers and seamen. A massive 
enlistment program was initiated to recruit from the civilian population and, 
where at all possible, from the merchant marine. Frequently the wartime 
experience of the new officers and crew was gained at considerable expense to 
the United States Navy. The USS Columbia, USS Petcrhoff and tugs Aster and 
Violet, four of the five, U. S. Navy vessels lost on the Wilmington Station, 
were under the command of inexperienced officers from the merchant marine. 
The massive purchasing program initiated to provide ships to establish 
and maintain the blockade was not without problems. Many of the merchant 
vessels purchased for the Navy were inadequate. Almost all required refitting 
to make them suitable for carrying ordnance and the purposes of war. In spite 
of what often involved extensive refits, many of the vessels procured by the 
Navy remained, like the USS Daylight, perpetual problems. Only a few were 
designed to resist the rigors of maintaining an extended station at sea. In 
addition to proving to be only marginally seaworthy, many suffered from 
equipment and machinery problems that kept them off station for repairs and 
on occasion seriously compromised the safety of the officers and crew. The 
logistics of maintaining steamers created perpetual problems at Wilmington 
and 'seriously undermined efforts to close that port. Communications of the 
officers and crew of the North Atlantic Blockade Squadron are filled with 
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complaints about the condition of their vessels and explanations for their being 
off station for coal or repairs when accounts of successful runs through the 
blockade reached Washington, D. C. 
At Wilmington the effectiveness of the blockade was also compromised 
by the priorities of the Lincoln administration. Charleston, South Carolina was 
both the origin and the symbolic epicenter of the rebellion. Eliminating 
Confederate commerce at Charleston was at times more of a political obsession 
than a military priority. Charleston became a symbol of the rebellion and as 
such received an inordinate amount Union attention. A great deal of the 
Navy's meager resources were allocated to the South Atlantic Blockade 
Squadron to "punish" Charleston for its role in secession. Because Charleston 
was a very high political priority, Wilmington received little initial attention 
and the blockade there was only significantly reinforced during the last year of 
the rebellion in spite of the fact that by 1863 it had become the Confederacy's 
most important link with Europe. 
Efforts to close the port of Wilmington were also undermined by the 
inability to make a decision concerning an amphibious assault and occupation 
of the Cape Fear. Union strategists maintained that the fall of Wilmington 
would seriously undermine the Confederacy's ability to procure war materials 
and could significantly shorten the war. Fortunately for the South, no decision 
was made until the fortifications defending the Cape Fear were highly 
developed and well armed.. Those defenses provided the critical protection 
blockade runners needed to reach Wilmington by New and Old Inlet. In spite 
of recommendations of the Blockade Strategy Board's to capture Wilmington 
in 1861, the decision was not made and carried out until the rebellion had 
almost collapsed. 
One of the most serious problems at Wilmington was the lack of an 
effective blockade strategy. At 
first that was dictated by the lack of resources 
available to close the two inlets to the Cape Fear. Initially, Union vessels 
maintained cordons just outside the range of Confederate artillery at New and 
Old Inlet. That created a very narrow window of opportunity to capture vessels 
attempting to run the blockade and proved to be only marginally effective. As 
additional steamers were assigned to the Cape Fear, an inner and outer cordon 
of vessels was established and the window of opportunity, although still 
limited, was expanded. However, it was not until fast steam vessels were 
available that the most effective strategy could be adopted. That strategy was to 
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maintain the two cordons in the proximity of each inlet and maintain fast 
cruisers offshore in the vicinity of preferred courses to Bermuda and Nassau. 
Those fast offshore vessels cruised along the projected tracks of ships that 
would clear Wilmington when environmental conditions were ideal and 
intercept them near daylight when success in a chase was more likely. 
Although speed remained the ultimate factor in a blockade runner's success, 
long chases increased the likelihood of more than one Union vessel becoming 
involved. That significantly reduced the chances of escape for even the fastest 
steamers. 
Ultimately, even the most effective Union strategy failed to close the 
port of Wilmington. Blockade runners arrived safely in Wilmington after 
running through both the vessels of the North Atlantic Squadron and the 
massive fleet assembled to attack Fort Fisher in December 1864. While the risks 
of the trade increased as the blockade was strengthened and a more effective 
strategy was developed, only the capture and occupation of the Cape Fear 
defenses closed Wilmington. 
Although the U. S. Navy found it impossible to close the Cape Fear, early 
Confederate economic and foreign policy almost eliminated commerce with 
Europe. A quasi-embargo on the exportation of cotton was the product of an 
unrealistic foreign policy. That policy was based on the assumption that 
withholding cotton from markets in Europe and Great Britain would motivate 
foreign powers to break the blockade and recognize the Confederacy. That 
policy virtually eliminated the 
South's commerce during the first year of the 
rebellion. Most of Wilmington's trade 
during that first year consisted of the 
exportation of naval stores. Those products were carried out of the Cape Fear 
in small coasting vessels that returned with cargoes of salt and produce. 
When Confederate demand for war materials exceeded the supply in 
1862, the cotton embargo was abandoned and the nature of blockade running 
changed dramatically. Initially, the pattern established by the Fingal was 
followed and war material was shipped from Great Britain and Europe in large, 
seaworthy, trans-oceanic steamers 
like the Bermuda, Gladiator and those of Z. 
C. Pearson and Company. The experience of Fraser, Trenholm and Company 
with the Bermuda, and Gladiator and 
that of Z. C. Pearson and Company with 
the Settin, Patras, Lodona, Peterhoff and 
Modern Greece prompted a change in 
the mechanics of blockade running. 
Fraser, Trenholm and Company devised a 
plan to use large steamers 
to transport goods to the neutral ports at Nassau, 
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Bermuda, Halifax and Havana. There the cargoes would be transferred to small 
fast steamers for the trip through the blockade at Charleston. By the fall of 1862, 
that pattern had been almost universally adopted by blockade runners. 
When yellow fever and the blockade began to disrupt trade between 
Nassau and Charleston during the fall of 1862, the focus of activity began to 
shift to Bermuda and Wilmington. By the summer of 1863 when Union forces 
occupied the coastal islands southwest of Charleston Harbor, that South 
Carolina port city had become the most important link in the South's foreign 
trading 'network. Because of the massive Union force blockade running 
became too risky at Charleston, many of the civilian operations also shifted the 
primary focus their operations to Wilmington and Bermuda. Until January 
1865, immediately prior to the collapse of the rebellion in April, Wilmington 
provided the most unrestricted opportunity for trade and communication with 
Europe and, more importantly, Great Britain. 
Without question, the most important element in the success of 
Confederate blockade running was the lack of British enthusiasm for strict 
enforcement of regulations on Anglo-Confederate trade associated with Queen 
Victoria's Proclamation of Neutrality and recognition of belligerent status of 
the Confederacy. As frustrating as Confederate ministers found the 
unwillingness of Britain to recognize the "nation status" of the Confederacy or 
intervene in the conflict, their relaxed attitude towards Anglo-Confederate 
trade was the key to both military procurement and civilian blockade running. 
Traditional economic and social ties between Great Britain and the 
American South were, if anything, strengthened during the rebellion. That 
was particularly true in cities like Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow where 
the exchange of cotton for manufactured goods and the construction of ships 
had a major impact on the economy. In those areas sentiment was frequently 
and openly in support of the South. 
The historical and archaeological evidence 
associated with the cargoes of blockade runners clearly indicates that British 
manufacturers, agents of the Crown, and merchants were willing to work 
within the system to supply Confederate military and civilian needs. 
Without 
that support, blockade running would have only existed on the most 
superficial scale. 
British and Confederate merchants and speculators were willing to take 
certain risks in dealing with the Confederate Government and trading with the 
South. While there was considerable Confederate sentiment in Great Britain, 
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the high profits generated by success in blockade running no doubt enticed 
many individuals and firms into associations with Confederate agents and 
their British representatives. Joint venture and other investment prospectus 
literature confirms that expectations for a high return on investments were 
anticipated. The financial scenarios projected by the Atlantic Trading Company 
and the high price of stock in organizations like the Steamship Pet Company 
confirm that the risks were considered acceptable even until the rebellion 
collapsed. In Great Britain, the prospects of high investment return even 
attracted members of Parliament like John Lindsay and Thomas Conolly and 
the mayors of cities like Liverpool and Hull. 
Without the indifference, if not the cooperation, of British agents and 
the active support of British merchants and manufacturers there would have 
been virtually no base of support for the trade that maintained the Confederacy. 
Had British neutrality been strictly enforced, ordnance manufacturers such as 
Whitworth and Armstrong would have been unable to supply the South with 
the rifled cannon and ammunition that contributed so significantly to the 
defense of Wilmington and protection of the salvage activities associated with 
beached blockade runners. Thousands of small arms and accoutrements such 
as the Enfield rifles shipped on Fingal, Bermuda and found on the Modern 
Greece would never have reached the Confederate soldier. 
As a consequence of the blockade running activity focused at 
Wilmington, the shallow Atlantic waters of the Cape Fear contain the remains 
of more than thirty steam powered blockade runners. Location, identification 
and investigation of eighteen of those wrecks has generated new data on 
blockade running and the vessels that supported the trade. Identification of the 
wrecks was accomplished using a combination of both historical and 
archaeological data. Most were identified on the basis of their location and 
comparison of the specifications for machinery and hull structure preserved at 
the site with those data preserved in the historical record. Research associated 
with the remains of those vessels has also identified avenues of additional 
archaeological and historical research. 
Although the initial investigation of one of the blockade runners can 
only be described as salvage, that project stimulated interest in the entire 
spectrum of blockade runners. Work on the Modern Greece generated little 
information about the nature of surviving vessel remains but, produced the 
most comprehensive collection of material to be recovered from a blockade 
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runner. Documentation of that important collection afforded the first insight 
into the specific nature of the material shipped through the blockade. The 
amount of material recovered from the Modern Greece suggested that other 
wrecks could contain extensive cargo inventories. 
Subsequent examination of additional wrecks indicates that may well 
not be the case. Of the remaining seventeen shipwrecks that have been 
examined, none have been found to contain the amount of cargo preserved on 
the Modern Greece. In fact, evidence from those sites suggests that the amount 
of cargo surviving in association with the hull remains could be marginal by 
comparison. Although severalýof the wrecks were found to be heavily covered 
by sand, the remains of the Ranger, Ella, Condor, Stormy Petrel, Lynx, Hebe, 
Wild Dayrell and Phantom were exposed enough to determine that only 
limited very amounts of cargo remain at the wreck site. 
The Modern Greece could be an exception rather than the rule 
concerning cargo. The spatial distribution of the wrecks suggests that where 
possible, the vessels were run aground under the protection of Confederate 
batteries. That permitted the wreck to be protected by artillery while army 
units, black laborers and the ship's officers and crew attempted to salvage the 
cargo. Both the archaeological and historical record confirm that Confederate 
salvage activity was highly successful. Historical and archaeological research 
associated with the Ranger, Ella, Condor, Stormy Petrel, Lynx, Hebe, Wild 
Dayrell and Phantom illustrate that effectiveness. Although little evidence of 
associated cargo was found on eight of the other identified blockade runners, it 
is possible that the heavily sanded sites and those yet to be located and 
identified could contain concentrations of material similar to that found on the 
Modern Greece. 
While the wrecks may not prove to be the most comprehensive source 
of cargo information, they do preserve valuable information concerning the 
hull and machinery. Examination of the eighteen wrecks in North Carolina 
and two additional sites in Bermuda suggests that the hulls had a characteristic 
sequence of breaking up. The structural remains of virtually every wreck was 
found to have very similar surviving hull characteristics. Forward of the 
watertight bulkhead at the forward end of the forward cargo hold the bow 
section remained virtually intact although each one was 
found to list heavily 
to starboard or port. 
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The forward cargo hold proved to be intact below the turn of the bilge 
and the sides of the hull and deck beams were scattered across and outside the 
hold. The engineering space, perhaps the most strongly constructed section of 
the hull, almost inevitably survived to a point above the turn of the bilge and 
contained the remains of the boilers and machinery. Because of their 
substantial construction, boilers were generally found in excellent condition 
unless an effort had been made to destroy them. Machinery, like the boilers, 
was of heavy construction and was found to survive in a generally excellent 
state of preservation. Exceptions were generally almost always related to 
historically documented efforts to destroy the vessel or subsequent salvage 
activity. 
Like the hull structure associated with the forward cargo hold, that 
associated with the aft cargo hold was inevitably found to have collapsed to the 
turn of the bilge. The sides of the hull and deck beams were scattered across 
and outside of the bottom of the hull. Aft of the aft hold the hulls were 
universally found to have broken at the location of the aft cargo hold bulkhead. 
The stern on most was well preserved and virtually intact below the fantail. In 
most cases the fantail itself was intact, but had broken away from the hull 
beneath it and lay close by on the sea bed. That pattern is surprisingly 
consistent throughout the vessels examined. 
Examination and documentation of the hull remains of blockade 
runners confirmed that iron and steel vessel construction was closely 
regulated. Materials employed in building the ships were highly standardized 
as uniformity was'the backbone of the industrial process. Patterns of framing 
and plating were a factor of 
both the industrial nature of construction material 
production and design criteria spelled out 
by the insurance industry. Scantling 
dimensions and configuration within the hull had to meet highly specific 
design criteria identified by the insurance underwriters. A comparison of the 
iron ship survey data for the steamer Modern Grcccc, Pctcrhoff, Scotia, Douro, 
Don and Hebe confirmed the strict adherence to those requirements. An 
examination of the contemporary documentation concerning the 
design and 
construction of iron and steel vessels confirmed the standardized nature of 
material and design criteria. 
Although this research suggests that much of the material and 
construction data for iron steamers such as those employed to run the blockade 
can be found in historical sources, data concerning the actual configuration of 
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each individual hull may only be preserved at the wreck site. Only a few plans 
for blockade runners are known to survive. Those consist of the Phantom, Ella 
and sister ship Annie, the Will of the Wisp and sistership Julia, the Hope, 
Stormy Petrel and sistership Mary Bowers, the Dare and sistership Fergus and 
the Emily. Additional information on hull configuration can be found in the 
builders models of the Dare, Colonel Lamb, Denbigh, Kelpie, Neptune, Iona I, 
Tubal Cain, Juno, Rothsay Castle, Mail, Alliance, Rosine and a few others. 
With those exceptions, information on the configuration of blockade runner 
hull forms can only come from reconstruction of; the structural remains of the 
vessels themselves. 
While those data comprise one of the most important attributes of a 
wreck site, the present condition of most hulls makes documentation and 
reconstruction a difficult, expensive and time-consuming task. In considering 
the condition of the wrecks examined by the author, the most effective 
approach to recovery and reconstruction of those data would appear to be to 
focus on recording and documentation on the bow and stern where lines are 
most complex and structural preservation the best. Additional documentation 
could consist of sections of the wreck taken at the watertight bulkheads and 
engine room. That level of recording should provide sufficient data to permit 
a reasonable reconstruction of the hull form. 
One of the most valuable assets of the wrecks of blockade runners is the 
steam machinery. Although patent data and contemporary engineering 
publications provide excellent documentation for the types of engines 
employed in blockade runners, machinery was often unique to the specific 
vessel. While the type of oscillating engines that were most commonly 
employed in the trade were all of a similar general configuration and function, 
each had its unique dimensions, configuration and associated assembly of air 
and water pumps, condensers and vibration dampers. Other types of 
machinery like the compound engines aboard the Modern Greece and 
Peterhoff and the horizontal direct acting engines of the Hebe, Dee and Vesta 
represent early configurations that merit additional highly specific 
documentation. Both of those machinery types had an impact on the 
evolution of steam technology in the nineteenth century. 
Like steam machinery, marine boilers were produced in a variety of 
designs. The remains of blockade runners also preserve an important and 
varied collection of marine boilers. While most boilers represent the return 
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fire tube box type with a square steam collector like those of the Bendigo, Wild 
Dayrell, Ranger, Nola and Mary Celestia, others proved to be more unique. 
The boilers of the Condor, for example, are perhaps the most unusual design 
and represent a "haystack" configuration developed by John Elder and 
employed in the Falcon, Flamingo, Condor and Ptarmigan. The boilers of the 
Hebe represent the box design without the steam collector and were constructed 
as a mirrored pair with a common flue. Those of the Stormy Petrel were 
designed as horizontal cylinders mounted in tandem and connected by a 
common flue. That type evolved into the high pressure "Scotch" boilers that 
became one of the most common designs of the late-nineteenth century. Many 
of the boilers of blockade runners like those of the Peterhoff and Stormy Petrel 
were fitted with superheaters to dry and increase the temperature of the steam. 
Blockade running would have also been impossible without the fast 
steam vessels available from Britain. Those vessels provided the technology 
required to circumvent the blockade. Had the British adopted a strict neutrality 
those vessels would not have been so readily available to support the trade. 
While the wrecks preserve an important record of evolving steam 
technology, historical and archaeological data confirms that vessel design 
characteristics most frequently employed in blockade running reflected 
previously developed innovations. Vessel hulls were designed to conform to 
models that had been developed over more than a half century of iron 
construction. The mechanics of constructing the hull and material employed 
in the framing and plating were highly regimented and tightly controlled by 
underwriters. Design characteristics were functions of both designer and 
customer preferences and theories of hydrodynamics such as the wave form 
theory associated with length, beam and depth ratios and speed. Many of the 
guiding principals of iron ship design and building had been developed by the 
Scottish scientist, engineer and shipbuilder Scott Russell during the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century. 1 
Fast, seaworthy and efficient hull forms had been a preoccupation with 
British ship designers and builders for more than two decades when the South 
attempted to secede from the Union. Successful competition among the public 
steamship lines that developed on the major rivers and to provide rapid 
reliable transportation between England, Scotland and Ireland or England and 
1Sidney Pollard and Paul Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry 1870-1914., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979, p. 15. 
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the Continent was based in large part on speed. British-built steamers were the 
fastest, most comfortable and reliable in the world. When those vessels built 
for the public transport services were nearly all purchased for blockade 
running, new blockade runners were built along the same general lines. Many 
of the technological innovations that had been a product of that competition 
were adopted to produce a successful blockade runner. 
Hull forms were produced with extreme length to beam and depth of 
hold ratios. Prior to the war in America steamers built for the public transport 
services had evolved with excessive length to beam ratios. That was in part a 
factor of the limitations of the machinery, particularly the length of the paddle 
wheel shaft, and the fact that hulls had to be designed to ensure that the paddle 
wheels would not end up in one of the troughs created by the wake. Side 
wheel steamers like the Dolphin, 1844; Scotia, 1847; Herald, 1853; Ruby, 1854; 
Hansa, 1858; Havelock, 1858; Iona, 1858 and Giraffe, 1860, ranged in length to 
beam ratio from the Scotia's 7 to 1 to the Iona's extreme 11.25 to 1. Ruby, 
Herald and Giraffe were all built with 10 to 1 length to beam ratios and the 
Dolphin, Hansa and Havelock had ratios of 8 to 1. Although purpose-built 
vessels varied considerably, their length to beam ratios reflected the traditions 
established by the construction of vessels for the public transport services. 
Vessel Year Length Beam Depth Ratio 
Built of Hold 
Dolphin 1844 170 21 10.5 8 to 1 
Scotia 1847 202 28.5 13.5 7 to 1 
Herald 1853 222 22 14.5 10 to 1 
Rudy 1854 177 17 8.3 lO to l 
Spunkie 1857 191 18 7.5 10.6 to 1 
Hansa 1858 177 22 8 to 1 
Havelock 1858 223 26 14 8.6 to 1 
Cornubia 1858 190 24 12.5 7.9 to 1 
Iona 1855 225 20 9 11.25 to 1 
Giraffe 1860 268 26 12 10.3 to 1 
Likewise, the ratio between length between perpendiculars and length of 
engineering space and tonnage and tonnage allocated 
for machinery illustrate 
that when speed was a prerequisite, the ratio was high. 
ti 
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A few hull configuration characteristics could represent modifications 
designed to adapt vessel designs for operations in the shallow inlets of the 
southeastern Atlantic coastal waters. Vessels like the Don, Venus, Ella, Hope 
and Stormy Petrel were constructed with almost no deadrise and no external 
keel. That lack of deadrise would contribute to reducing draft and a keelless 
hull configuration with a cut away forefoot would facilitate grounding and 
getting off with minimal damage. Hulls of some of the blockade runners like 
the Hope, Ella and Stormy Petrel were equipped with forecastle hoods or turtle 
backs that helped punch through the seas and shed water off the foredeck. The 
forecastle hood was developed for use on small steamers operating on the Irish 
Sea and were adopted by blockade runners operating in the Atlantic between 
Nassau, Bermuda, Halifax and Confederate ports. 
Blockade runners employed a wide variety of steam power plants. Early 
trans-oceanic steamers like the Bermuda, Princess Royal, Modern Greece and 
Peterhoff were fitted with advanced direct acting vertical cylinder compound 
engines that were first developed by Charles Randolph and John Elder in 1853. 
Compound engines were the most efficient and would later become the 
standard among oceanic steam cargo vessels. 2 Others like the American built 
Kate and Elizabeth and the Canadian built Arabian were fitted with walking 
beam engines similar to those designed by Robert L. Stevens in 1822. Although 
the walking beam engine was highly popular in America, it was not widely 
employed in Great Britain. The Douro, a British built cross channel steamer, 
was equipped with geared steeple engines and the Dudgeon twin screw vessels 
were equipped with twin horizontal cylinder direct acting engines for each 
shaft. The General Beaureguard (Havelock) and Antonica (Herald) were both 
fitted with side lever engines perfected by the Napiers of Glasgow in the 1850s. 
Side lever engines had been the most common power plant for side wheel 
steamers until the development of highly reliable oscillating engines. 
The arch typical side wheel blockade runner was powered by twin 
oscillating engines. The oscillating engine had been invented around 1785, but 
was not perfected for steamers until John Penn and Son of Greenwich and 
Maudslay & Field of London began to build that type of machinery during the 
1830s and 1840s. Most of the fast sidewheel steamers built for blockade running 
21bid. 
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were equipped with that configuration of steam machinery. Wrecks of the 
Condor, Wild Dayrell, Stormy Petrel, Ranger, Lynx, Fanny & Jenny and Venus 
all contain the remains of oscillating engines. 
Virtually all of the fast public service side wheel steamers purchased to 
run the blockade and those side wheel steamers purpose-built to run the 
blockade were equipped with paddle wheels fitted with feathering buckets. 
That design was patented as early as 1829 by Elijah Galloway and was developed 
to improve efficiency. 3 Although complicated, by the time of the American 
Civil War feathering floats were reliable, more efficient than wheels with 
radial floats and by 1858 John Elder was building them of iron with a concave 
surface. The remains of the Condor, one of John Elder's vessels, was equipped 
with feathering iron floats. 
Speed was one of the most important criteria for a blockade runner and 
paddle wheel vessels achieved the highest recorded speeds. While vessels that 
could make speeds of fourteen knots often proved to be successful, most 
purpose-built blockade runners were designed to achieve speeds of sixteen to 
eighteen knots on their trials. The fastest vessels were able to accomplish a 
remarkable speed of nineteen knots. 
However the vessels that attracted the most professional and public 
attention were not the ones that posted the fastest speeds. They were the twin 
screw steamers built by John and William Dudgeon of London. When, the 
Flora was launched in 1862, she was not the first twin screw vessel. In the 
United States, John Ericsson had built several successful twin screw vessels in 
the 1840s. In Great Britain, Richard Roberts had explored the concept of twin 
screw vessels in print in 1853 and the Dudgeons had constructed the machinery 
for a small twin screw tugboat in 1857. The idea of the twin screw was not 
novel, but functional systems were rare and Flora and several sister ships 
became the object of both experiment and debate. While the speed, compared 
to the fastest paddle steamers was not impressive, it was a surprise when 
compared with the horsepower and efficiency of the engines. Perhaps the most 
important issues illuminated by the trials of the Flora were the steering and 
maneuverability of twin screw vessels. 
Unparalleled maneuverability and 
3David K. Brown, Paddle Warships, Conway Press, 1993, p. 71 and Robert Gardiner, The 
Advent of Steam, Conway Press, 1993, p. 17. 
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reasonable speed, approximately 15 knots, made the Dudgeon twin screw 
vessels successful blockade runners. One significant advantage of the screw 
over the paddle wheel was the quiet operation of the screw. 
A variety of boiler types were employed in blockade runners. Because 
the insurance underwriters limited pressure to 25 pounds most were equipped 
with low pressure systems based on the return fire tube box design with a 
square steam dome. Boilers on the Wild Dayrell, Ranger, Ella, Nola and Mary 
Celestia were of that type. The Stormy Petrel was equipped with horizontal 
tubular "Scotch" boilers and the Condor was fitted with three vertical fire tube 
"haystack" boilers. Boilers on the Hebe were of the box design without a steam 
dome and fitted with a common flue. Only the boilers of the Stormy Petrel 
represented the state of the art in design and construction at the time of the 
American Civil War. 
Many of the vessels running the blockade were equipped with retractable 
smoke pipes. While not developed in response to the demands of blockade 
running, retractable smoke pipes were employed to reduce the visible profile of 
vessels. Smoke pipes could be raised at sea to improve draft and lowered when 
running through the Union blockade. On some vessels like the Aries, masts 
were designed and constructed to be lowered to reduce the vessel's visible 
profile. 
British neutrality and the availability of fast vessels was not in itself 
sufficient to ensure the success of blockade running. The geography of the Cape 
Fear also proved to be a critical factor. The Cape Fear River emptied into the 
Atlantic Ocean through two navigable inlets separated by Smith Island. Ready 
access to two inlets offered blockade runners an important option and greatly 
complicated Union efforts to eliminate Wilmington's commerce. To protect 
those entrances to the Cape Fear River, the Confederacy constructed a series of 
powerful fortifications. During the course of the war that protection proved to 
be one of the most critical elements in successfully trading through the 
blockade. The construction and arming of the fortifications at New and Old 
inlets forced vessels on the blockade to maintain stations and break off their 
pursuit of blockade runners at a respectable 
distance from each inlet. That 
protection provided blockade runners with a "pocket" of protection at the inlet 
where navigation was most critical. 
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As the war, progressed the Confederate system of fortifications was 
expanded to include smaller forts on Smith Island, Zeek's Island, west of Fort 
Caswell on Long Island and north of Fort Fisher on the beach as far away as 
Myrtle Grove Sound. The availability of highly accurate long range Whitworth 
field artillery permitted Confederates to greatly extend the range of their 
protection for steamers run ashore by Union vessels on the blockade. Almost 
every blockade runner chased ashore received sufficient protection from the 
forts, batteries or field artillery to permit salvage of some portion of the cargo. 
By 1863, the complex of fortifications and batteries were so well developed and 
armed that Union vessels were required to attempt to intercept blockade 
runners at considerable distance from the inlets. 
The increased number of vessels assigned to the Wilmington Station 
and employment of steamers brought a corresponding shift in the strategy of 
blockade running. Rather than running directly in through the blockade on a 
schedule that placed the blockade runner in the vicinity of the inlet and under 
the protection of Confederate artillery at daylight, vessels began to make 
landfall north of Fort Fisher or west of Fort Caswell at night and run along the 
beach. Once under the protection of Confederate artillery, blockade runners 
could anchor near the inlet until daylight and/or tides permitted a safe passage 
over the bar. 
The lack of success of large trans-oceanic steamers and the ability to 
trans-ship cargoes caused a dramatic change in the business in 1862. -Small fast 
steamers began to operate out of Nassau, Bermuda and occasionally Havana 
and Halifax. From those neutral ports they carried goods 
brought from Great 
Britain in sailing ships and large cargo steamers through the blockade. Initially 
most of those steamers were bought 
from companies that provided fast public 
transport and mail service in Great Britain. After that supply was exhausted, 
new vessels were built along their 
lines specifically to run the blockade. Those 
vessels provided the speed necessary to make 
blockade running successful. 
By 1862, the appearance of steamers running the blockade were being 
altered to make detection more difficult. Although most 
left Great Britain with 
a traditional paint scheme to avoid the suggestion that the vessel was to be 
employed in running the 
blockade, they received a coat of white or gray paint at 
Nassau or Bermuda. White or gray paint tended to blend with the surf at night 
and make the vessel 
difficult to detect. When white and gray blockade runners 
got in "under the land" they 
became almost impossible to identify. To make 
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identification more difficult some vessels were equipped with retractable 
smoke pipes and masts that were only marginal or could be lowered to the 
deck. Running along the shoreline also disguised the noise of the vessel with 
the sound of the surf. 
To increase the chances of not being observed, blockade runners 
scheduled their voyages to arrive off the Cape Fear on moonless nights. That 
made running along the shoreline and navigation of the inlets even more 
dangerous. To minimize that danger Confederates established a system of 
signal lights. After a blockade runner was identified by displaying lights on the 
inshore side of the vessel a series of range lights were lit on towers along the 
beach. Range lights were located to identify the channel across the bar for 
vessels running in and out of both New and Old Inlet. Light signals were also 
used to let the forts and batteries know that a vessel was attempting to run in so 
that covering fire could be provided if necessary. Communications between 
blockade runners and the garrisons of the coastal fortifications were greatly 
improved when Confederate Signal Corps officers were assigned to each vessel. 
The success of blockade runners ensured a supply of both war materials 
and civilian manufactured goods 
for the Confederacy. Although Bermuda 
Customs records provided a preliminary indication of the nature of material 
being shipped into the Confederacy, it was immediately apparent that those 
records had been designed to 
disguise material that might be in violation of 
British neutrality. Bermuda Customs officers employed such vague terms as 
"General Merchandize", "Manufactured Goods" and "Assorted Material" to 
ensure that the activities of Confederate agents and Anglo-Confederate 
merchants were not interrupted. 
When the cargo of the Modern Greece was salvaged during the 1960s, the 
artifact collection illuminated the real nature of a 
blockade runners cargo. That 
assemblage of more than ten thousand artifacts 
included ordnance, arms, 
weapons, war material and a cargo of tools, 
household utensils, hardware and 
spirits for the civilian market. Although salvage of the 
Modern Greece 
suggested that investigation of the remains of other 
blockade runners would 
produce collections of equally revealing material, 
that has not proven to be the 
case. 
In fact the remains of additional vessels that have been identified and 
examined suggest that the 
Modern Greece could be relatively unique. An 
examination of the historical records associated with 
blockade running 
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indicates that the Confederates were very adapt at salvaging the cargo of vessels 
run ashore. The geographical distribution of the remains of blockade runners 
suggests that running vessels aground under the protection of Confederate 
artillery was considered a viable option and the salvage value of the cargo 
could be sufficient to cover the loss of the vessel. 
While examination of the remains of eighteen of the steam powered 
blockade runners lost on the North Carolina coast supports the theory that 
extensive cargoes may well not exist in association with the remains of 
blockade runners, the corresponding historical research has identified a 
valuable and previously untapped source of information concerning those 
cargoes. That source is the United States Prize Court records preserved in 
regional repositories of the National Archives. Records, preserved at 
Waltham, Massachusetts; Bayonne, New Jersey; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Washington, D. C.; and Atlanta, Georgia contain a wealth of very specific 
information. 
Each vessel turned over to the Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
Washington or Key West Prize Court was surveyed and an inventory of the 
cargo recorded. Those records proved to be both comprehensive and extremely 
detailed. Material identified as "General Merchandize" or by other deliberately 
vague descriptions was specifically inventoried. Material in the Bermuda 
inventory was identified by type and sometimes by manufacturer. The cargo of 
the Banshee contained cases that were not only opened and the contents 
inventoried but, on more than one occasion the consignee was identified. 
Using a computer and the data preserved in those records, manifests from the 
Bermuda Archives and information preserved in the U. S. Consular dispatches 
from British ports, the plethora of shipping marks preserved in those records 
might be identified and cataloged. 
The evidence examined to date illustrates that there were three distinct 
patterns for the cargoes. Early in the rebellion the Confederate embargo on 
cotton served as an effective stumbling block. It eliminated foreign access to 
the South's most valuable export and curbed interest in putting expensive 
steam powered vessels at risk to trade through the blockade. Initially blockade 
running at Wilmington was carried out by small sailing vessels that carried in 
cargoes of salt and provisions and carried out cargoes of naval stores. The 
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example set by the Fingal and Bermuda demonstrated the effectiveness of 
steamers, the value of cargoes of war materials in the South and the profits to 
be realized from cotton run through the blockade. 
When the Confederacy discontinued the cotton embargo in 1862, British 
and Confederate merchants and ship owners were more than willing to risk 
their vessels in trading through the blockade. Until the passage of laws and 
regulations early in 1864, blockade running was for the most part unrestricted. 
With the exception of vessels owned and or operated by the Confederacy or 
individual states, vessels were owned and operated by civilian firms. Those 
vessels carried cargoes that consisted of both military and civilian goods. 
Military cargoes were shipped at exorbitant freight rates and civilian material 
was selected to command the highest prices. Huge profits were made in spite of 
the risks involved in the trade. 
Because the system crippled the government's efforts to obtain supplies 
and war materials and contributed to uncontrolled inflation, the Confederate 
Congress passed laws giving President Davis authority to control the South's 
foreign commerce. After the promulgation of regulations by Jefferson Davis, 
the nature of cargoes changed dramatically. Inventories of vessels captured 
after March 1864, contain only a limited amount of material considered to be 
contraband by the Confederate Government. In fact, the inventories suggest 
that cotton was so valuable that vessels could afford to run into the 
Confederacy with little more than the cargo consigned by the government and 
still make a massive profit on the cargo of cotton taken out on the return to 
Nassau or Bermuda. That hypothesis is supported by the value of the cotton 
carried out by vessels such as the steamers Memphis, Greyhound and Tristram 
Shandy. 
In the final analysis it appears that Anglo-Confederate blockade running 
is a rich and fertile area for additional research. The research associated with 
wrecks that have been identified and investigated demonstrates that additional 
archaeological and historical research could produce an even better 
understanding of the trade. Location, identification and investigation of the 
wrecks of the remaining twelve blockade runners known to have been lost on 
the coast of North Carolina would provide an opportunity to examine the 
entire spectrum of shipwrecks associated with the trade. 
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A more comprehensive program of site testing could generate more 
conclusive data concerning the machinery and hull forms that were employed. 
That research could also identify wrecks containing unsalvaged cargo. Testing 
could focus on a selection of wrecks representing early coastal steamers like the 
Kate or Elizabeth, trans-oceanic vessels like the Modern Greece, fast steamers 
built for the British public transport services like the Havelock, Herald or 
Scotia, and purpose-built blockade runners like the Hebe, Venus or Ranger. 
Testing could be designed to identify and assess any remaining cargo and collect 
sufficient data to accurately reconstruct the boilers, machinery and hull form. 
Reconstructions could be effectively developed using computer assisted design 
programs and hull forms could be generated using programs developed to 
support vessel design and assessment. 
One of the most productive areas of additional research appears to be the 
Prize Court records. Records examined in conjunction with this research 
revealed that they contain the most comprehensive known inventory of cargos 
associated with blockade runners. A thorough analysis of those data could 
produce an important picture of the material shipped through the blockade. In 
addition, a survey of shipper's marks documented in the Prize Court, Bermuda 
Customs, British Customs and U. S. Consular records could tic material to 
specific individuals, firms and Confederate or state agencies. Those data would 
be invaluable in the event that a largely unsalvaged cargo is discovered. 
The model of blockade running documented at Wilmington is no doubt 
unique. However, the efforts of the United 
States Navy to close that port and 
those of the blockade runners to circumvent the blockade to a great degree 
reflect the activities that occurred at other 
Confederate port cities where the 
associated historical record is not so comprehensive and the archaeological 
record has not been as thoroughly 
investigated. By combining additional 
evidence from both the 
historical and archaeological record, a more detailed 
picture of the clandestine trade that supported the 
Confederacy has been 
developed and several productive avenues of additional research have been 
identified. 
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